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INSTITVTIO THEOLOGICA
ANDOVER FVNDATA MDCCCVII.
Ps. CXIX
169.
JOH. XVII.
17.
ΑΚΡΟΓΩΝΙΑ
ΟΥ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ

THE WORKS

OF

THE REV. DANIEL WATERLAND, D.D.

FORMERLY

MASTER OF MAGDALENE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
CANON OF WINDSOR,
AND ARCHDEACON OF MIDDLESEX.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED A REVIEW

OF THE

AUTHOR'S LIFE AND WRITINGS,

BY

WILLIAM VAN MILDERT, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF.

THIRD EDITION, WITH COPIOUS INDEXES.

IN SIX VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

OXFORD:
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
M.DCCC.LVI.

21,376.

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Is there a God beside me? yea, there is no God; I know not any, Isa. xliv. 8.

I am God, and there is none like me; Isa. xlvi. 9. Before me there was no God formed, neither shall there be after me, Isa. xliii. 10.

The Word was God, John i. 1.

Thy throne, O God, Heb. i. 8.

Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 5.

Who, being in the form of God, Phil. ii. 6.

Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, Heb. i. 3.

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I am the first, and I am the last; and beside me there is no God, Isa. xliv. 6.	I am the first, and I am the last, Rev. i. 17.
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[c] Query V. p. 326.

[d] Script. Doctr. p. 438. first edition.

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Does the Doctor deny that every one of the Persons, singly, is God? No: Does he deny that God is one? No: How then are three one?

Does one and the same authority, exercised by all, make them one, nu-

[e] Clarke's Reply, p. 7.

merically or individually one and the same God? That is hard to conceive how three distinct Beings, according to the Doctor's scheme, can be individually one God, that is, three Persons one Person.

If therefore one God necessarily signifies but one Person, the consequence is irresistible; either that the Father is that one Person, and none else, which is downright *Sabellianism;* or that the three Persons are three Gods.

Thus the Doctor's scheme is liable to the same difficulties with the other.

There is indeed one easy way of coming off, and that is, by saying that the Son and Holy Spirit are neither of them God, in the Scripture-sense of the word. But this is cutting the knot, instead of untying it; and is in effect to say, they are not set forth as divine Persons in Scripture.

Does the communication of divine powers and attributes from Father to Son and Holy Spirit, make them one God, the divinity of the two latter being the Father's divinity? Yet the same difficulty recurs; for either the Son and Holy Ghost have distinct attributes, and a distinct divinity of their own, or they have not: if they have, they are (upon the Doctor's principle) distinct Gods from the Father, and as much as finite from infinite, creature from Creator; and then how are they one? If they have not, then, since they have no other divinity, but that individual divinity, and those attributes which are inseparable from the Father's essence, they can have no distinct essence from the Father's; and so (according to the Doctor) will be one and the same Person, that is, will be names only.

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[f] Reply, p. 81. [g] Ibid. p. 92. [h] Answer to Dr. Wells, p. 28.

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A REVIEW

A REVIEW

OF THE

AUTHOR'S LIFE AND WRITINGS.

SECTION I.

INTRODUCTORY.

FEW names, recorded in the annals of the Church of England, stand so high in the estimation of its most sound and intelligent members, as that of Dr. Waterland. During a period remarkable for literary and theological research, and fruitful in controversies upon subjects of primary importance, this distinguished writer acquired, by his labours in the cause of religious truth, an extensive and solid reputation. Nor did the reputation thus acquired die away with those controversies in which he bore so large a share. It has survived the occasions which gave them birth, and still preserves its lustre unimpaired. His writings continue to be referred to by divines of the highest character, and carry with them a weight of authority never attached but to names of acknowledged preeminence in the learned world.

Yet, notwithstanding this strong impression in their favour, it is remarkable, that during the period of more than eighty

years, elapsed since his decease, no entire collection of his writings has hitherto been made; and several of them have never been reprinted. The increasing avidity with which, of late years, they have been sought for, is a proof, however, that their intrinsic worth has obtained for them a more permanent character than usually belongs to polemical productions; and the scarcity of the far greater number of them has long been a subject of general regret. No apology, therefore, appears to be necessary for calling the attention of the public to the revival of productions, which can hardly but be acceptable to every theological student.

But, to enable the reader to peruse with greater interest and satisfaction a collection so copious, it is the design of this preliminary essay, not only to give some account of the author himself, but also to take a comprehensive view of his writings, both with reference to the subjects of which they treat, and to the occasions on which they were composed;—a design, which, in more efficient hands, might contribute to throw considerable light upon a very interesting period in our ecclesiastical annals.

With respect to the merely *personal* history of Dr. Waterland, the materials are fewer and more scanty than might be expected, considering how active a part he took in matters of general literature, as well as in theological discussions. His station and pursuits necessarily brought him into contact with the most distinguished of his contemporaries, academical and ecclesiastical; and his correspondence with them was probably extensive. Yet little more intelligence of this kind has been obtained, than that which was communicated to the public in the first edition of the Biographia Britannica. The article drawn up for that work is stated to have heen compiled from materials supplied by his brother Dr. Theodore Waterland. Of its general correctness, therefore, there can be little reason to doubt, although in some unimportant particulars it may be found not altogether unimpeachable. The notes subjoined to it contain also some interesting matters relative to the controversies in which he was engaged.

Mr. Seed, in a Funeral Sermon on Dr. Waterland, has left a well-merited and well-executed eulogium on his character and writings; but has inserted few circumstances of his history.

To the Sermons and Tracts of Dr. Waterland published soon after his death by Mr. Joseph Clarke, Fellow of Magdalene college, was prefixed, by the Editor, a preface, containing very just commendations of him, but no additional memoirs of his life; its design being chiefly to give a summary illustration of the two short Treatises annexed to the Sermons.

These are the chief *printed* documents, of good authority, from which any authentic memoirs of our author may be collected. Casual notices may be also gleaned from the biographical accounts of some of his contemporaries; such as Whiston's Life of Dr. Clarke, the Life of John Jackson, and Dr. Disney's Memoirs of Dr. Sykes; together with a few scattered passages in Mr. Nicholls's Literary History of the 18th Century, in his Life of Bowyer, in the Gentleman's Magazine, in Mr. Masters's History of Corpus Christi college, Cambridge, and in his Memoirs of Mr. Baker[a].

A work was, indeed, published in the year 1736, (four years *before* the death of Waterland,) entitled, "Memoirs of the "life and writings of Dr. Waterland, being a summary view of "the Trinitarian controversy for twenty years, between the "Doctor and a Clergyman in the Country, &c. By a Clergyman." But this is nothing more than a tissue of the coarsest railing and invective against Dr. Waterland's writings, containing not one single article of biographical information. It was well known to be the work of the above-mentioned Mr. Jackson, one of his most frequent and most virulent opponents; who was himself the "Clergyman in the Country," so designated in the title-page. In substance it is merely an angry vindication of one of his own tracts in that controversy, written in consequence of some strong animadversions upon it by an able advocate of Waterland.

[a] The article in Mr. Chalmers's Biographical Dictionary is professedly taken from that in the Biographia Britannica, and from Mr. Seed's Funeral Sermon.

What further information has been obtained respecting our author is derived chiefly from the following sources.

Among Mr. Cole's very curious manuscript collections for the *Athenæ Cantabrigienses,* deposited in the British Museum, have been found some few original letters by Dr. Waterland, addressed to Dr. Zachary Grey and others, with occasional observations subjoined to them by Mr. Cole; which throw some light upon his history. Most of these letters will be found inserted in this collection.

A somewhat larger portion of his correspondence has been obligingly communicated by Mr. Loveday, Fellow of Magdalene college, Oxford; in whose family the originals still remain. It consists of sixteen letters addressed to John Loveday, Esq. formerly of Magdalene college, Oxford, from the year 1735 to the year 1740, containing many incidental observations upon the theological controversies and literary transactions of that period. These also will be found, almost entire, in the present edition.

Respecting Dr. Waterland's academical life several interesting particulars have been communicated by Professor Monk, of Trinity college, Cambridge, now Dean of Peterborough; who, in the course of his investigation of documents for a life of Dr. Bentley, occasionally met with some in which Waterland was, more or less, concerned. These will be interwoven in the present narrative.

From the records of his own college it was hoped that some valuable information might be obtained; and no pains were spared by the present Master, the Hon. George Neville, in searching them for that purpose. But, excepting some few dates extracted either from the Master's private book, chiefly in Waterland's hand-writing, or from the college books; and a letter from Archbishop Dawes, which will be found in these memoirs, scarcely any circumstances relating to him have been there discovered. Mr. Neville took also the trouble to examine several books belonging to the Master's library, in which it was thought probable that Dr. Waterland might have inserted notes, or marginal observations. Of these, however, but few occurred.

Farther inquiries were made also in the University of

Cambridge, by the present Bishops of Peterborough and Bristol; but few additional materials have been met with, except some letters and papers in the library of Sidney college, relating to transactions between the University and the Company of Stationers; for the ready communication of which the Editor is obliged to the Master, Dr. Chafy, and to Mr. Todd, the Archbishop of Canterbury's librarian, by whom they were casually discovered in searching for other documents. They do not, however, appear to be of sufficient importance to meet the public eye.

To several other individuals of distinction in the Church, as well as in the Universities, similar acknowledgments are due; particularly to the Bishop of Worcester, who searched the library at Hartlebury for information which might connect Waterland's history with that of Warburton; to the Bishop of Chester, whose father, late Bishop of Carlisle, was well acquainted with Waterland; and to Dr. Goodall, Provost of Eton, who examined the collegiate library at Windsor, (though without success,) for some memorials of our Author. To Mr. Archdeacon Pott, the Editor is specially indebted for the original manuscript of the Commemoration Sermon at Cambridge by Waterland, now first published; and for several manuscript notes in Waterland's hand-writing, on two of his Charges and his tract on Regeneration. At Twickenham and at York search was also made, by Archdeacons Cambridge and Wrangham; but no documents were found.

In the University of Oxford, acquisitions of some value unexpectedly occurred. In the libraries of Christ Church and St. John's College are deposited manuscript copies of the letters on Lay-Baptism, added to this collection, besides very copious notes on Wheatly's Illustration of the Common-Prayer. Among Dr. Rawlinson's manuscripts in the Bodleian library was also found a large collection of letters from Dr. Waterland to Mr. John Lewis, vicar of Mergate, Kent, concerning the lives of Wickliffe and Pecocke, and Lewis's History of English Translations of the Bible; together with a great variety of marginal observations on other works.

No endeavours, therefore, have been omitted, to obtain access to every probable source of intelligence, public or private; nor in any instance has the disposition been wanting, to afford such information to the fullest extent: and although the acquisitions have not been very abundant, yet are they not wholly unimportant.

The most valuable illustrations, however, of our author's character and conduct, must be sought in his own writings, and in those of his friends and his opponents, who took part in the discussions to which his labours were directed. These will afford the most indubitable evidence of his principles and sentiments, of the extent of his attainments, of his temper and disposition, of his habits and pursuits.

SECTION II.

DR. WATERLAND'S BIRTH, EDUCATION, AND ACADEMICAL LIFE.

DR. DANIEL WATERLAND was born at Walesby in the Lindsey division of Lincolnshire, on the 14th of February 1683, being second son, by a second wife, of the Reverend Henry Waterland, rector of that parish, and also of Flixborough, not far distant from it[a].

In his earliest years, he appears to have discovered hopeful talents. He was taught to read by his father's curate, Mr. Sykes, at Flixborough; and is said to have read surprisingly well, when only four years of age. After this, he was instructed by his father in the first rudiments of grammar; and was then sent to the free school at Lincoln, at that time in great repute. Under the two successive masters of that school, Mr. Samuel Garmstone and Mr. Anthony Read, he made great proficiency, and was highly esteemed for his uncommon diligence and talents. Besides the ordinary exercises required of him, he frequently performed others, at the request of his preceptors, with such success, that they were "handed abroad for the honour "of the school."

With the learning thus acquired, he was admitted at Magdalene college, Cambridge, March 30th, 1699, having then but

[a] By the following extracts from the register of Magd. Coll. Cambridge it appears, that this Mr. Henry Waterland was also a scholar of that college, on Wray's foundation, son of a Lincolnshire Clergyman, and educated at Kirton in that county. "June 28, "1656. Henricus Waterland filius "Johannis Waterland, Presb. de "Braughton in com. Lincoln. annum "agens 16. e schola publica Kerto-"nensi admissus est pensionarius. "Tutore Magistro Hill."—"June "1657. Ego Henricus Waterland "electus et admissus fui in discipu-"lum hujus collegii pro domino "Christophero Wray."

recently completed his 16th year[b]. Mr. Samuel Barker was his tutor, of whom nothing more is recorded by Waterland's biographer, than that he was "a very worthy gentleman[c]." Here Waterland obtained a scholarship, December 24, 1702[d]; proceeded to the degree of A. B. in the Lent term following; and was elected Fellow of the college, February 15, 1703-4. He then took pupils, and became, it is observed, "a great "support to the Society." From this period he was alternately Tutor or Dean, and resided constantly in term time; and the number of admissions is stated to have increased very much about this date. In 1706, he commenced A. M. and, on the death of Dr. Gabriel Quadring, Master of the college, in February, 1713, the Earl of Suffolk and Bindon, by virtue of his hereditary right, conferred the Mastership upon him[e], and presented him also to the rectory of Ellingham in Norfolk. He continued, however, to hold the office of Tutor several years after this promotion, devoting his attention to the work of tuition, and giving up almost the whole revenue of his living, which was but small, to his curate. His tract entitled, "Advice "to a Student," written while he was engaged in that service, though not published till many years afterwards, is a proof how diligently he applied himself to this laborious duty. It is evident, however, that even at this period he must have been scarcely less indefatigable in the studies belonging to his sacred profession; and that he was then laying the groundwork of that splendid reputation which classed him among the most distinguished Theologians of his time.

[b] "Daniel Waterland filius Hen-"rici Waterland Presb. de Wailsbey "in com. Lincoln. annos natus cir-"citer 16, e Schola publica Lincoln. "admissus est sizator, tutore Mag^{r}. "Barker."—*Magd. Coll. Reg.*

[c] "Samuel Barker filius Johannis "Barker defuncti civis West^{n}. e "schola Etonensi. admissus sizator, "tutore Mro. Millington, Aug. 11mo. "1675." Elected scholar of Magd. Coll. 1678, fellow on Dennis's foundation, 1682, a foundation fellow, 1689, steward of the College from 1691 to 1697, and bursar 1699 and 1700. *Magd. Coll. Reg.*

[d] "Ego Daniel Waterland electus "et admissus fui discipulus hujus "collegii pro domino Christophoro "Wray, Decemb. 24, 1702, Gabr. "Quadring, Coll. Præfect."

[e] The Mastership of this College is in the gift of the possessor of the estate at Audley End, Essex, who is also Visitor of the college. The estate has now descended to Lord Braybrooke, by whom the present Master, the Hon. George Neville, was appointed.

Judging from the fruits of these studies, it will easily be supposed that but little of his time was spared for recreation and self-indulgence. Few have laid in such ample stores of knowledge, who have not borrowed largely from the accustomed hours of rest; and it is told of him, that the lights in his study frequently bore witness to his habits in this respect[f]. His biographers also have intimated, that his health was much impaired, and probably his life shortened, by too intense application to his studies.

With such talents and energies of mind, he could hardly fail of becoming an useful and distinguished member of the academical body. In October 1710, we find him appointed an Examiner of the students proceeding to the degree of Bachelor in Arts; and, in the following year, a Moderator in the Philosophical Schools. Not long afterwards, the privileges and jurisdiction of the University having been called in question, and certain litigations, in consequence, arisen, he was appointed one of a Syndicate, to ascertain their rights; and to institute such proceedings as might be necessary to maintain them. About the same period, he appears to have been a member of several other Syndicates for different purposes; a proof, that while he was yet a junior member of the Senate, he was regarded as a man of business, qualified to take a leading part in its transactions. In November 1712, he was selected to preach the Commemoration Sermon at St. Mary's, now first printed among his occasional Sermons; and in July 1713, the Assize Sermon before the University, which stands first of the posthumous Sermons, published by Mr. Joseph Clarke. These are indications of his growing reputation in the University.

Waterland's appointment to the Mastership of his college took place before he had graduated in Divinity. He did not, however, apply (as is usual with Heads of Houses in that University) for a degree by *mandamus*; but proceeded in the following year to the degree of B.D. by performing the accustomed exercises[g]. Whether this was done to avoid the

[f] The late Dean of Christ Church, Dr. Cyril Jackson, used to relate, that his father, who was an under-graduate at Magdalene college, whilst Waterland was Master, had often mentioned this circumstance.

[g] He took the degree, June 11, 1714, being the statutable day in that

heavy expenses of a *mandamus*, or whether he deemed it more creditable to go through the ordinary process of keeping a public act, we are not told. But certain it is, that he acquitted himself on that occasion with uncommon credit. Mr. Seed thus relates the circumstance.—"In the year 1714, at the Commencement, "he kept a Divinity Act for his Bachelor of Divinity's degree. "His first question was, *Whether Arian Subscription was lawful;* "a question worthy of him, who had the integrity to abhor, "with a generous scorn, all prevarication; and the capacity "to see through and detect those evasive arts, by which some "would palliate their disingenuity. When Dr. James, the Pro-"fessor, had endeavoured to answer his *Thesis*, and em-"barrass the question, with the dexterity of a person long "practised in all the arts of a subtle disputant; he immedi-"ately replied, in an extempore discourse of above half an hour "long, with such an easy flow of proper and significant words, "and such an undisturbed presence of mind, as if he had been "reading, what he has since printed, *The case of Arian Sub-"scription considered*, and the *Supplement to it*. He unravelled "the Professor's fallacies, reinforced his own reasonings, and "shewed himself so perfect a master of the language, the subject, "and himself; that all agreed, no one ever appeared to greater "advantage. There were several members of the University of "Oxford there, who remember the great applauses he received, "and the uncommon satisfaction which he gave. He was happy "in a first opponent, one of the greatest ornaments of the "Church, and finest writers of the age, who gave full play to "his abilities, and called forth all that strength of reason, of "which he was master." This opponent was Dr. Thomas Sherlock, afterwards Bishop of London. It has been observed, that probably the account of this performance having reached Dr. Clarke's ears, gave occasion to his omitting in the *second* edition of his Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, the passage in

degree: but it is mentioned in his Grace, that he had not kept his Act; that exercise being postponed till the ensuing Commencement-day, when it was to form part of the usual solemnities, the Commencement in that year being a public one. It was therefore not till the beginning of the following month that this celebrated disputation took place.

his first edition, respecting Subscription to the Articles, which had given offence.

In January 1714–15, Dr. Sherlock being then Vice-Chancellor, the thanks of the Senate were unanimously voted to Dr. Bentley, for his Reply to Collins's Discourse on Free-thinking. The following Grace for this purpose appears to have been drawn up by Waterland, and was presented by him, with two other distinguished friends of Bentley, Roger Cotes, and Mr. Bull of Queen's college:—"Whereas the Rev. Dr. Bentley, Master of "Trinity college, besides his other labours, published from our "press, to the great advancement of learning, and honour of our "University, has lately, under the borrowed name of *Philelu-* "*therus Lipsiensis*, done eminent service to the Christian "Religion and the Clergy of England, by refuting the objections "and exposing the ignorance of an impious set of writers that "call themselves Freethinkers, May it please you, That the said "Dr. Bentley, for his good service already done, have the public "thanks of this University; and be desired by Mr. Vice-Chan- "cellor, in the name of the whole body, to finish what remains "of so useful a work."

Mr. Waterland was elected Vice-Chancellor, according to the usual rotation, on Nov. 14, 1715, and during the whole time he was in that office, he proceeded to no higher degree than that of Bachelor in Divinity. He was now called upon, however, to take the lead in several important concerns, affecting the interests of the University.

Bishop Moore's valuable library had been recently presented to the University by His Majesty, King George the First. To convey this munificent gift of royal bounty to its place of destination, and to provide a fit place for its reception, were among the first cares that devolved upon the new Vice-Chancellor; who is stated to have exerted himself, during his continuance in office, in making various arrangements for their proper and convenient disposal; and although these were not actually completed till some time after, all the preliminary steps were taken during his administration [h].

[h] The extent of Bishop Moore's library is stated to have been above 30,000 volumes, and the price paid for it 6000 guineas. It occupies two

A matter of a very different kind engaged also his almost immediate attention. The College of Physicians in London had assumed a power to prohibit the University graduates in Medi-

of the four rooms, of which the public library at Cambridge consists. It was given to the University during Dr. Sherlock's Vice-Chancellorship; and the University returned their thanks in an eloquent Address to the King, probably composed by Sherlock; of which the annexed copy is extracted from the London Gazette, 1st October, 1715:

"*St. James's, September* 29. The "following Address was presented to "his Majesty by the Rev. Dr. Sher-"lock, Vice-Chancellor of the Uni-"versity of Cambridge, accompanied "by several Masters of Colleges, with "divers other members of that Uni-"versity, introduced by the Right "Honourable the Lord Viscount "Townshend, one of his Majesty's "principal Secretaries of State, in the "absence of his Grace the Duke of "Somerset, Chancellor of the said "University.

"'To the King's most Excellent "Majesty,

"The humble Address of thanks "from the Chancellor, Masters, "and Scholars of the University "of Cambridge.

"Most Gracious Sovereign,

"We beg leave to approach your "Majesty with our most humble "thanks for the gracious mark of "Royal favour which your Majesty "has bestowed on your ancient Uni-"versity of Cambridge.

"There never was an occasion "when we were either more desirous "to express our sentiments of grati-"tude, or less able to do it to our "own satisfaction. The Genius of "learning which has for many ages "so happily presided in this place, "cannot furnish us with language to "utter what we feel. There is nothing "to which even the wishes of your "University extend that is not fully "contained in the happiness she now "enjoys of calling your Majesty her "King and her Patron: one is the "common blessing of every Briton, "the other the peculiar privilege of "the sons of learning.

"The noble collection of books and "manuscripts gathered in many years "by the great industry and accurate "judgment of the late Bishop of Ely, "though in itself exceeding valuable, "is upon no account so welcome to "your University, as that it is a testi-"mony of your Royal favour: the "memory of which will be constantly "preserved by this ample benefaction, "worthy to bear the title of the "Donor, and to be for ever styled "The Royal Library.

"Liberty and learning are so "united in their fortunes, that your "Majesty's known character of being "the great Protector of the liberty of "Europe led us to expect what our "experience has now confirmed, that "you would soon appear the patron "and encourager of learning. Such "Royal qualities must necessarily "produce the proper returns of duty "and affection: your University will "endeavour, as she is bound to do by "the strongest ties of interest and "gratitude, to promote the happiness "of your government. And it is with "the greatest pleasure she observes, "that some there are whose youth "was formed under her care, of whose "abilities and fidelity your Majesty "has had the fullest experience.

"Your Royal progenitors, the "Kings and Queens of England, "moved by their regard to virtue and "learning, have conferred many large "privileges and donations on this "place; those who shine with the "greatest lustre in story, appear the "foremost in the list of our patrons "and benefactors; and as your Ma-"jesty's name will be an ornament to "the annals of Britain, so shall it "stand through ages to come a per-"petual honour to the records of this "University.

"It shall be our incessant prayer to "God for your Majesty, that he would "long preserve you to reign over us "in peace and tranquillity, that he "would extend your empire over the

cine from practising in the metropolis, or within seven miles of it, without first obtaining a license from that collegiate body. This assumption of privilege the Doctors of Medicine in Cambridge strenuously resisted; and a Grace was obtained from the Senate, on the 29th of November in this year, to assist them, by a pecuniary grant of fifty pounds from the University, in maintaining their rights against this supposed aggression. The University of Oxford took a part in this contest, which equally affected their own interests, and contributed a similar sum towards carrying on the suit. Several other concerns, of considerable local interest, seem to have rendered the time of Waterland's Vice-Chancellorship a year of active service. But towards the latter part of it still weightier matters;—matters, at least, of more general concern, and of more than ordinary difficulty;—called forth his exertions.

Political animosity was now at its height, and raged with considerable fury throughout the University. The enmity between Whigs and Tories was no where more vehement; and it required great discretion, good-temper, and self-possession, to enable a person, holding so high and responsible a station in the academical body, to escape obloquy, and to carry himself firmly, yet temperately, betwixt the contending parties. Waterland appears in this respect to have been eminently successful. He was a steadfast supporter of the Hanoverian succession; which was by no means the prevailing sentiment at that time in Cambridge; the Tories having been, on several occasions, the strongest party. On the night of King George's birthday in 1715, considerable disturbances had been made by the young men; and the preceding Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Sherlock, (whose politics, as well as those of

" hearts of your subjects, a dominion " for which he then designed you, " when he adorned you with so much " goodness and clemency.'

" To which his Majesty was " pleased to make the follow- " ing most gracious answer.

" ' It is great satisfaction to me " that this first mark of my favour " has been so welcome and agreeable " to you. The dutiful and grateful " manner in which you have expressed " your thanks upon this occasion, will " oblige me to take all opportunities " of giving farther proofs of my affec- " tion to my University of Cambridge, " being very sensible how much the " encouragement of learning will " always tend to the security and " honour of our Constitution, both in " Church and State.' "

some other Heads of Houses, were somewhat suspected to be of the same cast,) was accused of conniving at their excesses. Waterland took measures to allay these animosities; and was aided in his endeavours by powerful coadjutors. On the day after his election, Nov. 5, 1715, Dr. Bentley preached his celebrated Sermon against Popery, at St. Mary's. Another Sermon against Popery, preached before the University, on Jan. 25, 1715-16, by Peter Needham, the editor of Theophrastus, was printed by desire of Waterland, the Vice-Chancellor. In April 1716, an Address of Congratulation to the King, on the suppression of the rebellion, was proposed in the Caput, and through the influence of the Jacobites, (two especially, Mr. Tyson and Mr. King, both of Pembroke Hall,) it was stopped in the Caput. Bentley is supposed to have framed the Address; and he presented the Grace for its admission. Here the matter rested during the long vacation. But at the beginning of the next term, it met with better success. Bentley, with two of his personal friends, having been brought into the Caput, he proposed the Grace a second time; when it passed without opposition; and being offered in the Senate, it passed also in the Non-Regent House by a majority of 36 to 15, and in the Regent by 34 to 14[i]. Dr.

[1] No Copy of this Address is preserved in the University Register. The following is extracted from the London Gazette, October 23, 1716, deposited in the British Museum.

"*Hampton Court, October* 22. This "day the following Address to his "Majesty was presented to His Royal "Highness the Prince of Wales, by "the Vice-Chancellor of the Uni-"versity of Cambridge, attended by "several of the Heads of Houses "and Members of the said Uni-"versity, introduced by the Right "Honourable the Lord Viscount "Townshend, one of his Majesty's "Principal Secretaries of State.

"'The Humble Address of the "Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars "of the University of Cambridge.

"Most Gracious Sovereign,

"As we once had the peculiar "honour to attend your Majesty with "our thanks for a most eminent "instance of your Royal favour and "beneficence; so we had been among "the earliest messengers of the com-"mon joy and congratulation for "your victory over rebels, had not "our intention been frustrated by an "unforeseen and unexampled impedi-"ment, which being removed, we take "the first opportunity to shew to "your Majesty and the world, that "it was not the want of our duty "or affection but our misfortune and "calamity.

"This we hope will excuse and "justify our impatience, that we wait "not for your Majesty's return to "Great Britain, but hasten to address "you, even while absent. And indeed "we can scarce esteem it absence, "while you only cross your own seas "to visit your own hereditary coun-"tries; while we see the influence of

Bentley alludes to this occurrence, in a Letter to Dr. Samuel Clarke[k], published in Dr. Burney's Collection of his Letters, p. 258; where he says, "The fury of the whole disaffected "and Jacobite party here against me and Mr. Waterland, is "unexpressible: one would think that the late Address had "given them a mortal blow, by the desperate rage they are in. "I suppose you have seen a virulent lying paper printed "at London about the Address, wherein Mr. Waterland and "I are described as objects of their universal hatred. Nothing "now will satisfy them, but I must be put by the Professor's

"your mind and counsels pervade and "animate all your dominions at once; "while you still seem to reside among "us, in that lively image of your "person and virtues, as well as of "your Sovereign power, His Royal "Highness, your Son.

"'Tis with diffidence that we now "mention to you a Rebellion so "speedily suppressed, subdued, and "extinguished, and which your "princely magnanimity and clemency "seems already to have forgot. But "our own concernments, our late "fears, and present joys oblige us to "remark, that as no rebellion, in all "our annals, appeared in its designs "and consequences more terrible and "destructive, so none ever went off "and vanished in shorter time, with "less detriment, and more propitious "event; serving only to display your "Majesty's superior wisdom and "fortitude, the weakness and rash-"ness of your infatuated enemies, "the firmness of your Ministry, and "the faithfulness of your people. For "even the few wicked actors, and just "sufferers in it, that were not pro-"fessed Papists, have done the justice "to the Church established, to declare "they first deserted her communion, "before they could imbibe the prin-"ciples of treason and rebellion.

"In an age of such distraction, "such unaccountable folly as may "seem rather imputable to the anger "of Heaven than to the passions and "interests of men, your University "dare not answer for every individual. "But in the whole, we crave leave to "assure your Majesty of our heartiest "endeavours, both by precept and "example, to instill into our youth "the warmest sentiments of loyalty "and allegiance, of veneration and "gratitude to your Royal Person and "Family; to inculcate to them, that "whatever is dear to the good, or "valuable to the wise, our religion and "literature, our possessions and li-"berties, do principally subsist (under "God) upon the present happy Esta-"blishment.

"May the same good Providence "that has hitherto protected and "guarded you, and has bound up the "fate of the whole Reformation with "the fortune of your illustrious House, "bring your Majesty back to us in "peace and safety, with increase of "your health, and new acquests to "your glory; and (if we may aspire "to so high a wish) accompanied with "your beloved Grandson, that third "security and pledge of Great Britain's "felicity.'

"To which Address His Royal "Highness was pleased to return the "following Answer:

"'I will transmit this affectionate "address to the King, my father; "who, I am sure, will be very well "pleased with this instance of your "duty and loyalty; and it is with "great satisfaction I lay hold of this "opportunity of assuring you, that I "shall upon all occasions countenance "and encourage the University."'

[k] The Letter, by some mistake, bears date, in Dr. Burney's Collection, Nov. 1719: it ought to be 1716.

"Chair; and the Church is in great danger from my New "Testament."

Waterland's moderation and good temper appear, however, to have protected him in this affair, against much of that obloquy and ill-will which were so strongly shewn towards Bentley. And, probably, it was in consequence of his conduct on this occasion, that he was, in the following year, 1717, appointed to be one of the Chaplains in ordinary to the King. Bentley, in his above-mentioned letter to Dr. Clarke, had intimated how necessary it was at that juncture, that the court and government should give their public sanction and countenance to those who had strenuously laboured in the University to uphold the interests of the House of Brunswick, and to defeat the unremitting efforts of the opposite party. He represented, with his usual tone of confidence, the almost certain effect which would be produced, if those who had the patronage of the Crown at their disposal would openly shew their approbation of the adherents to the existing monarchy, by bestowing some portion of it upon such men as Waterland and himself. This he urged, regardless of being sneered at as a self-interested adviser, and apparently with a consciousness of the rectitude of sentiment which dictated the advice.

It is not, perhaps, ascribing too much to the weight of such advice, from such a man, if we suppose that it gave occasion to the conferring of this mark of royal favour upon Waterland. But notwithstanding the political considerations which might have an influence in this appointment, it seems hardly probable that he would have been selected in preference to others of the same principles with himself, had not his reputation as a scholar, a divine, and a leading member of the University, given him still stronger claims. Middleton's unworthy insinuations on this occasion scarcely deserve attention. They betray the fretful spirit of a jealous and implacable rival, who found in Waterland a competitor more formidable than he was willing to acknowledge[1]. After all, there is no evidence that Water-

[1] Whether the foundation of Middleton's hostility to Waterland was laid at this, or at an earlier period, is not certain; nor whether it had its

land was actuated either by vehemence of party, or by a time-serving policy, in the political contests at Cambridge. It was undoubtedly his sincere desire to uphold the public tranquillity against those, who, with whatever purity of intention, were pursuing an object utterly unattainable, without the hazard of involving the nation again in civil war, and incurring evils of which none could calculate the extent, or foresee the termination. The operation of such evils upon the interests of religion and morals he earnestly deprecated, and particularly as affecting the University. Adverting to these, he observes[m], "As there are none more sensible of these things than our-"selves, or more likely to suffer by them; so I beg leave to "intimate, how becoming and proper a part of our profession "and business it is, to do what in us lies to prevent the growth "and increase of them. While animosities prevail, arts and "sciences will gradually decay, and lose ground; not only as "wanting suitable encouragement, but also as being deprived "of that freedom, quiet, and repose, which are necessary to "raise and cherish them. As divisions increase, Christian "charity will decline daily, till it becomes an empty name, "or an *idea* only. Discipline will of course slacken, and hang "loose; and the consequence of that must be, a general dis-"soluteness and corruption of manners. Nor will the enemy "be wanting to sow tares to corrupt our faith, as well as "practice, and to introduce a general latitude of opinions. "*Arianism, Deism, Atheism,* will insensibly steal upon us, "while our heads and hearts run after politics and parties."

rise in political, rather than in literary or personal jealousy. In the Harleian Collection, there is a Letter without a name, but which, it is said, the handwriting determines to be Middleton's, addressed to the Earl of Oxford, in 1716, and giving an account of the motives of his Lordship's friends, the Cambridge Tories, in opposing the *Address*. The Tories, he maintains, were not actuated by disaffection to the Hanover family, but by a conviction that the Address was a *job*, intended to procure preferment for Waterland, and impunity for Bentley, who had written and promoted it. Middleton almost always speaks of Waterland with most unbecoming asperity. Perhaps, however, the grudge might have been of older date, as competitors for academical fame, nearly of the same age and standing in the University. Waterland's personal regard for Bentley might also give a keener edge to Middleton's resentment.

[m] Thanksgiving Sermon in 1716, vol. v.

These wise and moderate sentiments might well recommend the author to the favour of Government, as a person whose example should be held up for imitation to the Academical body; nor could distinction so obtained be justly attributed to any excess of party zeal.

Early in the following year, 1717, Dr. Bentley was elected Regius Professor of Divinity, on the death of Dr. James. It is stated, in the Biographia Britannica, that on this occasion, Waterland was generally pointed out as the fittest person to fill the chair; but that he was prevented from exerting his interest to obtain the situation, by his esteem for Dr. Bentley. This does not appear improbable. But it has been said also, that, notwithstanding his acknowledged ability to fill the station, no interest that he could have exerted would have been likely to avail, against that which Bentley, by his extraordinary address and boldness, had, for some time before the vacancy, secured in his own favour; so that no candidate but himself came forward. Both accounts, however, are consistent with each other; and both were probably well founded. It might be the general wish, and even expectation, that Waterland should succeed to the appointment; and Waterland might willingly have concurred in that wish, had he not been restrained by motives of personal regard towards Bentley; whose pretensions he would be foremost to acknowledge, and desirous to promote, whether or not he had any reason to believe that his own interest could have prevailed against him.

Connected with this part of our author's academical history, is an anecdote, which has passed current in most of the accounts given of him, respecting Dr. Bentley's famous prælection, delivered on the day before he became Professor, on the disputed verse in St. John's first Epistle, Τρεῖς εἰσι μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, κ. τ. λ. in which exercise Bentley argued against the genuineness of the text; and it is said that Waterland, who was present, being asked whether he was convinced, answered,

"No, for I was convinced before." The correctness of this anecdote, to which much importance has been attached by those who relate it, appears to be somewhat questionable. It is asserted with great confidence, and with some degree of triumph, by Whiston, in his memoirs of Dr. Clarke; and probably has been repeated after him by others, without further inquiry. Few authorities, however, on a matter like this, are less to be depended upon than that of Whiston; who readily caught up any current story which might furnish a ground of sarcasm on those who opposed his own opinions. Waterland has not, in any of his writings, disputed the genuineness of this text. On the contrary, in his Sermon on the Doctrine of the Trinity, published many years afterwards, he says, "that "though a disputed text, it is yet not without very many and "very considerable appearances of being truly genuine[n]." And in one of his letters to Mr. Loveday, now first printed, he takes notice of this anecdote related by Whiston, and treats it as a weak device or misrepresentation, for the purpose of charging him with inconsistency[o]. But even if the statement were correct, it can be of little weight, unless the occasion and circumstances were more distinctly known. It might be, that the arguments used by Bentley were such as Waterland was already well acquainted with, and brought no more conviction to his mind than what he had received before: and it might also be, that Bentley himself went no farther than to state the considerations which rendered the matter *questionable*, without inferring a positive conclusion that the text was spurious; to all which Waterland might accede, and yet deem the evidence insufficient to warrant its omission. And this is the more probable, since it appears that Bentley himself, in his proposal for a new edition of the Greek Testament, about four years afterwards, considered the point as still open to discussion.

In the latter part of this same year, the King visited the University of Cambridge; and, in the presence of his Majesty,

[n] Sermon on the Holy Trinity, vol. v.
[o] Sermon at the Meeting of the Sons of the Clergy, 1721. vol. v.

Waterland had the degree of D. D. conferred upon him. This circumstance is stated in the Biographia Britannica as a special mark of favour; and it is said, that the King "honoured him "with this degree without application." But, however deserving he might be of this, or of any other honour, it seems to have occurred only in the ordinary course of proceeding. There were thirty-two Doctors of Divinity created at the same time, *regiis comitiis*, by order of the King. The three at the head of the list were those *Heads of Houses* who had not already attained to that degree; namely, Grigg, Master of Clare Hall, and Vice-Chancellor; Davies, President of Queen's; and Waterland, Master of Magdalene. These were the only persons who were created Doctors in Divinity on that day, in the royal presence; and they were presented by Dr. Bentley, who made the speech on the occasion. The day being Sunday, there was not time for conferring the other degrees; and the remainder were postponed. There is no proof, therefore, that Waterland had any higher compliment paid to him, in this instance, than that which the two other Heads of colleges received at the same time P.

This was the memorable occasion which gave rise to the most vehement attacks upon Dr. Bentley, and brought him, for a time, into public disgrace. His extraordinary claim of a large additional fee from each of the twenty-nine remaining Doctors in Divinity,

P It is stated also in the Biographia Britannica, that soon after he had received his degree of D. D. at Cambridge, "he was *incorporated* in the "same degree at Oxford; being pre-"sented, with a large encomium, by "Dr. Delaune, President of St. John's "College in that University." In this, again, there seems to be some mistake; Dr. Waterland's name not being found in the list of Oxford Graduates; where it would hardly have been omitted, if he had become an *incorporated* member. Probably, he was admitted only *ad eundem;* an honorary admission, not carrying with it the privileges of an incorporated member. Dr. Delaune was at that time the Margaret Professor of Divinity; and might, perhaps, officiate in the absence of the Regius Professor, whose duty it is to present to Degrees in that faculty; and he would, no doubt, gladly avail himself of such an opportunity to do justice to Waterland's merits. Dr. Delaune is eulogized by Waterland's biographer, as "a Divine "of distinguished learning and elo-"quence, and author of an excellent "Sermon on Original Sin." This Sermon was first published singly, and afterwards in a volume of discourses by the same Author, in 1728; and it well deserves the commendation bestowed upon it.

brought on a controversy which continued for nearly a year; when Bentley was first suspended by the Vice-Chancellor, and then actually degraded by a vote of the Senate. In these proceedings Waterland seems to have avoided, as much as possible, taking any active part. Perhaps, he was absent during a part of the time when they were carrying on; or, if present, might be unwilling to join those who were eager to lower the pretensions of one whom they regarded with envy or with dread; while a conviction of some impropriety, at least, in the part which his friend had acted, would not suffer him to come forward in his vindication. It was scarcely possible, however, to observe a strict neutrality between parties whose impetuosity was so little under the restraint of personal decorum. Bentley hastily, and unjustly, attacked Dr. Colbatch, as the supposed author of an anonymous tract against him, which was soon avowed to be the production of Conyers Middleton. Dr. Colbatch's friends, and Dr. Waterland among the rest, united to rescue him from so unworthy an imputation. The paper to which Dr. Waterland's signature was affixed, contained a strong declaration against Bentley's treatment of Colbatch, and was issued by the Heads of colleges, upon a formal complaint having been made to them by the party aggrieved. Yet it by no means follows, from his concurrence in this single measure, that Waterland approved of the persecuting spirit which marked the other proceedings of Bentley's adversaries.

This contest, which was carried on, with more or less vehemence, from the latter end of the year 1717, to the early part of 1724, ended at last in Bentley's restoration. Waterland was one of a Syndicate appointed, in the long vacation of 1723, (when the issue in favour of Bentley was, perhaps, anticipated,) to take such measures as might be deemed best for the interests of the whole body. The Grace for the appointment of the Syndicate runs thus:—"Sept. 26, 1723. Whereas the cause between you "and the Master of Trinity college is drawing near to a de- "termination, and there may be occasion for resolutions to be

" taken, without sufficient time to consult the University, may " it please you that the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Sherlock, Dean of " Chichester, (who has taken a great deal of useful pains in the " cause,) Dr. Gooch, Dr. Waterland, Dr. Colbatch, Mr. Archer, " Mr. Green, and Mr. Heald, or any three of them, (whereof " the Vice-Chancellor to be one,) may have the power to do " any act or acts that may be necessary or convenient, in " carrying on, prosecuting, and finishing the said cause, in such " way or manner as they in their judgment shall think most for " the benefit of the University:—and that what they may do " therein may be confirmed, ratified, and held good, as the act " or acts of this University." Dr. Bentley was restored on the 26th of March following.

Upon reviewing these circumstances, it is still difficult to determine how far Waterland really favoured Bentley's cause. When the violent and bitter "Remarks" upon Bentley's proposals for a new edition of the Greek Testament were published, anonymously, in the year 1721, it is said that the public voice in the University fixed, at first, upon Waterland as the author: and some loose papers have been found in Dr. Colbatch's handwriting, intimating that Bentley himself was of that opinion, and that he thought there was no other of his opponents *capable* of such a performance. It is said also, that when Middleton, within a few days, avowed himself to be the author, Bentley affected not to believe him. Perhaps, the real state of the case might be, that Waterland's personal regard for Bentley suffered some abatement from that sense of public duty which led him to disapprove, if not openly to censure, the conduct so strongly reprobated by a large and respectable portion of the University; and that Bentley, quick and keen in his resentments, would ill bear any diminution of his friend's esteem. But that Waterland still continued earnestly desirous of seeing him restored to his well-earned honours and distinctions, may be inferred both from the share he had in at last effecting that restoration, and also from his apparent reluctance to join in the clamour against him,

or to give any countenance to the virulent invectives that issued from his opponents.

During these disputes, indeed, we find Dr. Waterland more profitably occupied, not only in those writings, hereafter to be noticed, which stamped his character as an author and a Divine, but also in matters of special importance to the interests of the University. In the year 1721, the question was agitated between Bishop Gastrell and Mr. Samuel Peploe, respecting the comparative validity of Lambeth degrees and University degrees. The dispute arose out of the appointment of Mr. Peploe, then only Master of Arts in the University of Oxford, to the wardenship of Manchester college, in Bishop Gastrell's diocese of Chester: and it being a necessary qualification that the Warden should be a Bachelor in Divinity, Mr. Peploe, instead of taking this degree (as he might have done) regularly and statutably at Oxford, procured a faculty for it from the Archbishop of Canterbury. Bishop Gastrell, as the Diocesan, refused to admit him; and, in vindication of his refusal, published a tract, in folio, entitled, "The Bishop of Chester's case, with relation to the "wardenship of Manchester: in which is shewn that no other "degrees but such as are taken in the University, can be "deemed legal qualifications for any ecclesiastical preferment "in England." But the matter being brought into the Court of King's Bench, it was decided in favour of Mr. Peploe: and, not long after, on Bishop Gastrell's death, Mr. Peploe succeeded him in the see of Chester. The University of Cambridge took an active part in favour of the Bishop. A Syndicate was appointed to maintain the Academical privileges in this case, and on the 22d of April, 1721, the following Grace was passed:— "Cum Reverendus admodum in Christo Pater Franciscus "Episcopus Cestriensis privilegia vestra in Gradibus conferendis "strenue propugnaverit; Placeat vobis, ut dicto Reverendo "Patri hujus Academiæ nomine Gratiæ agantur, et ut vene- "rabiles viri, Dr. Lany[q] et Dr. Waterland, sint ad hoc præ- "standum vestra authoritate deputati et assignati."

[q] Master of Pembroke Hall.

On the same day there was also passed another Grace, in which Dr. Waterland could not but take a special interest, and feel a particular gratification in being one of the persons deputed to carry it into effect. The Earl of Nottingham had distinguished himself as a strenuous defender of the doctrine of the Trinity, against Whiston's heterodox opinions. Two tracts written by him in answer to this vehement and eccentric controversialist, shewed very considerable learning and ability. That a layman, so distinguished by birth and station, and whose legal eminence had obtained for him the offer of the highest professional honours, [r] should successfully have engaged in a theological warfare, was undoubtedly a circumstance which claimed from the University to which he belonged some extraordinary notice. And as those thanks were well deserved, so they could hardly have been presented through a channel which would render them more acceptable, than that of a person whom the public already regarded as foremost in the ranks of orthodoxy, and whom the Earl himself had noticed with becoming respect. The Grace was as follows:—"Placeat vobis, ut viro perquam honora-"bili Daneli Comiti de Nottingham, propter egregiam suam "fidei Christianæ, nominatim vero æternitatis Filii Dei et "Spiritus Sancti, defensionem, hujus Academiæ nomine Gratiæ "agantur, et ut venerabiles viri Doctores Lany et Waterland, "ad hoc præstandum sint vestra authoritate deputati et "assignati."

Two years after the termination of the proceedings respecting Dr. Bentley, Dr. Waterland was actively concerned in a transaction considerably affecting the rights and interests of the University Press. This related to the renewal of a lease for printing, granted by the University to the Company of Stationers in London. Much difference of opinion, not without some

[r] This Earl of Nottingham (who was son of the Lord Chancellor Nottingham) was, on the accession of King William and Queen Mary, offered the post of Lord High Chancellor of England, which he excused himself from accepting, alleging his unfitness for an employment that required a constant application; but was appointed one of the Principal Secretaries of State. See Chalmers's Biograph. Dict.

warmth of altercation, occurred in the arrangement of this concern; in which Waterland's advice and assistance were freely given, and ultimately prevailed. Throughout the negociation, his efforts were directed to guard against any misconstruction or misconception, on either side: and his letters (which were written from London) shew that he entered upon the discussion with the most upright and equitable feelings. His residence at that time in the metropolis afforded him an opportunity also of personally mediating between the parties, so as to prevent occasion being given for subsequent litigation. His correspondence on this matter was chiefly with the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Craven, Master of Sidney College; his letters to whom, with other documents relating to them, are now in the possession of the college, and were obligingly communicated by the present Master, Dr. Chafy, on the application of Mr. Todd, Librarian to the Archbishop of Canterbury; who discovered them in searching for some other papers.

In the year 1729, the University was agitated by another political struggle; the two great parties vehemently contending to place each a favoured candidate of their own in the office of Vice-Chancellor. Dr. Mawson, afterwards Bishop of Ely, and Dr. Lambert, Master of St. John's, were the competitors. Lambert had already served the office; but was now again unexpectedly nominated by the Tory party. Waterland is mentioned as one of those whom this manœuvre of their opponents had taken by surprise; and he is said to have made great efforts to bring votes to Cambridge for Mawson. Dr. Gooch, and others of the Heads, did the same; but they were defeated, by a majority of 84 to 83. The successful party exulted exceedingly in the result of this hard-fought contest; and many pasquinades were circulated, in ridicule of the leaders on the other side: but the general respect entertained for Waterland's character appears to have secured him against the attacks of these petty assailants.

After this affair, Dr. Waterland's name is not often mentioned

in the University records. It occurs at a subsequent period, on the occasion of maintaining the rights of the University against some magistrates in the town, who had bailed a person committed by the Vice-Chancellor; and afterwards, as one of a Syndicate appointed to revise and correct the list of benefactors to the University; which is the last memorial of him in these public documents. It should not, however, be passed over here without due commendation, that in the year 1733 (as is recorded in the register of his college) he subscribed twenty guineas towards beautifying the College chapel.

The foregoing particulars, whether of greater or less importance, may serve to prove the high estimation in which Dr. Waterland stood among the leading characters of the University, his unremitting zeal for its best interests, and the active services which he rendered to it upon several occasions. They place him in the light of a person generally looked up to by his contemporaries, as one whose judgment, temper, and talents for business, as well as his learning and zeal, entitled him to the fullest confidence.

The correspondence subjoined to this edition of his Works will throw still further light upon this part of his history, and tend to confirm this representation of his academical character. Several passages in them shew the lively interest which he took, not only in the literary concerns of the University, but also in the ecclesiastical and parliamentary proceedings connected with its rights and privileges.

This attention, on the part of Dr. Waterland, to academical concerns, may be deemed so much the more deserving of notice, when it is considered, that a very large portion of his time, during the last twenty years of his Headship, was necessarily occupied elsewhere, and his attention required to other professional engagements of high importance. For we have now to trace his progress in a wider field of action, and to view him distinguished both by his honours and his labours in the Church;

the one opening the way to the other, as they who had the means of rewarding merit, and were desirous of upholding the interests of sound learning and pure religion, discovered in him one preeminently deserving of their patronage. It is necessary, however, for this purpose, to suspend in some measure the continuation of the *biographical* part of this narrative, that a more distinct and uninterrupted view may be presented to the reader of the services he has rendered, as an author, to the cause of religious truth, and which have handed down his name to posterity with such distinguished credit.

SECTION III.

WATERLAND'S CONTROVERSIAL WRITINGS IN VINDICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

IT was not until some time after Dr. Waterland had attained to academical distinction, that he established his more extensive reputation as an author. The only pieces he had hitherto published were an Assize Sermon preached at Cambridge, July 21, 1713, and a Thanksgiving Sermon preached before the University, June 7, 1716, on the Suppression of the Rebellion. In the year 1719, appeared his first considerable work, entitled, "A Vindication of Christ's Divinity, being a Defence of some "Queries relating to Dr. Clarke's scheme of the holy Trinity, "in answer to a Clergyman in the Country." This being the commencement of the chief polemical contest in which he engaged, and that in which truths of all others the most important were at issue, some account of the previous state of the controversy may not be unacceptable to the reader.

For nearly thirty years of a long and laborious life, Bishop Bull had taken the lead in defence of the doctrines of the Trinity and our Lord's Divinity, against the chief assailants of those doctrines, at home and abroad. Many publications, tending rather to Socinianism than Arianism, were put forth towards the latter end of the 17th century, in Holland and in England. Petavius a Jesuit, Zwicker a Socinian, and Sandius an Anti-Trinitarian, were foremost among foreign writers of this description; against whom Bishop Bull's first great work, his "Defensio Fidei Nicenæ," was principally directed. His

subsequent tract, "Judicium Ecclesiæ Catholicæ," had more immediate reference to the lax opinions of Episcopius and his disciple Curcellæus, and was intended to shew, (as supplementary to his former work,) that the Nicene Fathers held the belief of our Lord's true and proper Divinity to be one of the indispensable terms of Catholic communion. His last great treatise, "Primitiva et Apostolica Traditio," in continuation of the same subject, was written expressly against Zwicker; whose extravagant assertions, that the doctrines of our Lord's Divinity, Pre-existence, and Incarnation, were entirely inventions of some of the early heretics, led Bishop Bull to a more full investigation of that part of the subject.

The writers who, at the same time, advocated these heterodox opinions in our own country, were not men of considerable eminence, and were little more than mere importers of these foreign novelties. The names of Biddle, Firmin, and Gilbert Clerke, now scarcely retain a place in our recollection. Yet, excepting some few anonymous writers, these were the chief abettors of Anti-Trinitarianism in England. Some of the anonymous tracts were not, indeed, contemptible productions. One of them, entitled, "The Naked Gospel," was written by Dr. Bury, Rector of Exeter college, Oxford, and obtained extensive circulation. Another, called, "An Historical Vindi-"cation of the Naked Gospel," was ascribed to Le Clerc, an author unquestionably of high literary character. But the labours of these writers would probably not have called forth the powers of Bishop Bull, had not continental adversaries of still greater reputation taken a prominent part.

It is unnecessary to detail the particular points in debate between this great writer and his several opponents. The reader may find them fully stated in Mr. Nelson's Life of that venerable Prelate. It was Bishop Bull's main object, to take a comprehensive *historical* view of the subject; and, upon an accurate investigation of the doctrines maintained by the Nicene and Ante-Nicene Fathers of the Church, to establish a con-

vincing argument, that those doctrines must have been the true *primitive* articles of the Christian faith, handed down by the Apostles to their successors in the Church; and from which no important deviation, no essential difference, could reasonably be supposed to have gained admittance into the Catholic Creed. This argument had been, by some, contemptuously neglected; by others, insidiously perverted. The authority of the primitive Fathers had become a sort of by-word of reproach among many writers of that period. The *Socinians* were disposed wholly to set aside their testimony as of no real value. The *Arians* professed some respect for it, and endeavoured to press it into their own service. Great misrepresentations had obtained currency among the learned, as well as the unlearned, who applied their minds to the subject; and in no instance, perhaps, have profound learning and vigorous intellect been more successfully directed towards correcting such errors, than in these masterly performances of Bishop Bull. To his transcendent merits in this respect, not only the most eminent British and foreign Divines of his own time have borne testimony; but Theologians in every succeeding period have ascribed to him the credit both of obtaining a complete victory over his opponents, and of having furnished an inexhaustible armoury of weapons for those who came after him in defence of the truth.

But, however decisive this victory might be, it had not the effect of extinguishing the controversial spirit which had become so generally prevalent. The phalanx of adversaries endeavoured to supply by numbers what they wanted in individual strength; and when driven from one untenable position, sought refuge in another. Bishop Bull adhered to his main purpose, that of applying his labours to proofs drawn directly from Scripture or from antiquity; not entering further into *metaphysical* disquisitions, than was necessary for the illustration of those writings of the primitive Fathers, which he adduced in support of his argument. But it unavoidably occurred, that many subtle and difficult points were brought under discussion, arising out of the peculiar notions started by early heretics, and

against which many treatises of the orthodox Fathers had been more immediately directed. The chief heresies they had to combat, were those which led to *Tritheism*, *Sabellianism*, or *Arianism*. In maintaining the great points of our Lord's *pre-existence*, *eternity*, and *consubstantiality* with the Father, the discordant opinions of these several opponents were to be refuted, so as to give neither of them the advantage. In discussing also the *subordination* of the Son to the Father, more than ordinary precision was necessary, to guard against misconception or misrepresentation. All these difficulties this zealous defender of the Catholic faith had to encounter; and with what admirable skill and prudence he conducted himself, even in the most perilous of these researches, it is needless here to describe.

Disquisitions, however, of this kind, afforded temptation to minds of a certain stamp, to perplex the subject still further; and to place a doctrine, confessedly mysterious, in such a light, as to make it appear still more difficult of acceptance. Unhappily, too, persons of better dispositions, and earnestly desirous of vindicating the established Creed, were induced to attempt *explanations* and *illustrations* of the doctrine *itself*, grounded upon *hypothesis* rather than *proof*, and hardly admitting of demonstrative evidence, either from reason or from Scripture. They were laudably anxious to repel the charges of absurdity and contradiction, so pertinaciously alleged by their adversaries; and to exonerate themselves and others from the imputation of believing that which was, *per se*, irrational or incredible. They were induced, therefore, to overstep the boundaries of scriptural proof and historical testimony, and to push their inquiries into the dark recesses of metaphysical speculation. Here their opponents gladly followed them; well aware with how much greater advantage they might uphold the contest, where the very ground on which they stood was favourable to the promoters of perplexity and confusion, and where the main points at issue could never be decided by a victory, either on the one side or on the other.

Dr. William Sherlock, afterwards Dean of St. Paul's, (father of Bishop Sherlock,) engaged strenuously in this hazardous warfare. He was incited to it by two anonymous Socinian pamphlets, entitled, the one, "Brief Notes on the Creed of "St. Athanasius;" the other, "A brief History of the Unitarians, "or Socinians;" the former of which consisted chiefly of *metaphysical* objections to the doctrines of the Creed. Against these tracts Dr. Sherlock wrote his "Vindication of the Doctrine of the "Trinity," published in the year 1690. In this elaborate work, he proposed a new mode of explaining that "great mystery;" by an hypothesis, which (as he conceived) "gave a very "easy and intelligible notion of a Trinity in Unity," and removed the charge of "*contradictions*." His mode, however, of doing this was much disapproved, not only by Socinian writers, but by men who were no less sincere advocates of the doctrine than himself. Dr. Wallis, Savilian Professor of Geometry, one of the most profound scholars of his time, though he approved of much of Dr. Sherlock's treatise, yet regarded some of his illustrations as approaching too nearly to *Tritheism*. Dr. South, a man of no less powerful intellect, opposed it, upon similar grounds, with great vehemence, and with unsparing reproach. Both these distinguished writers substituted, however, for Dr. Sherlock's hypothesis, theories of their own, far from being generally satisfactory; and were charged by the opposite party with leaning towards *Sabellianism*. In the University of Oxford, Sherlock's view of the doctrine was publicly censured and prohibited. This produced further irritation; and such was the unbecoming heat and acrimony with which the controversy was conducted, that the Royal Authority was at last exercised, in restraining each party from introducing novel opinions respecting these mysterious articles of faith, and requiring them to adhere to such explications only, as had already received the sanction of the Church.

These unhappy disputes were eagerly caught at by Anti-Trinitarians of every description, as topics of invective or of

ridicule; and the press teemed with offensive productions of various description, calculated to agitate the minds of the people, and to bring the doctrines of the Church into disrepute. The advocates of the established Creed were represented as being now divided into two distinct and irreconcilable parties, the *Tritheists* and the *Nominalists*, or (as they were sometimes called) the *real* and the *nominal* Trinitarians; the former intended to denote those who maintained *Sherlock's* hypothesis; the latter, those who espoused the theories of *South* and *Wallis*. These terms of reproach were readily adopted by Socinian writers, whose policy it was to represent all Trinitarians as implicated in the errors either of Tritheism or Sabellianism, and to deny that any intermediate theory of Trinitarian doctrine could consistently be maintained. To follow up this supposed advantage over their adversaries, the tracts of Biddle were now collected and republished; and, together with several others by authors mostly anonymous, formed three small quarto volumes, printed in 1691—1695. Thomas Firmin, a disciple of Biddle, was particularly active in the circulation of these productions.

Bishop Bull took no public part in this warfare, though it was carried on, with more or less vehemence, for a considerable time, and even while he was engaged in controversy on these subjects with Episcopius, Zwicker, and others. Among his posthumous works, however, there is a "Discourse on the Doctrine "of the Catholic Church for the first three Ages of Christianity "concerning the Trinity, in opposition to Sabellianism and Tri-"theism," which is stated to have been drawn up at the request of a person of quality, (Lord Arundell,) who had been perplexed by the controversy betwixt Sherlock and South. But this appears to have been intended merely for private use. The learned Prelate's dignity, and probably his inclination, were better consulted, by abstaining from these subordinate points of litigation, while he pursued steadily his purpose of establishing the main articles in question upon a more solid basis, and felt not the necessity of calling to its aid any less substantial proofs than those which Scripture and tradition supplied. His in-

creasing age and infirmities also, as well as the burden of his episcopal cares, would doubtless indispose him for superfluous exertions.

Other distinguished persons had some share in these discussions; among whom were Cudworth and Stillingfleet. The former, in his "Intellectual System," chiefly imbibing his philosophy from Plotinus and other disciples of the Platonic school, incurred the charge of giving too much countenance to the Arian hypothesis. The latter, in his "Vindication of the "Trinity," steered a safer course, by avoiding unnecessary subtleties, and adopting more solid grounds of reasoning in defence of the received confessions and Creeds of the Church. Neither of these, however, carried on the controversy to any considerable length.

The best view, perhaps, that can be taken of Dr. Waterland's labours, will be to regard them as a continuation of those of Bishop Bull. This Prelate died in 1709; and his last controversial treatise on our Lord's Divinity was published in 1703. Waterland's first publication on the same subject appeared in 1719. This brings them nearly into contact with each other. Waterland, however, is not to be considered as precisely occupying the same ground, or engaged in the same personal warfare as his venerable predecessor. Bishop Bull had completely vanquished the opponents of his day; and so far the combat was at an end. But scarcely had his career terminated, when fresh ground was entered upon by an opponent of far more imposing character, and of much greater consideration, than any or even all of those against whom the learned Prelate of St. David's had maintained so good a warfare.

In the year 1712, Dr. Clarke published his "Scripture-Doctrine "of the Trinity." This was the commencement of a new æra in polemics. Dr. Clarke was a man of far too great importance, from the strength of his understanding, the depth of his knowledge, and the extent of his learning, to content himself with

retailing trite arguments already advanced and reiterated by the Anti-Trinitarians of the day. Indeed he disclaimed the character of an *Anti-Trinitarian*; and appears to have been firmly persuaded, that the doctrine of the Trinity was a true Scripture-doctrine. His labours were directed entirely to the *proof* of this doctrine, in the sense in which he himself embraced it, and which he laboured to prove was the sense both of Scripture and of the Church of England. He stands distinguished, therefore, from such writers as Biddle, Firmin, Clendon, Emlyn, and Whiston, in many prominent features of the doctrine he advanced; and consequently, the controversy with him assumed a very different aspect from that in which Bishop Bull had been engaged.

The professed design of Dr. Clarke's book was indisputably good. A full and digested collection of all the texts relating to the doctrine of the Trinity, with a critical interpretation of them, was a *desideratum* in theology, and could hardly fail to be of advantage to the biblical student. It served also to call off the attention of those who had hitherto chiefly derived their notions of the subject from teachers who rested more upon metaphysics, than upon the pure word of God; and to bring the whole matter of dispute into a train of more legitimate discussion.

Dr. Clarke, however, in this undertaking, set out upon a latitudinarian principle, which did not augur very favourably of the purpose which it might be intended to serve. With reference to the Liturgy of the Church of England, and to public formularies of faith in general, he assumed it as a maxim, "That every person may reasonably agree to such forms, whenever he can *in any sense at all* reconcile them with Scripture[s]." He also virtually, if not expressly, disclaimed the authority of the primitive Christian writers, as expositors of the doctrines in question; desiring it to be understood, that he did not cite their works "as *proofs* of any of the propositions, but as *illus-*

[s] Introduct. p. xxi. 1st edit.

"*trations* only;" moreover, that his purpose in citing them was oftentimes to point out their inconsistency with the doctrine they professed to hold, and thus "to shew how naturally truth some-"times prevails by its own native clearness and evidence, even "against the strongest and most settled prejudices[t]." These were suspicious declarations, and would naturally lead to an expectation, that the author might find occasion, in the course of his work, to exemplify his principles in a way not quite conformable either with the sentiments of the primitive defenders of the faith, or with those of the Church in which he was himself an accredited teacher.

Accordingly, the work was no sooner published and read, than he was accused of applying these principles to the introduction of opinions irreconcilable with the received doctrines of the Church Catholic in general, and with those of the Church of England in particular; and the work was reprobated as an indirect revival of the *Arian* heresy. Among the writers who thus arraigned it, were men of high character and respectability in the Church. Dr. Wells, Mr. Nelson, Dr. James Knight, Bishop Gastrell, Dr. Edwards, Mr. Welchman, Mr. Edward Potter, Dr. Bennet, and Mr. Richard Mayo, distinguished themselves, with considerable ability, by their animadversions on this work. On the other side, Dr. Whitby, Dr. Sykes, and Mr. John Jackson, appeared in favour of Dr. Clarke, and upheld his cause with zeal and talent. The weight, however, of public opinion, (so far, at least, as related to members of the Church of England,) preponderated greatly against him; and the subsequent proceedings of the Lower House of Convocation proved, that the persuasions of the Clergy in general were decidedly adverse to those which he had espoused.

Some account of the labours of these opponents of Dr. Clarke may be not unacceptable.

Dr. Wells published, in 1713, his "Remarks on Dr. Clarke's

[t] Introduct. pp. xvii. xviii.

"Introduction to his Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity." These remarks, for the reason he assigns in his Preface, were confined to the "Introduction" only, as containing principles which might mislead unwary or unskilful readers, with reference to other controversies in religion, as well as to that of the Trinity. The points he objects to are these;—that although Dr. C. professes to state the *Scripture-doctrine* upon this article of faith, he takes no notice whatever of the *Old* Testament, but cites all its authorities from the *New*;—that while he affirms that *Scripture* is the *only* rule of truth in matters of religion, he has not satisfactorily shewn how the true *sense* of Scripture is to be ascertained, nor has guarded against that perversion of it, by which men, disposed to put what sense they please upon it, may pretend that they are vindicating *the sole authority of Scripture*, when, in effect, they are substituting for it *the sole authority of their own reasonings*;—that he argues inconsistently, in acknowledging, that in order to find the true sense of Scripture, we are bound to use *the best assistance* we can procure; and yet insisting that we are to have recourse to *no other authority* whatever but that of Scripture only;—that he has greatly misrepresented the principles of the *Church of England* in this respect, as declared in her 6th, 20th, and 21st Articles;—that he has disrespectfully treated the writings of the *early Fathers*, charging them with prejudice and inconsistency; and disparaging their Creeds and Confessions of faith;—that his *directions to Divines* for studying these subjects are very loosely and unguardedly laid down, and, in particular, his cautions not to be misguided by the *sound* of *single texts* of Scripture are insidious, and liable to lead men from the simplicity of truth;—that his notions respecting the *assent* to *forms by law* appointed, and to all words of *human institution*, are inconsistent with that Christian sincerity which he professes;—and lastly, that he has covertly traduced *our Church*, by insinuating that she requires her ministers to receive the doctrine of the *Trinity* in *that* sense which the *popish* schoolmen had introduced for the sake of maintaining their doctrine of *transubstantiation*. To this pamphlet Dr. Clarke speedily replied, and, with more polemical skill than his anta-

gonist, availed himself of some indiscreet, and perhaps untenable positions, which Dr. Wells had advanced. But he is more successful in pointing out his adversary's defects, than in vindicating his own assertions; and, not unfrequently, an undue bias may be discovered against Church-authority, even in its mildest character, and a strong predisposition to such unbounded freedom, as can hardly consist with any *established* system of faith whatever. Dr. Wells followed up his attack by a *second* letter to Dr. Clarke, written evidently under impressions of irritation, and with a consciousness of having given his adversary some advantage; but not without shrewdness and ability. To this second letter Dr. Clarke made no reply.

Mr. Nelson had, in his Life of Bishop Bull, made some strong animadversions on the object and tendency of Dr. Clarke's book. With that truly Christian courtesy which distinguished every thing that came from the pen of this excellent man, he had complained of something like unfair treatment of Bishop Bull's writings on the part of Dr. Clarke. He prefixed also to an anonymous tract, entitled, "The Scripture-" Doctrine of the Trinity vindicated from the misrepresentations " of Dr. Clarke," a short letter to Dr. Clarke, expostulating with him upon the dangerous tendency of his book, and the unsoundness of some of its principles. The anonymous author of the tract published by Mr. Nelson (Dr. James Knight) does not go through the whole of Dr. Clarke's treatise, but selects about forty of the chief texts therein discussed, in order to shew the erroneous *principle of interpretation* which generally pervades the work. He particularly censures Dr. Clarke's position, that whenever the terms ONE and ONLY GOD are used in Scripture they invariably mean God the FATHER, to the exclusion of the *other* Persons of the Godhead. He complains also of his using the term *being*, as synonymous with *person*; his deducing inferences from the terms *self-existent* and *unoriginated*, derogatory to the true Divinity of the SON; and combats several other positions of a similar kind, which form the groundwork of Dr. Clarke's treatise. This was a learned,

acute, and well-digested performance, written with candour and good temper; and Dr. Clarke put forth his full strength in answering it. It was followed by a still larger tract in continuation of the subject; to which Dr. Clarke again replied in a letter to the author, printed, together with two other tracts, in 1719.

Another publication, written about the same time, and entitled, "Remarks upon Dr. Clarke's Scripture-Doctrine of the "Trinity," was the work of Dr. Gastrell, afterwards Bishop of Chester. This contains a clear and candid statement of Dr. Clarke's opinions; concerning which, the author remarks, that "in Dr. C.'s 55 Propositions, there is but one single expres- "sion, (viz. Proposition 27,) which any of those who now "profess themselves *Arians* would refuse to subscribe to." The contrast between these propositions and the received doctrine of the Church is distinctly set forth in the beginning of the tract; and the last twenty pages contain an excellent summary of the whole controversy, as it then stood, concerning the Divinity of our Saviour. Dr. Clarke published an answer to this tract; which he acknowledges to be the production "of a *very able and learned writer*," and "*proposed with a* "*reasonable and good spirit*." The answer is subtle and acute; and the author evidently feels that he is encountering no ordinary antagonist. It is written also with a degree of irritation which indicates a consciousness of not having victory fully at command; and in many passages Dr. C. labours more to convict his opponent of heresy or absurdity, than to acquit himself of the charges alleged against him.

In the same year with the above-mentioned tracts, appeared Dr. Edwards's "Brief Critical remarks" on Dr. Clarke's reply to Mr. Nelson and Dr. Gastrell. This is an attack, and a very powerful one, on Dr. Clarke's skill in critical theology. Dr. Edwards rallies him also upon his affected dislike to *metaphysical* terms in divinity; and animadverts with keenness on his use of the words εἷς, θεότης, and θεός; the last of which Dr. C.

usually interprets in a *relative,* rather than an *absolute* sense, as denoting *office* only, not *essence* or *nature*. This notion Dr. Edwards very successfully refutes, and charges the author with having borrowed it from Crellius and other Socinian writers.

Another able tract on the same side was written by Mr. Edward Welchman, the well-known author of an illustration of the Thirty-nine Articles. The tract is entitled, "Dr. Clarke's "Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity examined." In the Preface, he charges Dr. C. with endeavouring to accommodate the Scriptures to his own notions, and with misrepresenting the opinions of the Fathers. In reply to Dr. C.'s position, "that *particular* "*expressions* in any work are so much the *more* to be depended "upon, and the *more* to be regarded, when the author from "whom they are cited was, *upon the whole, more different* in "his opinion from what those particular citations seem to "express;" Mr. W. justly observes, "that chief regard ought "always to be had to the *main end* and *design* of the *writer*, "and the *particular expressions* interpreted, if possible, according "to that end; and that if any appear to be inconsistent with it, "it should be regarded as a slip of the author's pen, and no "greater stress laid upon *that,* than upon the general tendency "of the work." Some other violations of the established rules of interpretation are also charged upon Dr. Clarke, in this Preface. The body of the tract consists of a detailed examination of Dr. C.'s fifty-five Propositions; in which Mr. Welchman professes to acknowledge what is true, to explain what is ambiguous, and to reject what is false. Dr. C.'s quotations from the Fathers are but slightly noticed; the Fathers being, in Dr. C.'s estimation, of little moment, and his quotations, from them, in Mr. Welchman's opinion, of much less. At the end is subjoined, "A brief Explication of Dr. Clarke's view of the "subject, by way of Question and Answer, from the Doctor's "own writings;" exposing the inconsistencies and fallacies of his theory.

Another, and perhaps one of the ablest of these answers,

was written by Mr. Edward Potter, M. A. of Emanuel college, Cambridge, and entitled, "A Vindication of our Blessed Saviour's "Divinity, chiefly against Dr. Clarke." This tract comprised the substance of a series of discourses delivered by the author in the college chapel. After glancing at some of Dr. C.'s insinuations against Creeds and Articles of Faith imposed by human authority, he prepares the way for a *scriptural* view of the subject, by removing several preliminary objections grounded on the supposed incredibility of the doctrine, and its contradiction to human reason. The distinction between the appropriate attributes of the Father, *self-origination* and *self-existence*, and the appropriate attributes of the Son, *eternal* and *necessary existence*, is admirably cleared. It is further shewn, that this distinction does not derogate from the true and perfect Divinity of the Son; and that it neither makes him the same Person with the *unoriginated* Being, on the one hand, nor infers a *plurality of Beings*, on the other. On this ground, the doctrine of the Athanasian Creed is well defended. The great point of the honour and worship due to our Saviour is then considered, as a proof of his absolute Divinity; and this is succeeded by a full consideration of several texts of Scripture, ascribing to Him titles and characters, which imply that he is really and essentially God. The application of the terms JEHOVAH and LOGOS in the Old and New Testament, and the equivalent force of each, as denoting the essential and incommunicable character of the Deity, are strongly urged. The general purport of the tract is to prove, that our Lord's Divinity was not merely an arbitrary *communication* of the Divine nature by the *power* and *will* of the Father; but was *inherent* in himself, essentially and necessarily, as one with the Father, co-eternal and co-equal. Some few plain and convincing proofs are selected in the conclusion of the tract, to shew that the compilers of our Liturgy held these tenets, and could not possibly intend that the doctrine should be interpreted in any other way. The greater part of this tract may be read with advantage as a didactic treatise, without reference to Dr.

Clarke's book; and, in that point of view, it is more especially valuable[u].

Mr. Richard Mayo's tract (which was published with his initials only) is entitled, "A plain Argument against Dr. Clarke's "Doctrine concerning the ever-blessed Trinity." The design, as set forth in the Preface, was to guard the common people against being misled by *the pretence of Scripture* for Dr. Clarke's new scheme of the doctrine of the Trinity, and "to "give a plain Scripture-argument for the truth that they had "been taught." The tract consists of three letters interchanged between Mr. Mayo and Dr. Clarke, with a few additional pages of observations upon the correspondence. It turns chiefly upon one simple argument, deduced from Scripture, namely, "that the Supreme Independent Being has "declared, that there are *no other beings*, inferior or dependent, "to whom Divine titles, attributes, or worship, do or ought to "belong, or to be ascribed: and by consequence, that the *Son* "*of God* (to whom it is confessed that Divine titles, attributes, "and worship do belong) is indeed *a distinct Person* from the "Father and the Holy Ghost, *in the same essence;* but is not "another *Being*, but *of one* and the same *substance* with the "*Father* and the *Holy Ghost*." This point is enlarged upon with considerable ability; and unquestionably it is one, which, when firmly established, completely overthrows Dr. Clarke's theory. Of this Dr. C. seems to have been fully aware, since, though in the private correspondence, here published, he had declined pursuing the controversy with the author, he deemed it expedient afterwards to enter into a fuller discussion of it, in a "Letter to Mr. R. M." printed together with a letter to another of his opponents[x]; and both appended to another tract, "A "Modest Plea for the Baptismal and Scripture-notion of the

[u] There is no answer extant, by Dr. Clarke, either to this tract by Mr. Potter, or to those by Mr. Welchman and Dr. Edwards.

[x] A letter to the author of a book entitled, "The true Scripture-Doc-"trine of the Trinity continued and "vindicated, &c. 1719."

"Trinity." This "Modest Plea" was the production of Dr. Arthur Ashley Sykes, one of Dr. Clarke's most able and strenuous advocates; of whom, and of his other chief supporters, Dr. Whitby and Mr. Jackson, occasion will soon arise to take some further notice.

From the foregoing sketch it is evident, that Dr. Clarke's book had undergone a pretty severe scrutiny, and had occasioned no small dissatisfaction. It had also been examined so fully under all its aspects and bearings, and the main positions on which it rested had been so successfully refuted, that any further notice of it might have been deemed almost superfluous. At this period of the controversy, however, Dr. Waterland was induced to take the field; and the circumstances which led to his doing so are briefly stated in the Preface to his "Vindication "of Christ's Divinity," published (as has already been stated) in the year 1719.

Certain *Queries* had been drawn up, a few years before, by Dr. Waterland, at the request of some friends, without any intention of their appearing in print, and chiefly for the purpose of pointing out to *a Clergyman in the Country*, who had espoused Dr. Clarke's notions of the Trinity, the errors into which he had unguardedly fallen. The Clergyman was personally unknown to Dr. Waterland; and it was through the medium of some common friend that the Queries were submitted to his consideration. A correspondence ensued between the parties, carried on for a while in an amicable manner, with unreserved freedom, and (on the part of Dr. Waterland, at least,) without any design of engaging in public controversy. At length, however, the Country Clergyman unexpectedly announced to Dr. Waterland, that, having been *over-persuaded* to do so, he had actually committed these Queries to the press, together with his own Answers to them; and that thither Dr. W. must follow him, if he intended any thing further.

This Clergyman was Mr. John Jackson, first of Jesus college,

Cambridge, then Rector of Rossington and Vicar of Doncaster, and afterwards more generally known by his various polemical writings. A person of greater delicacy might have felt some scruple in thus forcing an opponent into public notice, without his consent, and without such previous intimation as might have led him to prepare himself more carefully for the press. Waterland justly complains of this treatment, and intimates that he would still have declined coming forward, had not copies of his manuscript "Defence of the Queries" already got into several hands; which determined him to revise his papers, and send them into the world in a less imperfect state.

Jackson's own representation of this matter does not materially differ from Waterland's; but he excuses himself on the ground, that the Queries had got into extensive circulation before they fell into *his* hands, and were become of too great notoriety to be concealed. He adds also, that the manuscript of Waterland's "Defence," in reply to Jackson's "Answer" to the Queries, had made its way into other hands before he was permitted to see it. But he chiefly shelters himself under the sanction and advice of Dr. Clarke, who suggested to him, "that he might print them as "anonymous objections which he found, and which no one had "owned; and so Dr. W. might either own them, (if they were "his,) or let them pass unregarded." This explains what Jackson had written to Dr. Waterland, on announcing the publication, that he had been *over-persuaded* to it[y].

From these accounts it is pretty evident, on the one hand, that Dr. Waterland was by no means desirous, in the first instance, of taking a conspicuous part in this controversy; and, on the other hand, that Jackson was (perhaps not very reluctantly) induced by Dr. Clarke to press the matter forward. Dr. Clarke appears, indeed, throughout the whole of the controversy, at this and at subsequent periods, to have had a great ascendancy over Jackson, and to have made free use of him,

[y] See Memoirs of Jackson, pp. 19—23; and Jackson's Memoirs of Waterland, pp. 17—20.

whenever it was more suitable to his purpose to speak *per alium* than *per se:* and from the correspondence between them, inserted in the Memoirs of Jackson's Life and Writings, there can hardly be a doubt, that in this Answer to the Queries, Dr. Clarke bore a considerable part[z]. If either party, however, had afterwards cause to regret the publication of these papers, it was that which had been most eager to promote it. From the time that Waterland took the field, the reputation and authority of Dr. Clarke perceptibly declined; while his new antagonist advanced rapidly in the estimation of the public, and obtained marks of distinguished favour from persons the most eminent in character and station.

To give an extended analysis of this important work of Dr. Waterland's, would occupy too large a portion of these pages. The texts compared, and the Queries grounded upon a comparison of them, are arranged under distinct heads, so as to exhibit, in striking contrast, the system maintained by Dr. Clarke, and that which has generally been received as the standard of the Catholic faith. The Queries are so clearly and unequivocally drawn up, that they seem almost to suggest their own answers, and scarcely admit of a diversity of solution. That Mr. Jackson, however, did in many instances, and even in those of the greatest moment, *evade* a direct and distinct answer to them, will hardly be denied by any who shall give Dr. Waterland's book and that of his opponent an impartial reading.

Take, for example, his answers to the first and second Queries proposed by Dr. Waterland.

The first Query is, "Whether all other BEINGS besides the "one Supreme God be not excluded by the texts of Isaiah," [therein referred to,] "and consequently, whether Christ can be "God at all, unless he be the same with the Supreme God?" —In answer to this, Jackson endeavours to establish, or rather

[z] See Jackson's Memoirs, pp. 23—27, and pp. 82—86.

assumes as established, the following positions:—that the texts cited relate to one *person* only,—that the Father is that one person,—that when it is said, There is no GOD besides me, the meaning is, there is no SUPREME GOD besides me,—and that our Lord cannot be the one Supreme God, because he is not the same Person as the Father. Thus the real question, Whether if Christ be not supreme God, he be not excluded from being God at all, remains still unanswered.

The second Query is, "Whether the texts in the New "Testament" [there referred to] "do not shew that he (Christ) "is not excluded, and therefore must be the same God?" Here again, instead of a direct answer, Jackson sets up an arbitrary distinction between the word GOD in a *supreme*, and in a *subordinate* and *inferior* sense; the latter (it is said) being applied to Christ, the former to the Father only; whilst the main point, whether, being *not excluded* by these texts, he must not be *the same God*, is left wholly untouched.

These may serve as specimens of the disingenuous and sophistical mode of argument, with which this writer encounters the plain and almost self-evident propositions, couched under the several queries proposed to him;—an attempt to mislead the reader, which Waterland has not failed to expose in the fullest manner.

The main points laboured throughout this Vindication, are those which lie at the root of the controversy. The *Arian* distinction between an *absolute* and a *relative* Deity, is proved to have no foundation in Scripture. It is shewn, that, in the sacred writings, there is no ambiguity in the term GOD; no difference between GOD and the SUPREME GOD;—that if the Son be not God in the full Scripture-notion of God, he cannot *truly* be called God; and if he be so, he must be *one* with the Father, since else there would be more Gods than one;—that the divine attributes, omniscience, ubiquity, and eternity, and also the divine powers, and divine worship ascribed to both Father and Son,

cannot reasonably be understood as bearing a different meaning, when referred to the one or the other, but must be substantially the same in both;—that there is no medium between being *essentially God*, and being a *creature*;—that though the *subordination* of the Son to the Father, *in some sense*, may be proved from many texts of Scripture, yet there is no plain text to be found that disproves his *eternity*, or his *consubstantiality* with the Father;—and that when it is asserted, in opposition to this doctrine, that there is no distinction between *being* and *person*, and no medium between *Tritheism* and *Sabellianism*, the question becomes no longer a *scriptural*, but a *metaphysical* inquiry, from which no certain or satisfactory conclusions can be drawn. In addition to these considerations, the 23rd Query places in a strong point of view the perplexities and inconsistencies of the Arian hypothesis. The remaining Queries have more especial reference to Dr. Clarke's treatment of the Nicene and Ante-Nicene Fathers, and of our Church Liturgy; and the treatise concludes with cautions as to the danger of trusting to private judgment, rather than to Scripture, reason, and antiquity.

It is a further recommendation of this work, that the author has conducted it in strict conformity with Dr. Clarke's professed design. Its general line of argument is purely *scriptural*; being deduced, by fair inference, from a collation of Scripture-evidence. The *arrangement* also is more skilful and more lucid than that of Dr. Clarke. Dr. Clarke, though he classes his texts under certain general heads, arranges them under each head, in the progressive order in which they occur in the New Testament; so that each text appears in a detached, insulated form, unconnected with the rest. Consequently, their mutual bearing, their effect in strengthening or in modifying each other, is not immediately perceived. Dr. Waterland, on the other hand, by his collecting together a number of texts relating to the same point, exhibits, at one view, the contrast or the concord between them; and thus materially assists the reader in forming a judgment, how far the doctrines deduced from them are borne out by Scripture-authority. Nor should we omit to notice the additional advantage of bringing together a variety of texts from the Old Testament,

cited, referred to, and sometimes expounded in the New; by which a great accession of light is obtained; and the want of which cannot but be regarded as a great defect in Dr. Clarke's performance.

This commencement of Dr. Waterland's labours brought him into high estimation. It manifested a vigorous understanding, acute discernment, laborious research, a clear conception even of the most intricate points, and a complete mastery of his whole subject. It obtained for him general confidence as a fit *leader* in the cause he had undertaken; and notwithstanding the acknowledged ability of many who had already entered the lists on the same side, it seemed as if all were now willing to transfer to *him* its chief direction.

To this work Dr. Clarke soon afterwards replied, in a short tract, entitled, "The Modest Plea continued, or a brief and "distinct Answer to Dr. Waterland's Queries relating to the "Doctrine of the Trinity. 1720[a]."

In the Preface to this tract, Dr. C. complains, that Dr. Waterland had "wholly neglected the only just method of refuting his "work, by shewing that he had mistaken or misinterpreted the "*Scriptures*, or by disproving the truth of his *propositions*;" and that he had grounded his defence either upon the metaphysical opinions of the Fathers, or upon the supposed mistakes of

[a] The "Modest Plea," of which this professes to be a continuation, has already been mentioned as the production of Dr. Sykes, under the designation of *a Country Clergyman*. Its professed object was to compare Dr. Clarke's and Dr. Bennet's notions of the Trinity, in refutation of the latter; and no notice is taken in it of Dr. Waterland's work. The reason, therefore, of Dr. Clarke's publishing his own tract as a sequel, or continuation of Dr. Sykes's, is not, at first, apparent. But from a passage in Disney's Life of Sykes, p. 88, and another from the Memoirs of Jackson, p. 55, it appears probable that Dr. C. himself had some share in the "Modest Plea;" since, in a letter from him to Mr. Jackson, he says, "The *Country Clergyman*" (meaning the author of the "Modest "Plea") "is *really* a person who was "convinced just in the manner you "were, *and I have just the same rela-* "*tion to his performances as to yours.*" What that relationship was, has already been noticed, in speaking of Jackson's Answer to the Queries. The publication of the "Modest "Plea," together with the two letters by Dr. Clarke, strengthens the probability that it was, in some measure, a joint concern between him and Dr. Sykes.

Dr. C. in his translation of some few passages of their writings, not at all affecting the merits of the cause. Yet is it remarkable, that of Dr. W.'s thirty-one Queries, twenty-four are exclusively grounded on *Scripture*, or on Dr. Clarke's own *propositions;* and that almost the whole of Dr. Clarke's Answer consists of endeavours to refute Dr. Waterland's expositions of *Scripture.*

Dr. Clarke's replies to each Query are ingenious, subtle, and acute. But the great and (as it seems) *insuperable* difficulty he had to contend with, was that of allowing to our Lord the title of GOD, in any legitimate acceptation of the term. It is a vain attempt, to disguise the absurdity, upon the *Arian* principle, of ascribing *real Divinity* to the Son. Whenever Dr. C. finds this express term given to him, he is evidently perplexed and troubled how to evade its force. Generally he is under the necessity of either adding to the text some expository word or phrase, or of expressing it by some mode of circumlocution, which may confine it to the particular signification his system requires. Where he conceives the term God to denote the Father, he inserts *supreme* before it, that the Divinity of the Son may appear to be inferior: where it is predicated of the Son, some qualifying terms are introduced from other texts of Scripture, to give it a *dependent* and *subordinate* meaning: and again, when it is used absolutely, denoting the *essence* or *being* of the Deity, the personal pronouns, *I* and *me, he* and *him*, are insisted upon as proofs that it relates individually and exclusively to the Father; — thus *assuming* the very points in question. Dr. Clarke's system, indeed, necessarily supposes a *supreme* God and a *subordinate* God; and upon this principle rests his interpretation of every text which cannot otherwise be made to accord with his views. Dr. W.'s Queries, and the arguments grounded upon them, tend to shew, on the other hand, that this is neither consistent with the true Scripture-notion of the divine *Unity,* nor with that of the *Trinity,* as understood by the Church, or even as professed to be received by Dr. Clarke himself. "I do not charge you," says Dr. W. "with "asserting two *supreme* Gods: but I do charge you with

"holding *two* Gods, one *supreme*, another *inferior*; two real "and true Gods, according to the Scripture-notion of the word "*God*, as explained by yourself[b]." To this charge "The "Modest Plea" gives no specific answer. The author contents himself with recriminating, that his opponent also asserts two *supreme* Gods.

The reputation which Dr. Waterland obtained by this important work did not fail to attract the notice of persons eminent in the church. Dr. Robinson, Bishop of London, had recently expressed his disapprobation of an innovation which some of the *Arian* party were endeavouring to introduce into his diocese, in substituting for the accustomed form of *doxology* in the singing psalms, another more conformable to their own persuasions. Mr. Whiston, in his Memoirs of Dr. Clarke, states, that "Dr. "Clarke attempted this *small* alteration for his parish of St. "James's." Dr. Disney, in his Memoirs of Dr. Sykes, mentions the same circumstance. The Bishop deemed it necessary to address a letter of caution to his clergy, admonishing them to discountenance these irregular practices. The letter brought upon him some rude attacks from Whiston, Sykes, and others; but it gave occasion also to a more full investigation of the primitive doxologies, as bearing testimony to our Lord's Divinity; and thus became a seasonable and useful topic of discussion[c].

Soon after Dr. Waterland had published his "Defence of the "Queries," the Bishop took the opportunity of testifying his high opinion of the author, by appointing him to preach the Lady Moyer's lecture, then recently founded[d]. Lady Moyer's will

[b] See below, Query v. p. 321. See also, more at large, his arguments in defence of Query xxiii. pp. 474—489 of this vol.

[c] The two ablest tracts in this short controversy were supposed to be written by Dr. Wm. Berriman, and were entitled, 1. "A seasonable Re-"view of Mr. Whiston's Account of "primitive Doxologies." 2. "A "second Review in answer to Mr. "Whiston's second Letter. 1719."

[d] The following is an extract from the will of the Lady Moyer, or, as she is therein styled, "Dame Rebecca "Moyer, late of the parish of St. "Andrew Holborn, in the county of "Middlesex, widow.

"My now dwelling house in Bed-"ford row or Jockey field I give to "my dear child Eliza Moyer, that "out of it may be paid twenty

bears date, Dec. 16, 1782, and was proved, Feb. 21, 1785. It appears, therefore, that she had endowed this lecture about three or four years before her death. Dr. Waterland being the first who was appointed to it; and as his sermons were published in 1730, it is probable that they were preached in the preceding year. No mention is made in the will of vesting the appointment of the preacher in the Bishop of London. But from Dr. W.'s expression in his dedication to the Bishop, that the sermons were "drawn up and preached under his Lordship's "influence," it may be inferred, that Lady Moyer herself had consulted with the Bishop, and requested his recommendation

"guineas a year to an able Minister "of God's word, to preach eight "sermons every year on the Trinity, "and Divinity of our ever blessed Sav-"our, beginning with the first Thurs-"day in November, and so the first "Thursday in the seven sequel "months, in St. Paul's, if permitted "there, or, if not, elsewhere, ac-"cording to the discretion of my "executrix, who will not think it any "incumbrance to her house. I am "sure it will bring a blessing on it, "if that work be well and carefully "carried on, which in this prodigate "age is so neglected. If my said "daughter should leave no children "alive at her death, or they should "die before they come to age, then I "give my said house to my niece "Lydia Moyer, now wife to Peter "Hartop, Esq. and to her heirs after "her, she always providing for that "sermon, as I have begun, twenty "guineas every year."

There is a list of the preachers of this lecture at the end of Mr. John Berriman's "Critical Dissertation on "1 Tim. iii. 16." (which is the substance of the lectures he preached) down to the year 1740-1; and in a copy of that book in Sion college library, there is a continuation of the list, in MS. by Mr. John Berriman, to the year 1748. In the year 1757, they were preached by Mr. Wm. Clements, librarian of Sion college, but he did not publish them till 1797. In the year 1764, or thereabouts, the preacher was Benjamin Dawson, LL.D. who printed them under the title of "An Illustration of several Texts "of Scripture, particularly wherein "the Logos occurs. 1765." Dr. Thomas Morell, author of the "Thesaurus Græcæ Poeseos," is supposed to have been the last. Mr. Watts, the present librarian of Sion college, (to whom the reader is indebted for the information here given,) heard him preach one of them in January 1773. One of these lectures Dr. M. published, without his name, in April 1774. It was written against Landsey, and entitled, "The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity justified."

In the Gentleman's Magazine for 1804, p. 187, mention is made of a Mrs. Moyer, who "died at Low "Layton, Feb. 1804, the widow of "Benjamin Moyer, Esq. son of Law-"rence Moyer, merchant, who suc-"ceeded as heir of his uncle, Sir "Samuel Moyer, a rich Turkey mer-"chant, Sheriff of Essex, in 1698, "Bart. 1701, died 1716. His widow "Rebecca, sister of Sir Wm. Jolliffe, "Knt. founded the lecture, *for a* "*limited number of years*." This does not however appear to have been the case; no *limitation* being mentioned in Lady Moyer's will. But since there is no compulsory obligation in the will to perpetuate the lecture, the probability is, that in course of time (perhaps immediately after Dr. Morell's turn expired) the property fell into other hands, and the lecture was no longer continued.

of a fit person. Certainly, no appointment could be better suited to Dr. W.'s pursuits, or better calculated to reflect credit upon the institution.

In the dedication of this work, the author takes occasion to compliment the Bishop on his "truly primitive zeal against "the adversaries of our common faith;" and speaks of "the "attempt to introduce, by a private authority, new forms "of doxology, in opposition to these now in use, as justly "to be abhorred by all that have the honour of our blessed "Lord, and of our common Christianity, near at heart."

The Preface contains remarks upon two pamphlets; one entitled, "Modest Plea continued," &c. the other, "Unity of God "not inconsistent with the Divinity of Christ," &c. Of the *former* of these it is observed, that the author does not offer any particular scheme of his own, though he evidently adopts that of the Arians; that he constantly avoids coming to the pinch of the question between Catholics and Arians; that he never attempts any proof of God the Son's being a *creature*, never undertakes to justify *creature-worship*, nor endeavours to clear the Arian scheme of the difficulties with which it is charged. His ambiguous use of the term *necessarily-existent* is also noticed; as well as several evasive modes of expression, by which the reader is left in doubt what the author's real sentiments and persuasions may be, although the general tendency to Arianism is manifest. The *latter* of these pamphlets hardly seems to have been worthy of notice, nor such an one as Dr. Clarke himself could have read with satisfaction. Dr. Waterland treats its absurdities with good-humoured pleasantry, as the reveries of "a grave, sober writer, who ingenuously speaks his "mind, without any doublings or disguises."

The eight sermons contained in this volume, Dr. W. says, "may be looked upon as a *Supplement* to his Vindication "of Christ's Divinity, before published;" avoiding, as far as possible, repetitions of former arguments, unless for the purpose

of giving them additional strength; omitting also entirely the argument from *worship*, as having been before distinctly and fully considered. The topics, however, which are brought forward, are of the first importance. With the exception of that of the divine worship paid to our Saviour, they comprise every thing requisite to establish his true Divinity, and to shew that this doctrine does not impugn the *Unity* of the Godhead. The work, therefore, though regarded by its author as supplementary only to his former volume, is in itself an entire and perfect treatise, didactic rather than polemic, and such as may be read with advantage by every student in theology; exhibiting, within a moderate compass, a luminous and comprehensive view of the subject. It has accordingly obtained a more extensive circulation, perhaps, than any of the author's other writings; and within these few years has been reprinted from the University press at Oxford; circumstances, which render it less necessary to dwell upon its particular merits.

Scarcely had Dr. Waterland completed this portion of his labours, than he was again called into action by an opponent of no ordinary powers. Dr. Whitby, to whose earlier studies in theology the public had been indebted for an excellent commentary on the New Testament; and who, at that period, had shewn no bias to sentiments at variance with the established Creed, became a convert to Dr. Clarke's opinions, and advocated them with considerable warmth. Besides other tracts of this tendency, he published, in the year 1718, a small volume, entitled, "Disquisitiones modestæ in clarissimi Bulli Defensionem "Fidei Nicenæ." This work he dedicated to Dr. Clarke; acknowledging, however, that he had not yet entirely satisfied himself as to the correctness of Dr. C.'s view of the doctrines in question; but was desirous of shewing that the controversies then agitated on the subject of the Trinity could not be decided by any clear and certain evidence from the *writings of the Fathers*; and that Bishop Bull, in endeavouring to prove the conformity between modern orthodox believers and the *Ante-Nicene* Fathers, had wandered from the truth, and laboured

in vain. This position he purposed to establish, by proofs that many of the opinions adduced by Bishop Bull from these Fathers, in defence of the Nicene faith, differed not from those of persons who were *adverse* to that faith; and that the learned Prelate had brought in aid of his cause some writings evidently spurious. But before he enters upon these proofs, he lays down, in his Preface, two preliminary maxims, which he regards as the proper foundation of all inquiries into these subjects; —1st, That nothing can be revealed or proposed as an article of faith, which the human mind cannot understand;—2dly, That Scripture is the only rule, by which the truth of any article of faith can be determined; because faith is an assent to the testimony of God.

Bishop Bull died in 1709. His "Defensio Fidei Nicenæ" was published in 1685. Why Dr. Whitby so long delayed his animadversions on this book, and thought fit to reserve them till the author was laid in his grave, it might be difficult satisfactorily to explain. The tone and temper of his "Disquisitions" do not, indeed, perfectly correspond with the candour and deference towards that venerable Prelate, which the title-page seems to indicate. This did not escape Waterland's notice; and accordingly, in the defence of his 26th Query, he comments with some severity upon Dr. Whitby's book. He charges him with some general *fallacies* running through the whole work; —1st, His making no distinction between *essence* and *person*, but always subjoining to the term *essence* the words *individual* or *numerical*, so as to identify it with *person*, and to make the Nicene faith appear to be mere Sabellianism; 2dly, His assuming, that because the Arians did not scruple sometimes to use the same high and strong terms to denote the Divinity of Christ, therefore the Ante-Nicene Fathers, when they used such expressions, meant no more by them than the Arians;—3dly, His assuming, on the other hand, that because the Ante-Nicene Fathers distinguished God from Christ, or the Father from the Son, and called the Father, God, absolutely, and without any distinguishing appellation, therefore they intended

thereby (as the *Arians* did) to exclude the Son from that title, in its unqualified acceptation. Dr. Waterland then proceeds to the next general charge of *defects, misquotations, misconstructions,* and *misrepresentations;* which is pursued somewhat *more in detail,* though not extended to any considerable length.

Dr. Whitby's reply is keen and acrimonious. In repelling the *general fallacies* charged upon him, he is certainly not successful; neither explicitly denying, nor satisfactorily defending them; but lightly passing them over, as of minor importance. On the charge of *misquotations, misconstructions,* &c. he is more diffuse and more vehement; always bold and confident, sometimes dexterous and acute; but, in general, much inferior, in point of wariness and discretion, to his friend Dr. Clarke; whom, indeed, he seems less anxious to defend, than to heap obloquy upon Bull and Waterland. Towards the conclusion, he more openly drops the defensive character, and assumes that of the assailant; retorting the charges of fallacies, misrepresentations, and misconstructions; accusing his opponent of not clearly defining the meaning of the words *person* and *personality,* nor confirming the doctrine of the *consubstantiality* and *co-equality* of the Holy Spirit by any authorities among the Ante-Nicene Fathers. He also accuses Dr. Waterland of "a perpetual fallacy, "in using the word *hypostasis* to signify neither a *general* "essence, that is, an essence common to all the three, nor an "*existent,* or an *individual* essence."

To this angry pamphlet Waterland returned a speedy Answer; in which he again notices the author's general fallacy of making *essence* and *person* to signify the same, and his unfair application of the term *individual* or *numerical* essence, in order to fix upon the Trinitarian doctrine the appearance of Sabellianism. This, he contends, was raising a dispute, not upon what Bishop Bull himself had maintained, but upon something which his opponent presumed to be his opinion. "The question "with Bishop Bull," says Waterland, "was, whether the Ante-"Nicene Fathers believed the Son to be of an *eternal, uncreated,*

" and strictly *divine* substance. But with *you*, it is, whether " they believed him to be the same *numerical intellectual essence* " (that is, as you interpret it, *person*) with the Father. Thus you " have changed the very state of the *general* question."—" Your " *excuses* for this," he adds, " are reducible to three heads. 1st, " That you did not know what Bishop Bull meant. 2dly, That " you had interpreted *numerical essence* as all the present " *orthodox* do, whose cause Bishop Bull is supposed to have " espoused. 3dly, That numerical essence, does and must signify " what you pretend, and nothing else:—taking it for granted, that " there is no medium between *numerical*, in your sense, and " *specific*; that is, no medium between *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*. " This, indeed, is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος, the prime falsehood, which " you set out with, and proceed upon; and which makes all your " discourses on this head confused, and wide of the point." Upon these fallacies our author enlarges with great effect; and since they lie at the root of *Arianism*, extend to all its ramifications, and equally apply to Dr. Clarke and Mr. Jackson, as to Dr. Whitby; the exposure of them may be regarded as of more general importance, than the proofs he again urged, and confirmed by additional evidence, of Whitby's misquotations and misconstructions of the Ante-Nicene Fathers. Adverting also to Dr. Whitby's peremptory assertion, that *his* sense of the phrase *numerical essence* is the only *proper* sense that it will bear, Waterland takes occasion thus to expostulate with him, in terms equally applicable to every other rash attempt to dogmatize *metaphysically* upon the nature and essence of the Godhead:— " I will give you a plain reason why you can never prove your " sense of the words to be the only *proper* sense: it is because " you can never fix any *certain principle of individuation*. It is " for want of this, that you can never assure me, that three *real* " persons may not be, or are not, one *numerical*, or *individual* " substance. In short, you know not, precisely, what it is that " makes *one being*, or *one essence*, or *one substance*. Here your " *metaphysics* are plainly defective: and this it is that renders " all your speculations upon that head vain and fruitless. Tell " me plainly, is the *divine substance* present in every place, in

" *whole*, or in *part*? Is the *substance* which is present here upon " earth, that very *individual numerical substance* which is pre- " sent in heaven, or is it not? Your answer to these questions " may perhaps suggest something to you, which may help you " out of your difficulties relating to the *Trinity*; or else the " sense of your inability to answer *either*, may teach you to be " less cnofident in matters so much above you, and to confess " your ignorance in things of this nature, as I do freely mine." To the charges retorted upon him by Dr. Whitby, Waterland postponed any answer, until they should assume a more tangible character. In the mean while, he concludes with warning him against a recurrence to certain *presumptions* in argument, which run through the whole of his writings in this controversy, and which betray him into continual sophistries, easy to be detected.

Dr. Whitby, with great alacrity, resumed the contest, and published " The second Part of a Reply to Dr. Waterland's " Objections, with an Appendix in defence of the first Part of the " Reply." In this he reiterates and enlarges upon the several charges of *fallacy* before imputed to Waterland, with respect to the terms *person* and *personality*; vindicates his own application of the terms, *nature, essence*, and *substance*; and lays down ten metaphysical "*postulata*, or propositions, confirmed" (as he asserts) " by the clearest evidence of reason," to serve as criteria by which the several points in dispute should be determined. Had these *postulata* been admitted as indubitable truths, they would indeed have superseded any further discussion; since, in substance, they included almost every point for which Dr. Whitby had contended. But with respect to any weight of authority, or argument, that could be claimed for them, they were nothing more than the mere *placita* of Dr. Whitby himself; opinions, already controverted by his opponent, and which he had been called upon to establish by satisfactory proofs. Upon such gratuitous assumptions almost the whole reasoning of this pamphlet is founded. It amounted, therefore, to little more than a repetition of the former Reply; and this was probably the reason that Waterland, for the present, suffered it to pass

unnoticed. His attention, indeed, just at this period, was drawn off in another direction.

Dr. Clarke, in the *first* edition of his "Scripture-Doctrine of "the Trinity," had laid it down as a maxim, that in complying with any formularies or confessions of faith imposed by *Protestant* communities, who professed to be guided solely by *Scripture-authority*, "every person may reasonably agree to such forms, "*whenever he can, in any sense at all, reconcile them with Scrip-* "*ture.*" Upon this extraordinary proposition severe animadversions had been made by some of his opponents. Several of his personal friends had also expostulated with him, upon the danger of giving such encouragement to insincerity and prevarication. In consequence of these censures, and probably from some secret misgivings in his own mind, he, in the *second* edition of his book, omitted this passage with some others of a similar tendency. Still there was reason to suspect that this was his real opinion, and that he only forbore to repeat it in consequence of the obloquy it had brought upon him. The ill effect therefore was not done away. Some would gladly take advantage of an authority so respectable, to allow themselves still greater latitude than he had done, in the interpretation of Creeds and Articles of Faith. Some, who held all religion in contempt, would seize the opportunity of scoffing at those who, while professing the most reverential regard for it, could thus tamper with its most sacred obligations. Others, though coinciding with the author himself in his doctrinal view, would either lament his want of consistency and firmness, or endeavour, for the sake of the cause itself, to give him countenance and support.

In no other point, perhaps, was this generally excellent and conscientious man so vulnerable to others, or so dissatisfied with himself. If we may credit his own personal friends and biographers, he must have suffered more even from the censures of those who highly esteemed him, than from the keenest sarcasms of his declared opponents. Many strong passages occur in

Whiston's Life of Dr. Clarke, reproving him, in direct terms, for his disingenuous and prevaricating conduct in vindicating Arian subscription to the Articles of our Church. Whiston was of too resolute and unbending a disposition to approve of such compromising expedients; and his endeavours were sedulously exerted, in conversation and in correspondence, by public and by private remonstrance, to prevail with Dr. Clarke to abandon so untenable a ground of defence. The subject, indeed, became a matter of warm controversy between several distinguished writers, both for and against Arianism. Dr. Sykes laboured to defend Arian subscription. Whiston and Emlyn indignantly disclaimed it. All these, however, joined in endeavouring to prove, that those who had subscribed some of our Articles in an *Anti-Calvinistic* sense, were no less chargeable with prevarication than they who had subscribed other articles in an *Anti-Trinitarian* sense.

Under these circumstances, Dr. W. published his tract, entitled, "The Case of Arian Subscription considered, and the "several Pleas and Excuses for it particularly examined and con-"futed." He states the immediate occasion of his writing it, to have been the publication of certain *Remarks* (probably by some anonymous writer) "against a *clause* contained in a bill brought "into the House of Lords, for the more effectual suppressing "of *blasphemy* and *profaneness*;"—in which publication it had been observed, "that the *clause*, being intended as a *test* against "*Arianism*, would be of little use or significancy as to the end "designed by it; because those who are now understood to be "Arians are ready to subscribe any *test* of that kind, containing "nothing more than is already contained in the XXXIX. "Articles." The *Remarker* (Dr. W. adds) "takes notice, that "these gentlemen make no scruple of subscribing to our "Church's forms: it is their *avowed principle* that they may "lawfully do it in their *own* sense, agreeably to what they call "Scripture. This is proved from their declared sentiments, not "only in common conversation, but in print; and from their

" constant practice of late years, since the year 1712;" that is, since the date of Dr. C.'s *first* edition of his Scripture-doctrine.

Upon this subject Waterland's thoughts had been long before occupied; as appears from the Divinity Act which he had kept for the Degree of B.D. in the year 1714, on the question, *Whether Arian subscription was lawful;* and the great applause he received on that occasion, though opposed by a most able antagonist, is a farther testimony that he had thoroughly considered and digested whatever might be urged on either side. As a reason, however, for not having enlarged upon this point in his late " Defence of the Queries," he states, that the offensive passages in Dr. Clarke's *first* edition having been omitted in the *second*, he was willing to hope that Dr. C. " had given, or was " giving up his former principles, relating to subscription;" and he " thought it would be ungenerous now to attack him in his " *weakest hold*, after he had himself betrayed a suspicion, at " least, that he could no longer maintain it." Some anonymous writer, however, had rashly ventured to take Dr. Waterland to task, even for the gentle admonition he had given upon this point, in his former work: and had also stated his belief, that Dr. C.'s omission of these passages in his second edition " was " *not* for the reason Dr. W. insinuated, viz. *that such subscription* " *is not justifiable.*" Dr. W. therefore wishes to be understood " as not disputing this point with *Dr. Clarke* himself, so much " as with his *disciples*, who laid a greater stress upon what he " had said, than he himself now seemed to do."

This is one of our author's ablest productions, and may be read with great advantage for the soundness and importance of its general principles, on a question deeply affecting moral integrity as well as purity of doctrine; independently of the particular case to which it more immediately relates.

The defence of Arian subscription " rests (says Dr. Water- " land) upon *two suppositions:* — 1. That every expression in

"our public forms is *capable* of a sense consistent with the *new* "*scheme*. 2. That their being *capable* of such a sense is "enough; without regard had to the more plain, obvious, and "natural signification of the *words* themselves, or to the *in-* "*tention* of those who first compiled the forms, or who now "impose them. If either of these suppositions, (much more "if both,) prove false or groundless, their whole defence of "*Arian subscription* drops of course." Dr. W. proceeds, therefore, to shew, "1. That the sense of the *compilers* and "*imposers* (where certainly known) must be *religiously* ob- "served; even though the words were *capable* of another "sense. 2. That whatever has been pretended, there are "several expressions in the *public forms*, which are really not "*capable* of any sense consistent with the *Arian hypothesis*, "or *new scheme*."

On the first proposition he argues, that as in the case of *oaths* imposed by the State, so in the case of *subscriptions* required by the *Church*, to *pretend* one sense in which the terms of the covenant are entered into, and to *mean* another, is manifestly a violation of the agreement, and a direct prevarication; that subscriptions so made are *fraudulent*, because contrary to the very purpose for which they are required to be made, which is, that *pastors* may be *sound in the faith*, that no doctrines be taught but such as the Church and State approve, and that *diversity of opinions* may be *avoided*;—also that such practices cannot but bring scandal upon religion, and be attended with pernicious influence.

Our author next considers the several *pleas* (sixteen in number) alleged in behalf of the new latitudinarian notions of subscription; and these are cited chiefly from Dr. Clarke's Introduction to his Scripture-doctrine, his Reply to Mr. Nelson, Sykes's Modest Plea, Bishop Hoadly's Postscript, and one or two other writings of inferior note. In sifting these pleas, Waterland carefully discriminates between the right of the Church to *impose* Articles of Faith, and the obligation of those

who subscribe them, to subscribe in the same *sense* which the Church intended. Many of the pleas alleged, go to the extent of denying to the Church the right of affixing any determinate sense to Articles of Faith professedly founded upon Scripture; and presume that the subscriber himself is to judge what that sense shall be. This, Dr. W. shews, is subverting the very principle on which the authority of all Creeds and Articles of Faith must depend; and, "if it proves any thing, proves the "*unlawfulness* of *imposing* any forms, not the *lawfulness* of "subscribing in a sense different from that of the *imposers*." Other pleas, again, do not rightly distinguish between the rule for *understanding* these formularies, and the rule for *receiving* them. They argue, that if the sense intended by the framers and imposers of such articles is not that in which our understandings concur, we may receive and subscribe to them in some other sense which we ourselves approve: whereas the plain and obvious inference should be, that, in such case, we ought not to *receive* them or subscribe to them. To another plea, that the Church of England, in her 6th, 8th, 20th, and 21st Articles, declares, that the Creeds are to be received and believed, because "*they may be proved by most certain warrants* "*of holy Scripture;*" and that, consequently, they are to be received only *in such a sense* as *Scripture* will warrant;—Dr. Waterland replies, that the Church having determined that *nothing is to be received but what is agreeable to Scripture*, for this very reason requires subscription in her *own* sense, because she judges no other sense to be *agreeable to Scripture:* and if any judge otherwise, let them not *subscribe*. But it was further contended, on the other side, that unless this liberty were allowed, no one could subscribe the Articles, Creeds, and Liturgy of the Church of England; because they contain things which, if taken in their *obvious* sense, would contradict one another. To this it is answered, that, so far as relates to *Arian* subscription, their *obvious* sense is clearly opposite to the Arian hypothesis; and that the Arians, however they may be inclined to *subscribe* to these formularies in a sense conformable to their own doctrine, are never found, when they write or speak for

themselves, to use terms so irreconcilable with their tenets, as those which they thus endeavour to wrest from their plain signification. Again; it was strenuously maintained, on the other hand, that they who held the doctrines of Predestination and Original Sin in the *Arminian* sense, made no scruple of subscribing Articles which, on those points, are *Calvinistic;* and that *Arians* are not chargeable with greater prevarication, in subscribing articles usually thought to be *Athanasian.* In answer to this plea, Dr. Waterland shews that the cases are by no means parallel; the former doctrines being laid down only in *general* terms, without any *specific* interpretation, and therefore left, in some degree, indefinite, as to the particular sense in which they are to be received;—whilst the latter are guarded most carefully and explicitly against any other interpretation, than such as is utterly inadmissible by Arian expositors.

These several *pleas* being dismissed, the tract concludes with a more detailed examination of Dr. Clarke's attempts to reconcile our public formularies with his own expositions of Scripture on the doctrine of the Trinity, and demonstrates how entirely his labours had failed.

To this tract an answer was soon after published by Mr. Sykes, entitled, "The Case of Subscription to the Thirty-nine "Articles considered, occasioned by Dr. Waterland's Case of "Arian Subscription." The main object of this answer was, to retort upon Dr. Waterland, and other writers on the same side, the charge of subscribing to the Articles in a private sense of their own, different from that of the framers or imposers of the Articles; and to vindicate the Arian party, upon the same ground on which Waterland had vindicated those who, in certain *particular* explications of doctrine, might differ from each other, though they subscribed to the same *general* propositions. This mode of recrimination was far from being generally approved by Dr. Clarke's friends. Mr. Whiston, Mr. Emlyn,

and afterwards Archdeacon Blackburn, author of the "Confes-"sional," and Dr. Disney, the biographer of Dr. Sykes, expressed much dissatisfaction at an attempt, which only tended to inculpate others, without acquitting the parties who had been put upon their defence. Moreover, the whole force of such reasoning depended upon satisfactory proof, that the differences in the one case were as irreconcilable as those in the other. To give it due effect, Mr. Sykes should have shewn, on the one hand, that the respective opinions of Bishop Bull, or Drs. Wallis, South, Sherlock, and Bennet, were no less at variance with the Creeds, Articles, and Liturgy of our Church, than those maintained by Dr. Clarke and Mr. Whiston; or, on the other hand, that, on the points disputed between Arminians and Calvinists, our Church had laid down the *sense* in which those points should be received, with the same precision and authoritative injunction, as in those which related to the doctrine of the Trinity. Such an attempt, however, had been already anticipated by Dr. Waterland, and successfully obviated, in his "Case of Arian Sub-"scription." He had there clearly stated what extent of latitude the compilers or imposers of the Articles had actually given in these respective cases: and he argued, that in proportion as the terms in which any proposition is expressed are *general, comprehensive*, or *indefinite*, in that same proportion there is room left for *diversity* of sentiment in the explication of the proposition; but that where the particular sense is given in *plain, distinct*, and *specific* terms, there the same latitude could not possibly have been intended. On this solid ground of distinction his objections to Arian subscription were founded; objections, applicable only to tenets irreconcilable with *essential* articles of faith, distinctly propounded, and not to *minor* differences of opinion, on which no such express declarations had been made.

Upon this point Mr. Sykes avoids, as much as possible, coming into close quarters with his antagonist. Waterland had said, "*both sides* may subscribe to the same *general* proposition,

"and both in the *same sense*, which sense reaches not to the "*particulars* in dispute." This Mr. Sykes treats as a *concession* of principle, by which his own cause may be defended. "Is "there more difference," he asks, "between two men who both "acknowledge the *Trinity*, but differ in the particular explica-"tion of it, than there is in two men, who both acknowledge "*predestination*, but differ in the particular explication of that "doctrine?" And again; "There is not a greater difference in "point of the *Trinity*, betwixt a man that is allowed to be "*orthodox*, and one that is called an *Arian*, than there is in "the point of *predestination*, betwixt a *Calvinist* and an "*Arminian*." But this was not the real question in debate. It might be true, that there is no greater *difference* in the one case than in the other. But the point in question was this: Had the Church in her Articles, Creeds, and Liturgy, left the points in dispute equally *undecided*; and *allowed* a similar diversity in the explication of them? Had she not left those between Calvinists and Arminians more open to an acceptation of them in either sense, than those between Arians and Trinitarians? Mr. Sykes does not fairly grapple with the question, as thus stated by Waterland; and therefore his general reasoning upon this *supposed concession* is fallacious. This error runs through his whole performance. Much of his reasoning tends also rather to shew that the Church ought not to exercise any authority in imposing articles of faith, or in restricting the interpretation of them to her own sense; than to justify those persons who receive them in a different and contrary sense. Two questions are thus blended together, which ought to be kept asunder; since neither of them essentially depends upon the other. Nor should it pass unobserved, that Mr. S. assumes throughout, that our Articles were framed by *Calvinists*, and were *intended* to be taken exclusively in a *Calvinistic* sense;—assumptions which both Bp. Bull and Dr. Waterland had strenuously controverted, and which in later times have been still more thoroughly examined and disproved.

Dr. Waterland deemed it expedient to reply to this pamphlet,

in a tract entitled, "A Supplement to the Case of Arian Sub-
"scription considered."

After briefly noticing that Mr. Sykes had "taken for granted,
"and reasoned all the way upon the supposition, that the Arti-
"cles of our Church, so far as concerns the Trinity, are *general*,
"*indefinite*, *undeterminate*, not *particular*, *special*, or *determi-*
"*nate*;" and had also manifested a disposition to exclude the *Liturgy* from being taken into consideration with the *Articles*; he proceeds to a fuller explanation of what had been advanced in his former tract. He exhibits, in contrast, the Scripture-doctrine of the Trinity, *according to Dr. Clarke*; and the Scripture-doctrine of the Trinity, *according to the Church of England* in her public forms;—two schemes palpably irreconcilable with each other. He demonstrates, also, by several of the plainest inferences, that the abettors of Dr. Clarke's scheme do, in reality, make God the Son a *creature*, however they may verbally disclaim it. They speak of Him as *finite*, *precarious* in existence, *dependent* on the will of another; they avoid nothing but the *name* of *creature*, while they inculcate the *thing*. This strange incongruity between Dr. Clarke's sentiments and those of the Church of England is still further exposed, by shewing how they appear when blended together in one profession of faith. Dr. W. then proceeds to answer, *seriatim*, Mr. Sykes's objections to the positions laid down in the "Case of Arian Subscription;" more particularly with reference to what had been said on the supposed *Calvinistic* Articles. This part of the work is executed with admirable spirit and vivacity, as well as with sound and solid judgment. Nothing can be more satisfactory than his vindication of our Church against those who insist that her Articles will admit of no other construction, or were intended to admit of no other, than such as favours the abettors of Calvinism. He abundantly proves that no such conclusion can fairly be drawn from the words of the Articles themselves; much less from an historical view of the intent with which they were framed. The argument, therefore, in favour of Arian subscription, grounded upon this

pretext, is shewn to be utterly untenable, and the attempt at recrimination, resulting from it, evasive and futile.

Mr. Sykes, however, would not thus be driven from the field. He soon put forth a "Reply to Dr. Waterland's Supplement;" of which his biographer, Dr. Disney, thus speaks:—"The "design and aim of this 'Reply' is to argue specially, that the "Articles and phrases usually called Trinitarian will bear an "Arian sense; an assumption that was denied by Dr. Water-"land. That scholastic terms, used with much subtlety, may "twist and distort some expressions, which in themselves are "certainly unscriptural, may be admitted; but it is one thing "to confound, and another to convince the understanding. "And it yet remains to be proved, that the Articles will, in "their usual grammatical meaning, bear an Arian sense." According to this ingenuous confession, Mr. Sykes failed in his main purpose. The secondary purpose, that of retorting the charge upon his adversary, Dr. Disney seems to think he has fully accomplished. More impartial readers, however, will probably be of opinion that he has equally failed in this. Considerable talent and ingenuity are undoubtedly displayed in both attempts; but that he has in neither satisfactorily refuted Waterland, is a conclusion, upon which it may safely be left to the judgment of unprejudiced men to decide. The other point, respecting the *Calvinistic* tendency of our Articles, is less laboured by Mr. Sykes than the former; nor would it be difficult to shew, that his reasoning is, in many respects, sophistical and disingenuous. This topic, however, has been, of late years, much more amply discussed; and the accession of historical evidence which has been adduced in illustration of it has more and more strongly confirmed Dr. Waterland's statement.

Waterland pursued this part of the controversy no further. His time and attention must, indeed, have been very fully occupied in other matters, from the publication of his "Defence" in 1719, to the year 1722, when his "Supplement to the Case of

"Arian Subscription" appeared; since besides the works already mentioned, some lesser pieces (hereafter to be noticed) were the fruit of his labours during this short period. Nor was he even now allowed a respite. His first opponent, *The Clergyman in the Country*, again challenged him to the combat; and he was not slack in taking up the gauntlet.

In the spring of 1722, this Clergyman (Mr. Jackson) published "A Reply to Dr. Waterland's Defence of his Queries;" a volume of considerable bulk, "wherein," according to the title-page, "is contained a full state of the whole controversy; and "every particular alleged by that learned writer is distinctly "considered." This elaborate performance is the work of which notice had been given at the end of Dr. Clarke's "Modest "Plea continued;" and in which, there is reason to believe, Dr. Clarke himself had no inconsiderable share[e].

In the preface to this Reply, the author censures Dr. Waterland for entitling his Defence of the Queries, "A Vindication of "Christ's Divinity," as implying that those who opposed him *denied* that Divinity; "whereas," says Jackson, "the question

[e] The writer of Jackson's Memoirs, speaking of this work, says, "In this our author received considerable assistance from Dr. Clarke, "as he has acknowledged to me." He subjoins also extracts of two letters from Dr. Clarke to Jackson, in one of which, dated June 1719, he says, "I "have interleaved *W—d*, and am "making short notes for you throughout. I believe you need do little "more than *transcribe* all the places "I have marked, with the *remarks I* "*have made upon them;* and then "range them in some proper method, "under *distinct* heads, such as they "will naturally fall under."—In the other letter, dated April 1722, he says, "The large book is just finished; "and upon the whole, I think it contains so full and clear an answer to "every thing that Dr. W. has alleged, "that you may with reason expect "every scholar, who can find leisure "to read it carefully through, should "be convinced by it."—Jackson himself, however, in his Memoirs of Waterland, (pp. 23, 25,) denies that Dr. C. was "called in to assist him in it;" but "owns that when he had drawn it "up, he thought it prudent to leave "it to Dr. Clarke's judgment to *correct, alter*, or *add* any thing, as he "thought fit; and that the 'Reply,' "on the whole, was rendered much "better, and more unanswerable, for "the corrections and additions made "to it by Dr. Clarke."—Taking both accounts together, therefore, it appears probable that Dr. C. at first supplied the author with *materials* for his Reply, and afterwards gave him the benefit of his suggestions and corrections for its improvement, when finished.

"is not indeed at all concerning *the Divinity of Christ*, but con-
"cerning *the particular manner of explication of that doctrine*,"
and whether "the true notion of the Divinity of God the Father
"Almighty does not imply, that He ALONE is supreme in author-
"ity and dominion over all." He complains also of Dr. Water-
land's "perpetual *unrighteous* use of the term *Arians* and *Arian-*
"*ism*," with reference to his opponents, "though they never
"assert" (says Mr. J.) "any of the peculiar tenets of *Arius*."
He moreover charges Dr. W. with "artificially concealing from
"the reader throughout, from the beginning to the end of
"his book, the *true* and indeed the *only material point in ques-*
"*tion*, viz. That WHATEVER *be the metaphysical nature, essence,*
"*or substance, of the Son; whatever be his unlimited past du-*
"*ration; whatever divine titles, greatness, or dignity, be ascribed to*
"*him in Scripture; still, there being confessedly in the monarchy*
"*of the universe but one authority, original in the Father, deriva-*
"*tive in the Son; therefore,* THE ONE GOD (*absolutely speaking*) *the*
"*one* SUPREME *God, always and necessarily signifies Him, in*
"*whom alone the power or authority is supreme, original, and un-*
"*derived; and on whom alone, consequently, all honour and worship*
"*primarily or ultimately terminates.*"

It is not easy to give a compendious view of such a work as this. Every one of the Queries discussed in the former work is here reexamined, the objections to them restated, the principles on which they had been drawn up and defended by Dr. W. again reviewed, and vehemently contested. On the other hand, the author reiterates all his former positions; assumes, as indisputable, points which his adversary had denied, and called upon him either to prove or to retract; and dilates upon arguments the very same in substance as those which had already been controverted.

Thus, on Query 1st, the very first sentence is a repetition of what had been affirmed in the former work, that the texts in Isaiah, and others, relating to the one supreme God, "do all of
"them *most expressly and uniformly* speak of a *person*, and

" not of a BEING, as distinguished from a person;" and " there-
" fore, not only *all other* BEINGS, but all other *persons* whatsoever
" are *expressly* excluded, besides the *person* there speaking;"—
" which person is *the one God and Father of all.*" So again, on the 2d Query, the real point in dispute is never fairly met, whether Christ can be God at all, unless he be the same God with the Father; but the distinction is still assumed as unquestionable between the Father as *supreme* God, and the Son as an *inferior* God. In like manner, in reply to the charge of " holding " two Gods, one supreme, another inferior," instead of any direct answer, an attempt is made, as before, to retaliate upon Dr. W. the charge of holding " two *supreme* Gods." It is obvious, that answers and replies so conducted may be extended *ad infinitum*, and no nearer approach made to any satisfactory decision.

It must, however, be acknowledged, that this is, upon the whole, a much more elaborate and able performance than that which had preceded it under the denomination of the Country Clergyman. In many parts it bears strong internal evidence of a more powerful pen than Jackson's: and had the author attended to Dr. C.'s advice to be as " *short*" as possible, and to " do little more than *transcribe* the places Dr. C. had marked, " with the *remarks* upon them," it would probably have produced considerably greater effect.

Early in the following year, Dr. Waterland published his " Second Vindication of Christ's Divinity, or a second Defence " of some Queries relating to Dr. Clarke's scheme of the holy " Trinity, in answer to the Country Clergyman's Reply: wherein " the learned Doctor's scheme as it now stands, after the latest " correction, alteration, and explanation, is distinctly and fully " considered."

Our author, well knowing the importance attached to Jackson's Reply by Dr. Clarke and his friends, and the extraordinary pains that had been taken to render it as complete as possible,

deemed it necessary to leave no part of it unnoticed or unrefuted. "The book," he says, "which I here profess to examine, may "be allowed to contain, in a manner, the whole strength of the "*Arian* cause, *real* or *artificial*; all that can be of any force "either to *convince* or to *deceive* a reader." Among the *artificial* means resorted to by that party, he notices, "their disclaiming "the *name*, while they are inculcating the *thing*" objected to;—"their wrapping up their doctrine in *general* and *confused* "terms;"—their elaborate and studied prolixity in "proving "such points as nobody calls in question, and then slipping "upon the reader, in their stead, something very different from "them, without any proof at all;"—"their avoiding as much as "possible the *defensive* part, where the main stress lies, and "keeping themselves chiefly to the *offensive*; perpetually "objecting to the *Catholic* scheme, instead of clearing up the "difficulties which clog their own;"—their bending their main force against our "*consequential* doctrine, of *three Persons* "*being one God*, instead of directly attacking our *premises*, that "the *divine titles and attributes belong equally to every one*; as "to which the Scripture is very full and *express*." "But," he adds, "their masterpiece of subtilty lies in contriving a set of "*ambiguous* and *equivocal* terms, to put the main *question* into; "such as may be capable of a *Catholic* sense, or at least look very "like it, in order to claim some countenance from Catholic anti-"quity; but such as may also be drawn to an *Arian* meaning, "that so they may secure the point which they intend."—The remainder of Dr. Waterland's Preface is employed in "obviating "two objections of very different kinds, which had lately been "made by men of very opposite principles;" one, by Mr. Whiston, who, in his Reply to Lord Nottingham, seemed to think it *singular* that the suffrage of the *Ante-Nicene* Church should be claimed in favour of the *Athanasian* doctrines;—the other, by the anonymous author of two letters to Lord Nottingham and Mr. Whiston, who was "for entirely waving all searches into *antiquity*, "in relation to this controversy, as being either *needless* or "*fruitless*."

Dr. W. proceeds to examine in detail the whole of the Country Clergyman's Reply; beginning with a distinct answer to the Preface; and then going over the objections to the Queries in regular order. The animadversions on the "Preface" touch upon most of the leading topics of the controversy. Among others which are very happily illustrated, is that of the alleged supremacy of the Father; which, according to Dr. Clarke's scheme, is equivalent to declaring that the *Father alone* is *supreme* God, to the exclusion of God the *Son*. Dr. W. shews, that this fallacy arises from making no distinction between supremacy of *dominion*, and supremacy of *order*, or *office*. "Let the reader," he says, "carefully distinguish *three* things, and he will then be "able of himself to unravel all your pretences, and to throw "off that studied confusion which you are labouring to intro-"duce in a *plain* thing. 1. *Supremacy* of *nature*, or *supremacy* "of *perfection*, is to be possessed of all perfection, and the "*highest* excellency possible: and this is to be GOD. There is "nothing of this kind but what is *common* to Father and Son; "who are therefore *one God supreme*. And as supremacy of "*dominion* and *sovereignty* (properly so called) over all creatures "(as soon as they exist) is included in it, and consequent upon "it, Father and Son have one *common* and *undivided sovereignty* "over all; the constant doctrine of *antiquity*. 2. *Supremacy* of "*order* consists in this; that the Father has his *perfections*, "*dominion*, &c. *from none;* but the Son *from the Father*, "and not *vice versa*. This kind of supremacy is of the Father "*alone:* and the Son's *subordination*, thus understood, is very "consistent with his *equality* of *nature*, *dominion*, *perfection*, "and *glory*, according to all antiquity. 3. *Supremacy* of *office*. "This, by mutual agreement and voluntary *economy*, belongs to "the *Father:* while the Son, out of voluntary condescension, "submits to act *ministerially*, or in capacity of *mediator*. And "the reason why the condescending part became God the *Son*, "rather than God the *Father*, is because he is a *Son*, and "because it best suits with the *natural* order of Persons, which "had been inverted by a contrary *economy*. These things "being fixed and settled, there will be no difficulty in replying

"to any thing you have offered, or can offer, in this cause."—This distinction between a supremacy of *nature* or *perfections*, and a supremacy of *order* and of *office*, is ever to be kept in view. It solves many difficulties in our apprehension of this mysterious and inscrutable subject. It makes the language of Scripture, as applied to the several persons in the Godhead, consistent and intelligible: and though it still leaves us uninformed as to that which is no where revealed, the *mode* in which the Personsthus subsist und er one undivided substance; yet it preserves their united as well as their distinctive properties unimpaired. This was a point, which Bishop Bull had particularly laboured to establish, and had confirmed by the general concurrence of the Nicene and Ante-Nicene Fathers.

For many other important points discussed in this second Vindication, the reader must be referred to the work itself; a work, in which the whole force of our author's great intellectual powers, and of his extensive and profound erudition, appears to have been collected, for the purpose of overwhelming his adversaries by one decisive effort. Scarcely could it be believed, were not the fact avouched by his personal friend, Mr. Seed, that a production, the result of so much labour and research, was "in two months finished, and sent to the press."

His opponents, however, would not suffer the controversy thus to terminate. In the following year, Mr. Jackson, under the newly-assumed title of *Philalethes Cantabrigiensis*, put forth his "Remarks on Dr. Waterland's second Defence of some "Queries." Not long after, Dr. Clarke also published, anonymously, a pamphlet with a similar title, "Observations on Dr. "W.'s second Defence." Dr. Clarke was perhaps not thoroughly satisfied with his friend's performance; nor chose again to hazard his reputation jointly with him, in a matter so critical. Yet still, as heretofore, he appears to have shrunk from openly encountering Waterland, and thought it prudent to conceal his name.

Jackson, in the commencement of his "Remarks," professes

to leave the rejoinder, on the part of Waterland's adversary, to be managed by the same able hand that had replied to his first Defence; which makes it probable that he was aware of Dr. Clarke's intention to undertake the rejoinder himself. Jackson therefore proposes only to consider briefly the *three questions* under which Dr. W. " had reduced and comprised the doc- " trine of the Trinity," towards the conclusion of his second Defence.

The three questions were these:—" 1. *What* the doctrine to " be examined is?—2. Whether it be *possible?*—3. Whether it " be *true?*" The first question, Dr. W. states to comprise these particulars. " 1. That the Father is *God*, (in the strict sense of " *necessarily existing*, as opposed to *precarious* existence,) and the " Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, in the *same* sense of the " word *God*. 2. That the Father is not the Son, nor the Son " the Father, nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son: they " are *distinct*, so that one is not the *other;* that is, as we now " term it, they are three distinct *Persons*, and two of them " *eternally* referred up to *one*. 3. These three, however, *distinct* " enough to be *three Persons*, are yet united enough to be *one* " *God*."

The question, whether this doctrine be *possible*, Dr. W. shews, must depend upon whether the points included in it can be determined in the *negative* with sufficient *certainty*. If they can, the doctrine then will be proved to be *impossible;* if they cannot, it must be allowed to be *possible*. Some short and plain reasons are added, to shew that the *negative* of these positions never has been, nor can be, clearly and satisfactorily proved.

The third question, whether the doctrine be *true*, is to be resolved by *Scripture* and *antiquity*, not by arguments drawn from the *nature of the thing;* because such arguments belong only to the other question, whether the doctrine be *possible;* and the *possibility* is *presupposed* in all our disputes from *Scripture* or from the *Fathers*.

Thus it appears, as Dr. W. observes, that the controversy of the Trinity may be easily brought to a short issue. The strength of the adversaries lies in the question of the *possibility:* and if they have any thing considerable to urge, it may be despatched in very few words; *one demonstration* (if it can be found) being as good as an hundred. If none can be found, the proofs from Scripture and antiquity cannot be overthrown.

The method here proposed is acknowledged by Jackson to be "rational and fair;" and he sets himself to debate the subject upon these grounds. But, instead of debating it on these "fair "and rational" terms, or demonstrating the *impossibility* of the doctrines, in the sense in which they are proposed by Waterland, he affixes to them a sense or interpretation of *his own*, and then argues to shew their falsehood and absurdity. Thus Dr. W. in explaining the different acceptations of the word *person*, had said, "A single person is *an intelligent agent;* having the distinctive "characters of I, Thou, He; and not divided, or distinguished "into more intelligent agents, capable of the same characters." This was stated as a *general* definition, including not only human individuals, but the Persons in the Godhead also, so far as one has any characters *distinct* from the others. "But," says Dr. W. "to clear this matter a little further, we must next distinguish "persons into several kinds; and first, as *divided* and *undivided*. "All persons, *but the three divine Persons*, are divided and "separate from each other in nature, substance, and existence. "They do not mutually include and imply each other: there-"fore they are not only distinct *subjects*, *agents*, or *supposita*, "but distinct *substances* also. But the divine Persons, being "*undivided*, and not having any *separate* existence independent "on each other; they cannot be looked upon as *substances*, but "as *one substance* distinguished into several *supposita*, or intelli-"gent agents." Notwithstanding the express distinction here made between the personality in the *undivided* substance of the *Godhead*, and the *divided* substance, as well as personality, of all *other* beings, Mr. Jackson has the effrontery to say, "You will "give me leave to understand you to mean, that as one person

" is an acting *substance*, an agent in the *singular* number, so *three* " are the *plural* number, i. e. *three acting substances*, or, as you " expressly admit, *three agents*; and that you really mean three " acting substances *distinct*, though not *separate* or *disunited*:" and having thus assumed a meaning absolutely *disclaimed* by Waterland, he proceeds to reason upon the *impossibility* of the thing, as involving a direct contradiction.

Again; Waterland, in order to shew that the *subordination* of one Person in the Godhead to the other does not affect the real *divinity* of that Person, had said " If it be pleaded, that such " *subordination* is not consistent with the *unity*, though it might " be with the *equality* of *nature*, our ideas of the *unity* are too " imperfect to be reasoned solidly upon: nor can any man prove " that every kind of unity must be either *too close* to admit of " any *subordination*, or else *too loose* to make the Persons ONE " GOD. How shall it be shewn, that the *distinction* may not be " great enough to answer the *subordination*, and yet the *union* " close enough to make the Persons *one God?* Our faculties are " not sufficient for these things." Elsewhere he had said; " When I apply *supreme* to the word *God*, I mean, as I ought " to mean, that the Son is God *supreme*, (knowing no *superior* " God, no *divine nature* greater, higher, or more excellent than " his own,) not that he is the *Supreme Father:* who, though " superior in *order*, is not therefore of *superior Godhead*; for " a supremacy of *order* is one thing, a supremacy of *nature*, or " *Godhead*, another." Yet Mr. Jackson says, " I conclude you " must mean a *subordination* of some sort of *prerogative*, *dignity*, " *precedence*, and *authority*, on which to found the *mission* and " the *economy* (which you allow) of the Son's *acting a ministerial* " *part*; being *angel or messenger to the Father*, by the Father's " *voluntary appointment*, and *executing his orders and commands*:" and upon this supposed admission on the part of his opponent, he grounds all his subsequent observations.

With such an adversary it would have been useless further to contend. Dr. Waterland accordingly passed over this production

in silence, until Dr. Clarke thought fit to take the matter into his own hands, by publishing the anonymous "Observations" already mentioned.

To this latter pamphlet Dr. W. replied in a short tract, entitled, "A Farther Vindication of Christ's Divinity, 1724;" in the Introduction to which, he observes, that since the publication of his "Second Defence," he had waited to see what further attempts might be made by the Arians; that the first effort to renew the contest appeared under the title of "Remarks" &c. by one *Philalethes Cantabrigiensis;* but that having no acquaintance with the author under that name, and finding little in the piece but tedious *repetition* and studied *confusion,* he thought himself not obliged to take notice of it. But upon the appearance of these "Observations," stated to be by the author of the "Reply" to his first Defence, he conceived it to be incumbent upon him again to come forward. "Whether it be Dr. Clarke," he adds, "or whether it be Mr. Jackson, (for though it be "doubted which, all agree that it lies between them,) they are "both men whom I must attend to: one, as he is the *principal* in "the cause, the other, as he is *second,* and had the first hand in "committing my "Queries" to the press, engaging me ever after in "the *public service.*" Probably, however, Waterland was well aware that Dr. Clarke was in this instance his real opponent.

In animadverting upon the "Observations," Dr. W. takes notice, that Dr. Clarke's friends had not cleared his scheme of the charge of making *two Gods;* one supreme, and another *inferior;* that they had not removed the difficulty of supposing God the Son and God the Holy Ghost to be *two creatures;* had not been able to defend *creature-worship;* had not invalidated the proofs of *divine worship* being due to Christ; nor accounted for divine *titles, attributes,* and *honours* being ascribed to a *creature;* nor given satisfaction as to Christ being both *Creator* and *creature;* nor established Dr. Clarke's pretences to *Catholic* antiquity. Having thus failed in the *defensive,* the writer of the "Observa-"tions" (says Dr. W.) had now undertaken the *offensive* part; and,

unable to vindicate his *own* scheme, sought to retaliate upon his opponent by false and injurious charges, by misrepresentations, or by invective and declamation.

The first charge relates to the *supremacy* of the Father. The "Observer" accuses Dr. Waterland of asserting, what the Ante-Nicene Fathers would have deemed the *highest blasphemy*, viz. that the Father "*has no natural and necessary supremacy of* "*authority or dominion at all; has no other supremacy of author-* "*ity and dominion than what is founded in mutual agreement* "*and voluntary concert; but has, naturally and necessarily, a* "*priority of order only.*" To this Waterland replies, that he had repeatedly and plainly declared, "that provided the Son's "*necessary existence* be secured, that he be acknowledged not "to exist *precariously*, or *contingently*, but *necessarily*, that his "*co-eternity* and *consubstantiality* be maintained, his *creative* "powers, his *infinite* perfections, his being no *creature*, but *one* "*God* with the Father, and the like; that then the *supremacy* "should be no matter of dispute with him. Any supremacy of "the Father," he adds, "that is *consistent* with these *certain*, "*plain*, *Catholic* tenets, always and universally believed by the "Churches of Christ; I say, any *supremacy* consistent here-"with, I hold, assert, and maintain; any that is *not consistent* "I reject, remove, and detest, with all the Christian Churches, "early and late." Dr. Clarke's notion of *supremacy*, he contends, is not consistent with an *equality* of nature; it makes God the Son *naturally* subject to the *Father*, and, consequently, makes him a *creature*, "a being that might never have existed, and "might cease to exist, if God so pleased[f]." Again; Dr. Clarke,

[f] Mr. Charles Butler, in his "Historical Account of Confessions of "Faith," chap. x. sect. 2, relates a remarkable anecdote of Dr. Clarke, concerning this point. Dr. Clarke, he says, "met a powerful opponent in Dr. "Hawarden, a celebrated Clergyman "of the Roman Catholic Church. By "the desire of Queen Caroline, the "consort of George the First, a conference was held by them in the "presence of her Majesty, of Mrs. "Middleton, a Roman Catholic lady, "much in her confidence, and the "celebrated Dr. Courayer. When "they met, Dr. Clarke, at some length, "in very guarded terms, and with "great apparent perspicuity, exposed "his system. After he had finished, "a pause of some length ensued: "Dr. Hawarden then said, that he "had listened with the greatest atten-

he observes, urges the *supremacy* "to destroy the *equality*: I "stand by the *equality*, and insist upon it, that it is consistent "with all the *supremacy* that either *Scripture* or Catholic Fathers "taught." This charge Dr. W. more particularly takes pains to refute, "because it runs in a manner through the book."

Another charge the Observer states thus: "When Dr. W. "says, that *many supreme Gods in one undivided substance are* "*not many Gods, for that very reason, because their substance* "*is undivided*, he might exactly with the same *sense* and *truth* "have affirmed, that many supreme persons in one undivided "substance are not many persons; for that very reason, because "their substance is undivided." To this, as well as to a similar charge by the author of the "Remarks," Dr. W. replies; "The answer, in short, is this: though the union of the three "persons (each person being *substance*) makes them *one sub-* "*stance*, yet the same union does not make them *one person*; "because *union* of *substance* is one thing, and *unity* of *person* "is another: and there is no necessity that the same kind "of union which is sufficient for one, must be sufficient for the "other also. There is no consequence from one to the other, "but upon this *supposition*, that *person* and *acting substance* are "*equivalent*, and *reciprocal*: which the author of the "Remarks"

"tion to what had been said by "Dr. Clarke; that he believed he "apprehended rightly the whole of "his system; and that the only reply "which he should make to it, was, "asking a single question: that, if "the question should be thought to "contain any ambiguity, he wished it "to be cleared of its ambiguity before "any answer to it was given; but "desired that, when the answer to it "should be given, it should be ex-"pressed either by the affirmative or "negative monosyllable. To this "proposition Dr. Clarke assented. "'Then' said Dr. Hawarden, 'I ask, "Can God the Father annihilate the "Son and the Holy Ghost?—Answer "me, Yes or No.' Dr. Clarke con-"tinued for some time in deep thought, "and then said, 'It was a question "which he had never considered.' "Here the conference ended. A "searching question," adds Mr. Butler, "it certainly was; and the reader "will readily perceive its bearings. "If Dr. Clarke answered, Yes, he "admitted the Son and the Holy "Ghost to be mere creatures; if he "answered, No, he admitted them to "be absolutely Gods." This con-ference Mr. Butler states to have given rise to a publication of Dr. Hawarden's, entitled, an "Answer to "Dr. Clarke and Mr. Whiston, con-"cerning the Divinity of the Son of "God, and of the Holy Spirit; with "a summary Account of the Writers "of the three first ages."

"had acuteness enough to see, and therefore fixes upon me, "unfairly, that very supposition."

In the next chapter, on the "*misreports* and *misrepresentations* "contained in the Observations," many similar instances are alleged of unfairness, or of carelessness, in citing Dr. W.'s statements and opinions. This gives occasion to our author to restate, to amplify, and to elucidate certain points of special interest and importance. One striking instance may be noticed in section ix. of this chapter, respecting *subordination of order* as consistent with perfect *equality of nature;* which, for clearness and strength of reasoning, as well as pure reverential feeling, dignified and sublime expression, is not, perhaps to be exceeded. Another instance occurs in section xv. where he refutes Dr. C. by reference to his own "Demonstration of the "Being and Attributes of God." Sections xvi. and xvii. are also deserving of particular attention, as affording similar proofs of great acuteness and powers of reasoning.

In the third chapter there are some excellent observations on the signification of the terms *supreme* and *independent,* when applied to the Persons of the Godhead; also on attempts to prove the existence of a First Cause, *à priori;* and on the question, whether, according to Dr. C.'s hypothesis, the existence of God the Son be not *precarious*[g].

The fourth chapter relates to *quotations from the ancients.* The fifth contains *a summary view of the judgment of the ancients, upon the question, whether God the Father be naturally ruler and governor over God the Son.*

In the Conclusion, the author briefly retraces the progress of the controversy between Mr. Jackson, Dr. Clarke, and himself; again notices his having been at first *forced,* in a manner, into *public* controversy; and complains of the unworthy treatment he had experienced. Some animadversions are also made on

[g] Sections xiii. xv. xix.

both these opponents having concealed their names; and they are advised, for their own sakes, as well as for the cause they had undertaken, to withdraw from the contest.

Here, indeed, on the part of Dr. Waterland, the controversy *did* terminate. Dr. Clarke made no reply to this "Farther "Vindication." Mr. Jackson put forth in answer to it, "Farther "Remarks on Dr. Waterland's Farther Vindication. By Phil-"alethes Cantabrigiensis. 1724." To this feeble pamphlet, Waterland (for the same reasons probably that induced him to pass over the former "Remarks" in silence) returned no answer.

Notwithstanding these continual calls upon Dr. Waterland for his exertions as a controversialist, he found an interval of leisure, between the publication of his "Second Vindication" and his "Farther Vindication," for a work of a less polemical description; though immediately connected with the doctrines he had so ably and successfully defended. This was his "Critical "History of the Athanasian Creed;" the first edition of which was published in the latter end of the year 1723, and a second edition, corrected and improved, in 1728.

The design of this treatise (as stated by the author in the Introduction) "is, to inquire into the *age, author*, and *value* "of that celebrated *confession*, which goes under the name of "*the Athanasian Creed.*" The treatises which had before appeared on this subject, he observes, were "mostly in *Latin*, "and some of them very scarce." He conceived, therefore, that an *English* treatise, laying before the English reader all that had "hitherto been usefully observed upon the subject," and not only referring to other authors, but "supplying, as far as "his materials, leisure, and opportunities enabled him, what "they had left undone," might be generally useful; "and "the more so at a time when the controversy about the "*Trinity* was spread abroad among all ranks and degrees of "men, and the *Athanasian* Creed become the subject of "common and ordinary conversation."

The *method*, by which this object is pursued, is clear and simple.

1. First, the opinions of the learned *moderns* concerning this Creed are briefly stated; beginning with Gerard Vossius, in 1642, and ending with Casimirus Oudinus, in 1722: and an useful table is subjoined, representing, at one view, the different conclusions of these several writers, as to the author of the Creed, the time when it was composed, and the date of its reception in the Church. Of these writers, (32 in number,) a great majority date its composition from the 5th or 6th century, and its general reception in the Church at a later period; *five* ascribe it to Athanasius himself; *eight* reject that opinion, and believe it to have been the production of some Latin author, between the 5th and 8th centuries; *eight* regard it as the work of Vigilius Tapsensis, in the 5th century; the rest hold different opinions as to the author of the Creed, but with no great variation as to the *date*. Dr. Clarke considers the author as doubtful, and brings down the date, both of its composition and its reception in the Church, to a much later period than most of the other writers.

Dr. Waterland next examines the *ancient testimonies* to this Creed; discarding as "*spurious*, or *foreign* to the point," those which have been pretended from writers of the 4th, 5th, and 6th centuries, and beginning with that of the Council of Autun, in 670. From this period, down to the year 1439, he cites a series of authorities, (36 in number,) to shew at what time it was publicly received and used. Sixteen of these authorities are earlier than the year 1000, at which time Dr. Clarke inclined to place its first admission into the Church. A table is subjoined also to this chapter, similar to that of the preceding.

The ancient *commentators* and *paraphrasts* of this Creed form the next subject of inquiry; beginning with that of Venantius Fortunatus in the year 570, whom Muratori supposed to have been the author of the *Creed*, as well as of the *comment*; an

opinion which Waterland rejects. These are valuable additional testimonies as to the early composition and reception of this summary of the Christian faith.

This is followed by an account of the *Latin MSS.* of the Creed; the Creed itself being generally supposed to have been originally a *Latin* composition: and the succeeding chapter is devoted to a consideration of the ancient *versions* of it, (whether printed or manuscript.) From these it results, that *Latin* manuscripts, chiefly in the Gallican and Roman Psalters, are extant, from the 6th century to the end of the 14th. The *versions*, as might be expected, are of more recent date: The earliest *written* version is the *German*, of the 9th century. Of the *French*, there are none extant earlier than the 11th; but there is evidence to prove, that so far back as the 9th century, this Creed was "interpreted out of Latin into the *vulgar* "tongue, for the use of the people, by the Clergy of France, in "their *verbal* instructions." *Anglo-Saxon* versions are found of the 10th century. The *Greek* versions are late, in comparison with the others. It is doubtful whether there were any earlier than the 12th or 13th centuries; but it is pretty evident, that the Creed was not *unknown* to the Greek Church before that time, since it appears to have been pleaded by the Latins against the Greek Churches, in the disputes about the *procession* of the Holy Ghost, during the 9th century. There are also *Sclavonian*, *Italian*, *Spanish*, *Irish*, *Welsh*, and (according to Fabricius) *Hebrew* and *Arabic* versions; but of uncertain date and authority[h].

Pursuing a similar course, in order to ascertain when this Creed was admitted into the Christian Churches, our author

[h] In the first page of Waterland's Hist. of the Athanasian Creed, in the library of Magdalene college, Cambridge (2nd edition, 1728) is the following note in Waterland's own handwriting, and probably transcribed from a letter of Bp. Gibson's; which proves the admission of the Creed into the Church of *Sweden*:—"A Swedish "Minister assures me to-day, that "the Athanasian Creed is read con-"stantly in the public service on Ro-"gation and Trinity Sunday, and "that all children are obliged to get "it by heart. *Edmund London*, "Whitehall, Jan. 21st, 1730-1."

inclines to believe, that it was received in France so early as the year 550; in Spain, 630; in Germany and England towards the close of the 8th century; in Italy about 880; in Rome, 930. Among the Greeks, it has been doubted whether it ever obtained admission. But Dr. W. is of opinion that it has been received by them, as well as by the Latins, throughout *Europe*, though not, perhaps, in Africa or Asia; and probably also, not without some alterations.

These inquiries are preparatory only to the main object of his dissertation, which is to determine, as nearly as possible, the *time* when, and the *place* where the Creed was composed, and also the *author* of it. The decision of these points depends, 1st, "upon *external* testimony from ancient citations, manuscripts, "comments, versions, and the like;" 2ndly, upon "the *internal* "characters of the Creed." The *MSS.* now extant carry us up as high as the 7th century; and one *comment* upon the Creed as far back as the year 570. This affords *presumptive* evidence for still greater antiquity. From the *internal* evidence, Dr. W. is confident that it could not be earlier than the rise of the *Apollinarian* heresy; against which it is particularly directed, and which first appeared about the year 360; but he sees reason also to think that it was not made till after St. Austin's writings upon the Trinity and Incarnation were made public, and therefore not before the year 420. On the other hand, from the absence of expressions specially directed against the *Eutychian* errors, he is convinced that it was not of so late a date as 451; and since there is the same silence with respect to the *Nestorian* heresy, it is probable that it was written before the *Ephesine* Council in 431. Having thus brought its supposed date within the compass of ten years, (viz. between 430 and 420,) our author finds good reasons further to conjecture, "that this Creed was made in "*Gaul*;" the *Gallican* Church appearing to have been the first that received it, and to have regarded it with the highest respect and estimation. And since it also appears that St. Austin was in close correspondence with the Gallican Churches, about the year 426, respecting some false doctrines then spreading in

Gaul on the subject of the *incarnation*, it may be inferred, "that "the Creed was, in all probability, composed in *Gaul*, some time "between the year 426 and the year 430." The *author* of the Creed is supposed by Dr. W. to have been "Hilary Bishop of "Arles, a celebrated man of that time, and of chief repute in "the Gallican Church;" being made Bishop in Gaul about the year 429, and recorded to have written an admirable exposition of the Creed. He was therefore, in his time, "a man of the "greatest authority in the Gallican Church, without whose "advice or privity at least such a Creed would hardly have "passed; and actually was the author of *such a work* as this, "which must either be this, or else is lost." A few brief observations, for the removal of objections to the hypothesis here offered, close this part of the inquiry.

Our author then proceeds to illustrate this Creed by a selection of parallel passages from authors who lived and wrote before 430, and principally from St. Austin. To this he subjoins an entire chapter, containing *his own commentary* upon it; and concludes the work with a *vindication* of the Church of England, both in receiving and retaining it. The *commentary* would in itself form a most useful tract for general circulation. The *damnatory* clauses are explained in that modified acceptation, which, there can be no doubt, was intended by *our Church*, and probably by the composer of the Creed. The main difficulty in the expository part of the Creed, that of acknowledging each Person to be *eternal*, *almighty*, &c. and yet not *three*, but *one*, is very successfully encountered. Every thing else is made clear and convincing.

The *vindication* has more especial reference to the objections made by Dr. Clarke, in his "Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity." These are distinctly answered; and many observations are interspersed on the utility of Creeds in general, as well as of this in particular, for the preservation of sound doctrine, and for preventing the people from being misled by insidious or erroneous teachers. This is the only part of the treatise which wears a

polemical aspect. The dissertation, in general, is purely *didactic;* having no immediate reference to any of the controversies in which the author was personally engaged; but pursuing the object of investigation with the temper and calmness of an unprejudiced critic and historian; indulging no acrimonious spirit; seeking no ostentatious display of superiority.

From the time of publishing his "Farther Vindication," in 1724, Dr. Waterland ceased to take a prominent part in the Trinitarian controversy, until the year 1734, when he published one of his largest and most valuable productions, entitled, "The "Importance of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity asserted, in "reply to some late pamphlets." The pamphlets he adverts to are now little known. The chief of them appears to have been one entitled, "A sober and charitable Disquisition concerning "the Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity;" intended to shew, that "those in the different schemes should bear with "each other in their different sentiments, and should not "separate communions." The tract, Dr. W. observes, "appears "to be written in a good manner, and with a Christian spirit;— "and the question debated in it is undoubtedly important in "every view, whether with regard to *peace* in this life, or "*happiness* in the next. And (he adds) as I have formerly "spent some time and pains in discussing the *truth* of that "high and holy doctrine, from *Scripture, reason*, and *antiquity*, "so now I think it concerns me the more, to debate, in like "manner, the *importance* of it."

This work, however, must not be regarded merely as an answer to an obscure, anonymous pamphlet, or even to any considerable number of such pamphlets which might then be in circulation; but as a dispassionate, and well-digested treatise, on a subject at all times momentous in the highest degree, and more especially called for, when writers of high name and reputation were found to incline towards that laxity of principle, which, scarcely acknowledging the obligation of contending even for the most essential and fundamental Articles of Faith, seemed

to encourage a general indifference to religious truth. Bishop Bull had already encountered certain works of this tendency, in his "Judgment of the Catholic Church." [1] His course of argument, however, led him to confine his observations chiefly to the sentiments of the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, which had been most unjustly represented by Episcopius and others. Dr. W.'s purpose was more comprehensive. The persons, he observes, who deny the *importance* of the doctrine, are reducible to three kinds; such as *disbelieve* the doctrine itself; such as are in some *suspense* about it; or such as really *assent* to it, as *true* doctrine. They who *disbelieve* the doctrine, will join others in decrying its importance, from motives of policy; as a surer, though slower method of attaining their object; "less shocking, and more in-"sinuating." They who are only *sceptical* as to the doctrine, and regard it as a matter of *uncertainty*, not yet satisfactorily proved, will naturally contend that no stress ought to be laid upon it. But they who *believe* the *truth* of the doctrine, and yet demur to its *importance*, are the persons whom this treatise is intended to convince, or to refute: persons, who make the *truth* and the *importance* of the doctrine two distinct questions; with a design, as it appears, either of reconciling parties who differ essentially in their opinions on the points in dispute, or of bringing them to a mutual *neutrality* in maintaining those opinions, whatever may be their disagreement or contrariety.

There are certain *general* principles, however, principles clear and indisputable, which are entirely at variance with the notions of these respective parties, and particularly with the last of them. Some Scripture-doctrines are evidently of greater importance than others, from the relation or connection they bear to *practice*, to *worship*, and to the whole economy of man's *salvation*. Hence some are called *essential*, *fundamental*; others, *non-essential*, *non-fundamental*. Some, more than others, affect the very *vitals* of Christianity; and judging from the nature and reason of the thing, and from the analogy of faith, it will,

[1] See his Preface to the "Judicium Ecclesiæ Catholicæ."

in general, be easy to distinguish what doctrines are thus important, and what are not so. In *slighter* matters, Christians are to bear with one another, and not to hazard the peace of the Church by unnecessary contests. In *weightier* matters, the desire of *peace* must give way to the higher interests of *truth* and *charity*, to the honour of God, and the eternal welfare of mankind.

Having further observed, in his introduction, that the arguments of those who question the *importance* of the Trinity rest upon three main suppositions, viz. that the doctrine is not *clear* enough to be insisted upon as a fundamental, or that it is merely *speculative*, and not so *practical* as to be important, or that it is not sufficiently insisted upon in *Scripture*, as of *necessity* to salvation;—our author proceeds to a distinct consideration of these several points, and in the course of the three first chapters establishes the contrary positions, by a series of close, argumentative reasoning, and with a variety of happy illustration.

First, he shews that the doctrine is sufficiently *clear* to be admitted as a *fundamental* article;—clear, with respect to the *matter* of it, and with respect to the *proofs* upon which it rests. Though *mysterious*, it is clear as to its *general* purport. "We "understand the *general* truths concerning the Father, Son, and "Holy Ghost; we understand the general nature of an *union* "and a *distinction*; and what we understand, we believe. As "to the minute *particulars* relating to the *manner*, or *modus* of "the thing, we understand them not: our *ideas* reach not to "them, but stop short in the generals, as our *faith* also does." The doctrine, thus viewed, is as clear, even to common and unlettered Christians, as most other high and divine things can be: perhaps it is even clearer to *them*, than to the more inquisitive; "because they are content to rest in *generals*, and to stop at "what they *understand*, without *darkening* it afterwards by "words without knowledge." The doctrine is also clear, as to the *proofs* on which it rests, which are purely *Scripture*-proofs. "*Scripture*, in its plain, obvious, unforced meaning, says it;

" and *reason* does not gainsay it. The Anti-Trinitarians, says " Bishop Bull, can never produce a *demonstrative* reason to prove " that it *cannot be*, and divine revelation assures us that *so it is*." These proofs cannot be evaded by any established rules of language or criticism; but only by resorting to some *philosophical* hypothesis, irreconcilable with the obvious and apparent sense of holy writ.

The first objection being thus removed, it is next shewn that the doctrine is not merely *speculative*, or *notional*, but strictly *practical*, and closely interwoven with the principles of the Christian life. If God be *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, there will be duties proper to be paid to each; " duties correspondent " to their distinct offices and personalities, beside the duties " common to all, considered as one God." Worship also is a *practical* duty of the highest importance; and with this the doctrine of the Trinity is directly concerned. If the doctrine be *true*, it is sacrilege and impiety to refuse to worship either of the Persons; if it be *false*, it is polytheism and idolatry to worship any but the *Father* only. *Creature*-worship is wholly irreconcilable with Scripture. Again; our *motives* to Christian practice are greatly heightened and strengthened by the influence of this doctrine. The love of God the Father in sending his Son to redeem us, and the love of God the Son in condescending to take this office upon him, appear in a much stronger light upon *Trinitarian*, than upon *Anti-Trinitarian* principles. The all-sufficiency of the *satisfaction* or *propitiation* made for the sins of the world, is no less dependent upon this doctrine. And the same may be said of our reliance upon the divine grace conferred by the Holy Ghost; concerning whose *universal* presence and assistance we can form no satisfactory conception, without ascribing to him those attributes of *infinity*, which belong essentially to God, and to God only. Thus inseparably is the doctrine of the Trinity " interwoven with the very frame " and texture of the Christian religion."

The remaining objection, that this doctrine is not insisted

upon in *Scripture,* as of *necessity to salvation*, is shewn to be equally fallacious. If Scripture has clearly *revealed* this doctrine, its *necessity*, or its *importance*, follows as a direct consequence. If it be a *true* doctrine, intimately connected with the whole economy of man's redemption and salvation, with divine worship, and with the most powerful motives to faith, love, and obedience; "men need not be *expressly* told that such a doctrine is "*important* and *weighty*, and *worth* the contending for: let but "Scripture once ascertain its *truth*, and every man's common "sense will supply the rest." The institution of baptism, however, in the name of the *Father, Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, may be regarded as an *express* declaration of the *importance* of the doctrine; since "our blessed Lord himself has thus recom-"mended it as the prime and leading doctrine, without the "explicit mention whereof a man cannot be made a *Christian*."

Admitting, then, that "the received doctrine of the Trinity "is both *clear* and *practical*, and sufficiently inculcated in "*Scripture* to be esteemed an article of high *importance*, an "*essential* of Christianity, a *fundamental* doctrine of the gospel, "diffusing itself through the whole of our religion, and being, "as it were, the very life and spirit of it; it remains to be "inquired," says our author, "how we ought to behave towards "those who openly reject or impugn it, or take part with them "that do."

This point is argued, in chapter the fourth, as a *general* question, in order to shew, from *Scripture*, and from the *nature* and *reason* of the thing, "that communion ought not to be held "with men that openly reject the fundamental doctrines of "Christianity, and persist in so doing." Several texts of Scripture are particularly discussed, to establish this position; and some important observations are made upon the true "nature "and notion of *heresy*, and what properly denominates a man "an *heretic*;" in answer to certain loose and indefinite notions of Dr. Whitby. Our author understands by these terms, "not "merely a *mistake of judgment*, (though in fundamentals,) but

"*espousing* such erroneous judgment, either teaching and dis-
"seminating it, or openly supporting and assisting those that
"do;" and this, he shews, brings those who adopt such errors clearly under that description of persons, whom the Scriptures enjoin us to *avoid*, as heretics. Moreover, from the *nature* and *reason* of the thing, this is evidently our duty. The honour and reverence due to God, and to his sacred word; charity towards the offenders themselves, and towards the rest of mankind; justice to ourselves, and a prudential care and caution respecting that which concerns our own sincerity and safety;—these are considerations, which render it hardly possible for us to hold communion with such persons, without becoming, in some measure, partakers in their offence.

The objections to this view of the subject are refuted in the succeeding chapter. The necessity of *moderation* and *forbearance;* the *harmlessness* of error in belief, if it be not productive of a *vicious* life; the respect due to conscientious *sincerity*, however erroneous; the *fallibility* of human judgment; the *persecuting* and *domineering* spirit implied in requiring men to conform to established Creeds and Articles of Faith; the *provocation* thus given to a reciprocation of censures, and to continual violations of Christian peace and charity; the right also of every one to be admitted to Church-communion, who is ready to acknowledge *Scripture* as his rule of faith, or to admit any Creeds or Confessions drawn up entirely in the very *terms* of Scripture; —all these plausible arguments are carefully and candidly considered. In answer to them, our author maintains, that true moderation does not require us to forbear insisting upon the *truth* and the *importance* of doctrines essential to Christianity itself;—that to spread and propagate opinions contrary to these, and to subvert the faith of others, is *evil* in itself, and may be as mischievous even as *immoral* practice;—that *sincerity* in error or falsehood is not excusable, unless it be free from *prejudice* and *partiality*, or arise from invincible *ignorance*, and, even then, it does not lessen the evil resulting from corrupt doctrine, nor render it less incumbent upon us to uphold the truth;—that

there is a manifest difference between *certainty* and *infallibility*; since we may have such *sure* grounds of belief as to remove all doubts from our mind, although we pretend not to an *infallible* judgment; and upon that moral certainty and conviction we are bound, in conscience and integrity, to frame our conduct, as well as our opinions;—that in pursuing this plain and upright course, there is nothing that savours of a *domineering* spirit, nothing that gives encouragement to *intolerance* or *persecution*, nothing that can justly *provoke* those who differ from us to hostility or offence;—that to admit all, whatever their tenets may be, to Church-communion, who merely acknowledge the authority of *sacred writ*, and who will assent to no Creeds or Articles of Faith, but such as are drawn up entirely in *Scripture-terms*; would be nugatory and ineffectual; since opinions the most erroneous, and the most contradictory to each other, are either believed, or pretended, to be deduced from Scripture, by those who maintain them; therefore, "if any persons are found "to pervert the *sense* of Scripture in any notorious manner, so as "thereby to undermine the *essentials* of faith, their pretending "a high regard for the *authority* of sacred writ, or for the "*letter* of it, is not reason sufficient for receiving them as "*fellow-Christians*."

In the sixth chapter, the author takes "a summary view of "the judgment and practice of the primitive churches" with reference to this subject; deducing from the most ancient *Creeds*, what were then deemed the most *important* Articles of Faith; observing what doctrines they condemned as *impious* and *heretical*; and examining the testimonies of the *Fathers* individually as well as of the *Church collectively*, upon both these points. Here the author professedly follows Bishop Bull, in his treatise against Episcopius; contenting himself, as he states, "with giving a summary view of the main things, "interspersing here and there a few slight observations, which "may be, as it were, supplemental to that great work." The author's own researches and observations, however, are not inconsiderable; and he moreover vindicates Bishop Bull against

certain writers of more recent date, particularly Le Clerc and Crellius, who, after the death of that distinguished Prelate, sought to obtain admission for Socinianism within the pale of the Christian Church, by arguments intended to prove that in the primitive ages it would not have been excluded.

The next chapter, "shewing the *use* and *value* of ecclesiastical "antiquity with respect to controversies of faith," is one of the most important in the whole work, and would form in itself a detached treatise of superior excellence. The principles on which this inquiry is grounded are laid down with great precision; the extremes of irreverent disregard, on the one hand, and of undue confidence on the other, being carefully avoided. "There is no occasion," says Dr. Waterland, "for "magnifying *antiquity* at the expense of *Scripture;* neither is "that the way to do real honour to either, but to expose both; "as it is sacrificing their reputation to serve the ends of novelty "and error. *Antiquity* ought to attend as an handmaid to "Scripture, to wait upon her as her mistress, and to observe "her; to keep off *intruders* from making too bold with her, and "to discourage *strangers* from misrepresenting her. *Antiquity,* "in this *ministerial* view, is of very great use." Its use is then pointed out, in ascertaining the true import of Scripture *words* and *phrases*, in letting us into the knowledge of ancient *rites* and customs alluded to in the sacred writings, in giving us an insight into the *history of the age* in which the books of the New Testament were written, and also in enabling us with more confidence to fix the *sense* of Scripture in controverted texts, by that *traditional* knowledge, which some of the earliest Fathers may be supposed to have received, of what the Apostles themselves had said and taught to their disciples and immediate successors in the Church. These considerations serve, at least, as "an useful *check* upon any *new* interpretations of Scripture "affecting the *main* doctrines;" and they may even be extended to establish what doctrines are really *necessary* and *true;* since it is scarcely conceivable that they who lived so near the times of the Apostles, and of Christ himself, should be unac-

quainted with any essential article of belief taught by them, much less that they should wilfully have corrupted, or suffered others to corrupt, that which they had received, upon such authority, as the revealed will of God.

A candid examination ensues of the considerations usually urged on the contrary side. The Scriptures, it has been said, are a perfect rule of faith; they are plain enough in all necessary points; Scripture is its own best interpreter; the sixth Article of our Church discountenances any other interpretation; and an appeal to antiquity is fruitless, because all parties lay claim to this, as well as to Scripture. These were arguments pressed by Dr. Whitby in the Preface to his Dissertation *de Scripturarum interpretatione*. Waterland admits these positions, so far as the perfection, fulness, and clearness of the Scriptures are concerned; but denies the inferences deduced from them. Scripture is perfect in itself; but the more perfect it is, the greater care and circumspection are requisite, to preserve it entire, both as to its *words* and *meaning*. We do not resort to the *Fathers*, "to superadd *new* doctrines to Scripture, "but only to secure the *old*:" and he shrewdly adds, "it is "much to be suspected, that many pretend a zeal for *Scripture*, "who mean nothing by it, but to have its *fences* taken down, "that they may deal the more freely or rudely with it. They "would exclude the *ancients*, to make room for *themselves*; and "throw a kind of slight upon the *received* interpretations, only "to advance *their own*." The Scriptures also are *plain* in all *necessary* articles of faith; but there is nothing so plain, that it may not be obscured and perverted by those who endeavour to evade its meaning; and the judgment of ancient writers of high authority is among the means of most effectually guarding against such injurious consequences. The same reasoning applies to the maxim, that Scripture is its own best interpreter. Unquestionably, it is so. But this does not supersede the use of ancient authority, of Fathers and Councils, to diminish the weight and influence of private gainsayers, who would set up their own opinions of the sense of Scripture against the

general sentiment of the Christian Church. Neither does our Church receive this maxim to the exclusion of all authoritative interpretation, but recognizes the expediency and utility of having recourse to the Catholic Fathers of the primitive ages, as the safest expositors of primitive truth.

But it is further urged, not only that the appeal to the Fathers is useless, because all parties lay claim to it; but that the Fathers are incompetent biblical critics, that they contradict each other, are full of obscurity, full of errors. Dr. Whitby, to a certain extent, had joined in this vituperative strain: but the chief partisans whom our author had here in view were Daillé and Barbeyrac; the former, in his well-known treatise on "the "right Use of the Fathers;" the latter, in the "prefatory "Discourse to his French Translation of Pufendorf, de Jure "Naturæ et Gentium," and in his "Traité de la Morale des "Pères de l'Eglise." Against these distinguished writers Waterland contends with great success; particularly against Barbeyrac, whose rude and petulant invectives were far more offensive than the comparatively guarded animadversions of Daillé and Whitby. A part of Barbeyrac's French Preface had been translated into English, and published separately under the title of "The Spirit of Ecclesiasticks in all ages, 1722," and it was ably answered by Dr. Zachary Grey, in a pamphlet, entitled, "The Spirit of Infidelity detected; By a Believer; "1723." Waterland convicts Barbeyrac of great unfairness and misrepresentation; of taking many of his reports of the Fathers at second-hand; and of aggravating every error or oversight to an unwarrantable extent. He shews also, that this prejudiced and uncandid writer continually argues, as if those who entertained a respect for the early Fathers regarded them as *infallible*, and entirely rested their faith upon them as expositors of Scripture. In refuting this gross accusation, Dr. W. draws the line with great accuracy and judgment between an implicit reliance upon these venerable guides, and that deference which is justly due to them, as the earliest and most unbiassed *witnesses* of the truth. The proper use of

the Fathers, in ascertaining any apostolical doctrine or practice, is in the way of *testimony*, rather than of personal *authority*. They certify us of the *received doctrine* of the Church in their times. Hence arises a strong *presumptive* argument, at least, that such must have been the truth delivered by the Apostles themselves; since we cannot otherwise account for the general harmony of Scripture-interpretation prevailing at a period immediately succeeding the apostolical age; nor can we conceive it possible that, on any essential point of Scripture truth, errors of real magnitude or importance should have so soon and so universally prevailed. In ascribing this degree of weight to their sentiments, whether individually or collectively declared, no claims to *infallibility* are allowed them, nor any other regard paid to their statements, than that which is due to the testimony of persons who were not placed in circumstances either to deceive others, or to be deceived themselves. "As "to *authority*," says Dr. W. "in a strict and proper sense, I do "not know that the *Fathers* have any over us. They are all "dead men. Therefore we urge not their *authority*, but their "*testimony*, their *suffrage*, their *judgment*, as carrying great "force of *reason* with it; and *reason* we should all submit to. "Taking them in here, as *lights* or *helps*, is doing what is "*reasonable*, and using our *own understandings* in the best "manner, and to the best purposes: it is judging *rightly* for "ourselves." In conclusion, he adds, "The sum of what I "have been endeavouring is, that *Scripture* and *antiquity*, under "the conduct of *right reason*, are what we ought to abide by, "for the settling points of doctrine. I have not put the case of "Scripture and antiquity interfering, or clashing with each "other; because it is a case which never will appear in points "of *importance*, such as that is which we are now upon....If "ever they clash, or appear to clash, then undoubtedly there is "an error somewhere....In such a case, a wise man will not "rest satisfied, (if the thing be of moment,) till he finds out, if "possible, the reason of the difference, and discovers where the "*error* lies. For either it must lie on the *Scripture-side*, (when "a man takes that for *Scripture* which is not Scripture, or that

" for true interpretation which is not true interpretation,) or it " must lie on the *tradition* side, through some *misreport* made of " the ancients, or some mistake of the ancients themselves. " Then the question will be, which of the two suppositions is " most likely to be true in that instance."

To this chapter is added a short one, in conclusion of the treatise, shewing the Arian interpretation of John i. 1, and Hebr. i. 1, by the author of the "Sober and Charitable Dis- " quisition," to be of no force or validity.

From the foregoing outline of this work, some notion may be formed of its general excellence and utility. Its value is far beyond that of a merely *polemical* treatise; and it may be read with almost equal benefit by persons conversant, or not, with the several controversial writings of that period. Its principles and its reasonings are, indeed, just as applicable to many party-writers of the *present* day, as they were to Episcopius, to Whitby, to Daillé, Le Clerc, or Barbeyrac. Accordingly, this is one of the very few of our author's performances which has hitherto been reprinted in modern times. A new edition of it issued from the Cambridge University press, in the year 1800. In the year 1815, a new edition of his "Sermons at the Lady " Moyer's Lecture" was printed at the Clarendon press at Oxford. These two volumes, together with "Dr. Glocester " Ridley's Sermons at Lady Moyer's Lectures on the Divinity " and Offices of the Holy Ghost," (also reprinted at Oxford in 1802,) may be recommended to all Divinity Students, as forming together a compendium of all that is necessary to establish them in the truth of that fundamental article of our faith, the doctrine of the Trinity. To these the "Critical " History of the Athanasian Creed" may be considered as a valuable supplement. And for such as are desirous of going further into the discussion of these subjects, the "three Vindi- " cations of our Lord's Divinity" will supply irrefragable arguments upon almost every point that has hitherto been contested.

SECTION IV.

INCIDENTAL CONTROVERSIES ARISING OUT OF THE PRECEDING.

THAT the account given, in the foregoing section, of Dr. W.'s larger works in vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, might proceed without interruption, no notice has yet been taken of some of his minor productions connected with that subject, which, in point of time, preceded several of the treatises already mentioned. His reputation was, indeed, chiefly established by successfully encountering such opponents as Clarke, Whitby, Sykes, and Jackson; whose united powers were exerted to the utmost, to put him to silence. The inferior antagonists, who occasionally called him forth, are now almost unknown by name or reputation; and are no otherwise deserving of attention, than from the notice our author deemed it expedient to take of their endeavours to disseminate opinions which he had laboured to counteract. Probably, he perceived that some danger was to be apprehended even from the weakest of these attempts, when the public mind had been already so much agitated by persons eminent in station and in learning; and that even if they gained no very extensive circulation, they might locally and individually produce considerable mischief. His short intervals of leisure from weightier undertakings were therefore not unfrequently employed in providing for the less instructed some convenient antidotes against works of this description.

Accordingly, in the year 1721, soon after he had published his "Case of Arian Subscription," our author committed to the press a short tract, consisting only of a few pages, and entitled, "An Answer to some Queries printed at Exon, relating to the "Arian Controversy." As there is no prefatory introduction to this short piece, nor any thing in the body of the tract which gives the slightest intimation of its history, some information respecting the circumstances which probably gave rise to it may not be unacceptable.

It is not undeserving of notice, that when controversies of considerable moment have at any time agitated our Established Church, the impulse has frequently extended to the leaders of those who separate from our communion. Thus when Bishop Bull was engaged in dispute with Dr. Tullie, Dr. Barlow, and other eminent Divines, on the subject of *justification by faith*, similar dissensions took place among the Separatists of that time. In like manner the numerous writings occasioned by Dr. Clarke's "Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity," being circulated among the Dissenters of that period, were debated between them with at least equal asperity. The city of Exeter, in particular, was distinguished by busy and zealous partisans of *Arianism*, who were encountered by opponents no less zealous in maintaining the *Catholic* faith. Two eminent Dissenting Teachers in that place, Mr. Joseph Hallet and Mr. James Peirce, with some others of inferior note, gave great offence to their respective congregations, by espousing, first covertly, and then openly, the tenets of the *Arians*. These tenets soon spread so rapidly, as to give alarm to the majority of the Dissenting Ministers in that neighbourhood; and created much dissatisfaction and uneasiness. In consequence of these divisions, several Ministers in and near Exeter deemed it expedient to draw up a statement of what had occurred, and to transmit it to some leading Dissenting Teachers in the metropolis, requesting them to confer upon it, and to give their advice as to the best course to be pursued, previous to an *assembly* being held upon the subject among those at Exeter. The result of

these deliberations was, that at a general meeting of the Dissenting Ministers in the western parts of England, at Exeter, in September 1718, the matter was fully discussed; and, after much debate, "it was agreed to make a *declaration of faith*, "every one in his own words, *viva voce*. Several delivered "their confessions entirely in *Scripture-terms*, without declaring "their sense and constructions of them. Others, and those the "*most*, freely declared their sentiments in their *own terms*. "After which it was moved, that the general sense of the "confessions there made appeared to amount to this article;— "*That there is but One living and true God, and that the Father*, "*Word, and Holy Ghost, are that One God*. This, after much "struggle, was put to the vote again, and was carried to be the "collected sense of a great majority, and accordingly was "entered as a *minute*[1]."

In these local dissensions, it is not to be supposed that Dr. Waterland felt any personal interest. But since they had excited much fermentation elsewhere, as well as at Exeter; and means had been used, by the Arian party, to give the greatest possible publicity to their proceedings; it became a matter of importance to counteract the intended mischief. Dr. Waterland, however, took no further part in the dispute, than by publishing the above-mentioned tract, called, "An "Answer to some Queries printed at Exon." The Dissenters had, indeed, many learned, pious, and able Divines, well qualified to guard their congregations against these innovators,

[1] In the Bodleian library at Oxford, there is a large collection of tracts relating to the controversies respecting Arianism at Exeter. Among them are two, which contain a clear and succinct account of what had passed: one entitled, "A plain and faithful "Narrative of the Differences among "the Dissenters at Exeter, relating to "the Doctrine of the ever-blessed "Trinity, so far as gave concern to "some London Ministers. Lond. "1719:" the other, "An Account of "the Reasons why many Citizens "of Exon have withdrawn from the "Ministry of Mr. Joseph Hallet and "Mr. James Peirce, being an Answer "to Mr. Peirce's State of the Case. "Published by order of the Com-"mittee. Lond. 1719. Written by "Mr. Josiah Eveleigh." There is also another work which throws considerable light upon these disputes among the Dissenters, entitled, "The "Grounds of the present Differences "among the London Ministers. By "John Cumming, M. A. Minister of "the Scots-Church in London. 1720."

and who proved themselves faithful to their charge. Dr. Edmund Calamy particularly distinguished himself by the publication of an excellent volume of "Sermons concerning the "Doctrine of the Trinity, preached at Salters' Hall, 1722;" in the Preface to which is given a perspicuous account of the opposition made to this doctrine, and of the unhappy differences which had lately arisen among his brethren with reference to the Arian controversy. It is a work of great learning and ability, as well as of candour and moderation; and the author bears handsome testimony to the services which Dr. W. had rendered by his labours in so important a cause[k].

The "Queries" printed at Exeter (to which Dr. W. published this Answer) were originally subjoined to a pamphlet, entitled, "The Innocent vindicated, or Arians defended," and formed an "Appendix to it." They appear *verbatim* in Dr. W.'s tract, and are answered with perspicuity and brevity. Most of them

[k] Dr. Calamy's work is dedicated to the King; and he ventures to assure his Majesty, that "how much "soever his subjects in the southern "part of this happy isle may in other "respects differ in their sentiments "about religious matters, yet as to "the great doctrine of the TRINITY, "they that are excluded the national "establishment do very generally "agree with those that are under it, "and cannot be charged with an "inclination to vary from the common "faith, without being greatly mis-"represented." In his Preface, he says, "As to the Sermons here pub-"lished, they were delivered to as "public an auditory as any among "the Dissenters, about the same "time that Dr. Waterland was en-"gaged upon the same argument to "so good purpose, at the Lecture sup-"ported by the generosity of the Lady "Moyer, at St. Paul's; in which Dr. "Knight has since so worthily suc-"ceeded him. And though the sub-"ject has been so much insisted on, "as that it may seem exhausted, yet "I am in hope that these Discourses, "together with a good number of "tracts lately published, may help to "prevent its being hereafter said, "that the Dissenters did not at that "time appear against *Arianism*, when "it so much threatened us."

There is reason, however, to believe, that Dr. Clarke's opinions had taken deep root among several communities of Protestant Dissenters, and that to this cause may be traced some of the multifarious schisms into which they were subsequently divided. Hence, at least, appear to have arisen the several *Unitarian* congregations, which succeeded to the *Arian*, and which are now for the most part become *Socinian*. In the West of England these opinions have ever since continued to have numerous abettors. The *Arian* Meeting-house at Exeter retained its appropriate designation long after other congregations of the kind had dispersed, and were forgotten. It has now, however, passed into other hands: and the Unitarians of the present day, who still abound in that district, would probably be almost as reluctant to subscribe to Dr. Clarke's Creed, as to that of Dr. Waterland.

turn upon points of *metaphysical* subtilty, particularly upon the assumed position that there can be no real difference between an *intelligent being* and a *person;* similar to the objections before raised by Clarke, Whitby, and Jackson, and afterwards examined and refuted in Dr. W.'s "second Defence." But many readers may find it advantageous, to refer to the compendious answers in this little tract, which, together with the Queries, comprises the substance of much larger treatises on each side of the question.

Another small tract of a similar kind was published by our author in 1722, entitled, "The Scriptures and the Arians com-
"pared, in their accounts of God the Father and God the Son:
"by way of rejoinder to a pamphlet, entitled, The Scripture and
"the Athanasians compared, &c." This pamphlet, like many others of that period, has long since sunk into oblivion. But Dr. Waterland's tract has reference also to several other publications of a similar tendency. In the first part is laid before the reader "the *plain* account of Scripture in one column, and the *true*
"account of what the modern *Arian* scheme is in the other." The statement of the *Arian* scheme is drawn from the writings of Whiston, Clarke, Sykes, Whitby, Emlyn, Jackson, Peirce, Morgan, and some anonymous authors. In a series of short paragraphs, each relating to some main point in the controversy, the contrast is exhibited in very striking colours; and is so wrought as to convey a keen satire upon the opinions against which it is directed. The second part contains short remarks upon certain *preliminary propositions* in the pamphlet, with strictures upon the author's frequent misrepresentations of the sense of Scripture, and upon his attempts to oppose certain metaphysical subtilties to the express declarations of holy writ. This tract, therefore, derives additional importance from its being, in substance, directed against the whole phalanx of Arians of that day; though, in the form and mode of attack, it seemed to aim more particularly at one inconsiderable writer.

At a somewhat earlier period than the publication of these

two short pieces, Dr. W. had been engaged in a private correspondence with a person of the name of Staunton on the subject of the Trinity; the occasion of which correspondence appears to have been as follows:

Mr. Staunton published, anonymously, in the year 1719, a tract entitled, "The sincere Thoughts of a private Christian, "touching the Faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Doctrine "of the Apostles, humbly offered in abatement of the Socinian "and Trinitarian Controversies." The title-page bears the motto, "An Christianus ero? An Christicola?"—pretty clearly indicating the author's opinion, that *divine worship* is not due to Christ. This is, in truth, the main purpose of the tract; in which the author labours to prove, that the titles, Son of God, the Word, &c. are not expressive of his *Divinity*, and that there are no sufficient evidences in Scripture of his being the proper object of worship.

In the year 1721, this same author published another tract, entitled, "A Packet of Letters to Dr. Waterland, being a Pro-"posal of a fourth Scheme, supported by Scripture and Demon-"stration. Also a modest Inquiry touching the Doctrine of "the Holy Trinity, and the manner of our blessed Saviour's "Divinity, as they are held in the Catholic Church, and in the "Church of England." In a long Preface to this publication, Mr. S. represents himself to have been very desirous of having his doubts and scruples, respecting what are called orthodox opinions of the Trinity, removed; and states that he had published his thoughts with that view: and he adds, that hearing of Dr. W.'s "Defence of his Queries," and his "Sermons" at Lady Moyer's Lecture "on our Lord's Divinity," he fully expected conviction; but being disappointed, he resolved to unbosom himself to Dr. W. upon the subject. He then commenced a correspondence with Dr. W., and this pamphlet contains the packet of letters sent by *him* to Dr. W. but *not* those which Dr. W. sent in return. The remainder of the tract con-

sists of a delineation of the author's peculiar notions, differing, as he conceived, from most other systems.

In the following year, 1722, Mr. Staunton brought out another tract, entitled, "Reason and Revelation stated, &c. by the "same hand that wrote the Packet of Letters to Dr. Waterland. "To which is added, a true Copy of Dr. Waterland's several "Letters by him sent in Answer to the Packet of Letters wrote "to him by W. S. and the printing whereof was at first for-"bidden by the Doctor, who now consents to the publication of "them." This pamphlet is chiefly levelled at Dr. Young, Dean of Sarum, animadverting on two sermons of his, entitled, "The Wisdom of believing;" and has but little bearing on the points in dispute between himself and Dr. Waterland.

It does not appear from any of these publications what was Mr. Staunton's profession, education, or habits of life. In his first letter to Dr. W. he says modestly of himself, "As to "*learning*, I am a mere *schoolboy*, and a dull one too I was in "1673, and am now in the 63rd year of my age. I was bred to "the desk, and about six years ago quitted my employment for "want of breath to follow it: but since, in my country retire-"ment, not willing to be idle, I spend some *few hours*, now and "then, in studying the Scriptures." He adds, "You see *what* "*authors* I converse with; neither *Arians*, nor *Socinians*, nor "any *Dissenters* from the Church of England: however it comes "to pass that in this point I do now *dissent* from it, I can at "present only impute it to the *voice of God*, both of *reason* "and of *Scripture*, in answer to my daily *prayers* that God "would be pleased to teach me *what He is*, and to give me a "right judgment therein: which if it be not *yet* obtained, may "now be set right by your kind assistance."

These, with other expressions of humility and of personal respect towards Dr. W., probably induced this learned divine to enter into a discussion otherwise of very unpromising aspect,

and hardly worthy of his labour. For it is evident that Mr. S. was not only a man of mean literary attainments, but that there was a sort of obliquity in his understanding, which totally disqualified him for unravelling the difficulties and perplexities he had himself raised upon the subject. His exposition of his own theory is confused, and scarcely intelligible. Dr. Waterland well observes, that "it seems to be *Socinian* in the main, "only taking in the pre-existence of Christ's human soul, "excluding from worship, and interpreting some texts in the "*Sabellian* way, and not after *Socinus*."

Any notice of such an author, whose name and writings never excited any general interest, would be superfluous, were it not for the occasion it affords of noticing an amiable feature in Dr. Waterland's character. His readiness to give satisfaction to so very inferior a disputant, in whom he thought there were indications of an honest love of truth; his civility and forbearance towards him in the course of the correspondence; and the unaffected frankness and good-humour with which he declines pursuing the contest, when it became utterly hopeless as to any good effect; may go far to redeem his character from the charge of asperity and moroseness, with which some of his opponents have reproached him.

Another short treatise of Dr. Waterland's is so far connected with these controversies, that it may most conveniently be considered in this part of our inquiry. It was published a short time before his greater work on the "Importance of the Trinity," as an "Appendix" to Mr. Law's "Inquiry into the Ideas of "Space and Time;" and is entitled, "A Dissertation upon the "Argument *à priori* for proving the Existence of a First Cause: "in a Letter to Mr. Law."

The discussion of this question arose out of some passages in Dr. Clarke's "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God;" a work, published some years before his "Scripture-Doctrine of "the Trinity." Dr. Clarke's purpose was, to demonstrate by

arguments *à priori*, the being and attributes of the Deity. "There are but two ways," he observes[1], "by which the *being*, "and *all* or *any* of the *attributes* of *God*, can possibly be proved: "the one *à priori*, the other *à posteriori*. The proof *à posteriori* "is *level* to *all* men's capacities: because there is an endless "*gradation* of *wise* and *useful* phenomena of nature, from the "most *obvious* to the most *abstruse*; which afford (at least a "*moral* and *reasonable*) proof of the being of God, to the *seve-* "*ral capacities* of *all unprejudiced men*, who have any probity of "mind. And this is what (I suppose) God expects (as a *moral* "governor) that *moral agents* should be determined by. The "proof *à priori* is (I fully believe) strictly *demonstrative*; but "(like numberless *mathematical demonstrations*) capable of being "understood by only a *few attentive minds*; because it is of *use*, "only against *learned and metaphysical difficulties*. And there- "fore it must never be expected, that this should be made "obvious to the *generality* of men, any more than *astronomy* or "*mathematics* can be."

Dr. Clarke undertakes to prove, not only the *attributes*, but the *existence* of the Deity, by demonstrating what he calls the *antecedent necessity* of his being. He assumes it as a general axiom, that "of every thing that *is*, there is a *reason* which now does, "or once or always did, *determine* the *existence* rather than the "*non-existence* of that thing:" and that "when once a thing is "known, by reasoning *à posteriori*, to be *certain*, it *unavoidably* "*follows* that there is *in nature* a reason *à priori*, (whether we "can discover it or not,) of the existence of that which we know "cannot but exist. Since therefore, in that which derives not "its being from any other thing, the *ground* or *reason why* it "*exists*, rather than *not exists*, must be *in* the thing itself; and "it is a plain contradiction to suppose its own *will*, by way of "*efficient* cause, to be the reason of its existence, it remains that "*absolute necessity* (the same necessity that is the cause of the "unalterable proportion between *two* and *four*) be, by way of

[1] Answer to the 6th Letter, added to the 6th and subsequent editions of the "Demonstration." pp. 31, 32.

"*formal* cause, the *ground* of that existence. And this necessity "is indeed *antecedent*, though not in *time*, yet in the *order of* "*nature*, to the *existence* of the being itself."

Upon this supposed axiom Dr. C. frames his demonstration: and his chain of argument runs thus: *Something must have existed from all eternity:* otherwise every thing that now exists must have been originally produced out of nothing, absolutely, and *without cause;* which is a plain contradiction in terms. That which has existed from eternity must also be *some one unchangeable and independent being*, from which all other beings in the universe have received their original; else there has been an infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings produced one from another in an endless progression, without any original cause at all; which is plainly impossible, and contradictory in itself. Moreover, the Being that has thus existed from all eternity, without any external cause of its existence, must be *self-existent*, that is, *necessarily existing*. Now to be *self-existent*, is, not to be *produced by itself;* since that would be an express contradiction. It is also to *exist by an absolute necessity originally in the nature of the thing itself:* and this necessity must be *antecedent*, not in time, but in the natural order of our ideas, to our *supposition* of its being. For, when we endeavour to suppose, that there is *no being* in the universe that exists necessarily, we always find in our minds some ideas of *infinity* and *eternity;* and to suppose that there is *no* being to which these attributes or modes of existence are necessarily inherent, is a contradiction in the very terms. Further; this *self-existing* Being must be *eternal*. The Being, which has no other cause of its existence, but the absolute necessity of its own nature, must of necessity have existed from everlasting, without beginning; and must of necessity exist to everlasting, without end. For the same reason, this Being must be *infinite* and *omnipresent;* these ideas being inseparably connected with *self-existence*. Moreover, this Being must also of necessity be but *one*. Absolutely *necessary* existence admits of *no variation* in *any kind or degree*, and cannot be the *ground* of the existence of a *number* of beings, however *similar* and *agreeing*. To suppose

two or more *distinct beings* existing *of themselves*, necessarily, and *independent* of each other, implies this *contradiction*, that they may *either of them* be supposed to exist *alone*; so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist; and consequently, *neither of them* will be necessarily-existing. Whatsoever therefore exists necessarily, is the one simple essence of the self-existing Being; and whatsoever differs from that, is not necessarily existing. The other attributes of the Deity are deduced in like manner from these principles.

Notwithstanding the high reputation of the author, and the acknowledged ability and good intention manifested in the work itself, this attempt was far from being received with general satisfaction. Its main principle was, by many, deemed questionable, if not fallacious; and some of the inferences deduced from it, not only doubtful, but of dangerous tendency. The more cautious and considerate inquirers after truth judged it expedient rather to rely upon the well-established proofs of the Divine being from arguments *à posteriori*,—those which resulted from the actual phenomena of the universe,—than to rest so great and fundamental a truth, the very ground of all moral and religious conduct, upon abstract metaphysical speculations, above the reach, perhaps, of any finite understandings, and confessedly not adapted to general apprehension. Even among those who were favourable to the general design of the work, considerable doubts were entertained as to the solidity of certain parts of it, on which doctrines of such importance were made to depend.

Doubts of this kind were advanced with great modesty, and with much personal respect towards Dr. Clarke, by an anonymous correspondent, "a gentleman in Gloucestershire," in a series of five Letters written privately to the author, and which, together with Dr. Clarke's answers, were subjoined to the fourth and subsequent editions of the work. They relate to some arguments in Dr. C.'s "Demonstration," to prove the *infinity*, *omnipresence*, and *unity* of the Deity. The discussion, which

was carried on very amicably on both sides, led to the consideration of some other metaphysical difficulties, concerning *substance*, *space*, and *necessary existence*; but it seems to have terminated without producing conviction, or change of sentiment, on either side[m].

To these Letters and Answers were added, in the *sixth* edition of the "Demonstration," Dr. Clarke's Answers to two other Letters, from different correspondents; one urging nearly the same objections as the foregoing; the other shewing the argument *à priori* to be inapplicable to such a subject. The Letters themselves are not inserted; but the objections contained in them appear to be fully and fairly stated in the Answers.

Dr. Clarke's Answer to the *seventh* of these Letters gave occasion to Mr. Gretton's larger and more elaborate treatise, printed in 1726, and entitled, "A Review of the Argument "*à priori*, in relation to the Being and Attributes of God: in "reply to Dr. Clarke's Answer to a seventh Letter concerning "that Argument."

In the Preface to this work, the author points out the hazardous tendency of Dr. Clarke's undertaking, and its un-

[m] The author of these Letters was the celebrated Bishop Butler, then a very young man, only 21 years of age; who, while he was at an academy in Gloucestershire, studying divinity to qualify himself for a Dissenting Teacher, addressed these Letters to Dr. Clarke; and treated the subject with so much penetration and knowledge, that Dr. C. thought them worthy of particular notice. It is remarked in the "Biographia Britan-"nica," that in Mr. Butler's objections to Dr. C.'s notions of space and duration, which include his dissatisfaction with the argument *à priori*, he raised the first battery against that argument; and though, through modesty, considering his youthful age, he forbore to push it to the utmost, yet he was followed therein by others of more strength and assurance, who played upon it so effectually as actually to demolish it: for instance, Mr. Gretton, Mr. Law, and Dr. Waterland; who have likewise shewn the inconclusiveness of Dr. Clarke's argument *à priori*. "It is observable," (adds the writer of that article,) "that Dr. C. evidently "raised the hint for erecting that "argument from Sir Isaac Newton's "general *scholium* at the end of his "*Principia*; and had he kept within "the bounds which that great master "never transgressed, he might have "avoided this metaphysical chimæra, "to demonstrate the necessary exist-"ence of the Deity." See Biogr. Brit. vol. vii. pp. 20, 21, and *note* B.

toward aspect as affecting revealed religion, particularly the doctrine of the Trinity; since it would follow, upon Dr. C.'s reasoning, that if no *antecedent necessity* could be shewn for more than *one* Person in the Godhead, the true Divinity of the *other* Persons could not be established; and "if we cannot "demonstrate *à priori* that there are three Divine Persons, "it will be pretended, in virtue of these novel positions, that "there cannot be three such Persons; and so we shall be put "upon proving an article of faith from natural reason, which "we freely own is a point of pure revelation, not discoverable "by reason, nor to be proved by our natural light." This, he further observes, is confirmed by the use Dr. C. himself afterwards made of these principles in his "Scripture-Doctrine of "the Trinity;" "in which the positive *self-existence*, and *prior* "*necessary existence*, of the *Father*, was drawn out at its full "length, and largely insisted on with all its train of conse-"quences;" whilst it was plainly intimated, that, in whatever sense the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* may be called Divine Persons, they are not *metaphysically* so, neither is the unity between them and the Father an unity of *nature* and *substance*, but only an unity of *government*, or, rather, a *metaphorical* union.

In reply to Dr. Clarke's main position, that "*there must be in* "*nature a permanent ground, or reason, of the existence of the* "*First Cause; otherwise its existence would be owing to mere* "*chance;*"—Mr. Gretton observes, that "such *internal ground* "or *reason* cannot be *prior*, though it may be considered as "subsequent to the Divine being, as a permanency flowing "from the Divine existence; that to argue from the Divine "perfections to the Divine being is not an argument *à priori;*" but is a contradiction, "as it supposes the Divine nature before "the Divine being; something internal before any thing to "which it may be internal; and the first cause springing up "from its own substance and self;" in short, that the *internal reason* alleged by Dr. C. "can only be regarded as a mode, or "attribute thereunto appertaining," and "presupposes exist-"ence," and "therefore can give us no right to argue there-

"from to the Divine being." It is also observed, that if the existence of the Deity must be demonstrated *à priori* by some *antecedent necessity* of its existence, then must that very necessity "have a reason *à priori* why it is, rather than why it is not; "and after that, another; and then a third; and so on *in in-* "*finitum*. And thus we may always be seeking a first cause; "but, by such an endless progression, shall never be able to find "one, whereon to fix ourselves, or such our restless and un- "profitable inquiries." And again: "If we ask you of the "antecedent necessity, whence it is? why it is? what prior "ground was there for it? you must content yourself with "saying, So it is, you know not why, you know not how. "Please to resolve me, therefore, whether your prior necessity "be necessary because it exists? or whether it is, because its "existence is necessary? and your answer, I presume, in one "case, will be as pertinent and useful as in the other." The author pursues this train of reasoning through the several different acceptations of the term *necessity*, ideal or physical; and contends that Dr. C.'s endeavours to establish upon that principle the eternity, infinity, immensity, and unity of God, are unsatisfactory and fallacious. Some extracts are subjoined, in an Appendix, from Letters between Mr. Locke and his friends; tending to shew, that neither Locke nor Limborch could satisfy themselves as to the possibility of demonstrating the Divine *unity* by any such arguments.

Dr. Waterland had incidentally animadverted on this work of Dr. Clarke's, in his first and second "Defences." Dr. Clarke, in his "Observations" on the *second* Defence, noticed this with some asperity; and Waterland, perceiving how sensibly his adversary felt the attack, renewed it still more forcibly in his "Farther Vindication."

But if we may give credit to Mr. Jackson's pretended "Memoirs of Dr. Waterland," the commencement of this dispute was of earlier date. Jackson says, "Soon after the "controversy of the Trinity was begun between the Doctor "and the Country Clergyman, another debate arose between

"them, relating to Dr. Clarke's Boyle's Lecture Sermons. "Dr. W. first suggested, and soon took upon him to shew the "Country Clergyman, that Dr. C. had failed in the proof of "the *being* and *attributes* of God, drawn from arguments *à* "*priori*." He then adds, that a correspondence took place between Waterland and Jackson, "in a *private* manner;" and it was agreed, "that neither side should print without mutual "consent;" but afterwards, "the Country Clergyman pro-"posed to the Doctor to have their papers printed," in order that Dr. Clarke might have an opportunity, if he pleased, of "taking the cause into his own hands:" to which Dr. W. would not consent, though the debate was generally known amongst the learned in the University; till at length, within a year or two after Dr. Clarke's death, Dr. W.'s principal objections were published at the end of Mr. Law's book.

This narrative (similar in its circumstances to the account before given by the same author, of the publication of the "Queries" relating to Clarke's "Scripture-Doctrine of the "Trinity") renders it probable, that Waterland's correspondence with the Country Clergyman on the argument *à priori* was communicated by the Country Clergyman to Dr. Clarke himself: and that the "Answer" to the *seventh* Letter, annexed to the 6th edition of his work, is an Answer to what Dr. W. had thus *privately* written to Jackson. This seems to be adverted to by Mr. Gretton, in his Preface above mentioned; where, after observing how much Dr. Clarke had been irritated by Waterland's severe censures of his "Demonstration;" he adds, "the "first opportunity which presented itself, he sends forth *a Letter* "*without a name, directed to a person who could not well be mis-*"*understood*, in maintenance of the argument *à priori*." If this were the case, the transaction differed little from that relating to the "Queries," excepting in this circumstance, that Dr. C. kept back Waterland's Letter, and committed the "Answer" only to the public eye.

After all, the question respecting the argument *à priori* to prove the existence of a First Cause, was only a collateral point

in the Arian controversy; and this may account for Waterland's unwillingness to make it a matter of public debate. But Dr. Clarke having thus attempted a refutation of his objections, an opportunity was not to be lost of discussing the subject more at large; and this opportunity was offered, not very long afterwards, when Mr. Law (Waterland's intimate friend[n]) published his "Enquiry," and added to it, as a Supplement, the "Dissertation," which, though anonymous, was well known to be our author's performance.

Dr. W. begins this Dissertation with observing, "that those "who had appeared as advocates for that argument *à priori* "seemed to have had no clear notion of the thing itself, or of "the terms they made use of; that the *thought*, however, was "not a *new thought*, though perhaps it might be justly called a "*new tenet*, as having been constantly exploded for many "centuries upwards, and never once maintained by *metaphy-* "*sicians* or *divines*; that moreover it was absolutely untenable, "yea and carried its own confutation along with it, as soon as "understood; and lastly, that such principles might be pre-"judicial, in some measure, both to *religion* and *science*, if they "should happen to prevail."

To establish these positions, our author proceeds, first, to give an *historical* account of the matter; 2dly, an *argumentative* consideration of it; 3dly, a view of its bearing and *tendency*, with respect to *religion* and *science*.

The *historical* inquiry shews great research into the scholastic writings of the middle ages, and some earlier productions in theology and metaphysics. The authorities adduced are of high reputation; and the quotations from most of them are

[n] Dr. Paley, in a short Memoir of Bishop Law, states, that "his ac-"quaintance, during his first residence "in the University, was principally "with Dr. Waterland, the learned "Master of Magdalen college; Dr. "Jortin, a name known to every "scholar; and Dr. Taylor, the editor "of Demosthenes."

decisive against attempting to rest the proof of the Divine existence and attributes upon such precarious grounds.

The *argumentative* view of the subject is conducted with equal ability. It proves that the term *necessity*, as applied to these discussions, is comparatively of recent date; and that the improper introduction of it into Christian theology made it requisite to distinguish carefully the several senses commonly affixed to it; of which, *one* only can properly be applied to God, as opposed to *mutable*, *precarious*, *contingent*, *dependent* existence; but in no sense can it be predicated as *antecedent*, in the order of nature or of reason, to that Being who is *self-existent*, *necessarily-existent*, and emphatically, the *First Cause* of all things. In some of these arguments, our author does justice to the able reasoning of Dr. Gretton in his "Review," and professes his obligations to him. The *pleas* alleged by Dr. C. in his Answer to the seventh Letter are also considered *seriatim*, and shewn to be of insufficient weight.

In the third section, on the hurtful *tendency* of insisting so much on *à priori* reasoning, Dr. W. strongly deprecates the "ill consequence of resting any *important* and unquestionable "truth upon *precarious* principles too weak to support it. "This tends," he observes, "to *expose*, rather than to *serve* the "cause so pleaded; to render it *suspected*, rather than to bring "*credit* to it; and to give the adversaries a handle for ridicule "or triumph." "Still worse," he adds, "is it to rest such "a cause upon principles, which are not only too *weak* to "bear it, but which also in their obvious natural tendency "threaten to *overturn* it: such is really the case with respect to "the argument *à priori;* which is so far from establishing "the *existence* of a *First Cause*, (the point aimed at,) that it "proceeds upon such premises as admit no *First Cause* at all. "The *pleas* made for it directly strike at the very notion of a "*First Cause*, proving (if they proved any thing) that there can "be no such thing as a being *uncaused*."

From the summary view which has thus been taken of Dr. Waterland's labours in the Trinitarian controversy, his claims to that distinction and preeminence which, both by his contemporaries and by eminent Divines of later date, have, for the most part, been readily acceded to him, may be deemed unquestionable. He has shewn the unsoundness and fallacy of the *Arian* hypothesis; that it is neither reconcilable with Scripture nor with the faith of the primitive Church; that it is inconsistent with the Divine *unity*, properly understood, while it derogates from the Divine *perfections* ascribed in holy writ equally to each Person in the Godhead; that it involves the absurdity and the impiety of acknowledging a *supreme* and an *inferior* God as distinct objects of Divine worship; that it, in effect, reduces the Son and the Holy Ghost to the rank of *created* beings, notwithstanding the titles and attributes of the Godhead acknowledged to belong to them; and thus, instead of rendering this inscrutable mystery more consonant to reason, or more accessible to our finite understandings, surrounds it with additional difficulties and perplexities, incapable of any satisfactory solution. His opponents, after vainly endeavouring to parry these attacks, changed their mode of warfare, and became, in their turn, assailants of the received notions of the Trinity. Their chief reliance was either upon metaphysical arguments to prove the *impossibility* of the doctrine; or upon detached texts of Scripture declaratory of the *supreme* Godhead of the Father, to the exclusion, as they maintained, of the other Persons of the Godhead. They assumed, on the one hand, that every text of Scripture in which the Supreme God is mentioned is to be understood of the *Father* only; and, on the other hand, that the terms *person* and *being*, when applied to the Godhead, are of one and the same signification; and consequently, that the believers of the doctrine, in its ordinary acceptation, must be either *Tritheists* or *Sabellians*. The discussion of these points necessarily engaged our author in *metaphysical* distinctions; which, otherwise, he was inclined to avoid. But it was always in *subservience* to the authoritative word of *Scripture*, that he ventured into this field of argument; in which, nevertheless, he

proved himself fully competent to meet even the most powerful of his antagonists: and seldom, perhaps, have the keenness and dexterity of the polemic been more under the discipline and regulation of this reverential feeling, than in the writings of Dr. Waterland.

His persevering adversary, Jackson, suffered hardly any of our author's labours to pass uncensured. He had eagerly espoused Dr. Clarke's *à priori* demonstration, before the appearance of the "Dissertation" appended to Mr. Law's work: and now he again came forward to animadvert upon the Dissertation with his usual petulancy and coarseness. In answer to Waterland's "Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity," he also put forth a work, called, "Christian Liberty asserted, and the Scripture-"Doctrine of the Trinity vindicated, 1734:" and not long after, he sought to take further revenge on his adversary, by publishing what he strangely miscalled, "Memoirs of the "Life and Writings of Dr. Waterland." To neither of these did Waterland think fit to return an answer. After the death of Dr. Clarke there was not the same inducement to notice Mr. Jackson's performances, as there had been whilst he was living, and might be supposed to approve and even to aid his labours. From the time that Jackson lost this support, he became more and more regardless of the restraints of decorum and the ordinary courtesies of well-trained disputants. To such scurrilities, indeed, as this last piece abounded with, Waterland could not, with any regard to his own personal respectability, condescend to reply. Jackson, however, met with a pretty sharp rebuke for his "Christian Liberty asserted" from a writer of great learning and ability, at that time anonymous, but known soon afterwards to be Mr. Horbery, of Magdalen college, Oxford; a writer, whose reputation has since been established by other theological writings of great excellence.

There is yet another controversy, in some degree connected with these, since it arose out of some passages in Dr. Clarke's "Exposition of the Church Catechism," published soon after

his decease, which appeared to Dr. Waterland to call for animadversion. But as this controversy turned chiefly upon a different subject, the relative importance of positive and moral duties, and the nature and obligation of the Christian sacraments, it may more conveniently be considered, in conjunction with our author's other writings upon the Eucharist, reserved for a future section.

SECTION V.

WATERLAND'S CONTROVERSIAL WRITINGS IN DEFENCE OF CHRISTIANITY AGAINST DEISTS.

THE period in which Dr. Waterland lived was strongly marked by a spirit of hostility, not only against some peculiar doctrines of Christianity, but against Christianity itself. Infidelity and heresy grew and flourished together, as if of kindred natures; and the soil congenial to the one, was found to be no less favourable to the other. Both, perhaps, owe their origin to that overweening pride of intellect, which disdains to receive, as necessary truth, any doctrine not discoverable by its own excogitative powers, or not, at least, in unison with its own preconceived notions of rectitude and fitness. In both also the process of reasoning is similar. The inquirer in each case usually assumes certain positions as the basis of his argument, for which he claims the privilege of indisputable axioms; and then proceeds to try the weight and credibility of Revelation, whether in whole or in part, by this criterion of his own devising. Physics, ethics, metaphysics, are, with him, paramount in authority to any thing which rests on *faith;* and independently of the testimonies by which that faith may be supported, an appeal is made to the arbitrary tribunal of human judgment. In the case of *infidelity,* this, for the most part, is unhesitatingly avowed. In that of *heresy,* though a certain degree of deference

may be professed, and even sincerely entertained, for Revelation itself, and for Scripture, its written voucher; yet the bias of a similar prepossession is almost always apparent. Faith is not absolutely discarded; but is brought into subjection to a domineering spirit, which will never rest until it has made every other authority bend to its decrees.

It appears to have been owing to the prevalence of this spirit, that the course of Deism in this country, for a considerable length of time, ran nearly parallel with that of heterodoxy. Lord Herbert of Cherbury, the philosopher of Malmesbury, and Toland, the follower of Spinosa, were contemporary with Biddle, Firmin, and the host of Anti-Trinitarians who poured forth their lucubrations as a counterpoise to the labours of Bishop Bull. In the next generation, Chubb, Morgan, Collins, and Tindal, united their forces against revealed religion; while Whiston, Emlyn, and Clarke were maintaining tenets at variance with some of its essential doctrines. Whoever is conversant with the Anti-Trinitarian writers of the former period will perceive that they wantonly, or inconsiderately, put weapons into the hands of the infidel party; who would hardly fail to render them available to their purpose. So little reverence did they sometimes shew for sacred writ, and so bold and unqualified were their assertions of the supremacy of human judgment in matters of religious belief, that scarcely could the most determined unbeliever desire to have principles conceded to him, better adapted to his own views. The same charge does not, indeed, apply, in an equal degree, to those of the succeeding generation, who controverted some of the received doctrines of the Church. Whiston, with a strange obliquity of understanding, and some unaccountable prepossessions peculiar to himself, had a strong vein of piety within him, and a certain degree of reverence for Scripture and antiquity, which led him to think somewhat meanly of metaphysical and abstract reasonings upon theological subjects. Dr. Clarke, too, must not be reckoned among those who presumptuously opposed reason to faith, or intentionally undervalued the sacred

writings. In the writings also of Emlyn, there is a cast of seriousness, sobriety, and modesty, which indicates a disposition abhorrent of profaneness or irreverence. Yet in all these, and still more in Dr. Clarke's supporters, Whitby, Sykes, and Jackson, the right of human reason to sit in judgment upon Articles of Faith, and to found their credibility or incredibility upon abstract metaphysical truths, is too often either virtually or expressly assumed. Of this, several instances have already been produced in the foregoing pages; and it is manifest, that a considerable part of Dr. Waterland's opposition to their tenets was grounded upon the danger to be apprehended from thus placing the doctrines of Christianity upon a footing which might endanger Christianity itself. He justly deprecated any arguments which might tend to weaken the authority of Scripture, upon points beyond the reach of human faculties, and on which the light of Revelation only could give us adequate information. These he maintained to be the distinct province of *faith* only; and not to be encroached upon by any pretensions of human wisdom.

Among the deistical writers above mentioned, there were several who affected not only great regard for natural religion, but so much good-will towards Christianity also, as to be desirous of rendering it conformable to that standard of perfection which human reason would prescribe. Lord Herbert of Cherbury led the way in these insidious professions. Morgan took infinite pains to confound Revelation with reason, and to reduce them both to the same standard. Yet he did not so openly avow his unbelief as some of his coadjutors; and he had taken a part with the Arians in the controversy against Waterland. Chubb, afterwards one of the coarsest and most virulent opponents of Christianity, began his career as a defender of *Arianism*, and was one of those who sought distinction by writing against Waterland[o]. For a while, he

[o] It is said, that his inclination leading him chiefly to theological inquiries, he formed a little society at Salisbury, under his own management and direction, for debating upon such subjects; and the controversy between

appears to have been much in favour with some of Dr. Clarke's friends; who could not, however, give him countenance in the part he subsequently undertook. But the most popular writer of this description was Tindal; who, to give the greater plausibility to his designs, called himself a *Christian deist*, and published his work, entitled, "Christianity as old as the "Creation," for the purpose of proving, that whatever had been revealed either in the Old or the New Testament, which had any pretensions to credibility, was merely a republication of the religion of nature; and that no otherwise were men obliged to accept or to believe it, than as derived from that source, the only legitimate authority to which rational beings could be bound to submit.

Soon after this work appeared, in the year 1730, Dr. Waterland published, in answer to it, the first part of his "Scripture "vindicated;" in the introduction to which, he observes, that Tindal's book "is a declamatory libel against *revealed* religion, "under colour and pretence of setting up *natural* religion in its "place;" and that "the author probably had no more regard "for natural religion than he had for revealed;" the latter being in reality necessary to the support and perfection of the former; which, separated from this, is "without lights sufficient to "explain it, or guards to fence it, or sanctions to bind it." Dr. Waterland further remarks, that two purposes are visibly intended in this performance; "one to *vilify the holy Scriptures*, which "the author does very frankly, and without disguise; the other, "to *magnify the law of nature*, which is the artificial part, and "can pass for nothing else but hypocrisy." Dr. Waterland's design was "only upon the *scriptural* part, to rescue the word "of God from misrepresentation and censure, from the re-"proaches and blasphemies of foolish men."

Clarke and Waterland being brought under the cognizance of this theological assembly, he drew up, at the request of its members, his sentiments upon it, in a dissertation, entitled, "The Supremacy of the Father "asserted."

The texts of Scripture which Dr. W. undertakes to vindicate against this unprincipled scoffer are limited to the Old Testament only; and they are arranged, not in the desultory way in which Tindal introduces them, to give point to his jests and sarcasms; but as they stand in holy writ, so as to form a regular series of expository illustrations. This *first* part extends no further than to the end of the book of Genesis.

A work of this description hardly admits of analysis or of abridgment. Its chief requisites are perspicuity, acuteness in the detection of sophistry, and judgment in the selection of such interpretations as are least liable to misconstruction. That Waterland's talents were well suited to such an undertaking, was attested by the general opinion passed upon his former productions; and that they were successfully applied in the present instance may be inferred from this, among other tokens, that few vindications of a similar kind have since been attempted, without borrowing from his stores. He himself, indeed, did not affect novelty or originality in the execution of the design; but referred frequently to the best authorities in our own Church, and among foreign divines, in confirmation of his remarks. Not only was an additional weight and sanction thus given to his Vindication; but the ignorance or perverseness of the infidel writer whom he opposed became so much the more evident, from the proof that his trite and superficial objections had been before repeatedly advanced and refuted. Waterland has clearly shewn, that several of his most pointed sarcasms were the result of no deeper reading or inquiry than the writings of men almost his own contemporaries, and of his own persuasion; particularly those of Lord Shaftesbury, to whom he had evidently been indebted not only for the substance, but the expression, of many of his sentiments.

The matters considered in this first part, though not numerous, are of high importance. The points most largely discussed are the literal interpretation of the fall, the origin of circumcision,

and Abraham's offering up of Isaac. The remaining topics relate chiefly to other parts of the history of Abraham, to the origin of language, the institution of sacrifices, the token of the rainbow, the blessing surreptitiously obtained by Jacob, and the history of Judah and Tamar.

It was not to be expected that Dr. Waterland's *mode* of defending Scripture against the attacks of an infidel, who pretended to set up *reason* against Revelation, would pass uncensured either by the Deists themselves, or by those advocates of revealed religion who had given countenance to the favourite maxim, that nothing ought to be enforced as an article of belief, which could not be demonstrated to the satisfaction of every man's private judgment. In opposition to this principle, Waterland, though always disposed to give human reason its full scope upon matters fairly within its reach, hesitated not to vindicate, upon *other* grounds, those which were beyond its sphere. He contended, that *faith* in God's word and *obedience* to His will were sufficient *reasons* for our reliance upon their truth, whether or not it were given us to discover their absolute fitness and expediency. He maintained also, that the actions even of the most exemplary characters in holy writ were to be judged of by their conformity to this rule; that it was sufficient for their justification, if the proof were clear that they acted under the special injunctions of the Almighty, or were sanctioned by his approval; and that to heap obloquy and ridicule upon them for their conduct in these respects, was not to uphold moral rectitude upon its just and proper principles; but was virtually to cast the imputation of iniquity upon the Divine Lawgiver himself, the Moral Governor of the universe, and thus to undermine the very foundation of all practical religion, obedience to the Divine will.

Sentiments so adverse to the prevailing opinions of most of his opponents did not escape severe animadversion; and charges were heaped upon him of giving advantage and triumph to the cause of infidelity, by placing the vindication of Scripture on untenable ground. Tindal himself, having already smarted

under the animadversions of Bishop Gibson's two pastoral Letters, took the opportunity, in a reply to the second of those Letters, to subjoin some "Remarks on Dr. Waterland's Scrip-" ture vindicated." This publication Dr. W. deemed unworthy of reply. Adverting to it, in the opening of his second part of "Scripture vindicated," he observes, "There has appeared a "pamphlet, called, 'A second Address,' which pretends to "make some exceptions to what I had written upon the former "texts. But the performance is so low, that my readers would "not excuse my stopping one moment about it. The author, "I perceive, had exhausted himself in his *great work*, and it is "but very little reinforcement we are to expect from him. He "has shewn that he can *rail*, which nobody doubted of: and "so he might as well have spared himself this new trouble. "He shall say what he pleases, for the present, of the *Vindi-* "*cator*."

A much more considerable adversary, however, now took the field. Dr. Conyers Middleton, from an early period of their academical history, had manifested much personal ill-will towards Waterland, his too successful competitor in literature and in public esteem; and had also already discovered symptoms of a disposition far from favourable to revealed religion. Scarcely could the first part of "Scripture vindicated" have got into general circulation, before it was assailed by this eager disputant, in an anonymous pamphlet, addressed as "A Letter "to Dr. Waterland, containing some Remarks on his Vindica-" tion of Scripture, in answer to a book, entitled, Christianity "as old as the Creation; together with a sketch or plan of "another answer to the said book. 1731." The attack is vehement, but unguarded; offensive in its personalities; rash in its principles and its positions; regardless of consequences that might flow from them; and directed, at all hazards, to the inflicting of a wound upon his adversary, whatever injury might incidentally accrue from it even to religion itself.

After deprecating any disrespectful treatment of deistical

writers, and intimating that the most effectual mode of rendering them favourable to Christianity would be to concede to them the principles on which they reason, and to detract somewhat from the entire perfection of the Scriptures, he proceeds to the discussion of those points in which he conceives the sacred writings to be most vulnerable, and Dr. Waterland's Vindication to have most completely failed. The Mosaic account of the fall he treats as a *mystical fable;* and ridicules, in every variety of contemptuous expression, its *literal* interpretation. The institution of *circumcision* he conceives to rest upon no satisfactory proof of *Divine* authority; but to have been evidently borrowed by Moses from the Egyptians. In touching upon this topic, he recommends "moderate and qualified senti-" ments concerning the *Divine origin* of the *Jewish religion*, and "the *Divine inspiration* of its *founder, Moses;* which will other-" wise prove a stumblingblock to men of understanding." The account of the confusion at Babel is also given up, as unworthy of credit. Having dwelt at considerable length upon these subjects, and protested against the *plenary* inspiration of the Scriptures, he proceeds to his plan of *another* answer to Tindal's book. This plan consists almost entirely of arguments grounded upon *hypothetical concessions* to the Deists; in order to convince them, that "should we allow *Christianity* to be a *mere imposture,* "on a level only with all the *other impostures* that have obtained in "the world, it would not be difficult to shew from the *dictates* "*of reason*, that an attempt to overturn it, as it is now esta-" blished by *law*, *derived* from *our ancestors*, confirmed by the "belief and practice of *so many ages*, must be *criminal and im-* "*moral.*" Upon this notable plan, the author would undertake to build the only defence of Christianity, that men of reason and understanding can approve!

It was unnecessary for Waterland himself to undertake the castigation of this performance. Though anonymous, its author was sufficiently known; and that the sentiments it contained should issue from such a quarter, was deeply felt as a discredit reflected upon the Church, and upon religion itself. The fore-

most among those who animadverted upon its contents was Dr. Zachary Pearce, who published, but without his name, "A "Reply to the Letter to Dr. Waterland, setting forth the many "falsehoods, both in the quotations and the historical facts, by "which the Letter-Writer had endeavoured to weaken the "authority of Moses." This tract is very dispassionately, ably, and successfully argued. Its design was not so much to defend Dr. W. or to enter into the dispute betwixt him and Tindal, as to expostulate with the *Letter-Writer* on the gross misstatements in his pamphlet. This was done with so much spirit and effect, that Middleton felt it necessary to put forth (though not till nearly a year afterwards) "A Defence of the Letter to "Dr. Waterland." Here he evidently betrayed a consciousness of having rashly committed himself upon certain points vitally affecting the credibility of the Mosaic history, and of having hazarded opinions, or insinuations, at least, exceedingly difficult to reconcile with the Scripture-records. He endeavours to shake off the imputation of scepticism, and of prejudice against revealed religion, by declaring himself to be "*a true friend to Christian-* "*ity,*" and by reiterated and vehement complaints, that any suspicions to the contrary should have been entertained of him. He expresses, however, a wish to "explain himself more clearly "in some points, where, contrary to his intention, he might "perhaps have given offence." Yet on these points no such explanation as might remove the suspicions is to be found. His "Defence" is chiefly confined to matters of criticism, and to the falsifications charged upon him in the "Reply." His dexterity in repelling or evading his adversary's blows, his spirit and vigour in seizing the opportunity of any fresh assault, his undaunted ease and effrontery under every advantage or disadvantage in the contest, discover talents and attainments of a superior order. But the unfortunate bias his mind had probably received at an earlier period was undoubtedly increased by acrimonious *personal* feelings; and this, together with a disdain of control, and a contempt for received opinions on matters where individual judgment ought least confidently to be trusted, rendered him captious, inconsiderate, and overbearing. Dr.

Pearce had the advantage of qualities better suited than these to the purpose he had taken in hand. His abilities were solid, his acquirements extensive and highly respectable, his temper firm and even, his learning sound, his sentiments under the regulation of the purest religious principles. He felt accordingly a proper degree of confidence in the cause he had espoused; and was not deterred by the contumelies heaped upon him by his opponent, from returning to the conflict. This he did in "A Reply to the Defence of the Letter to Dr. Waterland," published in 1732.

In this "Reply" fifteen charges of misquotation before alleged are re-considered, and Dr. Middleton's defence of them is shewn to be evasive and inefficient. But the "Defence" having more fully disclosed the author's sentiments upon some points affecting the *authority of Moses*, the latter part of the "Reply" examines at large what had been offered upon these two questions; *Whether Moses's account of the creation and fall of man is to be understood literally, or not;* and *whether the religion and laws which he delivered to the Jews had a Divine origin and authority:* and Dr. Pearce clearly shews that Dr. M. had at last reduced himself to the dilemma, of either retracting some of his opinions, or of ranging himself on the side of those who deemed the authority of Moses to be scarcely better substantiated than that of any legislator, real or fabulous, of heathen antiquity.

Dr Middleton's character as a believer in revealed religion being thus at stake, he again came forth with "Some Remarks" on the Reply; "wherein" (as the title-page states) "the "author's sentiments, as to all the principal points in dispute, "are fully and clearly explained in the manner that has been "promised." This pamphlet, therefore, may fairly be regarded as the author's *ultimatum* upon these points; and accordingly, after again going over much of the same ground as before, in repelling the charge of misquotations and falsifications, he takes up the main question of the *authority of Moses*. He acknowledges *a general belief of the Divine origin and inspiration of the*

books of the Old and New Testament; which he thinks ought to have been presumed from his having before declared himself to be a *sincere Christian*. Respecting Moses, he allows him to "have been *a great prophet and lawgiver*, who in an *extraor-* "*dinary and miraculous* manner was *favoured, assisted, and* "*inspired by God in the institution of his laws and religion*, "and consequently had a *Divine authority*, which is frequently "appealed to and confirmed *in the New Testament*." He asserts, nevertheless, "that we are under no obligation of *reason* or *reli-* "*gion*, to believe that *the Scriptures are of absolute and universal* "*inspiration*;" and the contrary opinion he holds to be "*neces-* "*sary to a rational defence of religion*." He alleges the attention of Moses to the suggestions of his father-in-law Jethro respecting the appointment of judges over the Israelites, and some supposed inconsistencies in the narratives of the evangelists, in refutation of the received opinion, that Moses and the Evangelists were under *the perpetual influence of a Divine unerring Spirit*. After more to the same effect, he states the general result of his own view of the subject to be as follows. "1. That the *Jews* "borrowed some of their ceremonies and customs from *Egypt*. "2. That the *Egyptians* were in possession of arts and learning "in Moses's time. 3. That the primitive writers, in order to "vindicate Scripture, thought it necessary in some cases to "recur to *allegory*. 4. That the Scriptures are not of *absolute* "*and universal inspiration*." In conclusion he adds, "If *reli-* "*gion* indeed consists in what *our modern apologists* seem to "place it, the *depreciating moral duties*, and the *depressing* "*natural reason*; if *the duty of it* be, what their practice seems "to intimate, to *hate*, and *persecute for a different way of think-* "*ing*, in points where the best and wisest have never agreed; "then I declare myself an *infidel*, and to have no share of *that* "*religion*. But if to *live strictly* and *think freely*; to practise "*what is moral*, and to believe *what is rational*, be consistent "with *the sincere profession of Christianity*; then I shall always "acquit myself like one of *its truest professors*." In this statement there is undoubtedly much that is less exceptionable, or more plausible at least, than in what had before dropped from his pen;

conveyed also in a tone and temper somewhat subdued, though still reluctant to yield. Throughout the tract, considerable anxiety is shewn, to stand better than he had done in the estimation of the public. But there is still a great want of ingenuousness and fair dealing, in the representation both of his own sentiments and of those of his opponents. No line of distinction is drawn between the *authority* which attaches to every part of a generally inspired writing, whatever its subject may be, and the absolute *dictation* of every part by the direct interposition of the Holy Spirit. All his opponents are presumed to contend for the *latter*; and he himself, he would pretend, never disputed against the *former*. Yet the advocates for the *plenary* inspiration of Scripture are driven to no necessity of maintaining more than the absolute and universal *authority* of *every portion* of it, as written under that Divine superintendence which guarded the writers from error and falsehood; whilst, on the other hand, on Dr. M.'s hypothesis, of an occasional and partial superintendence only, an opening is left, (of which he shewed a most ready disposition to avail himself,) to get rid of the *Divine authority* of any part of the sacred word, which did not approve itself to his judgment. Thus he might take what liberties he pleased in culling from Scripture so much only as would accord with *his* system, and regard the rest as of no more weight than mere human writings. In like manner, if religion were allowed to *depress natural reason*, he would have *no share* in it, and was ready to declare himself an *infidel*. If it would allow him to *think freely*, and to believe only *what is rational*, he was content to act like one of its *truest professors*. Who does not see the purpose and tendency of this contrast; that it is meant to represent all who repose *faith* in Revelation upon the ground of its Divine authority and inspiration, as *irrational* believers; and those only as *rational*, who pay *no other* deference to it, than that which they would yield to any *human* compositions which agreed with their own sentiments and persuasions?

Here this controversy terminated, so far as Dr. Pearce was concerned in it; though Middleton, in the following year,

published his "Remarks on some Observations," addressed to him by another writer, respecting the foregoing pamphlets. No new matter was, however, brought forward; nor any thing remarkable, except the increased solicitude shewn by the author, to clear himself from the imputations which were now so generally fastened upon him.

During the above dispute, Dr. Waterland, not at all diverted from his purpose, proceeded in his design, without taking any share in these collateral discussions. The *second* part of his "Scripture vindicated" was published in 1731, not long after the first. It carries on the examination of texts objected to by Tindal, from the book of Exodus to the second book of Kings. These are much more numerous than in the first part; and of not less importance. The personal character and conduct of Moses, the destruction of the Canaanites, the miracles of Joshua, the narratives of Balaam, of Jael, of Jephthah, and other incidents in the Book of Judges, the history and character of David, the conduct of Elijah and Elisha, with many other occurrences familiar to infidel writers, as standing subjects for the exercise of their malicious ingenuity, are touched with a masterly hand, and cleared from that odious colouring with which Tindal had disguised them. A strong and affecting expostulation is then addressed to the author himself, on the wickedness and folly of his attempts to bereave mankind of their best hopes and their most salutary fears, by undermining the only effectual *sanctions* of morality itself, and the expectation of a future state; and his conduct in this respect is likened to the most flagitious of the ancient Epicureans, in their endeavours to root out every sentiment of religion and virtue from the human mind.

To this *second* part of our author's work is subjoined a "Postscript, in answer to such as pretend that the bulk of "mankind, for 4000 years, were without Revelation, and had "no other guide but reason." This was occasioned by a tract which Dr. Sykes had then recently published, entitled, "The true

"Foundations of Natural and Revealed Religion asserted," in answer to Dr. Waterland's Supplement to his treatise, on the Nature and Obligation of the Sacraments. The matter of the *postscript*, however, extends only to the point above stated, as having a more immediate connection with his "Scripture "vindicated;" in the first part of which it had been briefly noticed, in refutation of one of Tindal's cavils. The point itself is certainly of considerable importance, and has often been satisfactorily cleared, for the removal of any prejudice that may arise from it to the credibility of revealed religion. Dr. W. briefly, but fully, considers the question; and shews that the objections raised upon it by Dr. Sykes and others are not warranted, either by the facts of the case, or by the reasoning grounded upon them; since there is no conclusive evidence, that, during the 4000 years before the coming of Christ, "the "bulk of mankind, or any considerable number of them, were "ever left so destitute of *opportunities*, or so barred from all "access to divine *Revelation*, as the objection supposes." Nor can it be proved that during that time "either the religion or "the *morality* which the Pagans had, (so far as it was *true* and "*right*,) was wrought out by mere *reason*, or that it was not in "a great measure the remains of ancient *Revelation*, handed "down by *tradition*." To ground an argument, therefore, upon this, for the *sufficiency* of mere *natural light*, or unassisted *reason*, is supposing what is incapable of proof, and what is, more probably, contrary to *fact*. There is also another fallacy in thus pleading the *sufficiency of reason*. To speak of it as *absolutely* sufficient, is to contradict its own suggestions, since it perpetually makes us sensible of its *insufficiency* in matters of religious truth. This is one of its first lessons. That it may be *sufficient*, where there is *nothing else*, to excuse *invincible ignorance*, we may hope and believe; but not to excuse *neglect* or *disregard* of the *light* and *knowledge* superadded by *Revelation*. And, after all, it is only through the merits of Christ, that the *honest endeavours* even of the most blind and ignorant will be mercifully accepted.

Dr. Sykes published a short "answer" to this "postscript," complaining that he had been misrepresented as "*depreciating* "*the use of Revelation*;" restating his former argument, that "*if* "*reason* be not a *sufficient guide* in matters of religion, a great "part of mankind had *no sufficient guide* to direct them in their "duties;" and inferring from thence, "*the sufficiency of reason* "to direct men to all that was necessary for them to know;" since "God would be *unjust* and *cruel*, if he required *duty* "where men had not *sufficient* means to acquaint them with it." Against the evidences adduced by Waterland, to shew the probability that mankind had not in general been so destitute as Dr. Sykes had presumed them to be, of any aid but that of their own reason and the light of nature; he insists, that there being no positive proof from Scripture that Revelation had been vouchsafed to any but a small portion of mankind, and not even to *them*, for the purpose of instructing them in the knowledge of God and of moral duties; all such conjectures are of no avail; and therefore, it is still to be maintained, that reason alone might be, and must have been sufficient, to teach the *immortality of the soul*, to shew them *how* to serve God acceptably, and also *how* a sinner might be reconciled to God after he had offended him. This he asserts must have been the case even with Adam, with Noah, with Abraham, and with all the Patriarchs; to whom it is not expressly said, that the doctrine of the soul's immortality, or any mode of religious worship, or any code of moral duty was taught by *Revelation*. Such is the substance of the argument by which the author thinks he has established the *sufficiency of reason*; meaning, as he declares, by that term, "that men are enabled, in virtue of the powers they have to "think and judge, to discover every duty that is required of "them, in order to their being accepted by God." Yet is he indignant beyond measure, that he should be charged with *depreciating the use of Revelation*.

Dr. Waterland pursued this controversy no further; but went on to the completion of his *third* part of "Scripture

"vindicated," published in 1732, and which extends through the remaining books of the Old Testament. Various passages in the Book of Job, the Psalms, and the Prophets, charged by infidel writers with inconsistency, injustice, or absurdity, are here examined; and occasionally some collateral topics are entered into, tending to their further elucidation. No extraneous matter, however, is attached to this part, either in the way of preface or of appendix. The author only intimates, in the last paragraph of the work, that "there remained still "some texts of the *New Testament* which the objector had "been tampering with, in the same way, and which," (he adds,) "if God grants me life and health, will be all distinctly "considered in a *fourth part*, to follow this in due time." This fourth part, however, was never published. Whether it was ever taken in hand, or why it was laid aside, does not appear.

The above three parts of "Scripture vindicated" were afterwards republished in one volume; and to a subsequent edition of them was prefixed a *general preface*, or preliminary dissertation "concerning the *various kinds* of interpretation of Scrip-"ture, and of the *several names* which they have or may go "under." These are distinguished into three kinds, *literal*, *figurative*, and *mystical*. The *literal* admits of a subdivision into two main branches, *historical* and *doctrinal*. Of the *figurative*, there may be as many kinds as there are *tropes* or *figures* of rhetoric. *Mystical interpretation* (whether of words or things) is distributed into four several kinds, *parabolical*, *symbolical*, *typical*, and *allegorical*. All these are explained with our author's accustomed accuracy, and are illustrated by apposite examples; the whole forming an excellent elementary treatise for theological students, as well as for more general use. At the time when it was written, this subject had not been *systematically* treated by any of our English Divines. Glassius's "Philologia sacra" was the chief work of the kind among foreign writers; and to this work Dr. Waterland acknowledges his obligations.

Another production, of a lighter kind, but executed with much spirit and vivacity, was published by our author about the same time, entitled, "A Defence of the Lord Bishop of "St. David's; particularly in relation to the charge of perse-"cution: in answer to Jonathan Jones, Esq. 1730." This was written, in consequence of a virulent attack upon the Bishop (Dr. Smalbroke) by an obscure infidel writer; of whom, or his pamphlet, no further information has been obtained, than that which is supplied by Waterland's answer. It bore the title of "Instructions to the Right Reverend Richard, Lord "Bishop of St. David's, in Defence of Religious Liberty, by "Jonathan Jones, Esquire." Whether this was a real or a fictitious name is doubtful. Probably, it was assumed for the purpose; the pamphlet being nothing more than a railing accusation against the Bishop, as an instigator to persecution, and an enemy to religious liberty; and the *gravamen* of the charge consisted in the Bishop's having recommended, that some restraints should be imposed upon licentious infidel writers, and the laws more strictly enforced against them.

The usual topics brought forward by writers of this description, in claiming the unlimited right of private judgment, appear to have been pressed by Mr. Jonathan Jones with no small portion of flippancy, conceit, and confidence. But, as Dr. Waterland observes, "it is not merely liberty of *private* "*judgment*, that the fraternity are contending for, but liberty of "setting up as apostles of infidelity, in opposition to the "Christian guides, and to draw away people from paying any "respect or deference to CHRIST and his religion:" and when they clamour against the laws which punish blasphemy and profaneness, irreligion and immorality, they confound *persecution* with *prosecution*; as if there were no difference between being punished "for *religion*, for *conscience*, for *truth*," and being punished "for *no religion*, *no conscience*, *no truth*." The author had vehemently charged the Bishop with taking vengeance out of the hands of the Almighty, with maintaining religion by fire and sword, and calling upon the sovereign to

"cease to be the father of his people, that he may become de-
"fender of the faith," and to "force them, against their consent,
"to become orthodox believers." In which, says Waterland, there is not one word of truth. "What is desired is, that "petulant, blaspheming libellers may be prosecuted according "to law; may be forced, against their will, to become "modest, quiet, inoffensive, and may no longer fly in the face "of the Establishment, and defy all laws, sacred and civil." Mr. Jonathan Jones was no less indignant, it seems, with the *judges* also, for having authoritatively declared Christianity to be a *part of the common law of England*, and that *all attempts to subvert it are punishable by common law;* whilst the advocates for Christianity maintained, that "the more freely it is dis-
"cussed, the more firmly it will stand." But, replies Dr. W., these judgments "may both be very right, and very consistent "with each other: for the one speaks of the *natural* and *general* "tendency of a thing; the other of the *accidental* effect. "Rebellion often serves *accidentally* to strengthen a government, "while its *natural* or *general* tendency is destructive of it. For "which reason a rebel, though accidentally serviceable to the "crown, yet deserves to be hanged for rebelling." But Mr. J. Jones insists, that this would be "a total restraint upon "all religious inquiries, and all arguments in general, on any "subject, whether pleasant or grave." As to which plea, that all *religious inquiries* would be restrained, Dr. W. observes, "he "should have said, *irreligious*, which is quite the contrary, and "alters the whole state of the argument. For he must not "bear us in hand, that libelling Christ Jesus, flouting his mira-
"cles, running riot against both Testaments, and poisoning the "minds of the people, can come under the soft name of *religious* "*inquiries*. Mere inquiries do not satisfy these gentlemen, but "they deal abroad their instructions, obtruding themselves "as guides, listing proselytes, and forming a sect; which is "something more than making inquiries." Again; to the common-place objection, that the advocates of Christianity betray a want of confidence in their arguments in defence of it, by endeavouring to deter others from answering them, Dr. W. replies, "that be their arguments or replies ever so full

"and unanswerable, yet possibly they may not spread fast "enough, nor far enough, to undo the mischiefs which infidels "have been doing;"—that "arguments are feeble artillery "against insults;"—that "if infidels escape with impunity, "they will presently renew the same wicked calumnies, though "abundantly before confuted;"—that others also "may revive "the same calumnies, or invent greater, if not deterred by some "exemplary severities;"—"that libels against Christianity "should not be thrown among readers of every description, "though answers immediately be sent after them; for where a "constitution is infirm, the antidote may be insufficient to "expel the poison;" and that it were "endless to permit every "ignorant impertinent disputant to pelt Christianity, and "impose upon weak readers, only that wiser and good men, "who could employ their time better, may be constantly "exercised in answering their scurrilities." "If," he adds, "it be reasonable to suffer men to be assaulted and wounded, "because surgeons may heal; or poison to be administered, "because physicians may cure; or firebrands to be thrown "abroad, because somebody may quench them; then may it "be reasonable to permit infidels to propagate irreligion, "because the pious Clergy may (if perchance they may) stop "the effect of it. In all other cases of like nature, wise men "are used to trust more to early precautions than to after "remedies."

In a similar strain, many other petulant objections of this writer are repelled; and the whole answer, short as it is, excites an interest far beyond that of a temporary and fugitive publication. Almost every part of it is as perfectly applicable to the conduct of the low infidels of the present day, and their incessant outrages against the religion and the laws of their country, as if it had been written for that purpose; and, perhaps, a better exposure of their views and principles could hardly be desired than is contained in these few pages.

This Defence of the Bishop of St. David's appeared just before our author's publication of the *first* part of his "Scripture vindi-

"cated." Two of his "Charges" upon the subject of *infidelity* intervened also between the *second* and *third* parts of that work. But these will be noticed, together with his other Charges, in a subsequent section.

To the foregoing account may here be subjoined some brief notice of two or three of Dr. Waterland's minor productions, of a miscellaneous description; which, in the present edition of his Works, form a part of the same volume with those which have just been mentioned.

The first of these is entitled, "Advice to a young Student;" a short essay, drawn up, as the author states, for the private use of his pupils, while he was an University Tutor, and not intended for publication; but having, without his knowledge or intention, found its way to the press, in an incorrect state, and altered for the worse, he thought it necessary to reprint it more than twenty years after it had been first written. So slight a performance, and appearing under circumstances so disadvantageous, is hardly to be made a subject of criticism. It contains, however, some excellent hints for a course of studies and of conduct; and although its utility may in a great measure be superseded by the improved state of academical education and discipline in later times, it is valuable as a standing memorial of the author's diligence, zeal, and qualifications, as a College Tutor.

The next piece is a "recommendatory Preface to the second "edition of Mr. Blair's Sermons;" giving a short account of the author and his writings. Mr. Blair, in the stations he filled, first as Missionary, and then as the Bishop's Commissary, in Virginia, appears to have been a most useful and exemplary man, and highly esteemed by Bishops Compton, Robinson, and Gibson, under whom he held the above-mentioned office for upwards of fifty years. Archbishop Wake and other persons of distinction in the Church are mentioned as encouraging the publication of these Discourses, which comprise a full explanation of our Lord's sermon on the mount. Dr. Waterland, after

speaking of them as "a valuable treasure of *sound divinity*, of "*practical Christianity*," makes some just observations upon the importance and the *difficulty* of becoming a complete *practical Divine*, able "to bring down the most important truths "to the level of a *popular audience*; to adapt them properly to "*times*, *persons*, and *circumstances*; to guard them against "*latent* prejudices and *secret* subterfuges; and to enforce them "with a becoming earnestness, and with all the prudent ways of "insinuation and address. A person (he adds) must have some "knowledge of *men*, besides that of *books*, to succeed well here; "and must have a kind of *practical sagacity*, (which nothing but "the grace of God, joined with recollection and wise observation, "can bring,) to be able to represent truths to the life, or to any "considerable degree of advantage." Mr. Blair's Sermons correspond well with this description. They are much above the ordinary level of popular discourses, though remarkably plain, familiar, and unaffected.

The last of these publications is a tract entitled, "Regenera-"tion stated and explained," being the substance of two Sermons delivered at Twickenham and at Windsor, upon the text, Titus iii. 4, 5, 6, which Dr. W. shews is to be interpreted of *water-baptism*, and is nearly parallel to our Lord's declaration to Nicodemus, John iii. 5. "The general doctrine," he observes, "both of our Lord and of St. Paul in those texts is, that *water* "applied outwardly to the body, together with the *grace* of "the Spirit applied inwardly to the soul, *regenerates* the man: "or, in other words, the Holy Spirit, in and by the use of "water-baptism, causes the *new birth*." This is the doctrine here maintained by Dr. Waterland; who explains at large "the name and notion of *regeneration*," and also of the "*renew-*"*ing*" spoken of by the Apostle as distinct from *regeneration*; the former comprising all that relates to the nature and efficacy of the sacrament of Baptism; the latter whatsoever is further necessary towards securing the benefits obtained by that sacrament.

About the time that this tract was written and published, (in the year 1739,) Wesley and Whitefield had begun to make proselytes to their new modes of preaching, and had succeeded in drawing multitudes after them, by their fanatical views of the gospel system. *Regeneration* was one of their most frequent and favourite topics; and served, according to *their* acceptation of it, as the groundwork of that delusive scheme of *spiritual experiences*, or *inward perceptible motions of the Spirit*, which, in common with some other enthusiastic sects, they strenuously inculcated. The necessity of being *born again* and made *new creatures*, is, indeed, clearly the doctrine of Scripture. But, separating this *spiritual* regeneration from the *baptismal*, they "endeavoured to explain away the *outward* part, resolving all into "the *inward* part, or thing signified, namely, the grace of the "Spirit;" and thus, while they rendered Baptism, in effect, a nugatory aud unavailing ordinance, they necessarily led the believer to seek for some *other* proof that he was actually regenerated. This proof their disciples were taught to expect in the perception of certain divine impulses, or impressions *immediately* proceeding from the Spirit of God, and the influence of which it would be impossible for them to resist. In this fundamental error, it will be found that the opinions of Wesley and Whitefield nearly coincide, whatever difference might subsist between them on other points. The one as a Calvinist, and the other as an Arminian, might and did very materially differ in their respective views of *predestination:* but as to the necessity of *personal election*, they were both agreed; and also as to the kind of *evidence* by which this was to be ascertained, to the infallible conviction of the favoured individual. Their harmony of opinion on this point seems to be still the main bond of union between the two great parties of Wesley's and Whitefield's followers; and when such a persuasion has once got possession of the mind, it sets reasoning at defiance. It opens an inlet to every wild imagination; and by making the whole of vital religion to depend only upon internal feelings, renders it amenable to no higher authority than that of the individual himself.

A thorough investigation of the whole subject was therefore peculiarly seasonable at the time when Dr. Waterland turned his attention to it; nor could the discussion have fallen into abler hands. Without any personal notice of these new enthusiasts, not only *their* errors, but those of less exceptionable writers, are refuted; not in the spirit of controversy, but by a plain and lucid exposition of the doctrine, as deducible from Scripture, reason, and antiquity, and in connection with the whole system of our redemption. The tract itself being brief and comprehensive, to attempt an abridgment of it, would be doing it injustice. The recent controversies, however, which unhappily have arisen on this essential point of doctrine, render a recurrence to such a treatise as this almost imperative upon every one sincerely and impartially desirous of forming an accurate conception of it. Nothing can be more simple and intelligible than the exposition here given; nothing more exactly conformable with the Scriptures, and with the Articles and Formularies of our Church: nor does it appear that any direct attempts to controvert it have been made, either at the time of its appearance, or by those who have lately revived, with so much zeal and vehemence, opinions of an opposite tendency.

This was almost the last of our author's works which he lived to publish.

SECTION VI.

CONTROVERSIES RESPECTING THE EUCHARIST.

WE have already had abundant proof of Dr. Waterland's great versatility of talent, and of the extraordinary extent of his acquirements, in his polemical writings against the Arians and Deists. His depth of knowledge in Scripture and in ecclesiastical antiquity, his judgment in discriminating between what was essential and what was non-essential to the questions brought under discussion, and his steadfastness, as well as skill and prudence, in confining his labours to the former, and not unnecessarily wasting his strength upon the latter, were continually put to the trial, by opponents of consummate dexterity and of determined perseverance. By these his spirit was continually excited, his energies called forth; and his inexhaustible vigour and vivacity disposed him to take an active part in the prevailing discussions and disputes on matters of religion, whenever they were such as he deemed likely to affect any of the vital interests of Christianity.

But, besides these general incitements to the exertion of his talents, an evident *connection* may be observed between the several controversies in which he bore a part, which would naturally lead him on from one to the other, as they successively arose. His Arian opponents (as has been already observed) not unfrequently betrayed sentiments, of which infidels would hardly

fail to take advantage in support of their own views. If human reason were set up as sole or chief arbiter in deciding upon matters of faith, the Deist would readily perceive that a first principle was conceded to him, which might greatly facilitate his endeavours to establish the all-sufficiency of the religion of nature. If unbelievers saw that even Christian Divines were labouring to distort the language of Scripture from its plain, obvious, and generally received signification, in order to avoid the admission of doctrines which they treated as contradictory to reason; it was but a step further, to question the credibility of Scripture itself. If, again, some of these speculative theologians had formed mean and unworthy conceptions, not only of the mysterious *doctrines* of Revelation, but also of its peculiar *rites* and *institutions*, and had held them up as insignificant and worthless, when compared with those *moral* duties which (as it was contended) reason, of itself, might discover and dictate; in this strain also would the sceptic and the scoffer most readily join; well aware, that they were thus furnished with some of the most plausible pretexts for discarding altogether a system, reduced so greatly in value and estimation, even by its professed advocates, as to present scarcely any thing worth acceptance, which might not be obtained without it.

In this point of view Dr. Waterland seems to have contemplated the progress of those opinions which he most zealously controverted. It was not only their own inherent errors or defects, but their tendency to weaken the general faith of Christians, and to injure the very foundations of revealed religion, that he so earnestly deprecated. The probability of these consequences was indeed, on the other hand, confidently denied; and the apprehension of them was treated as weak and ridiculous: nor did the parties forbear to express their strong resentment, that any such surmises should be harboured against them. But that these were not merely imaginary fears, the writings of the enemies of revealed religion too clearly proved. Nor was Waterland himself a man disposed to charge such consequences lightly upon his opponents. He was capable of taking enlarged

and rational views of every subject of his inquiry. No indications of superstitious weakness, of credulity, or enthusiasm, are discoverable in any of his writings. On the contrary, he guarded, most carefully, against extremes on either side.

The circumstances which first led him to publish his sentiments upon the doctrine of the Eucharist, arose out of a controversy with Dr. Sykes, in its commencement more immediately connected with that which he had maintained against Dr. Clarke's view of the doctrine of the Trinity.

Dr. Clarke died in 1729, leaving, revised and prepared for the press, an "Exposition of the Church Catechism;" "which "was published," says Bishop Hoadly, "according to his own "express desire, the same year of his death." In the following year came forth Dr. Waterland's "Remarks" on this "Expo-"sition;" animadverting upon several passages which he deemed likely to mislead incautious readers. These censures relate rather to *omissions* of certain points which ought to have been brought forward, or to some heterodox opinions obscurely insinuated, than to any express declarations of exceptionable doctrine. Dr. Clarke studiously inculcated, that religious *worship* should be paid to the *Father* only, *through* the Son, and *in* the Holy Spirit; implying, that it is not paid to either of these as their own due, but only through or by them, ultimately to the *Father*. He represented also the work of *redemption*, and that of *sanctification*, to be from the *Father* only, *by* the Son and the Holy Ghost; as if *these* were merely *instruments* in *His* hand; and that, consequently, to HIM, and not to them, is the glory exclusively to be ascribed. Other passages of similar tendency occur in this treatise, more or less derogating from the essential Divinity of our Lord and of the Holy Spirit; passages, which our author illustrates by reference to others in Dr. Clarke's "Modest Plea," expressing more fully and unreservedly what is covertly advanced in this "Exposition."

Dr. Waterland observes further, that Dr. Clarke, in explain-

ing that answer in the Catechism which states our belief in God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, "says no-"thing of GOD the Son, or GOD the Holy Ghost: he never asserts "the *Divinity* of either, never so much as gives them the title "of GOD:"—moreover that the titles and attributes ascribed to the Son and the Holy Ghost, as well as to the Father, were so interpreted by Dr. C. as to adapt them to those *lower* notions of their Divinity, which he had elsewhere maintained. Even the form of *baptism*, in the name of each Person in the Trinity, he explained in such a way as to denote that we are dedicated to the *service* and *worship* of God the *Father* only.

These were points which had already been debated between Dr. Clarke and Dr. Waterland, in their former controversy. The subsequent "Remarks" introduced a fresh topic, not, indeed, unconnected with the others, but which had not before been brought into discussion, though in itself of no inconsiderable importance.

On the Sacrament of the *Lord's Supper*, Dr. W. objects that the "Exposition" is by no means full and satisfactory; since the account given of the *atonement* by Christ seems to place all its efficacy in our Lord's pure and spotless character, not in any inherent *propitiatory* virtue belonging to it; nor, as Dr. W. observes, is it conceivable, that, "supposing Christ to be a *creature* "only, he could have such a degree of merit, by any thing he "could do or suffer, as thereby to purchase pardon for a whole "world of sinners."

Again; the "Exposition" imperfectly stated the sense in which the Eucharist may be called a *sacrifice;* ascribing to it that character in no higher acceptation than might be ascribed to any other service of praise and thanksgiving; not taking into account that it is a solemn commemoration and representation to God of the sacrifice offered on the cross, and an act of covenant also, in which we lay claim to that, as our *expiation*, and feast upon it, as our *peace-offering*.

The same inadequate representation is charged upon the "Exposition," respecting the *benefits* of this holy sacrament; which Dr. Clarke represented to be nothing more than that assurance of blessing and assistance from God which accompany *all* religious and virtuous habits; benefits arising naturally from the good dispositions of the recipient, and not from any special gifts of grace, or spiritual advantages, communicated through the medium of the sacrament itself. Dr. Clarke, indeed, expressly says "of the two *sacraments*, in common with other positive in-"stitutions, that they have the nature only of *means to an end*, "and that therefore they are never to be compared with moral "virtues." On the contrary, Dr. W. contends, that "*moral* "*virtues* are rather to be considered as means to an end, be-"cause they are *previous* qualifications for the sacraments, and "have no proper efficacy towards procuring salvation, till they "are improved and rendered acceptable by these Christian per-"formances." He asks, "What is the exercise of *moral* virtue, "but the exercise of *obedience* to some law, suppose of charity "or justice? But the worthy receiving of the sacrament of the "Lord's Supper is at once an exercise of *obedience* to the law of "Christ, and of *faith*, of *worship*, and of *repentance*, and carries "in it the strongest incitement, not only to all *moral virtues*, "but to all *Christian graces*." Neither is there good reason "for slighting *positive institutions* in general, in comparison "with *moral* virtue." Man's first offence was breaking a *positive precept*. Abraham's obedience to a *positive command* obtained for him the special favour of God. Obedience to *positive* institutions is an exercise, and sometimes the *noblest* and *best* exercise, of that *love of God*, which is the *first* and *great* commandment: and there may be, in some cases, greater excellency and more real virtue in obeying *positive* precepts, than in any *moral* virtue. Not that these should be opposed to each other; since both are necessary, and perfective of each other. "But," he adds, "if they must be opposed and compared, I say, *moral* "*virtue* is but the handmaid leading to the door of salvation, "which the use of the sacraments at length opens, and lets "us in."

Dr. Sykes, who had already distinguished himself as a warm friend of Dr. Clarke, and a strenuous advocate of his opinions, immediately stepped forward, in defence of the "Exposition," against these "Remarks." "The 'Remarks,'" says Dr. Disney, in his Memoirs of Dr. Sykes, "appear to be the effusions of a "captious and impatient adversary, more attached to the defence "of the notions of an established theological system, than to "that fair and candid reasoning which so well become the in-"quirers after, and advocates of truth, and to which the very "name of Dr. Clarke was justly entitled." And Dr. Sykes, he tells us, not only "from having been many years united with "him in general sentiment and personal friendship," but "from "an ardent desire to draw aside that veil, which others were "eager to throw over every liberal inquiry into Scripture-truth, "was readily induced to examine these Remarks on the cate-"chetical lectures of Dr. Clarke." Such reflections may come with characteristic propriety from Dr. Disney, an open seceder from our Church, and avowedly hostile to her doctrine and her establishment. But it was matter of just complaint, with respect both to Dr. Clarke and Dr. Sykes, that, professing adherence to the Church, and to hold communion with her in faith and practice, they yet laboured to introduce their own individual opinions, in opposition to those of the "established theological system;" and that, therefore, whatever claim they might have, in their own estimation, and in that of others, to the character of "liberal "inquirers after Scripture-truth," they were, in effect, undermining the system which, as ministers in that Church, they were pledged to uphold. And though, perhaps, it may be allowed, that, in some instances, Dr. Waterland's remarks are pushed further than the very expressions of the "Exposition" may seem at first to warrant; yet, when the intent and purpose of the writer is judged of by his *former* writings in conjunction with *this*, there can hardly be a doubt in the mind of any impartial reader, that the "Remarks" impute to the "Exposition" no more than it was really intended to convey.

This indeed might be inferred from the line of defence chiefly

taken by Dr. Sykes. Here and there a charge is rebutted with considerable effect. But, for the most part, the omissions or insinuations noted by Waterland are *vindicated*, rather than *disproved*. Much is also said in derogation of the authority of the Church, of the primitive Fathers, and of Creeds, and Confessions of Faith; the same in substance with Dr. Clarke's memorable rule, in the first edition of his Scripture-Doctrine, and with Dr. Sykes's own notions of *Arian subscription* to the Articles of our Church. The same laxity is contended for respecting *fundamental* doctrines; and the old arguments are again urged, to lessen the force of the Divine character ascribed to our Lord. It is therefore not unfair to argue, that such, even in Dr. Sykes's own opinion, was the direct tendency, at least, if not the real purpose of the "Exposition" itself.

But the most important, and perhaps the most exceptionable part of Dr. Sykes's "Answer," is that which relates to the design and efficacy of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. After expressing great abhorrence of the terms *satisfaction*, *merit*, and *sacrifice*, usually applied to our Lord's death upon the cross;—which he regards as *unscriptural*, and unworthy of a *just* and *merciful* God;—an attack is commenced upon what Dr. Waterland had said respecting the *benefits* which Christians receive from that sacrament. The sum of Dr. Sykes's assertions (for they are scarcely supported by a semblance of proof) is this. He affirms, that there is not a word in Scripture to shew, that the sacrament of the Lord's Supper *unites us to Christ*, or has a *life-giving virtue* annexed to it, or supplies the defects of moral virtue; on the contrary, that in Scripture positive institutions "are treated as mere nothings, as things not *required* at all, "compared with moral virtues. Have moral virtues, then, "(he asks,) an efficacy towards salvation, without their being "made acceptable by the sacraments? I answer, Yes. They "are *in themselves* acceptable to God:—they want nothing to "make tham acceptable, nor can any thing make them more "acceptable than they are. They are already *perfection*; the "exact imitation of God himself; and therefore need no aid to

"*relieve* them, nor any thing to *improve* them.—What is "baptism, but only the *dying to Christ*, and a *resurrection to* "*a new life*, in a figure: and does not St. Peter treat it as a "very low thing in itself, 1 Pet. iii. 21, and shew, that living "after the dictates of moral virtue is that which saves us? As "to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, there are but two ends "mentioned of it in the New Testament; the one, *to do it in* "*remembrance of Christ*; the other, that it is a symbol of *love* "*and friendship with one another*."

These are, some of them, bold positions, which Dr. Clarke would probably have hesitated to avow. They involved, however, matters of too great importance to be passed by unnoticed. The former part of Dr. Sykes's pamphlet called for no reply; the topics to which it related having been again and again considered on both sides. But in these concluding observations fresh ground of controversy was broken. Waterland felt it necessary again to encounter this keen opponent. Accordingly, within a short space of time, he published a tract, entitled, "The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian "Sacraments considered. 1730."

This is a short, but systematic and well-digested treatise upon a subject of deep interest with respect both to theology and morals. The question of the importance of the sacraments, necessarily involves the previous question respecting "the com-"parative value, excellency, and obligation of moral and "positive duties." Dr. Sykes had rather assumed, than proved, that these latter duties were as nothing in comparison with the former; and consequently he regarded Dr. W.'s notions of the Eucharist, not only as extravagant and unwarrantable, but even as injurious to the interests of moral virtue. To clear up a point of such magnitude, and to prevent misapprehensions detrimental, on either side, to truth and piety, were the objects which our author had in view

It is Dr. Clarke's general principle, "that this and all other

"*positive institutions* have the nature only of means to an end, "and that therefore they are never to be compared with *moral* "*virtues*." Dr. Waterland observes, that "to make the com- "parison clear, and the opposition exact," it ought to have been between "*positive duties* and *moral duties*;" since otherwise it is comparing what is merely the *external* part of *positive* duties, the *institution*, with the *internal* part of *moral* duties, the *virtue*, the moral habit and disposition which accompanies their performance; which could not be intended; since "the opposition does not lie between outward acts and "inward habits, but between obedience, both outward and "inward, to *positive* laws or rules, and obedience, both outward "and inward, to *moral* commandments."

This being premised, as necessary to a fair statement of the question, Dr. W. proceeds to examine the distinction between moral and positive duties. The distinction itself, however, (he observes,) is, perhaps, not the most proper. "Every law, "properly so called, is *moral*, because it is a rule regulating the "practice of moral agents. But in a more restrained sense, it "signifies the same with *natural law*, a law derived from God, "consonant to the *nature* and reason of things, and therefore of "as fixed and unmovable obligation as the nature and reason "of things. *Positive* Divine law, in contradistinction to the "other, is not founded in the fixed nature or reason of things, "or at least not known to be so; being considered only as "*prescribed*, and depending on God's good pleasure either to "remove or continue it." Of several duties enjoined in Scripture, it may be difficult to say whether they are *natural* or *positive*; though of their importance and obligation there can be no reasonable doubt. Such are the duties we owe respectively to God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, in their several distinct capacities, as well as in their united characters as God. These we know from Revelation only, and from the Divine injunctions concerning them; yet they may justly be regarded as *natural* and *moral* duties, "since Scripture has discovered to us what foundation

"they have in the nature and truth of things." They thence become of unalterable and of universal obligation to all who know them; and do not partake of that character ascribed to *positive* duties only, that they are dependent upon circumstances and conditions liable to change or cessation.

Dr. W. proposes, therefore, to divide our duties into *natural* and *supernatural:* the former discoverable by the bare light of nature; the latter by Revelation. The *supernatural* may again be divided into *constant* and *occasional;* such as are of eternal and immutable obligation, and such as are temporary or changeable. Of these latter, which answer most correctly to the term *positive* duties, some were *transient*, as several occasional precepts given to the Patriarchs, to Moses, and the Prophets; some *permanent*, as the *ritual* and many of the *judicial* precepts given to the Jews, to continue so long as the Jewish polity continued; and also the two *Christian sacraments*. And "though we are used to consider these merely as *pre-* "*scribed*, and to resolve them commonly into the mere will and "pleasure of the legislator, yet they are always founded upon "*reasons*, known, perhaps, in part to us, but perfectly known "to God; and so they are ultimately resolvable into infinite "wisdom and goodness."

Dr. Clarke's principle is thus shewn to rest upon a false presumption, a fundamental error, that of "confounding *external* "with *positive*," and of "not considering that *positive* duties "have both an *inward* and an *outward* part, both a *formal* and "a *material* constituent, as well as *moral* duties." *Almsgiving*, for instance, is a *moral* duty; but if done without a true principle of piety and charity, is no *virtue*, is nothing worth. *Receiving the holy Communion* is a *positive* duty; but if performed without faith, reverence, or repentance, is nothing worth: if performed as it should be, it is as truly an act of *moral* obedience, and as much an exercise of *virtue*, as *almsgiving*. "In *positive* duties, therefore, though the matter, in "itself considered, is indifferent; yet the obedience is *moral*,

"the disobedience *immoral*." Hence they are as strictly obligatory, for the time being, as any other commands whatever. For, "all obligation arises from some law; and it is the divine "law that constitutes moral good and evil. Things may be "*naturally* good or bad, that is, may have a natural tendency "to promote happiness or misery; may be *materially* good "or evil, that is, useful or hurtful, previous to any law; but "they cannot be *formally* and *morally* good or evil, without "respect to some law, natural or revealed; for where *no law is*, "*there is no transgression*." This shews, too, that the notion of "an obligation antecedent to all law, is a contradiction and "absurdity."

Again; there may be as great virtue, (or greater,) in obeying *positive* precepts, as in obeying *moral* ones. The positive command may require a greater degree of self-denial, as in the case of *Abraham*, whose faith and love of God were eminently proved in his implicit resignation to the Divine will. This implicit resignation is due to every command of God, whether we know the *reason* for it, or not. A *positive* precept may also aim at some benefit of greater value than any other. Such was the command, to *preach the Gospel to every creature*, extending to the salvation of all mankind; in comparison with which all other works or attainments are of inferior value. And there may be times and circumstances, in which other positive duties may be preferred to moral. By the same rule, there may be "greater impiety and iniquity in disobeying positive precepts, "than in disobeying moral ones." Saul was reproved by Samuel for offending in this respect. Heavy penalties were appointed in the Jewish law for the breach of positive institutions.

The comparative value, then, of any precepts or duties depends not upon whether they be *positive* or *moral*, but upon conscientious obedience, and upon a due consideration of the circumstances belonging to them with reference to the Divine will. And "any pretence of setting up *moral virtues* in

" opposition to *religious duties*, is undermining morality, instead " of serving it, and is defeating the very end which it pretends " to secure."

The objections to these principles, whether from Scripture or from reason, are shewn to be of little weight. When the Scriptures appear to speak in disparagement of *positive* duties, it is not because they are in themselves of inferior value to others, but because they were performed, by those who trusted in them, hypocritically, and without the requisites to render them acceptable. They were reduced to mere *external* acts, and had not the *inward* piety, faith, and obedience which properly belonged to them. Under such circumstances, *moral* duties would be equally insignificant and unavailable. *Almsgiving without charity*, St. Paul assures us, *profiteth nothing*. So is it with *every* duty, moral or positive. The mere outward act does not constitute virtue, but the inward disposition. Neither will the performance of one kind of duties make amends for the neglect of another kind. Sacrifice without obedience would not satisfy the Jewish law; nor would any pretence of moral duty be permitted to excuse the omission of sacrifice. It is not true, therefore, that the Prophets, or any of the sacred writers, speak with contempt of positive ordinances, except when they were defiled and polluted by the wickedness and hypocrisy of those who practised them; nor is any reproach cast upon them, which would not equally apply to *moral* duties also, under circumstances similarly exceptionable. St. Paul, indeed, argues, " to persuade men not to trust to the *efficacy* of the works of " the *law*, because no man's works would be, or could be, " *perfect* enough to trust to; for which reason he advises them " rather to trust to the efficacy of *faith*, that is, to the *grace* of " the Gospel covenant sealed in the blood of Christ, by which " alone men might justly hope for salvation. Not that good " works were not *necessary* conditions, though wanting that " proper *efficacy* to salvation, which the alone merits of Christ's " death supplied." And this applied to all works of the law, whether natural or positive, whether moral or ceremonial; since,

in all, "the *grace* of God in Christ could alone supply the "defective obedience even of the best men, and make it ac-"ceptable with God."

After rebutting other objections of a similar kind, grounded not upon Scripture, but upon the supposed reason of the thing, our author proceeds to a more special consideration of the Christian sacraments; in order to shew, that they operate, both *naturally* and *supernaturally*, as *means* to *moral* and *Christian* virtue, being in themselves essential to Christian holiness and perfection, and moreover the instituted ordinary means of applying the benefit of the great atonement to every worthy receiver.

The sacraments are, in their very nature, adapted to promote a good life; chiefly because they are federal rites, by which we enter into a solemn stipulation to obey God to the utmost of our power; a consideration, of great force, to restrain us from evil, and to incite us to good. This *natural* effect is allowed by Dr. Clarke. The *supernatural* effect he passes over. He has told us what *we* do in them, but not what the *Spirit* of *God* does. The Spirit of God *works invisibly* upon the worthy receivers, to assist, strengthen, and confirm them. This is the *inward and spiritual grace* spoken of in our Catechism, Liturgy, Articles, and Homilies. Nor is there any *enthusiasm* in this notion, as Dr. Sykes seems to suppose. What is thus done by the Holy Spirit is done suitably to our nature as *moral* agents, and does not exclude human will and endeavour. It does not destroy natural agency, but helps and advances it.

The right use of the sacraments, then, is in itself virtue, a *part* of moral and Christian holiness and perfection. It is an exercise of the *love of God*, of *obedience*, of *worship*, of *faith*, *hope*, and *charity*, of *humility* and *self-abasement*, of *thankfulness* and *reverence* towards *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*. All this we cannot but ascribe to it, unless we abstract the *outward* act

from that *inward* disposition, which is always implied in the *worthy* reception of the sacraments, and without which the outward performance of any *moral* or *natural* duties would be equally unavailable to our acceptance with God.

But further; the sacraments are the instituted ordinary means of applying the benefit of the great atonement to every *worthy* receiver. In this they have a more direct and *immediate* influence upon our justification and salvation, than any of our best works can have. They are the channels of pardon and remission of sins; the appointed means of entering into and renewing the Christian covenant. *Cornelius* was a man of exemplary moral virtues, yet *baptism* was necessary to bring him into a state of *salvation*. Of the *Eucharist*, St. Paul says, is it not the *communion*, or *participation*, of the body of Christ, and of the blood of Christ?—not merely an act of communion or fellowship with *Christ*, as his professed disciples, but of communion of his *body* and *blood*, or a participation of the benefits of his death and passion, for the remission of sins. Therefore, although the sacraments, considered as mere acts of obedience, may bring no more remission of sins than other duties; yet considered as *seals of the covenant*, they are the instruments of pardon, or the channels of conveyance by which God confers it.

Hence it follows, that the sacraments are to be preferred, or not, to *moral* duties, as circumstances may direct. They dispose to good actions, and they form good dispositions. In some respects, they are more *comprehensive* in their nature than moral duties, and tend more to elevate the mind above earthly things. The objection that they are light and easy services, supposes that there is nothing in them but the *opus operatum* only. But to perform them *worthily*, is, at least, as difficult as to perform *moral* duties *worthily;* nay, more so; since they require an universal obedience, a thorough change of heart, a general renunciation of sin and wickedness. Neither *outward* religion, nor *outward* morality, is any thing: the *inward* principle is the

life and spirit of both. Yet the *external* is not to be laid aside, on a presumption that we have the *internal*. Both must go together, unless there be some insuperable difficulty, to disable a man from doing what he sincerely intends.

Having thus argued, that the sacraments are not merely *means* of virtue and holiness, but duties essential to the Christian covenant, and out of which all other Christian duties thrive and grow; so as to be *productive* of virtues, rather than *instrumental* to them; and consequently, that morality is not destroyed, or weakened by maintaining the dignity of the sacraments, but is fixed more securely upon its true basis: our author, in conclusion, makes some brief observations upon the different parties who have combined to depreciate their value; animadverting upon the unnatural union of fanatics on the one hand, and of libertines on the other, in bringing them into disrepute: the former, for the purpose of extolling *faith* above all external duties, whether moral or positive; the latter, for the sake of extolling *morality* in opposition to faith, and consequently, in opposition to *instituted* religion, whatever the end or design of its institutions might be.

To this able performance Dr. Sykes soon after replied, in "A Defence of the Answer to the Remarks upon Dr. Clarke's "Exposition of the Church-Catechism. 1730."

Dr. Sykes complains, that Waterland had "artificially em-"barrassed" the controversy; and therefore proceeds to "fix "the meaning of the terms." *Moral duties*, he states, are such as we are obliged to perform, in conformity to the reasons of things; *positive duties* are such as we are obliged to, not from any reason of the thing, but purely from the command of him that prescribes them. *Obligation* signifies the tie we have upon us to act agreeably to those faculties or powers which we are vested with by God. Moral duties, therefore, must be obligatory at all times and in all places. Positive duties cannot have the same sort of obligation, because they are changeable at the

pleasure of the institutor. Consequently, when they interfere with each other, the latter must give way to the former.

Dr. S. affirms also, that it is not a Divine law, or the will of God, that constitutes moral good or evil; but something *antecedent* to any Divine law, even the relations of things to one another, which were the same in the Divine mind before moral agents were created, as they are now. Waterland had said, that obligation antecedent to all law is a contradiction and absurdity. Dr. S. replies, that, if so, the arbitrary will of God might have made vice equally acceptable to him as virtue; and if he had commanded men to be unjust or ungrateful, it would have been morally good to be unjust and ungrateful: but this he could no more do, than he could have made two and two equal to ten.

In reply to Waterland's observation, that "there may be as "great virtue, or greater, in obeying *positive* precepts, as in "obeying moral ones," he contends, that the obedience to positive commands (such as those which had been instanced in *Abraham*) is merely "a *proof*, or *evidence* of virtue;" the virtue, or good disposition, being already inherent, as a moral quality, in the person who obeys the precept, and only manifested, or called into action, by the opportunity thus afforded. This and similar arguments are drawn out to considerable length, and are intended to prove, that the *positive* duties enjoined in Scripture derive all their weight and value from their being intended to promote *moral* duties, or from their calling forth the exercise of *moral virtues*.

The objection, that "*moral* performances, if *outward* only and "hypocritical, are as worthless" as *positive* duties, unworthily performed, is put aside, by observing that such performances are not *moral*, but *immoral*; because to constitute them moral, in the true sense of the word, there must be the *internal* virtuous disposition: whereas *positive* duties, depending upon the will of the prescriber, and being changeable, "must all consist of *out-*

"*ward* acts;" and that, therefore, to distinguish betwixt *outward acts* and *positive duties*, is to confound positive with moral duties, and to render them the same.

Upon these several assumptions, that *positive* duties are nothing more than *means* to virtue; that they are mere *external* acts, with no *internal* worth to recommend them; and that, on the other hand, *moral* duties necessarily imply and include those *internal* qualities which render them perfect in their kind; the author grounds his whole theory. Admitting these positions, there could be no great difficulty in overthrowing what his opponent had advanced. But upon these very points the disputants were decidedly at variance; and an impartial reader will hardly allow that Dr. Sykes has either satisfactorily vindicated his own principles, or invalidated those of his opponent.

In his application of these positions to the *sacraments*, he chiefly labours to prove that Dr. W. had failed in bringing any clear and decisive proofs from *Scripture*, of their efficacy as means of conveying spiritual graces or benefits. Discarding all authorities, either of Churches or of individuals, upon this point, he insists that, respecting the *Eucharist*, in particular, no text of Scripture, rightly and fairly interpreted, warrants any such assertion. The argument from the *analogy* between this sacrament and Baptism he rejects as irrelevant: and the sixth chapter of St. John he dismisses almost without a comment, as containing "not a word about the *sacraments*." The text of 1 Cor. xii. 13. he understands to mean nothing more than "shewing "ourselves members of that figurative body which is Christ; "that we are admitted into that religious society, the truth of "whose doctrines has been confirmed by the Spirit." St. Paul's expressions, the *communion* of the body and *blood* of Christ, are interpreted, in like manner, to denote only our "associating "ourselves with Christ," or being "in friendship with Christ "and with all Christians;" having no reference whatever to any "real participation of the merits and benefits of the great "atonement." The *ends* of this sacrament, he affirms, are two

only; "to put men in mind of Christ who died for them, and "to shew their love and unity to one another as brethren." He denies that any of those virtues or good qualities which Dr. W. had stated to be essential to the *worthy* performance of them, are in Scripture required to accompany the performance. The absolute perfection of *moral* virtues is here again and again insisted upon; and the notion of any *pardon* being necessary on account of their imperfection is ridiculed, as confounding virtue with vice, good with evil, moral excellence with actual guilt. The author's sentiments upon this point are expressed with a degree of confidence, not to say of arrogance, difficult to reconcile with Christian humility.

The *Appendix* is intended to rebut what had been said of the advantage given to *Deism* by undervaluing the efficacy of the sacraments. *Natural religion* (Dr. S. contends) is, in itself, true and perfect religion; and the sole or chief purpose of *revealed* religion is to supply additional *motives, incitements, encouragements,* and *assistances,* to perform what the religion of nature requires. "By the religion of nature, men may know that God "*is,* and *what* he is, and *how* God is to be worshipped: it will "shew how men, beings placed in the circumstances they are, "full of passion, full of infirmities, and surrounded with variety "of temptations of all sorts, may be reconciled to and accepted "by God: it will shew a future state of rewards or punish-"ments: and it will shew the duties we are to practise one to "another." Thus even *reconciliation* and *acceptance* are ascribed to the all-sufficiency of *natural* religion; nor does the author drop a hint of the necessity of any *atonement, intercession,* or *sanctification,* to give efficacy to this imaginary scheme of perfection. Thus to magnify the work of human reason, is, he maintains, the surest way to impress the Deist with a more favourable opinion of the truth of a divine Revelation.

To this tract, still more adventurous and unguarded than the preceding "Answer to the Remarks," Dr. Waterland replied, in "A Supplement to the Treatise on the Nature, Obligation,

"and Efficacy of the Christian Sacraments," printed in 1730; being the *third* tract he had published on the subject in the course of the same year. To an author so thoroughly conversant with the matter in debate, it was no very laborious undertaking to expose the sophistries, or to overthrow the untenable positions, on which his adversary had relied. All, indeed, which he proposed, in this Supplement, was to notice more particularly some few points urged by the author of the Defence, which seemed to be "capable of further illustration, and important enough to "deserve it."

On Dr. Sykes's position, that moral virtue is "obligatory to "all intelligent beings, even *previous* to any *laws*, or commands, "or injunctions, *divine* or human," Dr. W. remarks, that this is "setting up a system of morality without *God* at the head "of it;" and "supposing *obligation* without *law*, a *religion* of "nature without a *Deity*, and *duty* without a *superior* to whom "it is *owing*:" in which, he observes, there seems to be the like fallacy and mistake, as in the argument *à priori* for the existence of a God; for "as well might we suppose a cause prior to the "first, as a lawgiver higher than the highest, or a law without "a lawgiver, or obligation without law." Again; whatever notion we may form of moral duties as arising out of the abstract *fitnesses* and *reasons* of things, "if God be at the head of them, "he *obliges*, and not they; and if you abstract the Deity, you "abstract the obligation:" nor is it *virtue* or *duty* to conform to them upon any other principle; but mere policy, inclination, or interest. Yet this by no means warrants the inference Dr. S. would draw from it, that, in that case, the arbitrary will of God might make vice, virtue, or virtue, vice. On the contrary, our unqualified *obligation* to obey HIM supposes this to be impossible, because it supposes Him to be infinitely *good* and *great*: and to suppose otherwise is absurd and self-contradictory; it is supposing Him not to be that which He really is.

Neither is it true, that *positive* duties arise from the mere arbitrary will of the prescriber. They are understood to be

founded upon as wise and good *reasons* as *moral* laws; reasons, known to God, and ultimately resolvable into His infinite wisdom and goodness, whether revealed to us, or not: and though they may, in their circumstances, be *local*, *occasional*, or *personal* only, yet are they, according to those circumstances, no less obligatory upon those who are required to observe them, than duties of the most general and universal obligation. Wherever, and for whatever period or extent of time and place, a positive law is in force, "obedience is indispensably necessary; "and nothing can remove it but the same authority that gave "it."

Our author pursues the subject, through the different windings and perplexities traced out by his opponent; nor does he omit some severe, but just, reprehensions of the high and presumptuous tone in which Dr. S. had descanted upon the absolute perfection of human virtues, insisting that they stand in no need of *expiation* to render them *saving*, and to ensure their acceptance with God. The question respecting the special obligation and efficacy of the *Christian sacraments* is not resumed at any considerable length; probably because it was evident that the author of the Defence had made this part of the subject to depend chiefly, if not entirely, upon the previous question concerning the comparative value of moral and positive duties; to which, therefore, Waterland deemed it expedient almost exclusively to direct his attention in this particular controversy.

Dr. Sykes was not slow in his Reply to the "Supplement." It was published in the same year, 1730, and entitled, "The "true Foundations of natural and revealed Religion asserted." But of this publication Waterland took no notice till the following year, when he made it the subject of some animadversions in a postscript to his second part of "Scripture vindicated," of which some account has already been given in the preceding section.

Not long after this debate was closed, another was stirred up,

by the publication of Bishop Hoadly's "Plain Account of the "Sacrament of the Lord's Supper;" a tract which lowers the importance of that sacrament more perhaps than had ever been done before, except by *Socinian* writers; reducing it to a bare memorial of our Lord's death and sufferings, an act of pious gratitude and obedience on *our* part, but unattended by any special benefits on *his*; discarding from it all mystical signification, and all efficacy as the means of conveying pardon or sanctification; and not even requiring, on the part of the communicant, any recognition of that *atonement* and *propitiation* made for sin, which Christians in general have conceived to be the main object of the institution itself.

This work excited great dissatisfaction, and was almost instantly attacked by several distinguished writers. The celebrity which the author had gained by his writings against church-authority, and his high station in that church whose pretensions he had so underrated, could not but excite public attention to any fresh topic he might be inclined to agitate: and the popularity of his sentiments among those who bore no good-will either to the church or to religion, ensured an extensive circulation to his performances. It were uncharitable, however, not to believe him to have been sincerely persuaded that he was rendering good service to Christianity, in simplifying (as he conceived) a rite which had, in some cases, been rendered instrumental to the grossest superstition and idolatry; in others, had been invested with more of a mysterious character than really belonged to it; and in others, represented with an aspect of severity and harshness, which tended rather to terrify men from its observance, than to invite them to it as a source of rational satisfaction and improvement.

On scarcely any subject, perhaps, has the Christian world been more divided, than on that of the Eucharist. Between the high ground (the perilous height, indeed) of papal transubstantiation, and the low and contracted views taken by Socinian interpreters, an indefinite variety of opinions may be traced,

difficult either to be enumerated or explained. And although it is exceedingly desirable, that, on a subject of such deep interest, the utmost possible accuracy should be attained; yet, within these extremes, a considerable latitude of opinion may, perhaps, be taken, without the abandonment of any essential principle. But in the work of Bishop Hoadly, it was the opinion certainly of many among the most distinguished and approved members of our church, that the spirit and intent of this sacred ordinance were compromised by the view in which he placed it; and that the very doctrines which gave it its chief force and signification were studiously cast into the shade. It was also but too evident, that this work would soon become a standard of doctrine upon the Sacrament among a considerable party in the Church. All who had any bias towards Socinianism or Arianism, all who were indisposed to receive the doctrine of a vicarious sacrifice and expiation for guilt, all who were sceptical as to the gifts and operations of the Holy Spirit, and their necessity in the work of salvation; would readily fall in with a scheme, which did not depend upon the truth of any of these articles of faith for its support; but might be adapted to a Creed, in which neither the Divinity of the Saviour, nor his all-sufficient merits, nor his mediation and intercession, nor the influence of the Spirit of grace, formed any of its component parts. This laxity of sentiment appeared to have been gaining ground, for a considerable time, both among Clergy and laity. It had been much fostered by the labours of those who took part with Dr. Clarke in his endeavours to lower the doctrine of the Church of England to the standard of his own opinions; and who upheld Bishop Hoadly in the Bangorian controversy. The authority of two persons so distinguished could not but give currency to their tenets among many who had neither leisure nor ability to investigate such subjects, nor were disposed to yield that deference to the collective judgment of the Church, which they paid implicitly to individual opinion.

These considerations gave additional importance to Hoadly's treatise on the Sacrament: and the solicitude it awakened was

proportionate to the impression it was thus calculated to make upon the public mind, rather than to any extraordinary pretensions of the work itself. It was controverted by a host of eminent writers; among whom were Warren, Wheatly, Whiston, Ridley, Leslie, Law, Brett, Johnson, and Stebbing; besides others of less notoriety. The strength on Hoadly's side was far inferior.

Dr. Waterland's exertions were not therefore wanted to counteract the effect of this work. Nor did he come forward as the controversialist of Hoadly. It appears, from his correspondence with Dr. Grey and Mr. Loveday, that he had been expected, and perhaps pressed, so to do: but as far as any immediate consequences were to be apprehended from this attempt to depreciate the Sacrament, he was well satisfied with the answers and animadversions which it had called forth; particularly with those of Dr. Warren, Dr. Stebbing, and Mr. Wheatly, which he notices in strong terms of commendation. His own opinion of the work is briefly, but impressively stated in one of his letters above mentioned, where he describes it as *Socinianizing* the doctrine of the Sacrament, by divesting it of its reference either to the Divinity of our Lord, or to his suffering as a propitiatory sacrifice. In this, he conceived, lay the main objection to it. That the Eucharist was a *memorial* only, might not have been so exceptionable, although certainly an incomplete representation of it, had the author distinctly set forth, of *what* it was intended to be a *memorial*. Was it merely to preserve the recollection of a teacher or prophet sent from God, a friend and benefactor to the human race by the lustre of his example and the purity of his precepts? or was it, to confirm the faith of his disciples, throughout all generations, by impressing upon their minds the great truths, that he was indeed the *Saviour* of the world; that in Him were united the perfections both of Divine and of human nature; and that, in that mysterious union, he effected, by his sacrifice on the cross, the redemption of mankind? Every one must see how vast a difference the *memorial* itself exhibits, in point of dignity and value, according to the view we take of it, in the one aspect or in the other.

In the latter case, it comprises the sum and substance of Christianity: in the former, it is comparatively a meagre and spiritless service. But, upon this question, Bishop Hoadly seems to have been studiously silent; or, rather, by the *omission* of the points most essential to its main object and design, he has given a manifest advantage to those who would fain obliterate from their Creed, and consequently from the Sacrament itself, these prominent and distinguishing characteristics of the Christian system.

In a Charge, on *the doctrinal use of the sacraments*, delivered in June 1736, Dr. Waterland took a compendious view of their importance in this respect. By historical evidence, and by illustrations selected from ecclesiastical writers of various periods, he shewed how much these ordinances had contributed to the preservation of the fundamental articles of our faith; the reception of the sacraments, according to their full intent and meaning, necessarily implying the reception of those doctrines so immediately connected with them. The charge does not expressly advert to Bishop Hoadly's performance; but it is hardly possible to doubt, that the plan of it was suggested by observing the striking defects of that treatise, with reference to this great and leading principle.

But the subject of the sacraments, and that of the Eucharist in particular, appear to have occupied Waterland's mind long before this occasion was given of communicating his thoughts to the public.

Dr. Zachary Pearce, who so ably vindicated Dr. Waterland against the attacks of Conyers Middleton, on his "Scripture "vindicated," in 1731 and 1732, had, in the preceding year, amicably disputed with Waterland himself on certain points relating to the Eucharist, in consequence of some observations which had fallen from him in his controversy with Dr. Sykes. Two letters on the subject appear, among Bishop Pearce's other posthumous works, subjoined to his Commentary on the New

Testament. They relate chiefly to the view which Waterland had taken of the sacraments as *federal* rites. Dr. Pearce contended, that the Sacrament was not in itself a federal act, *communicative* of the benefits of his death, but only *commemorative* and *representative* of those benefits. He further objected to the Eucharist being considered as substituted for the *passover*; nor did he think there was sufficient proof that the passover was a *sacrifice*, or that sacrifices themselves were *federal* rites. His general persuasion was, that the Eucharist was nothing more than "a feast instituted as a *memorial* of Christ's death; the "bread and wine to be received in *remembrance* of Him, not in "*renewal of the covenant* made by Him." He combated also another argument grounded upon St. Paul's representing the Eucharist to be an act of *communion* between *God* and the *receiver*, analogous to that of the Israelites at their altars, and that of the heathens in their idolatrous offerings, 1 Cor. x. 16—21; conceiving, that St. Paul refers only to the *communicants* themselves, jointly participating in the ordinance, and not to the communication of spiritual blessings from God. Nor does he admit that the Eucharist can be proved from Scripture to be *a conveyance or channel of pardon, an instrument of absolution.* The remission of sins, he contends, is the effect of *Christ's blood shed for us*, not the effect of *our commemorating that, by drinking of the cup in the Eucharist.*

It will immediately be perceived, that although these opinions (which were advanced by this learned and estimable Prelate with the candour and modesty conspicuous in all his writings) were much at variance with some of the highest authorities in our church, as Mede, Cudworth, Barrow, and others; yet do they distinctly recognise those fundamental articles of the Christian faith, which, to all who admit them, must be deemed inseparably connected with the Sacrament itself. The covenant between God and man ratified by the blood of Christ, and the remission of sins flowing from it as its immediate benefit, are expressly acknowledged; consequently, Dr. Pearce's view of the Sacrament, as a *commemorative* act, rises infinitely higher

than Bishop Hoadly's; and the matter in dispute betwixt him and Dr. W., though undoubtedly of considerable interest and importance, did not, like the other, involve in it the very essentials of the rite itself.

Dr. Waterland's Answers to these Letters are not extant; nor does it appear that either party had a view to the publication of their sentiments. The subject of them, however, is fully treated in our author's "Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist;" and there can be little doubt that the *substance* of *his* share in the correspondence is interwoven in that larger work.

But at a much earlier period than this, there is evidence that Dr. Waterland had attentively studied this subject, and was no less careful to guard against one extreme than another, in forming his judgment upon it. Dr. Brett, the celebrated Non-juror, and one of the most learned and acute theologians of his time, had published, in 1720, "A Discourse concerning the necessity "of discerning the Lord's Body in the holy Communion;" in which he carried the doctrine of the *real presence* in the Sacrament so far, as, in the opinion of many judicious persons, seemed almost to confound the *sign* with the *thing signified*, the *mystical* with the *literal* sense of the ordinance, the *spiritual* with the *corporal* participation of the body and blood of Christ. Mr. Johnson, another learned Divine, and an intimate friend of Dr. Brett, had also published, in the year 1714, his "Unbloody "Sacrifice;" a work, intended to prove that the Eucharist is a propitiatory sacrifice, in which the representative, though not the real body and blood of Christ, are actually offered up for the remission of sins; the *material* elements being, by virtue of this ordinance, made efficient to that purpose, and our Lord's sacrifice thus solemnly presented by the faithful worshipper at the altar of God. This notion, though it stands entirely clear of the absurdities of *transubstantiation*, yet seems to be grounded upon the supposed necessity of *material* sacrifices, analogous to those of the *Jewish* ritual, and also to bear some resemblance to the doctrine of the *Romish mass*, that our Lord's sacrifice is to be

repeatedly and continually offered up before God, in order to render it efficacious to the salvation of individuals.

Upon both these writers Waterland animadverted with considerable severity, in some marginal observations, written with his own hand, in copies of their works now deposited among Dr. Rawlinson's manuscripts in the Bodleian Library. The notion of a *material* sacrifice in the Sacrament he steadfastly resisted, conceiving it to be derogatory to the *spiritual* character of the ordinance, derogatory also to the all-sufficiency of our Lord's sacrifice made, once for all, upon the cross, and not borne out by any legitimate interpretation of sacred writ. He maintained, that the Eucharist is altogether a *commemorative* and *representative* service, *symbolically* representing that which had before been *actually* and *materially* offered up, and accepted of God; and that no other *offering* or *oblation* is made in this sacrament, than that of the elements themselves, for the purpose of their consecration to God's service, and the spiritual affections of the communicant himself, requisite to render him a meet partaker of those holy mysteries, and to obtain for him those benefits which the Sacrament is intended to convey. To Dr. Brett's opinion, on *discerning our Lord's Body in the holy Communion*, he also objected, on similar grounds; maintaining, with Cranmer, that when it is said, "that the *body of Christ* is present "in them that worthily receive the sacrament," the meaning is, "that the *force*, the *grace*, the *virtue*, and *benefit* of Christ's "body that was crucified for us, and of his blood that was shed "for us, be really and effectually present with all them that "duly receive the sacraments: but all this is to be understood "of his *spiritual* presence; and no more truly is He corporally "or really present in the due ministration of the Lord's Supper, "than He is in the due ministration of Baptism." These topics are touched with great effect, in a series of observations, remarkably acute and powerful; but in a manner somewhat more caustic, perhaps, than if they had been intended for the public eye.

Thus prepared, by long continued habits of considering this important branch of Christian theology; and perceiving that something was still wanting to settle the minds of less informed readers, and to enable them to rest their opinions upon some solid and substantial grounds; our author seems to have formed his determination, very soon after the publication of Bishop Hoadly's treatise, to undertake an enlarged and comprehensive inquiry into the whole subject; for the purpose of forming a didactic, rather than a polemical dissertation, comprising every part that essentially belonged to it.

Bishop Hoadly's "Plain Account" was published in 1735. Dr. Waterland's "Review" followed early in 1737; no long interval of time for so extensive and elaborate a performance; a work of established reputation both here and abroad, for which he had been collecting materials during a considerable portion of his life.

The general design is briefly stated in the Introduction. It was to guard the doctrine of the Sacrament against a *superstitious* abuse of it, on the one hand, and against *profane neglect* of it, on the other. Hooker's observation, that the holy Communion is "*instrumentally a cause of the real participation of Christ, and* "*of life in his body and blood*," is adopted by our author, as comprising the substance of the whole doctrine;—that which, as Hooker remarks, "all approve and acknowledge to be most "true; having nothing in it but that which the words of "Christ are on all sides confessed to enforce; nothing but that "which the Church of God hath always thought necessary; "nothing but that which alone is sufficient for every Christian "man to believe concerning the *use* and *force* of this sacrament; "nothing but that wherewith the writings of all *antiquity* are "consonant, and all Christian *confessions* agreeable." The observation of Hooker is, indeed, well worthy of commendation. It contains both a correct definition of the Sacrament, and an effectual guard against the misapprehension of it. The Sacrament is but *instrumentally* the cause, yet it *is* the cause, of the *real*

participation of *Christ*, and of *life* in his *body* and *blood*; that is, it instrumentally conveys to us pardon and sanctification: *pardon*, through the *atonement* made by the death of Christ;—*sanctification*, through the Holy Spirit which Christ obtained for us. The *sign* and the *thing signified*, the *efficient* and the *instrumental* cause of the benefits communicated, are thus accurately distinguished from each other; so as to ascribe to the Sacrament its full value and importance, without investing it with such characters as belong only to the one great sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction; of which, in itself, it is nothing more than a figurative and commemorative representation.

After some further introductory observations on the danger of *underrating* this ordinance, and on the prejudice done to the sacraments by regarding them merely as *positive duties*, rather than as *sacred rites*, in which God himself bears a *part*, or as *covenants*, solemn transactions between God and man; Dr. Waterland conducts his inquiry in the following order:

First, he gives a brief historical account of the most considerable *names* by which this sacrament has been called; a matter by no means unimportant; some of these being expressive simply of the external form of the institution; others, of its origin; others, of its purpose and design; others, of its distinguishing characteristics as a religious service; others, of the effects resulting from it. The titles enumerated are ten in number; *breaking of bread*, *communion*, *Lord's supper*, *oblation*, *sacrament*, *eucharist*, *sacrifice*, *memorial*, *passover*, *mass*; every one of which, excepting the last, has evidently some appropriate meaning, suitable to the nature of the ordinance. A full and adequate conception of it, however, is rather to be obtained by *combining* the force and meaning of these several appellations, than by adopting any one of them, to the exclusion of the rest.

Upon the *institution* of this sacrament, but few important questions arise. The chief are those which relate to its having

succeeded in the place of the *Jewish passover*; and to the points in which these two ordinances resemble each other. By the resemblance between them, (which is here very satisfactorily traced,) much light is thrown upon the subject. The type and the antitype so fully and minutely correspond with each other, that it is scarcely possible to overlook the analogy between the temporal and the spiritual deliverance to which they respectively refer; and thus a view is presented of this sacred mystery, which the most simple as well as the most profound inquirer may contemplate with much edification.

The next subject of inquiry is "concerning the *commemoration* "of Christ in the holy Communion. The Greek words εἰς τὴν "ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν," Dr. W. observes, "may bear three several "renderings: 1. *In remembrance of me.* 2. *In commemoration of* "*me.* 3. *For a memorial of me*, or, *for my memorial.* They "differ not *much* in sense; but yet as they do *differ*, they may "deserve a distinct consideration. The *second* includes the first; "and the *third* includes both the former; not *vice versa.* So "they rise, as it were, in sense, and are so many distinct "gradations."

The Socinians make the bare *remembrance* of Christ the only end and use of the Sacrament; not distinguishing between the mere *act* itself, and the *purpose* intended by it; nor do they include in their notion of it a full and complete view of our Lord himself. All parties are agreed that we ought to *remember* Him in this sacrament, but are not agreed as to *who* he really was, or what he really did and suffered for us. It is not sufficient to remember Him merely as a great and good man, a wise instructor, and an admirable teacher, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven; nor only as our Lord and Master, the founder of our religion, whose disciples we are; nor even as higher than the angels: but we must also remember Him, to the full extent of his *personal dignity*, declared in holy writ, as our *divine* Lord and Master, the *Creator* and *Lord* of all, the object of universal *adoration.* Unless our remembrance and acknow-

ledgment of Him correspond with these declarations, we fall short of what is required of us in this solemn act of devotion.

But *commemoration* advances a step further than this. To a bare remembrance "it superadds the notion of *extolling*, "*honouring*, *celebrating*, collecting all into one *complex* idea." It includes both an inward remembrance, and an outward expression of it in praise and thanksgiving. And this *commemoration* also extends, as the *remembrance* does, to every point of our Lord's dignity and character, and of what he did and suffered in that character, to his *Divinity*, his *incarnation*, his *atonement*, his *merits*, every quality and perfection belonging to Him as our Saviour and Redeemer.

The term *memorial* includes both the preceding terms; and if we consider it as bearing allusion to the sacrifices and other typical services of the *Jewish* law, (which were sometimes called *memorials*,) it may denote, that the service of the Eucharist, the most solemn part of *evangelical* worship, ascends up as incense, *for a memorial before God*. This is the highest view of it. But it is also a *memorial before men*, as the passover was; a memorial, to perpetuate our greater deliverance from the bondage of sin and death; in which Jesus Christ is *set forth crucified*, as it were, *before our eyes*, to make the stronger impression upon our minds. Moreover; "it is not sufficient to commemorate the death of "Christ, without considering what his death *means*, what were "the *moving* reasons for it, and what its *ends* and *uses*. The "subtilties of Socinus and his followers have made this inquiry "necessary: for it is to very little purpose to *shew the Lord's* "*death till he come* by the service of the Eucharist, if we "acknowledge not *that Lord* which the Scriptures set forth, "nor *that death* which the New Testament teaches." His death was "a willing *sacrifice* to Divine *justice* for the sins "of mankind;" it was properly "a vicarious *punishment* of "sin;" and "by virtue of it we receive the benefit of *atone-* "*ment*, *redemption*, *propitiation*, *justification*, *reconciliation*, and "*remission*." It was therefore not only "a *confirmation* of his

"gospel, a *pattern* of holy and patient suffering, or a necessary "*preparation* to his resurrection;" but it had such "a particular "*virtue, merit, efficacy*, in it, that God's acceptance of sinners, "though *penitent*, (not *perfect*,) depended entirely upon it." These points our author establishes upon the clearest Scripture-evidence: and sums up his statement by enumerating "the "several concurring *means* to the same end," in the work of our redemption. The divine *philanthropy* is the *primary*, or *principal* cause. Our performing the duties required of us, *faith* and *repentance*, by the aid of Divine grace, is the *conditional* cause. The *sacrifice* of Christ's death is the *meritorious* cause. The Divine *ordinances*, and more particularly the two *sacraments*, are the *instrumental* causes, in and by which God *applies* to persons fitly disposed the *virtue* of that sacrifice. This shews the end and use of *commemorating* our Lord's death in the Eucharist. "It is suing for pardon, in virtue of the same plea that Christ "himself sues in, on our behalf. It is acknowledging our in-"dispensable *need* of it, and our *dependence* upon it; and con-"fessing all our other *righteousness* to be as *nothing* without it. "In a word, it is at once a service of *thanksgiving*, (to Father, "Son, and Holy Ghost,) for the *sacrifice* of our redemption; "and a service also of *self-humiliation*, before God, angels, "and men."

The 5th chapter treats of the *consecration* of the elements. The *relative holiness* of these, as well as of other things set apart for religious uses, is denied but by few; and St. Paul's expression, *the cup of blessing, which we bless*, puts this matter beyond all doubt. Hence also the guilt which the apostle charges upon profane and unworthy communicants. Not that we attribute any real virtue or efficacy to the things *themselves*, or to any *human* benedictions, except as they are founded in *Divine* promise. Whatever *sanctification* is imparted, can be derived only from "the *Divine* warrant, authorizing men to "administer the holy Communion; from the *Divine* word inti-"mating the effect of it; and from the *Divine* promise and "covenant, tacit or express, to send His blessing along with it."

What the *degree* of sanctity thus bestowed upon the elements may be, is no where precisely determined. It can only be judged of by the high and important *purpose* of the Sacrament itself, the relation it bears to our *Lord's person*, the *judgments* denounced upon those who treated it with irreverence, and a comparison of it with what is elsewhere required in Scripture with regard to holy and sacred things. But besides this relative holiness, the Fathers frequently speak of this sacrament as more especially sanctified by a supposed illapse of the Holy Spirit upon the elements, or rather, upon the devout communicants in the use of them; which seems to be the more rational and scriptural view of it. The *prayers*, *thanksgivings*, and *benedictions*, used in the service itself, may also be considered as *instrumental* to this effect. Some of the Fathers reasoned upon our Lord's words, at the time of instituting the Sacrament, "as "virtually carrying in them a *rule*, or a *promise* to all succeeding "ages of the Church, that what was *then* done when He him-"self *administered* or *consecrated*, will be *always* done in the "celebration of the Eucharist;" so that "what the Sacrament "then was, in meaning, virtue, and effect, the same it is also at "this day;" conceiving our Lord's words to be "directly "*declaratory* of what then was, and virtually *promissory* of what "should be in like case for all time to come." In this sense only, they supposed the elements to become *Christ's body*; being *sanctified* by *consecration* pursuant to our Lord's institution, and thus made the *representative* body of Christ. "The "sum is, that the *consecration* of the elements makes them *holy* "*symbols*, relatively holy, on account of their *relation* to what "they represent, or point to, by *divine* institution: and it is "*God* that gives them this *holiness* by the ministry of his word. "The *sanctification* of the communicants (which is *God's* work "also) is of *distinct* consideration from the former, though they "are often confounded: and to this part belongs what has been "improperly called making the symbols become our *Lord's* "*body*; and which really means making them his body *to us*; "or more plainly still, making us partakers of our Lord's *broken* "*body* and *blood shed*, at the same time that we receive the *holy*

" symbols." *This* sanctification, however, depends upon the *dispositions* of the communicants.

The much-disputed question as to the right exposition of the *sixth chapter of St. John's Gospel*, and its application to the Sacrament, comes next under consideration; and the substance of our author's opinion, supported by many high authorities, ancient and modern, appears to be as follows:

It is evident, that a great part of this discourse of our Lord's cannot be *literally* interpreted, but must admit of some *figurative* or *mystical* construction. Affirmatively, it is said, *Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life:* negatively, *Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. All*, therefore, that feed upon what is here mentioned, have life; and *all* that do not feed thereupon, have no life. Hence arises an argument against interpreting the words of *sacramental feeding* in the Eucharist; since all cannot be said to have life who receive the communion, unless they are *worthy* communicants; neither can all be said *not* to have life who do not receive it, if they are *incapable* of receiving it, *invincibly ignorant* of it, or destitute of the *opportunity* of so doing. For the same reason, the words cannot be interpreted of *faith in Christ*, which must be subject to similar restrictions and exceptions. But there is one sense, in which the words admit of being understood in their fullest extent; and it is this:—" All that shall finally *share* in the death, passion, and " atonement of Christ, are *safe;* and all that have not a part " therein, are *lost*. All that are *saved*, owe their salvation to " the *salutary* passion of Christ: and their partaking thereof " (which is *feeding* upon his *flesh* and *blood*) is their *life*. On " the other hand, as many as are excluded from *sharing* therein, " and therefore feed not upon the atonement, have no *life* in " them. Those who are blessed with capacity and opportunities, " and have *faith*, must have *sacraments*, must be in *covenant*, " must receive and obey the Gospel, in order to have the *expia-* " *tion* of the death of Christ *applied* to them. But our Lord's

"*general* doctrine in this chapter seems to *abstract* from all "particularities, and to resolve into this; that whether with "*faith* or without, whether in the *sacraments* or out of the "*sacraments*, whether *before* Christ or *since*, whether in *cove-* "*nant* or out of *covenant*, whether *here* or *hereafter*, no man "ever was, is, or will be *accepted*, but in and through the *grand* "*propitiation* made by the *blood* of Christ."—"This *general* "doctrine of *salvation by Christ alone*, by Christ *crucified*, is "the great and important doctrine, the burden of both Testa- "ments; signified in all the sacrifices and services of the old "Law, and fully declared in every page almost of the New "Testament."—"He is to be considered as giving his *body* to "be broken, and as shedding his *blood* for making an atone- "ment; and so the *fruits of his death* are what we are to *receive* "as our spiritual food: his *flesh is meat indeed*, and his *blood is* "*drink indeed*. His *passion* is our *redemption*; and by his "*death* we *live*." Ordinarily, we take it in the use of the sacraments: but extraordinarily, God may *apply* the same *benefits* of Christ's death, and *virtue* of his atonement, to others not enjoying the same opportunities, though capable of being made partakers of the effect.

"Some have conceived that *faith*, or *doctrine*, is what our "Lord meant by the *bread* of *life*, and that *believing* in Christ "is the same with the *eating* and *drinking* there spoken of." But "belief in Christ is the *condition* required, the *duty* com- "manded: the *bread of life* is the *reward* consequent: faith is "the *qualification*; the body and blood is the *gift*, and the *real* "*inheritance*." In like manner, "the *doctrine* of Christ gives "the soul its proper temperature and fitness to receive the "heavenly food; but the heavenly food is *Christ himself*."— "It may be true, that *eating* and *drinking* wisdom, is the same "with *receiving* wisdom: and it is no less true, that *eating* and "*drinking* flesh and blood, is *receiving* flesh and blood: for "*eating* means *receiving*. But where does *flesh* or *blood* stand "for *wisdom* or for *doctrine*? What rules of *symbolical* language "are there, that require it, or can even admit of it? There lies

" the stress of the whole thing. *Flesh*, in symbolical language, " may signify *riches*, *goods*, *possessions*; and blood may signify " *life*; but Scripture never uses either as a *symbol* of *doctrine*. " To conclude, then, eating wisdom is receiving *wisdom*; but " eating Christ's flesh and blood, is receiving *life* and *happiness* " through his blood, and, in one word, receiving *Him*; and " that not merely as the object of our *faith*, but as the fountain " of our *salvation*, and our *sovereign good*, by means of His death " and passion."

This view of the subject is, perhaps, better adapted than any other, to reconcile the discordant notions that have prevailed respecting this difficult portion of Scripture. Our author proceeds to confirm it by a copious and elaborate investigation of the opinions of the early Fathers of the Church; and at the same time shews how much these have been misunderstood. " There have been two extremes," he observes, " in the " accounts given of the Fathers, and both of them owing, as " I conceive, to a neglect of proper *distinctions*. They who " judge that the Fathers in general, or almost universally, do " interpret John vi. of the *Eucharist*, appear not to distinguish " between *interpreting* and *applying*. It was right to *apply* the " *general* doctrine of John vi. to the particular case of the " Eucharist, considered as *worthily* received; because the " *spiritual feeding* there mentioned, is the *thing signified* in the " Eucharist, yea and *performed* likewise. After we have suffi- " ciently proved, from other Scriptures, that in and by the " Eucharist, ordinarily, such spiritual food is conveyed, it is " then right to *apply* all that our Lord, by *St. John*, says in the " *general*, to that *particular* case: and this indeed the Fathers " commonly did. But such *application* does not amount to " *interpreting* that chapter of the Eucharist. For example; " the words, *Except ye eat the flesh of Christ, &c. ye have no* " *life in you*, do not mean directly, that *you have no life without* " *the Eucharist*, but that you have no life *without participating* " *of our Lord's passion*. Nevertheless, since the Eucharist is " one way of *participating of the passion*, and a very considerable

"one, it was very pertinent and proper to urge the doctrine of "that chapter, both for the clearer understanding the *beneficial* "nature of the Eucharist, and for the exciting Christians to a "frequent and devout reception of it. As to those who, in "another extreme, charge the Fathers in general, as interpret-"ing John vi. of *digesting doctrines* only, they are more widely "mistaken than the former, for want of considering the *tropo-"logical* way of commenting then in use; which was not "properly *interpreting*, nor so intended, but was the more "frequently made use of in this subject, when there was a "*mixed* audience, because it was a rule not to divulge their "*mysteries* before incompetent hearers, before the *uninitiated*, "that is, the *unbaptized*."

To this account of the interpretations given by the Fathers, is subjoined that of our own Divines, particularly of *Cranmer*, the sum of whose doctrine on this head, is, 1. That John vi. is not to be interpreted of *oral* manducation in the Sacrament, nor of *spiritual* manducation as *confined* to the Eucharist, but of spiritual manducation *at large*, in that or any other sacrament, or out of the sacraments. 2. That *spiritual* manducation, in that chapter, means the feeding upon Christ's *death* and *passion*, as the price of our redemption and salvation. 3. That in so feeding we have a spiritual or mystical union with him. 4. That such *spiritual* manducation is a privilege belonging to the Eucharist; and therefore John vi. is not *foreign* to the Eucharist, but has such relation to it as the inward thing *signified* bears to the *outward signs*.

Closely connected with this difficult part of the subject is that which next comes under consideration, the *sacramental or symbolical feeding in the Eucharist*.

Dr. Waterland begins with a passage of St. Bernard, which he conceives to give a good general idea of the *symbolical* nature of the sacraments. St. Bernard "compares them with *instru-"ments* of *investiture*, (into *lands*, *honours*, *dignities*,) which are

" *significant* and *emblematical* of what they belong to, and are " at the same time *means* of conveyance. A *book*, a *ring*, a " *crosier*, and the like, have often been made use of as *instru-* " *ments* for such purpose. They are not without their *significancy* " in the way of instructive *emblem:* but what is most consider- " able, they are instruments to *convey* those rights, privileges, " honours, offices, possessions, which in silent language they " point to. So it is with the *signs* and *symbols* of both *sacra-* " *ments*, and particularly with the *elements* of *bread* and *wine* " in the Eucharist. They are, after consecration, called by the " *names* of what they are *pledges* of, and are ordained to *convey;* " because they are, though not *literally*, yet in *just construction* " and *certain effect*, (standing on *Divine* promise and *Divine* " acceptance,) the very things which they are called, viz. the " *body* and *blood* of Christ, to all *worthy* receivers. In *them-* " *selves* they are *bread* and *wine* from first to last: but while " they are made use of in the holy service, they are *considered*, " *construed*, *understood*, (pursuant to Divine law, promise, cove- " nant,) as standing for what they *represent* and *exhibit*. Thus " frequently, in human affairs, things or persons are *considered* " very differently from what they really are in themselves, by " a kind of *construction of law:* and they are supposed to be, " to all intents and purposes, and in full *legal effect*, what they " are presumed to serve for, and to supply the place of. A " *deed* of *conveyance*, or any like *instrument*, under hand and " seal, is not a *real* estate, but it *conveys* one; and it is in *effect* " the estate itself, as the estate goes along with it; and as the " *right*, *title*, and *property* (which are *real* acquirements) are, as " it were, bound up in it, and subsist by it."

According to this view, it may be said, " The bread and wine " are the body and blood in *just construction*, put upon them by " the Lawgiver himself, who has so appointed, and who is able " to make it good. The symbols are not the body in *power* and " *effect*, if those words mean *efficiency:* but, suitable dispositions " being supposed in the recipient, the *delivery* of these symbols " is, in *construction* of Gospel-law, and in *divine* intention, and

" therefore in certain *effect*, or *consequence*, a delivery of the " *things* signified. If God hath been pleased so to order, " that these outward elements, in the due use of the Eucharist, " shall be *imputed to* us, and *accepted* by Him, as pledges of the " *natural* body of our Lord;—then those outward symbols are, " though not *literally*, yet *interpretatively*, and to all *saving* " purposes, that very body and blood which they so represent " *with effect*: they are appointed instead of them."

Our author then proceeds to shew, that " this notion of the " Sacrament, as it is both intelligible and reasonable, so is it " likewise entirely consonant to Scripture-language;" whether considered as to the *general* phraseology of Scripture, or with respect to Jewish *sacrifices* and *sacraments*, or with regard to Christian *Baptism*, or with respect to what is taught of the *Eucharist*. These points he dilates upon at considerable length; grounding his proofs relative to the *Eucharist* chiefly upon St. Paul's calling it the *communion* of the body and blood of Christ, " which expresses *communication* on the part of the " donor, and *participation* on the side of the receiver;" and also upon the punishments threatened to the *unworthy* receiver as *guilty of the body and blood of the Lord*, and *not discerning the Lord's body;* both which passages, it is conceived, " suppose that the sacramental symbols are *interpretatively*, " or in *just construction*, by divine appointment, the *body and* " *blood of Christ*." The remainder of the chapter is taken up with a detail of the opinions of the early Fathers of the Church, as well as of Cranmer and other of our Reformers and Divines; which are shewn to be generally conformable with the doctrine here maintained; and the doctrine itself is ably contrasted with the tenets of the Romish Church, the Lutherans, the Calvinists, the Zuinglians, the old Anabaptists, the Socinians, and lastly with Mr. Johnson's notion, in his " Unbloody " Sacrifice," that " the *elements*, as impregnated, or animated " with the *Spirit*, are the *only body* received, and are made our " *Lord's body* by such union with the *Spirit*."

The next chapter enters into a more particular explanation of St. Paul's doctrine concerning the Eucharist, in 1 Cor. x. 16—21; where the Apostle argues, in the way of parallel between the Christian Eucharist and the Jewish sacrifices, against partaking of offerings to idols. The points which St. Paul had to establish were, that eating of the *idol-sacrifices* was *interpretatively* consenting with the *idolaters*, or *communicating* with them; and that such consenting with the idolaters was also interpretatively, or in effect, *participating* of *devils*. His argument is this:—that as the Eucharist is interpretatively a *participating* of Christ's *body* and *blood*, and as the *Jewish feasts* were a *participating* of the *altar*; so the *eating* of *idol-meats* was interpretatively a *participating* of *devils*. It is evident, therefore, that St. Paul meant by the *communion* of Christ's *body* and *blood*, a participation, in common with others, of the body, considered as *broken*, and of the blood considered as *shed*, according to the terms of the *institution* itself;—not a *communion* of the *natural* flesh and blood, by *transubstantiation*, or *consubstantiation*, or even by *faith*, (errors, which arise from too strict and servile attention to the *letter*, without reason, and against reason;)—nor, on the other hand, merely a *joint participation* of the outward *signs*, *symbols*, or *memorials* of the body and blood;—nor merely holding *communion with Christ* the *head* of the Church, or with *Christians* our *fellow-members* of it;—but as, moreover, an actual *participation*, "or having a "*part in* our Lord's *passion*, and the *reconcilement* therein "made, and the blessed *fruits* of it." The objections to this interpretation of the passage, by Whitby, Mosheim, and others, are then noticed; and the exposition here given, shewn to be conformable with that of Cudworth, and other writers of established reputation.

The two next chapters relate to the efficacy of the Eucharist in conferring *remission of sins* and *sanctifying grace*.

Remission of sins is properly the gift of *God alone*. But he

may, and does, confer it, through such means, by such agents or instruments, and upon such conditions as he sees fit to ordain; and this may be given as a *present* benefit, *revocable* under such circumstances as the donor shall prescribe. Thus in *Baptism*, the benefit is generally acknowledged to be remission of sins, as its present consequence; but subject to be forfeited upon breach of the baptismal engagement. The analogy between Baptism and the Eucharist forms a strong presumptive argument, that this is also the case with the latter sacrament; and there seems to be no valid reason against it. If renewals of repentance and of forgiveness be necessary on every occasion of a breach of the baptismal covenant, then there is an evident reason for supposing that in the Eucharist these renewals are rendered efficient. Baptism is, indeed, more especially the sacrament of *remission*, and the Eucharist of *spiritual growth*; the former, the instrument of *justification*; the latter, of *sanctification*. But these are so closely connected, that whatever increases either, increases both. If the Eucharist therefore be a *renewal* of the *baptismal covenant*, it must be a *renewal* of *remission of sins*, which is of the very essence of the sacrament of Baptism, and the very purpose for which it was ordained. And indeed, remission of sins, to be effectual, seems to be a *continued* act on the part of God, vouchsafed according to the exigencies of believers during the several stages and advances of the Christian life. But not to rest upon this argument from analogy, Dr. W. adduces Scripture-proof, "that "the Eucharist really is an *instrument* of *remission*, or a "*Gospel-form* of *absolution*." This he infers, first, from 1 Cor. x. 16, explained in the preceding chapter; arguing thus: "If we are, in the Eucharist, *partakers* of Christ's death, "with the fruits thereof; if the *atonement* be one of those "fruits; and if *remission* follows the atonement, wherever "it is truly applied; then *remission* is *conferred*, or (which "comes to the same) is *renewed* and *confirmed* in this sa-"crament." In like manner, he argues from our Lord's words in the institution of the Lord's Supper, "the blood of the new "covenant, shed for you, and for many, for the *remission of*

"*sins*;"—the remission is here mentioned as the effect of the blood shed: the blood we *symbolically* drink in the Eucharist: therefore we drink *remission* in the Eucharist. The stress laid on *drinking* this, shews it to be more than merely *commemorating*; that it is also *receiving*. *Eating* and *drinking* are, symbolically *receiving*. These signs, therefore, "*exhibit* "what they *represent*, *convey* what they *signify*, and are in "*divine* construction and acceptance, though not literally or "substantially, the very thing which they supply the place of." This is further confirmed by the analogy between the Eucharist and the *Passover*, and other ancient sacrifices, *prefiguring* the blood of Christ, which were tokens of the covenant to which they belonged, and conveyed *remission* as far as that covenant extended.

The communication of *sanctifying grace* in the Eucharist rests upon the same foundations as that of the *remission of sins*. It is implied in the *participation* of our Lord's death, with its *fruits*, in the Eucharist, as represented by St. Paul in 1 Cor. x. 16. "They who so *partake* of Christ, do of course partake of the "*Spirit* of Christ. It cannot be otherwise upon *Christian* "principles taught in the New Testament." This follows also, by undeniable *consequence*, from our Lord's doctrine of *spiritual feeding* in John vi. They who *receive worthily*, *spiritually* feed upon Christ, and are made partakers of all the privileges thereto belonging; consequently they have Christ *dwelling* in them, and if so, the *Spirit* of Christ, who is inseparable from him. The *analogy* between the two sacraments here also, as in the other case, proves the same. If the *putting on* Christ, in Baptism, carries with it the conveyance of the *Holy Spirit*; *à fortiori* the *eating* and *drinking* Christ, in the Eucharist, does the same. To this St. Paul seems to advert, 1 Cor. xii. 13, *By one Spirit are we all baptized into one body—and have been all made to drink into one Spirit*; that is, "By one and the "same *Spirit* we are in Baptism made one *mystical* body of "Christ, and have been all made to *drink* of the sacramental "cup in the Eucharist, whereby the *same Spirit* hath again

"*united* us, yet more perfectly, to *Christ* our *head*, in the same "mystical body." To apply *both* clauses in this paragraph to *Baptism* makes it border upon *tautology*; and *drinking* the Spirit appears to be a "harsh figure" if applied to Baptism. It is also more consonant with the tenor of the apostle's argument, to understand him as referring to *both* sacraments.

Having thus examined each of these points by the light of Scripture-evidence, our author enlarges upon the views taken of them by the ancient Fathers, and by the Reformers and other Divines of the Church of England; all tending to confirm his own exposition. On the *sanctifying grace* conferred in the Eucharist, he further enters into an investigation of "what the "*ancients* taught concerning the *descent* or *illapse* of the Holy "Spirit upon the *symbols*, or upon the *communicants*;" and states the result to be, that the illapse of the Spirit is upon the *persons* receiving the elements, rather than upon the *elements* themselves; conveying spiritual graces to those who partake either of this sacrament or of Baptism, and accompanying the use of the outward signs, wherever there is no obstacle on the part of the recipient;—that the *sanctifying* of the *water* in the one sacrament, and of *bread* and *wine* in the other, means no more than the consecrating them to the uses of *personal* sanctification; the Spirit making use of them as *symbols* for conveying his graces; in which use of them consists their *relative holiness*; though the Spirit dwells not properly upon *them*, but upon the *persons* who receive them. In the ancient *Liturgies*, the forms of invocation did not implore any *physical* change in the elements, nor any physical connection of the Spirit with the elements; but a *moral* change only, as to their *relations* and *uses*, and a gracious presence of the Holy Spirit upon the communicants. This too was the notion of our Reformers, and the framers of our Liturgy. In Baptism we pray, "Give "thy Holy Spirit to this infant"—"Sanctify him with the Holy "Ghost"—and, "Sanctify this water to the *mystical* washing "away of sin." In the Communion, "Grant that we receiving "these thy creatures of *bread* and *wine*—may be partakers of

"his most precious *body* and *blood*. The Christian world, "therefore, has all along believed, that the Spirit of God "is invisibly *present*, and operates *effectually* in both sacra-"ments; as well to confer a relative *holiness* upon the outward "*symbols*, as to convey the *grace* of *sanctification* to the faithful "recipients." But, adds our author, "we place no more "virtue in the naked symbols, than in the meanest instruments "whatever, which God may at any time please to make use of, "and sanctify to high and holy purposes. Those instruments "in themselves do nothing: it is God that does all, in and "through the appointed use of them."—"As to the *manner* of "it, it is not for us to presume to explain it: but we are "certain it is wrought in a *moral* way, in a way consistent "with *moral* agency and human *liberty*." — "Neither do we "*confine* God's grace to the *sacraments*; nor do we assert any "*peculiar* grace, as *appropriate* to them only: but what we "assert is, some *peculiar degree* of the same *graces*, or some "peculiar *certainty* or *constancy* as to the effect, in the due use of "those means. And if the Divine graces, more or less, go "along with all the Divine ordinances, well may they be "supposed to go along with these which are the most solemn "and most exalted of any, and have also more of a *federal* "nature in them."

This *federal* or *covenanting* nature of the Eucharist then comes under consideration, in a distinct chapter.

The Eucharist has generally been considered as of a federal nature; not as making a new covenant, but renewing and confirming that which had been before entered into at *Baptism*. Although that covenant was granted and completed by the prior rite of Baptism, yet may it properly be said to be *renewed*, as circumstances require, or as individuals are concerned in it. For the term *covenant* may be applied, either to the bare *sign*, which is merely the *token* of the covenant; or to the *thing signified*, including the *terms* of the agreement itself; or to the *whole transaction*, comprising both. In each of these senses it is

equally applicable to Baptism and to the Eucharist. Baptism is the *answer*, or rather, *stipulation* of a good conscience. The Eucharist is an act of communion between God and the worthy receiver; a reciprocal intercourse of blessings on the one hand, and homage on the other; which, in effect, is a mutual *stipulation:* it is performing, on both sides, what was before stipulated in Baptism; conveying the strongest assurance of its continuation; and amounting, in just construction, to a repetition or renewal of the reciprocal engagements. Nor can it fairly be objected, that it is only a *memorial* of the covenant. For, if (as the Apostle teaches) it is not only a memorial, but a *communion* also of the *body* and *blood* of Christ, so must it be a *communion* or *participation* of the *covenant* founded upon our Lord's death and passion. Dr. Cudworth's view of the Lord's Supper as a feast upon a sacrifice, and consequently a *federal* rite, sealed and ratified by both parties, is then vindicated against Lutherans, Socinians, and those among our own Divines, who either regard it as a bare *memorial* only, or insist upon its being actually a *material* and *propitiatory* sacrifice. The sum of our author's opinions on this point is stated thus: "The *legal* sacrifices were "*federal* rites, binding *legal* stipulations directly; and, indirectly, "*evangelical* stipulations also, shadowed out by the other: the "Gospel sacraments, which by St. Paul's account (in 1 Cor. x.) "bear an *analogy* to those legal sacrifices, do likewise bind in "a way proper to them, and as suits with the *Gospel state:* "therefore they do directly fix and ratify *evangelical* stipulations. "These are properly *federal* rites of the Gospel state; as the "other were properly *federal* rites of the legal economy."

In the next chapter, the Eucharist is considered in a *sacrificial* view; a point, on which much difference of opinion has prevailed among protestant Divines. That, in some sense or other, it may be called the Christian sacrifice, is maintained by Protestants as well as by Papists. But "the general way," Dr. W. observes, "among both *Lutheran* and *reformed*[p], has been to

[p] The distinction here made by Dr. Waterland between *Lutheran* and *reformed* Churches, though it may seem inadmissible upon the general prin-

" reject any *proper* propitiation, or *proper* sacrifice in the Eu-
" charist; admitting, however, of some kind of *propitiation* in
" a qualified sense; and of *sacrifice* also, but of a *spiritual* kind,
" and therefore styled *improper* or *metaphorical*. Nevertheless,
" Mr. Mede scrupled not to assert a *proper* sacrifice in the
" Eucharist, (as he termed it,) a *material* sacrifice, the sacrifice
" of *bread* and *wine*, analogous to the *mincha* of the old Law."
Dr. Cudworth opposes this, " but admits of a *symbolical* feast
" upon a sacrifice, that is to say, upon the grand sacrifice itself
" *commemorated* under certain *symbols*;" and this has since been
the most prevailing opinion; although Dr. Grabe concurred with
Mr. Mede in his view of the subject, and Bishop Bull gave some
countenance to it. Dr. W. shews, that according to the best
ancient authorities, the Eucharist " is both a *true* and a *proper*
" sacrifice, and the noblest that can be offered, as comprehending
" under it *many* true and evangelical sacrifices;" viz. the sacri-
fice of *alms* and *oblations*; of *prayer*, of *praise*, and *thanksgiving*;
of a *penitent* and *contrite* heart; of *ourselves*, our *souls* and *bodies*;
of Christ's *mystical body*, the *Church*; of true *converts* or *peni-
tents* by their *pastors*; and of *faith*, *hope*, and *self-humiliation*,
in *commemorating* the *grand sacrifice* upon the cross, and resting
finally upon it. All these may meet together in the Eucharist;
and " into some one or more of these may be resolved all that
" the ancients have ever taught of it, under the name or notion
" of a *true* or *proper* sacrifice." They discountenanced the no-
tion of a sacrifice of the real *body* of Christ, or of a *material*
sacrifice of any kind. " The fathers well understood, that to
" make Christ's *natural* body the real sacrifice of the Eucharist
" would not only be *absurd* in reason, but highly *presumptuous*
" and *profane*; and that to make the outward *symbols* a proper

ciples of the Protestant reformation, is common among continental writers, especially those of the *Calvinistic* persuasion, who hold none to be reformers in the full sense of the word, who do not go beyond Luther in their departure from the see of Rome. This will account for Dr. W.'s adoption of the distinction, to which he was familiarized by his acquaintance with such writers; and more especially when treating on the subject of the *Eucharist*, in which the reformed Churches in general differed, in some respects, almost as widely from the Lutheran doctrine, as from that of the Romish Church.

" sacrifice, a *material* sacrifice, would be entirely contrary to " Gospel principles, degrading the *Christian* sacrifice into a " *Jewish* one, yea, and making it much lower and meaner than " the Jewish, both in *value* and *dignity*. The right way, there- " fore, was to make the sacrifice *spiritual:* and it could be no " other upon Gospel principles. Thus both *extremes* were " avoided, all perplexities removed, and truth and godliness " secured." This is the *sacrificial* view of the subject which Dr. W. himself maintains, and holds to be entirely conformable with the *federal* sense of it, as before explained.

The two concluding chapters, on *perparation* for this sacrament, and on the obligation to *frequent communion*, are more directly of *practical* concern. The medium is here carefully observed between a devout reverence for this sacred institution, and a superstitious dread of it. With regard to the *preparation* required, it is observed, that St. Paul's admonitions respecting an *unworthy* participation of the Lord's Supper, and the guilt of *not discerning the Lord's body*, apply, not only to such gross irreverence as disgraced the Corinthian Church, but, in a proportionate degree, to every kind of profaneness, or carelessness, in the use of the sacred symbols. It is contended also, that whatever is necessary as a qualification for *Baptism*, is requisite for worthily receiving the *Eucharist*. Besides previous admission into the Christian covenant by *Baptism*, a *competent knowledge* of what the Communion means, a *sound* and *right* faith as to the main substance of the Christian religion, hearty and unfeigned *repentance*, (including *reparation* of injuries and *forgiveness* of injuries,) *union* with the Church, and *mercy* and *charity* towards the poor; are necessary preparatives, as duties either *habitually* practised, or, at least, *actually* resolved upon, with reference to the performance of this service.

Concerning the *frequency* of receiving this sacrament, an historical inquiry is instituted into the practice of the primitive Churches; which is shewn not to have been established upon any prescribed, or invariable directions; but to have been

regulated, according to circumstances, by the supposed *fitness*, or the supposed *preparation* of the communicant, for a worthy participation of it. Where no impediments in these respects exist, it may, in general, be safely affirmed, that it cannot be *too often* received. But the application of this rule must be left to the judgment of each individual, assisted and guided by the direction of the Church and the spiritual pastor.

From the foregoing analysis of this treatise, it will be seen that it has little the aspect of a *polemical* work, although so large a portion of it may be applied, as a corrective, or a preventive, of error. With scarcely any personal reference to the living authors of his time who entertained different views of the subject from that which he supported, Dr. W. has so conducted his train of reasoning and investigation, as to meet all their diversities of opinion in their full force; stating them with candour and fairness, and controverting them with no less moderation, than ability and decision. That he did not entirely succeed in satisfying those from whom he thus differed, whether in points essential or not essential to the main doctrine, is not to be wondered at, nor to be regarded as any proof of defect in the execution of his design. Animadversions were made on his treatise by Dr. Brett, in vindication of his friend the author of the "Unbloody Sacrifice;" and the admirers of Bishop Hoadly would hardly accede to a system so utterly discordant with their own. Of the latter opponents, Dr. W. took no further notice. The arguments of the former he again reviewed in some of his Charges, and restated his reasonings with additional proofs and illustrations. But these will fall more directly under our observation in the ensuing section.

SECTION VII.

CHARGES, AND OCCASIONAL SERMONS.

BESIDE those larger treatises, on which his reputation was chiefly established, Dr. Waterland distinguished himself, in the course of his professional labours, by several lesser productions of considerable importance. Of these, a series of archidiaconal Charges, and some few occasional Sermons, are all that he himself committed to the press.

Dr. Waterland was collated to the archdeaconry of Middlesex by Bishop Gibson, in the year 1727. Eight of his Charges are extant: two, in vindication of Christianity against the Deists; two, compressed into one discourse, on Fundamentals; one, on the doctrinal use of the Sacraments; three, on special points relating to the Eucharist. The two first may be considered as supplemental to his "Scripture vindicated;" the three last, as further illustrative of his "Review of the Eucharist." It appears that none were delivered previous to the year 1731, that being entitled the "Primary" Charge.

This Primary Charge relates to the growth of Deism, particularly in this country, where it had been encouraged, as Dr. W.

observes, by the efforts of many, who, though not themselves infidels, laboured to bring some of the main doctrines of Christianity into disrepute, to depreciate some of its most solemn institutions, and to render the whole system of revealed religion dependent upon the diversities and uncertainties of human judgment. Our author confines himself, however, to one chief point of inquiry, much misunderstood, or misrepresented, by infidels, both ancient and modern; and upon which he had already touched in the Appendix to his second part of "Scripture "vindicated;" namely, the alleged independence of *natural* religion upon that which is *revealed*, and the sources from which Pagans, and others destitute of the light of Christianity, are supposed to have derived their knowledge of moral and religious truths.

This inquiry is conducted historically; beginning with the writings of *Jewish* apologists for the religion of Moses, in opposition to the Greek philosophers, particularly Josephus's two books against Apion; and pursued through those of the *Christian* apologists, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Theophilus, Clemens of Alexandria, Tertullian, Minutius Felix, Origen, Lactantius, Eusebius, Theodoret, and others, who laboured to prove that the heathen world were chiefly indebted to Revelation, either scriptural or traditional, for such portion of moral and religious knowledge as they had been able to acquire. The same opinion has been ably maintained by several distinguished modern writers; and the argument, hence arising, to lessen the pretensions of what is called *natural religion*, and to enhance the value and importance of Revelation, is such as cannot easily be overthrown. Dr. Waterland, however, exercises a sound judgment and discretion in the extent and application of this argument. "There may be," he observes, "an extreme either "way; either by extending the argument too far, laying more "stress upon it than it can justly bear; or not allowing enough "to it, but throwing a kind of slight or contempt upon it." Sir John Marsham, Dr. Spencer, and M. Le Clerc, he conceives, have gone into the latter extreme; while Huetius and others of

less note have been justly censured for exceeding in the other way. The same observation might be applied to several writers who have more recently discussed this point; and perhaps there are few subjects on which it is more difficult to resist the temptation of erring on one side or the other. Dr. W. is of opinion that the excesses of most of these authors have arisen from "not carefully distinguishing the several channels by which "revealed light was conveyed to the Gentile world, or not being "content to rest in generals, when they might most safely and "prudently have done it."—"The Pagans," he observes, "might be instructed in divine things, either by reading the "*Scriptures*, or by conversing with *Jews*, or by conversing with "other nations that had been acquainted with Jews; or by "means of public edicts of several great *princes* that had "favoured the Jews; or lastly by *tradition* handed down to "them from *Abraham*, or from *Noah*, or from the *first* "*parents* of mankind:" and "since revealed light, more or less, "might break out upon the Pagan world all these several ways, "it is not necessary, in every case, to determine which way it "came." Having pursued this observation more in detail, our author arrives at the conclusion, that the Gentile world "were "never entirely destitute of supernatural notices, never left to "the mere *light of nature*, either for forming a knowledge of "God and religion, or for directing their life and manners." And hence he shews upon how precarious a foundation infidels ground their tenet of the *sufficiency* of natural light, or attempt to set it in competition with that which is *supernatural*. He notices also how much more reprehensible and inexcusable in this respect are *modern* unbelievers than their Pagan predecessors: and observes, in conclusion, that since they can never prove Revelation to be *needless*, unless they can first prove that there has been no Revelation, they commit "an ὕστερον πρότερον "in their main argument; pretending to disprove a *fact*, by "arguing that the thing was *needless*, when there is no possible "way of proving the thing *needless*, but by first disproving the "*fact*."

The *second* Charge, delivered in 1732, after noticing the increasing growth of Deism, and briefly reviewing its origin and progress under that specious name, animadverts upon the artifice of its advocates, in thus endeavouring to screen themselves from the odious imputation of Atheism, although their evident purpose is to bring all religion into contempt, under cover of assailing *Revelation* only. While they arrogate to themselves almost exclusive pretensions to *sense*, and *reason*, and *truth*, they would fain persuade mankind, that their object is "not to destroy *reli-* "*gion*, and *conscience*, and the *fear of God*," but only to contend "against *credulity* or *bigotry*, against *superstition* or *enthusiasm*, "against *statecraft*, *priestcraft*, or *imposture*; names, which "they are pleased to affix, for the most part, to true religion "and godliness." These insidious pretensions our author then proceeds more distinctly to examine; and the accusations thus levelled against revealed religion in general he not only vigorously repels, but makes them recoil, with powerful effect, on the adversary himself.

Credulity, he shews, denotes in the infidel's vocabulary, a belief in Moses and the Prophets, in Christ and his Apostles. Pagans, credulous themselves in the highest degree of absurdity, ventured to cast this reproach upon the primitive Christians, and met with merited castigation from Christian apologists. Modern infidels betray scarcely less credulity even in the very arguments they use to overthrow Revelation. They believe the records both of the Old and New Testament to have been forgeries and falsehoods, in direct opposition to historical evidence, to facts the most indisputable, to existing circumstances which can only be explained upon the admission of those facts, and to principles on which all mankind (infidels themselves not excepted) do and must necessarily act in all the ordinary concerns of human life. While, therefore, they affect to disbelieve *mysteries* and *miracles*, they virtually admit hypotheses more marvellous and more incredible than those which they reject; and assume credit for superiority of intellect, only

by inverting the order of sober ratiocination in every well-constructed mind.

In like manner, when *bigotry* is imputed to the Jew of past times, or to the Christian of the present day, "let the indifferent "world," says Dr. W., "judge whether *Christians* or *infidels* "are most properly *bigots*. While they are afraid of being "*guided* by *priests*, they consent to be *governed* by *anti-priests*; "who demand a much greater submission from them than we "can pretend to." Even the leaders themselves "generally "follow the track of their predecessors, and appear to be "zealous *bigots* to their *systems*, their *creeds*, their *paradoxes*, "their *party*; all which they adhere to as pertinaciously as we "can do to our *Bible*." *Pagan* historians, *Pagan* morals, *Pagan* calumnies, are set up as oracles against *Christian* evidences; and implicit credit is given to such men as Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian, in ancient times, or Hobbes and Spinoza, in modern. Men may be bigots also to their own *passions* and *prejudices*, in rejecting *Divine* authority; while submitting and adhering to this supreme authority is not *bigotry*, but an act of the *highest reason*. Let them shew, says Dr. W., "that the *reasons* are "all on their side, and then we shall readily admit that all the "*bigotry* is on ours: but till this be done, (and it is impossible "it ever should,) the charge which they bring against us is as "easily retorted as made, and with much more truth and "justice.'

Superstition is another current term of reproach often applied to Christianity, and to all revealed religion. Properly it denotes some kind of *excess* in matters of religion, and particularly any *false* religion: and "they who admit *no* religion as true, make "superstition the common name for *all*." "The contrary "extreme to excess, is *defect*, or want of religion, and is called "*irreligion*, *profaneness*, *impiety*, *apostasy*, *Atheism*, according "to its respective circumstances and degrees. The due mean "between the two extremes, is true and sound religion. Upon

" this ground we contend that Christianity is properly *religion*, " and not *superstition*: and that the disbelief of it is irreligion, " profaneness, madness." Nor are its opponents, he observes, so free perhaps from *superstition* as they imagine. *Infidelity* and *superstition* may proceed from a similar kind of weakness and of corruption. Guilty fears and apprehensions drive men to one or to the other, according to their respective tempers and constitutional propensities; and there have been proofs that none are more apt to become *superstitious* in a time of danger, than they who at other times have been most *profane*.

The same is also observed of the term *enthusiasm*, so often charged upon believers in Christianity. For, who are the *visionaries?* they who imagine that the world was converted to the Christian faith by lunatics and madmen; or they who see the impossibility that any such effect could be produced but by rational conviction grounded on evidence irresistible? " There may be an *irreligious* phrensy, as well as a *religious* " one; and the imagination may as soon be heated with a spirit " of *profaneness*, as with the fervours of *piety*." Cudworth has described enthusiastical or fanatical *Atheists*, and shewn that even those among them who pretended most to reason and philosophy might be justly so entitled. Nor are even the deistical notions, that *virtue* is independent of hopes and fears, rewards and punishments, altogether free from this imputation. Still more nearly allied to enthusiasm is their practice of dignifying each man's individual *reason* with the character and the titles of *inspiration*, *internal revelation*, *inward light*, *infallibility*, and terms of similar import; claims, which when " brought " to exclude Scripture, are *enthusiastic* and *fanatical*, false and " vain."

Statecraft and *Priestcraft* are moreover favourite topics with the Deists, when they endeavour to prejudice men's minds against religion. These calumnies, however, seem to be directed against our Lord himself and his Apostles, rather than

against the rulers or the priests of after-times. For if no *false facts* or *false doctrines* can be imputed to the Gospel historians, it is futile to charge *craft* and *deceit* upon those who maintain them as *truths*. Either those facts and doctrines must be refuted, or both priests and statesmen stand acquitted of any guile or craft in upholding them. In the mean while, they who bring these accusations "are labouring to impose *false facts*, "*false doctrines*, and *false claims* upon the world, under the "name of *religion*, for their own humour, ambition, or advan-"tage." Many acute observations are urged by our author upon this popular subject of declamation.

On the general imputation of *imposture*;—"a compendious "calumny, all reproaches in one;"—Dr. Waterland observes, "That there is an *imposture* somewhere, is very certain: and "the only question is, who are the *impostors*? Reckon up the "marks and characters of an imposture: apply them first to "*Christ*, and his doctrine and followers, and see whether they "will fit; and next apply them to *Hobbes*, *Spinoza*, &c. and see "whether they will not fit." What is the doctrine of these men, but a *fraud* and imposition on the public? The strength of their cause lies in "falsification, stratagem, and wile. It "cannot be *pleaded for* decently, without *disowning* it, verbally, "at the same time, and making it pass for the very reverse of "what it really is."

It will be seen, by reference to the author's notes upon this Charge, that most of these observations were levelled at Tindal's mischievous work, "Christianity as old as the Creation;" against which, together with his former Charge, and his "Scripture "vindicated," it afforded a most seasonable and powerful antidote.

The next Charge, comprising the substance of two which had been delivered in 1734 and 1735, forms a complete and very valuable dissertation upon a subject of high importance;

the discussion of which was more especially called for by the laxity of religious opinions then too generally prevalent. That laxity may for the most part be ascribed to a want of clear and accurate conception of what constitutes (to adopt an expression of Cranmer's) "the necessary doctrine of a Christian man." Where this knowledge is wanting; where vague and indefinite notions are entertained of the relative importance of different articles of faith; no fixed or consistent principles can be laid down of Church-communion, nor can any certain criterion be established, by which to weigh the pretensions of different sects and parties. The obtrusion of certain heterodox tenets into the Church, by some who lay under the most sacred obligations to maintain its faith unimpaired; and the unblushing attempts made even by infidel writers to identify their own systems with Christianity, and thence to assume to themselves the appellation of *Christian* Deists;—rendered it still more necessary to guard the faith against such perversion, and to draw the line of demarcation betwixt truth and error, with as much clearness and precision as the nature of the case would admit.

With this view Dr. Waterland's Charge, entitled, "A Dis-"course of Fundamentals," was professedly undertaken.

Several distinguished writers had before treated upon this subject; among whom were Bacon, Mede, Chillingworth, Hammond, Stillingfleet, Sherlock, Clagett, and others of our own Church, besides Hoornbeck, Spanheim, Puffendorf, Witsius, Turretin, and Buddeus, of the Lutheran and other foreign reformed Churches. The importance therefore of the subject had been generally acknowledged; but so much diversity still prevailed as to the mode of determining the points in question, as to render a more distinct and satisfactory view of it exceedingly desirable.

Our author clears the ground for this difficult undertaking with his usual ability. The term *fundamental,* as applied to

articles of faith, he observes, "is supposed to mean something "*essential* to religion or Christianity; so necessary to its being, "or at least to its well-being, that it could not subsist, or "maintain itself tolerably without it." The distinction between things thus essential, and those which are less so, is shewn to be recognised in Scripture, and to have been acted upon by St. Paul, in making converts to the faith. The primitive Churches carefully attended to this principle. Certain articles were invariably insisted upon as terms of Church-communion; and a departure from these was regarded as a renunciation of Christianity itself. But as parties multiplied in the Church, different rules of this kind were, from time to time, set up, by sects, or by individuals, desirous of advancing their own particular tenets. Under such circumstances, the hope of *perfect union* could hardly, perhaps, be entertained. But to disentangle the subject, as far as might be, from the perplexity in which it had thus been involved, was certainly a laudable purpose, tending in some degree, at least, to prevent the increase of error and disunion.

Dr. W. sets aside the distinction between *natural* and *revealed* religion, so far as this subject is concerned, because *revealed* he considers as including *both*; nor does he dwell upon the distinctions between *faith, worship*, and *morality*, "these being all "*essential* to Christianity, and equally to be insisted on as "terms of *Christian communion*." "But," he observes, "it "may be needful to distinguish between fundamentals con-"sidered in an *abstract* view, as essentials of the Christian "*fabric* or *system*, and fundamentals considered in a *relative* "view to particular persons." The former "are of a fixed "determinate view, as much as Christianity itself is, and may "be ascertained by plain and unalterable rules;" the latter "will always vary, with the *capacities* and *opportunities* of the "persons." Accordingly, almost all parties make some distinction between *terms of communion* and *terms of salvation*; excluding many from the former as erring fundamentally, whom notwithstanding they would not dare to condemn to perdition.

A fundamental doctrine, then, may be defined, in the terms expressed by Dean Sherlock, namely, "such a doctrine as is, in "strict sense, of the *essence* of Christianity; without which the "whole building and superstructure must fall; and the belief "of which is necessary to the very being of Christianity, like "the *first principles* of any *art* or *science.*" In conformity with this general definition, Dr. W. lays it down as an axiom, "that such doctrines as are found to be *intrinsecal* or essential "to the *Christian covenant* are *fundamental truths,* and such as "are plainly and directly *subversive* of it are *fundamental* "*errors.*" The *Christian covenant* he moreover considers as including the following requisites: "1. a *founder* and principal "covenanter; 2. a *subject* capable of being covenanted with; "3. a *charter* of foundation; 4. a *Mediator;* 5. *conditions* to be "performed; 6. *aids* or means to enable to performance; 7. "*sanctions* also, to bind the covenant, and to secure obedience."

1. The *existence* of the Deity is a fundamental article; and so is the belief of his Divine attributes and perfections, and that he is the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of the world; all which is included in the very idea of God; so that to deny either of these is to err *fundamentally.* It is essential also to *Christian* theology, to acknowledge Jehovah, the God of Israel, and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, in opposition to any false gods, either of heathens or heretics.

2. A *covenant* implies some subject, or party, *capable of being covenanted with;* a *moral* agent, able to discern between *good* and *evil,* and to *choose* either. Therefore the doctrines of *free-will,* and of the *essential* differences between *moral good* and *evil,* are *fundamental* verities; and to disown them, is to err *fundamentally.*

3. The *charter* of foundation is also *essential* to the covenant. Consequently, the *sacred oracles* which contain that charter, and convey it to us, must necessarily be received: so that to reject the *Divine authority* of sacred writ, is another fundamental error.

4. The belief of a *Mediator* is equally *essential*, and to deny our Lord to be that Mediator, is to deny the Scriptures and Christianity altogether. So is it, to deny Him to be *such* a Mediator as the Scripture describes him to be, a *Divine* Mediator, *God* and *man*. This is what the very nature of the covenant requires. And under this is included his making *expiation*, *atonement*, and *satisfaction* for us. To deny these doctrines is, in effect, rejecting the chief person upon whom our salvation depends, and overthrowing the whole covenant.

5. The *conditions* of the covenant, *repentance* and *holiness*, are no less plainly *essential* to it: and whatever tenets militate against these, are fatal errors; errors in the very *foundation* of the Christian system.

6. The *aids*, or *means*, without which these conditions cannot be performed, are, for the same reason, *essential* articles of belief. In this view, the *sacraments*, as *means* of *grace*, cannot be dispensed with; and they who discard them, or deny their use and their necessity, err fundamentally. Here also the *sanctifying operation of the Holy Spirit* comes in, as another *fundamental* point, including the *personality*, the *Divinity*, and *all-sufficiency*, of the third Person in the Godhead, and consequently, the acknowledgment of the *three Persons in the Trinity*, by whose cooperation, the entire work of salvation, redemption, justification, and sanctification, is effected.

7. Lastly, the *sanctions* which give to the Christian covenant its force and efficacy, are to be reckoned among the *essentials* which cannot be set aside without renouncing the Gospel itself. The doctrines of a *future state*, of a *resurrection*, of final *judgment* by our Lord himself, of *heaven*, and of *hell*, are *fundamental* points of Christian theology, inseparable from it, and constituting the very end and purpose to which all its doctrines and its precepts are directed.

Keeping these general principles steadfastly in view, Dr. W.

conceives that "it is not necessary to exhibit any complete *cata-* "*logue* either of fundamental truths or errors." It is sufficient that we have a *certain* rule to go by; and "though Divines take not "upon them to number up with exactness all the verities "*essential* to the life of Christianity, or all the errors *subversive* "of it, yet they can specify several in each kind with unerring "certainty, and have certain rules whereby to judge, as occa- "sion offers, of any other; and this suffices in the essentials "of *faith*, as well as in the essentials of *practice*." Where there is any reasonable *doubt*, our author urges the duty of endeavouring to promote *peace* and *charity*, as far as may possibly be consistent with adherence to truths really and essentially important. This part of the subject is further pursued, for the purpose of shewing more distinctly what terms of communion may be insisted upon, or complied with, according to the foregoing principles.

The remainder of the Charge is occupied with a brief review of several other *rules* which had been laid down by different writers on the subject.

Some have proposed to cut off all disputes by determining what is fundamental or not, solely on the *authority of the Church*. This is the rule of *Popery*, and can only be consistently maintained on the ground of papal *infallibility*.—Others conceive, that every thing asserted in *Scripture* is *fundamental*; confounding what is *true* or *useful*, though of comparatively less moment, with that which is of paramount *importance*, and *essential* to the Christian system.—Others limit the rule to that which is *expressly* declared in Scripture, in contradistinction to that which is only deduced from it in the way of *inference*; a rule, "faulty both in *excess* and in "*defect*;" since there are many truths expressly taught in Scripture which have no *immediate* connection with the Christian covenant, and therefore are not *fundamental*; while, on the other hand, doctrines the most important in that respect may be fully proved by plain, direct, and immediate *con-*

sequences from the declarations of holy writ, though not expressly affirmed in any particular texts.—Sometimes, this rule has been further restricted to "whatever Scripture has expressly declared *necessary*, or commanded us to believe, "under pain of *damnation*, or *exclusion* from Christian communion;" which, though it will oblige us to receive what is thus enjoined as *fundamental*, will yet not extend to many points which are in reality no less so, from their immediate and necessary connection with the whole design of the Gospel.—Another proposition has been, to receive every article in the *Apostles' Creed* as fundamental, and no others. But that Creed neither contains, nor was intended to contain, certain points very essential to a Christian's belief, such as the *divine* authority of Scripture, the *worship* of God, and the *practical* duties of Christianity; while, on the other hand, it affirms some points, which, though strictly *true and scriptural*, do not fully come up to the description of matters absolutely essential to Christianity itself. Again; St. Paul's list of those elementary principles of the Gospel, *repentance, faith, baptism, confirmation, resurrection,* and *judgment*, have been thought to comprehend all that is necessarily required of us: whereas the Apostle evidently states these to be merely those *first* notions which should be inculcated upon new converts, before they are well able to proceed to higher and more recondite truths; the passage having no relation to points *essential* or *non-essential*, and therefore is irrelevant to such a purpose.—Others have contended, that the bare acknowledgment "that *Jesus is the* "*Messiah*," is "a *general* belief sufficient to *make* a man a Christian, and to *keep* him so;" and that nothing beyond that ought to "be absolutely insisted on as *fundamental*, or made a *term* of "*communion*." This is a most *defective* rule in many respects; since though the whole of Christianity may be virtually implied in this one article, yet the denial of any essential point of the Christian faith would be "in effect revoking that very article;" and therefore the acknowledgment of such a *general* truth cannot supersede the necessity of receiving those *special* doctrines, without which it can hardly be said to have any definite

signification.—*Universality of agreement* among professed Christians has been proposed as another criterion of fundamental articles; "to throw out what is *disputed*, and to retain only "what all *agree in*." But "how shall any one know what all "sects and denominations of Christians agree in, or how long "they shall do so? Or if that could be known, are we to be "guided by the floating humours, fancies, follies of *men*, or by "the unerring wisdom of God?" A *comprehension* or *coalition* of religious parties is very desirable, so far as it can be effected by throwing out *circumstantials*, and retaining only *essentials*. But to attempt it by relaxing the *rule* for *essentials*, is leaving no rule at all, or next to none, and is uniting in nothing but *indifference* to the truth.—A still more extravagant scheme has sometimes been proposed, that of making the *universal agreement*, not of Christians only, but of all *mankind*, the standard of fundamental truth; reducing them to Lord Herbert's *five* articles of *natural religion*; the *existence* of a *God*, some kind of *worship* to be paid to him, the practice of *moral virtue*, *repentance*, and a *future state*. This is at once confounding infidelity with Christianity, and discarding altogether the authority of Revelation.—One more attempt of a similar kind has been, to regard a *right faith* as utterly insignificant, and to comprise all that is fundamental in religion in the single article of a *good life*. The futility of this plea for error or unbelief, Dr. W. had exposed in his "Importance of the Doctrine of the "Trinity;" and he here again briefly lays open its fallacy and absurdity.

The Charge concludes with a summary recapitulation of our author's view of the subject; stating that "whatever verities "are found to be plainly and directly *essential* to the doctrine "of the *Gospel-covenant*, are *fundamental verities*: and whatever "errors are plainly and directly *subversive* of it, are *fundamental* "*errors*." By this rule, he observes, we may with "sufficient "*certainty* fix the *terms of communion* with the several deno-"minations of Christians. As to the precise *terms of salvation*, "they may admit of greater variety and latitude, on account of

"particular circumstances, of diverse kinds: and there is no "necessity of absolutely excluding all from *uncovenanted* or even "*covenanted* mercies, whom we may be obliged to exclude from "*brotherly communion.*" Certainly, these are quite distinct considerations; and our author, by carefully drawing the line between them, has guarded his treatment of the subject from the imputation of laxity on the one hand, or of uncharitable rigour on the other. Upon the whole, this is, perhaps, the most valuable of his minor productions.

The next Charge on "the doctrinal Use of the Christian "Sacraments," has been already incidentally noticed. It is a brief, but curious and learned investigation of the manner in which, from the earliest ages of the Church, the sacraments have been applied, by distinguished Christian writers, either to the vindication, or the illustration, of several important articles of Christian faith. The opinions of those early visionaries who denied our Lord's human nature, the fantastic notions of the Gnostics, the pretences of some who disbelieved the resurrection of the body, of enthusiasts of various kinds, of the impugners of the doctrine of the Trinity, whether Sabellians, Arians, or Macedonians, those also of the Nestorians and Eutychians respecting our Lord's twofold nature, besides the errors of Pelagius, and of those who were addicted to image-worship; have been all combated, more or less successfully, by shewing them to be incompatible with the doctrine implied in the sacraments; by one or both of which the abettors of these heretical tenets found themselves inextricably embarrassed. This is a novel view of the subject, and well deserving of fuller consideration. The force of the argument against *infidels*, derived from these institutions, as standing evidences of the historical *facts* of the Gospel, had, indeed, been pointed out and very forcibly urged by Leslie, in his "Short Method with the Deists;" nor had it entirely escaped the observation of other writers. But the sketch here given by Waterland of their utility in giving collateral proof of the *doctrines* of Christianity, is scarcely

less important, and might perhaps be pursued still more in detail with considerable advantage.

The foregoing Charge contained little that was likely to excite controversy, although (as was before observed) it was probably intended to act as a counterpoise to Bishop Hoadly's tract on the Lord's Supper. Dr. Waterland, however, had in his treatise on the Eucharist, taken a view of the subject, which, on certain points, appeared to be considerably at variance with some other distinguished writers, who, no less strenuously than himself, opposed Bishop Hoadly's account of it. Upon the true nature of the *Christian sacrifice*, and the proper distinction between the *sacramental* and the *sacrificial* parts of the Eucharist, he had deemed it necessary to declare his dissatisfaction with the opinions maintained by Mr. Mede, Dr. Grabe, Dr. Hickes, and more especially by Mr. Johnson, in his "Unbloody Sacrifice;" and he had stated the ground of his objections without reserve, though with the respect due to theologians of such high character and reputation. Mr. Johnson died several years before this work of Dr. Waterland's appeared. But Dr. Brett, his warm friend and admirer, undertook a defence of the "Unbloody Sacrifice," in a tract, entitled, "Some Remarks on Dr. Waterland's Review "of the Doctrine of the Eucharist," published in 1738.

In this tract, Dr. Brett's professed design is to shew, that there is less difference than might be supposed between Dr. Waterland's and Mr. Johnson's opinions; "that the difference between them "is of very little moment, and rather *verbal* than *real;* and that "Dr. W. had in effect granted all that was contended for."

The points of difference, however, as stated by Dr. Brett himself, appear to be not so slight as he would fain believe. He contends, with Johnson, that the elements are offered as a *material* sacrifice, and are rendered efficacious, *as such*, by the supernatural virtue bestowed upon them from above. Waterland maintains, that the sacrifice in the Eucharist is purely *spiritual*,

the offering of those holy desires and affections, those pious resolutions, that penitence, faith, devotion, thankfulness, fear, and love, which render it an acceptable service; and that it is upon the *worthy communicant* thus receiving, and not upon the *elements* themselves, that the Holy Spirit vouchsafes to descend, and, through the medium of this sacrament, to convey the real participation of the body and blood of Christ, or, in other words, the actual benefits of the one great sacrifice on the cross. Together with this main point are connected several other collateral questions, in which the opinions of the respective parties cannot easily be made to harmonize; such as the interpretation of the sixth chapter of St. John's Gospel; the sense in which the elements in the Eucharist are understood to be our Lord's body and blood; the operation of the Holy Spirit upon the symbols, and the effect of its operation; the notion of this sacrament as a feast upon a sacrifice, and in what respects it may properly be deemed a sacrifice. On all these topics Dr. Brett dilates; and on each of them, much of what Dr. W. had advanced is controverted, though in a respectful manner, and apparently with a desire to differ as little as might be from so deservedly esteemed a writer.

To engage in a full examination of these questions would be an undertaking of no small labour, nor could it be very briefly executed, without injury to the one side or the other. It is evident, that Dr. Waterland's three last Charges were written chiefly with a view to settle these points, by stating more explicitly than in his larger work what was necessary to their elucidation, and supporting his own views of the subject by additional authorities, ancient and modern.

The first of these three Charges, delivered in the year 1738, is entitled, "The Christian Sacrifice explained." Dr. W. never questions that the Eucharist may properly be called a *sacrifice*. He maintains, that "as it is a *federal* rite between God and man, "so it must be supposed to carry in it something that *God gives* "*to us*, and something also that *we give*, or present, *to God*.

"These are, as it were, the two *integral* parts of that holy "ceremony: the former may properly be called the *sacramental* "part, and the latter the *sacrificial*." His whole purpose in discussing this part of the subject, is to keep these two points distinct: and he shews how much confusion and misapprehension have arisen, in particular, from not "settling the *definitions* of "*sacrifice* by certain rules, such as might satisfy reasonable men "on both sides." For hence it has been assumed, that there can be no real *sacrifice* but that which is *material;* whereas according to the oldest acceptations in the Church, and according to Scripture itself, *spiritual* sacrifice is always considered to be not only *real* and *true*, but even the *best* and *most excellent* that could be offered; *that*, indeed, without which no *material* oblation, however costly and magnificent, could avail any thing. If, therefore, in the Eucharist, these *spiritual* offerings be presented, it is, to all intents and purposes, so far a *sacrifice;* and upon this ground, as *one* sense in which it was so to be understood, the best Protestant writers uniformly defended themselves against their Romish opponents, who charged Protestants with having no *Christian sacrifice* whatever, in consequence of their abandonment of the *mass*.

But there was another sense also in which the Eucharist might be deemed a *sacrifice;* in that it imparts, to the faithful communicant, the actual effect of that one great sacrifice on the cross, "commemorated, applied, and participated" in this sacrament. The participation of the *elements* is, mystically and efficiently, though not *literally* and in *material* substance, a participation of the *body* and *blood* of Christ. Consequently, the sacrifice of our Lord himself is, in a certain sense, offered up in the Eucharist; since, by virtue of it, we therein plead his all-sufficient merits and satisfaction as the sole ground of our pardon and acceptance with God.

Dr. W. shews, at considerable length, how these considerations were successfully urged against the Romanists, in vindication of the Protestant view of the Eucharist. He shews also their

coincidence with the opinions of most of our eminent Divines, notwithstanding the different sentiments entertained by some of deservedly high reputation. Archbishop Sandys, Bishop Bilson, Dr. Field, Bishop Andrews, Bishop Montague, Dr. Hammond, Bishop Taylor, Archbishop Bramhall, Bishop Patrick, Bishop Lany, and Dr. Brevint, all nearly agree in maintaining this view of it; nor is the venerable Hooker much at variance with it, although some of his expressions seem to imply "that "we have, *properly*, now *no sacrifice*," meaning, probably, that we have no *propitiatory* sacrifice, such as is professed in the Romish mass. But others, anxious to prove that we *have* a sacrifice, resorted to the expedient of representing the elements themselves to be a *real* and *material* sacrifice, analogous to those which were offered under the Jewish law. Mr. Mede led the way in this novel system; and he was followed by Heylyn, Hickes, and others of less note; and subsequently by Johnson, in his "Unbloody Sacrifice." Our author eloquently concludes this part of his subject with an exhortation to adhere to the *ancient* ideas of *spiritual* sacrifice, as being far more appropriate to the Eucharist. "Let us not," he observes, "presume to offer "the Almighty any *dead sacrifice* in the Eucharist: he does not "offer us *empty signs:* but as he conveys to us the *choicest* of "his *blessings* by these *signs*, so by the same *signs* (not *sacrifices*) "ought we to convey our *choicest gifts*, the *Gospel-services*, the "*true sacrifices*, which he has commanded." The material sacrifices of the Jewish law had *legal* expiations annexed to them, which were but *shadows* of that *true* expiation, made upon the cross. "The *shadows* have since disappeared, and now it is our "great *Gospel privilege* to have *immediate* access to the *true* sa-"crifice, and to the *true* expiation, without the intervention of "any *legal* expiation or *legal* sacrifice."

To this Charge is subjoined an Appendix, equal in length to the Charge itself, in reply to Dr. Brett's "Remarks," and in which Johnson's treatise is more particularly considered. Its tendency to depreciate *spiritual* sacrifices, and to overvalue *material* sacrifices, is strongly urged; originating, as Dr. W.

conceives, in "not distinguishing between the *sacramental* view "of the Eucharist, and the *sacrificial;* between what is *in* the "elements, and what comes *with* them; between the *gifts of* "*God* to man, and the *gifts of man* to God." The notion, that our Lord himself, in the institution of the Eucharist, offered up the *elements* as a sacrifice, is also examined and disproved; since though our Lord "might present them as *signs* and *figures* of "the *real* sacrifice he was about to offer, inasmuch as they were "*signs* and figures of his *real* body and blood; yet as they were "not the *real* body and blood which they represented, so nei-"ther were they the *real* sacrifice." Some hazardous opinions of Mr. Johnson's respecting our Lord's sacrifice of himself, which he represents to have been made not *upon the cross,* but at the *institution of the Eucharist,* previous to his actual death and passion, are also censured with some severity, though not, perhaps, without justice; since their *tendency* is certainly such as neither Mr. Johnson nor Dr. Brett can be supposed to have contemplated, that of casting some degree of doubt upon one of the most fundamental articles of the Christian faith. "A brief "analysis of Mr. Johnson's system, shewing what it is, and by "what steps he might be led into it," is then subjoined; together with "a distinct summary view of the several *oblations* in the "Eucharist, previous to consecration, or subsequent," or, as they are usually called, the *ante-oblation* and the *post-oblation.* These are useful appendages.

In the following year, our author pursued the subject, by discussing more fully "the *sacramental* part of the Eucharist," as distinguished from the *sacrificial,* explained in the preceding Charge: observing, that "as truth is uniform, just notions of "one part will of course tend to preserve just ideas of the other "part also: and as error is apt to lead to error, any erroneous "tenets there, will naturally bring in erroneous positions here." Accordingly, the necessity of carefully distinguishing between *figurative* and *literal* expressions, when applied to this sacrament; between the use of the elements as *signs* and *symbols* only of what they represent, and the persuasion that they

undergo any actual change, even in their *inward* qualities, by their consecration to this purpose; is again urged with powerful effect; and a succinct account is given of the progress and change of opinions upon this point, from primitive writers of the Christian Church to the Romanists and Protestants of more recent times. Some peculiar notions entertained by Bishop Poynet, in particular, and by Harchius, a learned German physician, are copiously detailed; and certain singularities of other writers are occasionally noticed. But Dr. W. again commends our great reformers, *Cranmer* and *Jewell*, for avoiding these novel subtilties and perplexities, and endeavouring to reestablish the more simple and intelligible expositions current in the earliest ages of Christianity, and sanctioned by the standard authorities of those times. Bishop Jewell's sentiments, with respect to the elements in *both* sacraments, are thus briefly and comprehensively expressed: "We are taught, "not to seek that *grace* in the *sign*, but to assure ourselves by "receiving the sign, that it is given us by the *thing signified*.— "It is not the creature of *bread* or *water*, but the *soul* of man "that *receiveth* the *grace of God*. These corruptible creatures "need it not: we have need of God's grace. But this is a "phrase of speech. For, the *power* of God, the *grace* of God "the *presence* of the Trinity, the *Holy Ghost*, the *gift* of God, "are not in the *water*, but in *us*: and we were not made "because of the sacraments; but the sacraments were made for "our sake." The application of these remarks is then again made to Mr. Johnson's system; "the fundamental error of "which lies," says Dr. W., "in the want of a right notion of "*symbolical* language." "Hence it is, that *signs* have been "supposed either literally *to be*, or literally *to inclose*, the very "things *signified*, viz. the *divine* body, or the *divine* graces, "virtues, or powers:" whereas, as he afterwards observes, "God may cooperate with the elements, so as to affect the "*soul*, while they affect the *body*; but his operations and "powers, though *assistant* or *concurrent*, are not *inherent*, or "*intermingled*, but are entirely *distinct*; and are as truly *ex-* "*trinsic* to the elements, as the *Deity* is to the *creature*. When

"and where the elements are duly administered and received, "God does *then* and *there* work the effect, pursuant to his "promise and covenant. The elements are the *occasional* "causes, as it were, and He is the *efficient*."

The last of Dr. Waterland's Charges, entitled, "Distinctions "of Sacrifice," delivered in the year 1740, is not so directly controversial as the two which immediately preceded it; but may be read as a valuable didactic dissertation upon a point of theology, interesting to every one who is desirous of forming a clear conception of the several dispensations of revealed religion, and the modes of worship appropriate to each. That almost every system of religion in the known world has, in some way or other, recognised the rite of sacrifice as an essential part of worship, is a fact well known to the most superficial readers of history; and a fact not easily to be accounted for, upon any other supposition than that of its originally *divine* institution. Yet the *distinctive* characters of sacrifice, as applicable to true or false religion, or to the different dispensations of true religion, are exceedingly important. Considering the whole of revealed religion as *one* stupendous system, carrying on the great purpose of man's redemption, and comprising all that was needful to give it effect, whether before or since the actual coming of the Redeemer himself, it is reasonable to suppose that according to the various circumstances of mankind, variations would take place in the mode of conducting it, correspondent to the respective conditions of those for whose benefit it was intended. The views and apprehensions which the faithful in *patriarchal* times were enabled to form of the Divine proceedings, with reference to this vast design, could not have been equal, in clearness or extent, to those which were presented under the *Jewish* economy; nor could even the enlarged conceptions of *Jewish* worshippers be commensurate with those which were afterwards vouchsafed to the *Christian* world. *Types* and *figures* might shadow out, by anticipation, the *realities* afterwards to be displayed: *prophecies* might heighten and strengthen the expectations of men, and fill them

with no inconsiderable portion of joy and hope in believing: but the services suited to a state of *unfulfilled* promises would hardly accord with that in which they were actually *accomplished*; and even the very same services, or such as were similar only in their design and intent, would acquire a new and more appropriate signification, when connected with a new state of things, unknown to those who lived in other times.

Conformable with this general view of the subject are most of the *distinctions of sacrifice* which Dr. W. has discussed, with much precision and perspicuity, in this Charge. They relate chiefly to the difference between the object and design of the Levitical ritual, and the Christian. The terms, *passive* and *active*, *extrinsic* and *intrinsic*, *visible* and *invisible*, *material* and *immaterial*, *bloody* and *unbloody*, *old* and *new*, *literal* and *spiritual*, *symbolical* and *true*, *legal* and *evangelical*, *Aaronical* and *Melchizedekian*, *instrumental* and *real*, *typical* and *commemorative*, with several others, more or less obvious in their signification, are used to convey to the reader an apprehension of the several acceptations in which the word *sacrifice* is to be understood, so as to distinguish the one dispensation from the other. Our author's observations upon these terms throw great light upon the general subject of Sacrifice, as well as upon the Eucharist in particular, considered as a *sacrificial* service. By a careful attention to what he had thus clearly and elaborately drawn out, any material error in forming our opinions on this latter point may easily be avoided. One instance of this occurs in the distinction between *bloody* and *unbloody* sacrifices; on which Dr. W. takes occasion to observe, that the ancients did not apply this latter epithet (as Mr. Johnson did) to the *elements* in the Eucharist, the *bread* and *wine*, in contradistinction to the *animal* sacrifices of the Levitical law; but to *spiritual praises* and *thanksgivings*, to *faith*, *devotion*, *pure affections*, and *Christian virtues*, accompanying the mystical and commemorative offering of the symbols of our Lord's body and blood; and that if at any time the phrase *unbloody sacrifice* was applied by them

to the elements themselves, it was only by a *metonymy* of the *sign* for the *thing signified.*

For more explicit information on the several points here discussed, the reader must be referred to the Charge itself. It would be difficult, indeed, to compress the substance of this, or of either of the two preceding Charges, into a much narrower space than they already occupy. But the labour of attentively persuing them will be amply rewarded. For, though they relate to topics not all of equal magnitude and importance, and may occasionally lead to subtilties on which a general agreement can hardly be expected; yet they contain stores of information which, to the ordinary student, may spare infinite labour; and the elucidations they incidentally afford of other points of doctrine also, connected with the subject of the Eucharist, are of no inconsiderable value.

On the matters in question between Dr. Waterland and those who adopted the theory of the "Unbloody Sacrifice," some difference of opinion still continues to subsist. Probably, however, in the estimation of the majority of those who have well considered the subject, the preponderance of argument as well as of authority, will be thought to rest with him. He seems, at least, to have proved that the notion of a *material* sacrifice, in its *literal* acceptation, is not essential to the Eucharist; although, *symbolically* and *figuratively,* the material elements may be so denominated. He has also proved, that *spiritual* sacrifice *is* essential to it as an *evangelical* ordinance; and that *spiritual* sacrifices are not only *true* and *proper* sacrifices, but of comparatively far greater intrinsic value than the most costly of material oblations. On the other hand, the question is embarrassed with some difficulties, which Dr. W. has either not directly encountered, or not completely removed. The chief of these relates to the interpretation of the *sixth chapter of St. John's Gospel.* Dr. Brett argues, that the objections made by Dr. W. to interpreting this chapter of the *Eucharist,* from the *universality* of the expressions respecting the necessity of re-

ceiving it, might equally be urged against interpreting John iii. 5. of the sacrament of *Baptism;* since in the one, the same universal necessity is affirmed, as in the other; and the same restrictions or reservations must be understood, with respect to want of capacity, or want of opportunity, to partake of it. This difficulty Dr. W. had not obviated in his "Review," nor did he afterwards advert to it in either of his "Charges." In his posthumous treatise, however, on "Infant Communion," it is expressly noticed. After observing that St. Austin "did not "ordinarily interpret John vi. of the *outward* sacrament of the "Eucharist, but of the *inward* grace signified by it, or exhibited "in it," he adds, "There is this very observable difference "between John iii. 5. and John vi. 53, that the *former* text "teaches the necessity both of the *outward* sacrament and of "the *inward* grace; while the *latter* teaches only the necessity "of the *inward* grace, abstracted from the *outward* signs. Had "the *Eucharist* been as plainly pointed out in John vi. as "*Baptism* is in John iii. *both* must have been allowed to be "equally *necessary:* but it is worth observing, that the *former* "teaches the necessity of spiritual regeneration and incorpora-"tion, as *confined* to one *particular* form, or *outward* instrument; "the latter teaches the same *necessity* of spiritual incorporation, "*at large*, not mentioning any *particular form*, not restraining "the privilege or benefit to the *Eucharist* only." This is certainly an important observation. The *material* elements in the *Eucharist*, *bread* and *wine*, are not mentioned in John vi. *Water*, the *material* element in *Baptism*, is expressly stated, in John iii, to be essential to the receiving of spiritual regeneration. The application, therefore, of the former to the *Eucharist*, though perfectly easy and appropriate, and, no doubt, *proleptically* intended by our Lord himself; is yet not so directly declaratory of it, as the latter is of *Baptism*. Perhaps, however, when we consider the discourse in the sixth chapter of St. John in conjunction with the words afterwards used by our Lord in the institution of the Eucharist, "*Take, eat, this is my body*," and recollect that these very words supply a direct answer to the question put by the Jews, "*How* can this man give us his *flesh*

"to eat?"—we shall be persuaded, that in no other way can this chapter be so clearly and satisfactorily interpreted, as by supposing it to have been intended in anticipation of that solemn ordinance.

But whatever difference of opinion might exist between Dr. Waterland and other approved Divines upon such secondary and subordinate points, it will be generally allowed, that these and his other Charges are, in every respect, worthy of his distinguished reputation. They are the result of very extensive reading, of acute observation, and of clear and comprehensive views of the several subjects to which they relate.

Besides these valuable productions, Dr. W. published, at different times, five occasional Sermons; to which is prefixed, in the present edition of his works, another, of an earlier date than the rest, never before printed. The manuscript of this discourse, in the author's own handwriting, had long been in the possession of the present Archdeacon of London; by whom it was obligingly offered for insertion in this collection. It was preached before the University of Cambridge, on Commemoration Sunday, 1712; somewhat more than a year before Dr. Waterland was appointed Master of Magdalene college. It bears strong *internal* evidence of its authenticity, and possesses claims of that kind which render any apology unnecessary for now communicating it to the public.

Of the remaining Sermons, two were preached on political occasions; one, a Thanksgiving Sermon before the University, on the suppression of the rebellion in 1716; the other at St. Paul's Cathedral, before the Lord Mayor and Corporation of London, on the 29th of May, 1723. These do much credit to the author's good temper and moderation, in treating of subjects always difficult to be dilated upon without offence; and more especially so, when so much dissension and party-spirit prevailed. The political circumstances of the times are touched, in both Sermons, with remarkable circumspection and delicacy, yet

without compromising those principles of good government, in Church or State, on which our national prosperity must always essentially depend.

The Sermon before the Sons of the Clergy, and that on the anniversary meeting of the charity schools in and near London, are no less commendable in their kind. They shew a vigorous and fertile mind; nor are they wanting in that manly and impressive eloquence more especially requisite on such occasions[r].

The "Familiar Discourse upon the Doctrine of the Trinity," delivered, probably for the instruction of his own parishioners, in the church of St. Austin, London, answers well to its title; being written with remarkable plainness and perspicuity; unembarrassed by any subtilties or perplexities; and no less *practical* in its tendency, than edifying and satisfactory in point of *doctrinal* elucidation. It would be difficult, perhaps, to select another discourse on the same subject, more perfectly adapted to popular edification.

[r] The former of these Discourses derives, perhaps, some additional interest from the circumstance of its being preached at the *first* anniversary feast of the Sons of the Clergy.

SECTION VIII.

POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATIONS.

THE works of Dr. Waterland published by himself are undoubtedly those on which his reputation must chiefly depend. But the pen of so ready a writer, and one so extensively engaged in professional labours, could not but be continually called forth for purposes less generally known and observed, though scarcely less conducive to the public good. It was well, therefore, that he had consigned to a confidential friend, the care of "selecting "and revising for the press," after his decease, "such of his "writings as should be thought most useful, and proper for the "public view."

This trust was confided to the Rev. Joseph Clarke, M. A. Fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge, and formerly a pupil of Dr. Waterland; who discharged it with that affectionate ardour and respect which might be expected from one who had so much reason to hold his memory in veneration. In a well-written preface to this posthumous publication, he briefly touches upon the leading points of the author's literary and personal character; and his eulogy is marked by that judicious discrimination, which gives the strongest presumptive evidence that it is a genuine and characteristic portrait. The preface contains

also so full and circumstantial an account of the pieces thus selected, as renders it hardly necessary to do more than refer the reader to it for satisfactory information.

The works thus selected by Mr. Clarke, consist of thirty-three sermons, and two tracts, one on "Justification," the other on "Infant Communion."

The sermons appear to have been written chiefly for parochial instruction. Mr. Clarke has well observed of them, that they possess the qualities which Dr. W. himself, in his preface to Mr. Blair's Sermons, had represented to be most essential to *practical* discourses; and he adds, that "if some may have "looked upon him as a *mere scholar*, conversant only in the "learning of the schools; they will here find they were mis-"taken, and that he understood *men* as well as he did *books*;"—"that he had a thorough insight into human nature, understood "the secret springs and movements of the passions, and the "whole *anatomy*, if we may so speak, of the human mind." In this point of view, they add greatly to the author's reputation; as shewing not only the versatility of his talents, but his sincere and ardent desire to apply them to the substantial benefit of those who were committed to his charge. It is seldom, indeed, that the characteristic excellencies of the polemic and the pastor have been so successfully united in the same writer. To this, his remarkable perspicuity, in thought and in expression, greatly contributed. Even on the most abstruse subjects his meaning can hardly be misunderstood; while to such as are more level to ordinary capacities, he continually gives additional interest and importance, by laying open the grounds and reasons on which they rest. Hence, we find occasionally, even in the plainest of these discourses, questions of considerable difficulty very satisfactorily elucidated, and applied in the manner best calculated to make impression upon understandings unaccustomed to such investigations.

It is another great excellence in these sermons, that the

author, in treating of Christian duties and the great practical concerns of life, carefully avoids giving encouragement, on the one hand, to any laxity of principle, or, on the other hand, to excessive rigour and austerity. We find him uniformly insisting upon the full extent of moral obligation, and the necessity of entire and unreserved obedience to the Divine will; yet never straining any point of duty to an impracticable extent, nor affording countenance to those visionary notions of perfection, or fantastic schemes of life, which owe their origin, rather to the wanderings of imagination and the waywardness of spiritual pride, than to sober and solid reasonings grounded upon Scripture-truth. Many of the subjects chosen by him are such as require considerable care and circumspection in the application of them; such as may either lead to subtle and dangerous *casuistry* in the hands of designing men, or to doubts and perplexities in the minds of the undiscerning. Seldom, perhaps, does Dr. Waterland appear to more advantage, than in unravelling difficulties of this kind, and removing stumblingblocks in the way of truth, piety, or virtue. Instances, in confirmation of these remarks, continually occur; more particularly in the sermons on the "love of our neighbour" and "self-love," on "keeping the heart," on "passing judgment concerning the "calamities of others," on "sins of infirmity" and "presumptuous "sins," on the "joy in heaven over repentant sinners," on "charity to enemies," and on "the pharisee and publican."

The sermons in this collection which are more immediately *doctrinal* or *expository*, are no less excellent in their kind, and are equally adapted to parochial instruction, though they might deservedly claim attention from the highest class of readers or hearers.

It has, of late years, been made a subject of censure, that our principal Divines in the middle and earlier part of the last century, had, in a great degree, departed from *doctrinal* and *evangelical* preaching, and had done little more for the edification of their flocks than deliver dry and jejune dissertations

on *moral* topics, grounded rather upon *heathen* ethics or abstract *philosophy*, than upon *Christian* principles: and it has answered the purpose of a certain active and zealous party in the Church, to arrogate to itself the merit, not only of having been the first to introduce a more spiritual and evangelical mode of preaching to the people, but also of giving a higher and better tone than heretofore to the great body of the Clergy at large, in their popular discourses. It would not, perhaps, be difficult to shew, that these assumptions have been somewhat hastily advanced, and inconsiderately admitted. For, upon a careful examination of the very many volumes of sermons published during the above-mentioned period, by the parochial Clergy, as well as by Preachers before the Universities, the Inns of Court, and other congregations above the ordinary class, it is surprising to observe (after hearing such a sweeping charge as this) how large a proportion of them relate to the most essential articles of the Christian faith; how many of them are expository and illustrative of Scripture-history, of prophecy, of miracles, of parables, of doctrines, of every thing which comes within the province of a diligent Divine and faithful Pastor, intent upon enlightening his flock on all matters necessary to salvation, and desirous to build them up in the true faith and knowledge of the Gospel, as well as to render them practically virtuous and holy. Nor does it appear that the Clergy of that period were, in general, less assiduous in inculcating *moral* duties upon purely *Christian* principles. Few instances, comparatively speaking, will be found of practical discourses deficient in this great requisite: and if some writers were wont to fail in this respect, or were prone to indulge in the pride of *human reasoning*, to the neglect of the more authoritative mode of teaching which *Scripture* would have supplied, there were not wanting, on the other hand, a far greater number who steadfastly counteracted this propensity, and supplied better arguments and persuasives to Christian duty from the oracles of sacred truth.

But, whatever opinion may be entertained upon this matter, it is certain, at least, that Waterland was not one who "shunned

"declaring the whole counsel of God," whether as to faith or practice. His controversy with Dr. Sykes on the nature of moral obligation, and his vindication of Scripture against the Deists, sufficiently prove that the *ethics* which he inculcated were *Christian* ethics, in contradistinction to moral philosophy, or the religion of nature only. They prove also, that he suffered not any practical obligation to be considered as separable from the authority of *holy writ;* that every motive, every persuasive, to virtuous conduct was grounded, by him, upon the essential doctrines of *Christianity;* and that upon the *faith* alone which the Gospel sets before us, did he warrant any hope of Divine acceptance. Of the two volumes of sermons now under consideration, the latter consists chiefly of such as may be more strictly termed *theological;* either expounding difficult portions of Scripture, or guarding some important doctrines against misconstruction. Of those which are purely *expository*, the sermons on "St. Paul's wish that he were accursed from Christ," on "our "Lord's argument against the Sadducees," on "the case of St. Paul "in persecuting the Church," on "the history and character of "Balaam," and on "the appearance of Samuel to Saul at Endor," are suited to every description of readers. On points of *doctrinal* difficulty, may be selected, as of special importance, the discourses on "sinless perfection," on "the unprofitableness of man's best "performances," on "the operation of the Holy Spirit," and on "false pretences to the Holy Spirit." The subjects of these, and the manner in which they are treated, indicate that they were written with a view to certain enthusiastic notions which began to prevail towards the close of our author's life. To such delusions they afford a powerful antidote; yet without giving occasion to the sceptic, or the scoffer, to undervalue any of the essential points of evangelical doctrine; and also without any of that controversial bitterness which others too frequently betrayed, in their endeavours to rectify the public mind.

Of the two tracts subjoined to these sermons, the editor has, in his preface, given a full account. The doctrine of *justification* he observes, had been the occasion of much controversy in the

preceding century; and had been ably discussed by Bishop Bull, in his "Harmonia Apostolica," and other treatises, against those who maintained the *solifidian* doctrine, "that we are *so* justified "by *faith alone*, as to exclude *good works* from being *necessary* "*conditions* of *justification*; admitting them to be only necessary "*fruits* and *consequences* of it." This doctrine was revived by the new sect of Methodists, particularly by *Whitefield*; and it was a notion calculated to spread rapidly among corrupt and ignorant minds, to the great prejudice of sound morals and pure religion. The same motive, therefore, which induced Dr. Waterland to take in hand the subject of *regeneration*, led him to examine, more closely than had hitherto been done, the doctrine of *justification*, so immediately connected with it. There is evidence also, that he had been strongly pressed to do so by his friends. In Mr. Nicholls's "Literary Anecdotes," vol. viii. p. 292, is a letter from Mr. John Jones, the editor of "Free and "Candid Disquisitions," to Dr. Zachary Grey, in which he says, "I rejoice to hear that Dr. Waterland is recovering. His death "would have been an extraordinary loss to the Church. I "extremely value his late piece on *regeneration*. It is excellent. "I had long intended, before he fell ill, to desire you to write "to him, in order to desire such another piece on *justification*. "It is as much wanted as the other; and nobody can do it "better. If the Doctor recovers, pray, write to him on the "subject, and desire him to clear it. Pray do, good Sir, I again "beg of you." This letter is dated October 6, 1740. Waterland died in December following. But it appears from one of his own letters to Dr. Williams, in February of that same year, that he had taken up the subject some months before. There can be no doubt, however, that this, as well as the tract on regeneration, was intended to counteract the growing fanaticism of the times; both doctrines being equally perverted from their genuine signification, by the endeavour to engraft upon them the tenet so vehemently inculcated both by Wesley and Whitefield, that persons once *regenerated* and *justified* could never afterwards fall away from grace.

This notion could neither be reconciled with *baptismal* regeneration, nor with justification at the *commencement* of the Christian life. With respect to *justification*, it led also to the error, so ably refuted by Bishop Bull, that *good works* are not a *condition* of justification, but its necessary and certain *result;* justification being that act of sovereign grace, which ensured the final acceptance of the believer, and consequently could not but be productive of the fruits belonging to it.

To correct these erroneous persuasions, and restore the doctrine to its original and scriptural signification, Dr. W. pursues a method similar to that of his former treatise; summarily stating, what the term *justification* really denotes, and what is included in the right notion of it; how it stands distinguished from regeneration and renovation; what is requisite to give it effect; and what are the chief fallacies to be avoided, in the different views that may be taken of it. These several points are explained and illustrated, according to our author's accustomed method of treating all theological doctrines, by reference to Scripture, to reason, and to the sentiments of the Church Catholic, from the apostolical Fathers to St. Austin. The deviations of modern writers from these high authorities are then examined and refuted; particularly, the denial of *Baptism* as the ordinary instrument for conveying justification, of the instrumentality of *faith* in receiving it, and of the *conditions,* on which its efficacy is made to depend. The doctrine is then further guarded against the extremes of undervaluing the Divine grace in the work of justification, on the one hand; or, on the other, of so magnifying it as to supersede, or to diminish the necessity of obedience and a good life. The former error is charged upon the Pelagians, Socinians, Romanists, and those enthusiasts who pretend to *sinless perfection;* the latter, upon the Antinomian and Solifidian teachers. Adverting to those of the latter description, then gaining many proselytes, he says, in conclusion of the treatise, "It is certain that the Antinomian "and Solifidian doctrines, as taught by some in later times,

"have deviated into a *wild extreme*, and have done infinite mis-
"chief to *practical Christianity*. I have not room to enumerate,
"much less to confute, the many *erroneous* and *dangerous tenets*
"which have come from that quarter: neither would I be
"forward to expose them again to public view. They have
"been often *considered*, and often *confuted*. Let them rather
"be buried in oblivion, and never rise up again to bring
"reproach upon the *Christian name*. But take we due care
"so to maintain the doctrine of *faith*, as not to exclude the
"*necessity* of *good works*; and so to maintain *good works*, as not
"to exclude the *necessity* of *Christ's atonement* or the *free grace*
"of God. Take we care to perform all evangelical duties to
"the utmost of our power, aided by God's Spirit; and when we
"have so done, say, that we are *unprofitable servants*, having no
"strict *claim* to a reward, but yet looking for one, and accepting
"it as a *favour*, not challenging it as *due* in any right of our
"*own*; due only upon *free promise*, and that promise made not
"in consideration of any *deserts of ours*, but in and through the
"alone *merits*, active and passive, of Christ Jesus our Lord."
This is sound, rational, scriptural doctrine; and had it been more generally attended to, both before and since this admonition was given, the Church might have been spared much reproach and vexation, brought upon it either by injudicious friends, or by inconsiderate opponents.

The tract upon "Infant Communion" is of less general interest. Yet, besides throwing light upon a curious, though obscure point of ecclesiastical history, it is not unimportant with reference to its bearings upon the comparative obligation and necessity of the sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist. Difficulties have sometimes been raised respecting *Infant Baptism*, grounded upon an argument that the *universal* obligation of the *Eucharist* is no less positively affirmed in Scripture, than that of *Baptism*; and that, therefore, if the one is supposed to extend to *infants*, so must the other; our Lord's declaration, *Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you*, seeming to be equivalent,

in the *extent* of its application, to his other declaration, *Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of heaven.* Our author's solution of this difficulty, so far as relates to the inference thus erroneously drawn from these texts, has been already noticed, in stating his sentiments upon the doctrine of the Eucharist. The subject, however, is in the present tract treated *historically* rather than *doctrinally*, for the purpose of tracing what were the opinions concerning it among the early Fathers, particularly St. Cyprian and St. Austin. The inquiry into the practice of Infant Communion is also briefly carried on to later times; and it is shewn to have been very inconsiderable at any period, being grounded rather upon over-scrupulous fears and doubts, than upon any solid and clear conviction of its real foundation in Scripture. Our author's conclusion is, that the practice is neither enjoined by Scripture-authority, nor appears to have been known till the middle of the third century; and that it is not supported by any express injunction as to the *precise age* of admitting persons to the holy Communion; this being a matter of mere *expediency*, left to the regulation of the Church. This tract, though a posthumous publication, was probably of an earlier date than either his Review of the Eucharist, or his Charges; mention being made, towards the beginning, of an essay then *lately* published on the subject, by Mr. Pierce of Exeter, dated 1728.

Here might have ended the investigation of Dr. Waterland's learned labours, had not some other of his productions lately come to light, which have been deemed of sufficient importance to admit them into this first entire collection of his writings. The public might reasonably have been dissatisfied if any undoubted manuscripts of the author, not undeserving of his high reputation, had been suffered to remain unnoticed, or known only to those few who might have access to the public or private archives in which they are deposited. Some brief account of these remains, therefore, to be given.

The first to be noticed are "Two Letters on Lay-Baptism."

In the Biographia Britannica,[a] it is stated, that in the year 1716, there passed several letters between Jackson and Whiston upon the subject of "Infant-Baptism," which Jackson defended against Whiston, as he did also the lawfulness and validity of "Lay-Baptism" to another friend and correspondent. "But" (it is added) "whether in the last letter he had an eye, or no, "to *Dr. Waterland*, does not appear, who once denied the "validity of Lay-Baptism; however, he afterwards changed his "opinion." This is said to have been "communicated by Dr. "Nicholls, Rector of St. Giles, Cripplegate." The communication, however, will hardly obtain credit, when compared with the evidence of these two letters by Dr. Waterland now under consideration.

The first letter was found in the collection of Archbishop Wake's Manuscripts, deposited in the library at Christ Church, Oxford. It is inscribed to "the Reverend Mr. P. Rector of L—." dated "M. C." (Magdalene College) "October 29, 1713," and subscribed "D. W." It can now only be conjectured who was this Mr. P. Rector of L. Probably it was Mr. Pyle, then Rector of Lynn, in Norfolk. The letter was evidently written for the purpose of removing certain doubts entertained by Mr. P. in consequence of some correspondence or conversation between him and a Mr. Kelsall, in which the latter had maintained Dr. Bingham's opinion on the subject, against that of Mr. Laurence, the well-known author of "Lay-Baptism invalid." In the introductory part of the letter, Dr. W. professes himself to have been, till lately, of Dr. Bingham's opinion, but to have changed that opinion upon further deliberation; a statement, the very reverse of that brought forward in the Biographia Britannica; unless we are to suppose, that, even after these letters were written, he abandoned his latter judgment and returned to the former; than which nothing can be more improbable. The letter itself contains a brief summary of the main arguments on which the *invalidity* of Lay-Baptism is grounded; and shews in

[a] Art. *Jackson*. Vol. vii. Supplement, p. 107. note B.

a very concise, but distinct and luminous manner, the proofs to that effect, from *Scripture, antiquity,* and *reason.* To this *general* view of the subject the first letter is confined, the writer professing not to enter into any further detail, but rather to be desirous of information from Mr. Kelsall himself, of whose learning and ability he speaks in terms of high respect.

Together with this letter, (which is transcribed in a small duodecimo book, and written in a remarkably neat and distinct hand, not much unlike to that of Waterland,) there is also a transcript, in the same hand-writing, of *Mr. Kelsall's* letter, addressed to the same Mr. P., in consequence (as it appears) of Mr. P.'s having sent Dr. Waterland's letter for his consideration. It is subscribed, "E. Kelsall," and dated, "Boston, May 12, 1714." The same name occurs in Cooke's "Preacher's Assistant," as the author of two Sermons in the years 1710 and 1712; and also among the "Cambridge Graduates," is found *Edward Kelsall, St. John's, A. B.* 1691, *A. M.* 1695. There can be little doubt that this was the author of the letter; and that he was a man whose opinion Dr. Waterland thought might have considerable weight. His letter, indeed, shews great learning, research, and ability; vindicating his former judgment on the validity of Lay-Baptism, and elaborately combating the arguments against it; though at the same time expressive of great personal respect for Dr. Waterland. At considerable length, he goes through the whole question, examines it in all its bearings, and contests with much strength, not without some asperity also, the conclusions formed, on the other side, by Mr. Laurence and Dr. Brett. He takes the liberty, however, of *inverting* the *order* of his opponent's arguments, by examining *first,* what *reason* has to allege from the *consequences* which, he conceives, must follow from admitting the *invalidity* of Lay-Baptism; and *then,* what may be inferred from the authorities of *Scripture* and *antiquity;* thus, in some measure, *prejudging* the main question, or, at least, prepossessing the mind of the reader somewhat unfairly in favour of his own hypothesis. Great acuteness and polemical skill are displayed throughout the letter; which it has been thought

proper to insert together with Dr. Waterland's, not only for its intrinsic worth, but that the reader may be better able to appreciate the value of Dr. Waterland's reply.

The manuscript from which Dr. Waterland's *second* letter is now printed, was not found together with the former in the library at Christ Church; but is a transcript which had been in the possession of *Mr. Charles Wheatly*, who bequeathed it, among other manuscripts, to St. John's College, Oxford, in the archives of which library it is deposited. On the manuscript Mr. Wheatly has written a memorandum, stating it to be "a *copy* transcribed by the late Mr. Austin Bryan[t], from "one which Mr. Wheatly had from the Doctor himself, and "afterwards lent to Mr. Bryan by the Doctor's order." It has neither date nor subscription: but in the margin is this note; —"Mr. Bryan died in April 1726; the letter was wrote "probably before the year 1720." The probability, indeed, seems to be that it was written considerably before that time. Waterland's *first* letter is dated, October 1713; Mr. Kelsall's, May 1714: and it seems not likely that Waterland, who had already so thoroughly considered the subject, should have delayed his reply much beyond that same year; although he apologizes, in the latter part of it, for the *long delay* occasioned by a pressure of other business. But this is comparatively unimportant. The *authenticity* of this, as well as of the other letters, is unquestionable; and, though not intended for the public eye, it is, perhaps, scarcely inferior to any of the author's other writings. Towards the conclusion, he says, "I might, no doubt, have been more exact in many "things, had I more leisure, or could I bear the trouble "of transcribing. But since these papers are designed only "for private use, I am content to let them pass. You may "please to communicate them to your learned friend, whom "I have a great respect and value for."

From these circumstances it appears, that Dr. Waterland was

[t] The editor of Plutarch's Lives.

induced to take up the subject, rather for the satisfaction of his friend *Mr. P.* (to whom the letter is evidently addressed, though in this copy of it the superscription is wanting,) than from a desire of controversy with Mr. Kelsall: and probably, Mr. Kelsall had the same motive, in the pains he took to support his own opinion. Perhaps, too, they both considered the subject as already nearly exhausted, by those who had publicly engaged in it; and were mutually unwilling to re-kindle the controversy, or to come before the world as opponents to each other. There seems, however, to be no reason, why these papers should any longer be kept from the public eye. They reflect great credit on both parties. They are the result, on each side, of much reading and reflection, upon a point certainly of considerable interest; and to those who may be desirous of forming a correct judgment upon the question, without much labour, they present, within a moderate compass, a complete statement of the main arguments on which it depends. The temper also with which this correspondence was carried on, is such as might be expected between writers entertaining a mutual respect for each other, though personally unacquainted; and the spirit of the controversialist, on either side, appears to be always under this control. It will be observed, however, that Dr. Waterland, in the arrangement of his arguments, pursues, in his second letter, the same *order* which he had adopted in the first; and disapproves of Mr. Kelsall's *first* considering what *reason* has to allege, and *then* proceeding to the authorities of *Scripture* and *antiquity*. Mr. Kelsall, no doubt, was sensible of the advantage he might derive from taking this course. But, as Dr. W. justly observes, "there is no reasoning to any good purpose in this question, "till some foundation be laid, either in Scripture or antiquity, "or both, to reason upon." Undoubtedly, on any matter of revealed religion, and especially on a *positive* duty instituted by Divine ordinance, no reasoning can avail, which is adverse to these authorities. The truth to be established must primarily depend upon its agreement with the word of God, and the concurrent practice of the primitive Church.

The propriety of our author's mode of treating the subject is therefore obvious. With what success he has advocated his opinions, the impartial reader is left to judge. On a point not absolutely of *fundamental* importance, to espouse, on the one side, the opinions of such men as Laurence, Brett, Leslie, and Waterland; or, on the other, those of such opponents as Bingham, Burnet, Kennet, and Kelsall; can hardly be deemed discreditable to either party. We know that great and good men have differed, and still differ from each other on this point, without any diminution of mutual respect, or any intentional deviation from the doctrine or discipline of the Church.

The Letters on Lay-Baptism are followed, in this edition, by a series of hitherto unpublished letters to the *Rev. Mr. Lewis*, of Mergate, Kent, the well-known author of several valuable publications and of other writings which still exist in manuscript. The works by which he is chiefly known, are his Lives of Wickliffe and Pecock, and his History of English Translations of the Bible. That in these, his acquaintance with Waterland was of great advantage to him, the Letters sufficiently prove. It appears not, however, that Dr. W. intended more than to furnish his friend with materials, and to suggest hints for the use of them; nor ought it to derogate from the talents and industry of Mr. Lewis, that he availed himself copiously of this aid, in addition to his own indefatigable labours. Dr. W. encouraged him also in the prosecution of other designs of considerable interest and importance, but which, from want of sufficient patronage, he was compelled either to leave unfinished, or to withhold from the press. Among these, were the Lives of Bishop Fisher, of Dr. Hickes, Servetus, Mr. Johnson, author of the "Unbloody "Sacrifice," and Dr. Wallis; besides a history of the English Liturgy and other historical and ecclesiastical tracts; some of which are among Rawlinson's MSS. in the Bodleian library, and others, probably, in private hands. It is to be regretted that none of these have yet been printed. The Life of Fisher he had intended to print in one volume with the Lives of

Wickliffe and Pecock, had he met with due encouragement from the booksellers. The history of our Liturgy, or some parts of it, he submitted to Dr. Waterland's inspection, who kindly proffered his assistance towards its revision and improvement.

Dr. Waterland has proved himself, by these letters, to have been eminently qualified for such labours. They shew an extent of historical reading which entitles him to rank high among ecclesiastical antiquaries. His acquaintance with the history of our own Church was also greatly facilitated by his skill in Anglo-Saxon literature, and by his accurate observation of the progress and variations of the English tongue, from very remote periods, to the time of the reformation. Of this he had given proof in some parts of his "Critical "History of the Athanasian Creed;" and these letters afford still further evidence of his attainments in this useful branch of knowledge. Many of his observations on the peculiarities of style, phraseology, and orthography, in the earliest English translations of the Bible, and on the internal evidence of the times in which they were written, shew much critical sagacity and discernment: and where any extraordinary difficulties of this kind occurred, it will generally be found that Mr. Lewis adopted his solution of them.

The letters addressed to Mr. Loveday, Dr. Zachary Grey, Mr. Browne Willis, and Dr. Williams, derive their chief interest from the literary, ecclesiastical, or academical occurrences of the time when they were written. They throw some light also upon the controversies in which the author was then engaged. To these is subjoined a letter to Mr. Edmund Law, of Christ's College, Cambridge, (afterwards Master of Peter House and Bishop of Carlisle,) containing some ingenious suggestions with reference to one of Mr. Law's notes on Archbishop King's "Origin of Evil," respecting what constitutes *moral good* and *evil*, and their connection with the present well-being of the world.

In addition to the above-mentioned letters, (which could have formed but a small part of his extensive correspondence,) there have been found copious *marginal notes*, in Dr. Waterland's hand-writing, upon some of *his own* works, and upon the works of *other* writers; sufficient, if collected together, to form a volume of very considerable magnitude.

The additional notes upon *his own* writings, it has been thought expedient to print entire. Those on his "Importance "of the Doctrine of the Trinity" are contained in a copy met with accidentally in the shop of a London bookseller. Those on two of his "Charges" and his tract on "Regeneration" are in copies now in possession of the Rev. Archdeacon Pott. They were all probably intended by the author for the improvement of any subsequent impression that might be called for.

The notes upon *other* writers are much more numerous. Some are polemical, some merely illustrative, or corrective. The following is a list of them, in chronological order. 1. Johnson's "Unbloody Sacrifice." 2. Whitby's "Disquisitiones Mo-"destæ." 3. Hoadly's "Answer to the Lower House of Con-"vocation." 4. Wheatly "on the Common Prayer." 5. Brett's "Discourse on discerning the Lord's Body in the holy Com-"munion." 6. Jackson's "Remarks on Waterland's Second "Defence." 7. Dr. Clarke's "Observations on Waterland's "Second Defence." 8. Tindal's "Christianity as old as the "Creation." 9. Stebbing's "Defence of Dr. Clarke." 10. Middleton's "Letter to Waterland." 11. "Sober and charitable "Disquisitions on the Importance of the Doctrine of the "Trinity." 12. Dr. Reed's "Essay on the Simony and Sacri-"lege of the Bishops of Ireland." The copies of the works in which they are written, are all (except Wheatly on the Common Prayer) deposited among Rawlinson's MSS. in the Bodleian library. That of Wheatly is in the library of St. John's College, Oxford; to which College it was bequeathed by Mr. Wheatly himself, once a Fellow of that Society[u].

[u] The Editor has since been favoured by Mr. Neville, the Master of Magdalene College, with the perusal of some other marginal notes

The authenticity of all these notes is unquestionable; and it had been in contemplation to publish them entire, in an additional volume. But, upon further consideration, the intention was relinquished. Some of the notes, it is probable, have already, in substance, been introduced into the author's subsequent publications. Comparing the dates of those on *Johnson*, *Whitby*, *Brett*, *Jackson*, and *Clarke*, it may be reasonably supposed, that, in his printed animadversions on those works, Dr. Waterland used them as materials for his purpose, as far as he was himself satisfied with them. The same may have been done with the notes on "Sober and charitable Disquisitions," which gave occasion to his work on the "Importance of the "Doctrine of the Trinity," as he states in the introduction to that work. The notes on *Wheatly* were most probably turned to account by Wheatly himself, in the later editions of his work, which vary considerably from the folio edition in which these notes were written; and from a cursory inspection of the notes this conjecture is strongly confirmed. Again; with respect to such marginal observations in general, some of them might have been hasty effusions, which the author, upon reconsideration, would not have entirely approved,

by Dr. Waterland, preserved in the library of that College, viz. on his "Second Defence of the Queries," his "Critical History of the Athanasian "Creed," his "Review of the Eu-"charist," and Mr. Gilbert Burnet's "Full Examination of several im-"portant Points relating to Church-"Authority," &c. in a second Letter to Mr. Law, 1718.

The notes upon his "Second De-"fence" and his "Review of the Eu-"charist" relate to the *first* editions of those works, and were most of them adopted in the revision of the second editions. Those upon the "Critical History of the Athanasian "Creed" relate also to the *first* edition; but they are not in his own hand-writing. They appear to have been written by one of his friends, (perhaps Mr. Wanley,) and to have been submitted to Dr. Waterland's consideration; some use having evidently been made of them in his *second* edition. The notes upon Mr. Burnet's tract contain some valuable observations upon the several heads into which it is divided, *human authoritative benedictions*, *human authoritative absolutions*, and *Church-communion*. Mr. Gilbert Burnet was second son of Bishop Burnet, of Merton College, Oxford, and afterwards Chaplain in Ordinary to his Majesty. He is said to have been a contributor to "Hibernicus's Let-"ters," a periodical paper carried on at Dublin, and also to the "Free-"thinker;" and to have been considered by his father as one of his best assistants in the *Bangorian Controversy*. He wrote also two other tracts in that Controversy: 1. "A letter to the Rev. Mr. Trapp;" 2. An answer to Mr. Law's "first "Letter to the Bishop of Bangor." See Biographia Britannica, second edition, vol. iii. p. 39.

or would, at least, have more carefully guarded against misconstruction, or the hazard of giving offence. Others could hardly have justice done to them, without large citations of the passages to which they relate. And after all, few readers, perhaps, would now be inclined to encounter the toil of going through so great a mass of desultory observations, impossible to be connected together in any regular series, and the spirit of which cannot be thoroughly felt or understood, without being well conversant with the writings which gave occasion to them.

There are also extant some valuable manuscript notes by Dr. Waterland, which confirm what has been already said respecting his skill in Anglo-Saxon literature. He laboured much in this way for the improvement of Hearne's edition of Robert of Gloucester's Chronicle; of which there is a copy preserved among Rawlinson's collections in the Bodleian library, full of his marginal corrections and illustrations. The following memorandum is prefixed to the title-page;—"This book was "collated with some MSS. by the Rev. Dr. Daniel Waterland, "Rector of Twickenham in Middlesex, Canon of Windsor, and "Master of Magdalen College, Cambridge; and purchased in "his auction by R. R. 24 Feb. 1741."

Besides the above-mentioned fruits of his almost incessant labours, Dr. Waterland had made several annotations upon the holy Scriptures; apparently not with any view to publication, but for his own private use. They are inserted in an interleaved quarto Bible, and are in his own hand-writing; consisting chiefly of short, critical remarks, intended either to elucidate the text, or to correct the translation of it; and not very numerous. They afford, however, a valuable accession of materials to a commentator; and, as such, have, most of them, if not all, been brought before the public in Dr. Dodd's "Commentary on the "Bible," published in 1765. The Bible which contains these manuscript notes found its way into Dr. Askew's library. At the sale of Dr. Askew's books, it was purchased by Dr. Gosset; at Dr. Gosset's sale, it was purchased by the late Dr. Combe, and is said to be now in his son's possession.

SECTION IX.

BIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVE RESUMED AND CONCLUDED.

THAT the account of Dr. Waterland's extensive and important labours as an author might be carried on without interruption, the biographical part of these memoirs has been, for a while, suspended. His *academical* history has been pretty fully investigated. It remains now to take up the thread of the general narrative, at the period when he first came forward as the antagonist of Dr. Clarke.

This was in the year 1719, when Dr. Waterland was about thirty-six years of age. His services as Fellow and Tutor of a College, as Examiner and Moderator in the University, as a member of several Syndicates, frequently called upon to take an active part in concerns of considerable importance, had brought him rapidly into distinction. Attaining to the Headship of his College at the early age of thirty years, the chief magistracy of the University devolved upon him very soon afterwards, and at a crisis when more than ordinary judgment and discretion, as well as firmness, were requisite for the discharge of its duties. How satisfactorily he acquitted himself in all these stations, and with what respect and esteem he was, in consequence, regarded, it is unnecessary to repeat[x].

[x] In addition to what has already been stated respecting Dr. Waterland's conduct in his academical station, the following note, drawn up by the present Master of Magdalene College, and communicated since the former part of these memoirs had gone through the press, will place in a striking point of view the benefit derived from his unwearied attention to the duties of the Headship, and to the interests of the society over which he so worthily presided.

"Dr. Waterland did not confine "his attention at Magdalene College to "the advancement of learning among

It has already been mentioned, that the same patron who advanced him to the Mastership of Magdalene College, presented him to the Rectory of Ellingham in Norfolk. Whether these appointments originated in private friendship, or in public principle, it is fruitless now to inquire. In either case, the public interest was greatly benefited.

It has also been noticed, that, in the year 1717, Dr. Waterland was appointed a Chaplain to the King; and that they who were jealous of his increasing reputation made some unworthy attempts to ascribe this, and other marks of favour conferred upon him, to *political* influence, rather than to his personal deserts.

But his generally acknowledged merits soon gained him patronage liable to no such invidious observations. His first "Vindication of our Lord's Divinity" attracted the notice of the Earl of Nottingham, by whom it was spoken of in terms of the highest approbation. Bishop Robinson's recommendation of him to the Lady Moyer, to be the first preacher of the lectures she had endowed, was another public testimony of considerable weight. By these unsolicited tokens of respect from the great and good, much was added to his well-earned reputation, though little to his pecuniary emoluments.

In the year 1721, soon after the publication of his Sermons at

"his pupils, but when he became "Master he greatly improved the "College revenues by looking tho-"roughly into the wills and deeds of "the different benefactors, and by "regulating and sorting all the papers "in the College archives. The title-"deeds are many of them still in the "drawers in which Waterland placed "them, and several of the compart-"ments are yet docketed in the "Doctor's own hand-writing. He "also compiled a history of the dif-"ferent benefactions to his College, "and a list of all the Fellows and "Scholars from the earliest period of "the foundation to his own time. "There is much matter contained in "this manuscript which is highly "interesting to the Society, and the "information comprised in it has "always been considered as the best "authority in all College matters. "The book is beautifully written in "Waterland's own hand-writing, in "a small quarto volume. It contains "about two hundred and fifty pages, "and has a regular index. It is much "prized by the present Master, and "must have been selected with great "labour and difficulty, many of the "original papers from which it was "compiled being very voluminous "and much injured by time."

the Lady Moyer's Lecture, he was presented by the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's to the Rectory of St. Austin and St. Faith in the city of London; Dr. Godolphin, (Provost of Eton,) being Dean, and Dr. Stanley, (Dean of St. Asaph,) Dr. Hare, (afterwards Bishop of Chichester,) and Dr. Younger, the Residentiaries.

To so respectable a body as the London Clergy, Dr. Waterland could not but be deemed a valuable acquisition. Among them were at that time several of distinguished learning and ability, whose pursuits were congenial with his own; particularly, Dr. James Knight, the two Berrimans, Stebbing, Twells, Trapp, Gurdon, Bedford, and Biscoe. To his pastoral labours in the parish of St. Austin's we are probably indebted, for most of those excellent sermons which were published after his decease. In the same year that he entered upon this benefice, he preached the anniversary sermon before the Sons of the Clergy; and, two years afterwards, rendered the same service to the charity schools of the metropolis, at their great annual meeting. No mention of him is made in the records of Sion College. He retained the living but a few years; not long enough to be called, in the usual rotation, to those offices in which the government of the College is vested. The only instance in which his name there occurs, is when permission was given him, in the year 1727, to have the loan, for a certain time, of a manuscript of Wickliffe's Bible.

His literary labours evidently suffered no interruption from these additional calls upon his time. Both his tracts on the "Case of Arian Subscription," his "Second Vindication," his "Farther Vindication," and his "Critical History of the Athanasian Creed," besides some minor performances, were published within three years from his acceptance of this benefice. Nor was his attention to the concerns of the University materially slackened: for it was during this period that the proceedings against Bentley, and other matters of more than ordinary interest, occurred, in which Waterland had no inconsiderable share. At the same time, his correspondence with Mr. Lewis

respecting the lives of Wickliffe and Pecock was carried on. These were occupations sufficient almost to have engrossed the time and labour of a less active and powerful mind.

Within about two years after his presentation to this London benefice, Dr. Waterland was promoted to the Chancellorship of the diocese of York, by Sir William Dawes, Archbishop of that province. That this dignity was conferred upon him, solely from the high estimation in which his public services were held by that truly excellent prelate, is evident from the terms in which Waterland acknowledges the favour, in the dedication of his "Critical History of the Athanasian Creed." After paying his tribute of respect to the Archbishop, as "the watchful "guardian and preserver of the Christian Faith," and congratulating him on "the happy fruits of his conduct, visible in the "slow and inconsiderable progress that the *new heresy* had been "able to make in his Grace's province," he adds, with reference to his own work, "what advantage *others* may reap from the "publication will remain in suspense; but I am sure of one to "*myself*, (and I lay hold of it with a great deal of pleasure,) "the opportunity I thereby have of returning my *public* thanks "to your Grace for your *public* favours." The Archbishop's feelings in this respect are shewn in the following letter, on the receipt of Dr. Waterland's book, dated Bishop's Thorpe, November 9, 1723:—"Sir, I can never thank you enough for "the service which you have done to orthodox Christianity by "your 'Critical History of the Athanasian Creed;' nor for the "honour which you have done me and my whole province, in "the Epistle Dedicatory to it. With great pleasure I read it, "both upon account of the subject-matter of it, and the manner "in which you have treated it: the one, of the greatest import-"ance to the Christian faith; the other, a pattern to all writers "of controversy, in the great points of religion. God grant that "it may attain the end, which I dare say you designed by it, "and which it is so well fitted for, the quelling of that spirit "of heresy which has of late so much prevailed amongst us, "and the preserving our holy faith entire and undefiled. I

"am, Sir, your obliged and affectionate friend and brother,
"W. Ebor.[7]"

The next step in our author's ecclesiastical promotions was to a Canonry of Windsor, in the year 1727. This favour is said to have been conferred through the joint recommendations of the Lord Townshend, Secretary of State, and Dr. Gibson, Bishop of London. It led to his obtaining also the Vicarage of Twickenham in Middlesex, from the Chapter, on a vacancy made by Dr. Booth's advancement to the Deanery, in 1730. On his presentation to this Vicarage, he resigned the Rectory of St. Austin and St. Faith. In the same year he was collated by Bishop Gibson to the Archdeaconry of Middlesex; an appointment peculiarly well suited to his habits and acquirements.

Dr. Waterland had now before him a wide and extensive sphere of action, with full scope for the exercise of his various attainments. His residence appears to have been pretty equally divided between Windsor, Twickenham, and Cambridge; and his labours in religion and literature were carried on with undiminished ardour. His controversy with Dr. Sykes on the Nature and Obligation of the Christian Sacraments, his correspondence with Dr. Zachary Pearce on some points relating to that controversy, his Vindication of Scripture against Tindal, his Dissertation on the argument *à priori*, and his greater work on the Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity, shew the continued activity and energies of his mind, and his indefatigable exertions in the cause of truth. Yet in the midst of these almost incessant avocations, we are assured by his personal friends, (and his letters bear testimony to the same effect,) that he was not averse from habits of social intercourse, but freely cultivated and improved his acquaintance with those around him; and found leisure to assist and encourage others in every laudable undertaking. In his retirement at Twickenham, it is probable that he enjoyed much satisfaction in the society of his friend and

[7] This letter was communicated to the editor by the present Master of Magdalene College.

Curate, Mr. Jeremiah Seed, who was also Minister of Twickenham Chapel, and preached there the funeral sermon upon the death of Dr. Waterland. From this intimacy between them, it may be conjectured that Mr. Seed profited not inconsiderably, in qualifying himself to preach a course of sermons for the Lady Moyer's Lectures, which he delivered in 1732–33, and which did him much credit[z].

An additional honour now awaited Dr. Waterland, of which he could not but be deeply sensible. In the year 1734, the Clergy of the Lower House of Convocation determined upon choosing him their Prolocutor. To this mark of high favour and distinction he adverts, in one of his letters to Mr. Loveday, and in another to Dr. Grey; and assigns as his reason for declining it, his sedentary disposition and his uncertain state of health. Probably it was pressed upon him with some urgency. The Archdeacon of London, Dr. Cobden, had actually prepared the speech to be delivered on presenting him to the Upper House; and it was afterwards printed in a volume of his miscellaneous writings[a].

[z] It is said of Mr. Seed, in Mr. Chalmers's Biographical Dictionary, that "he was exemplary in his mo-" rals, orthodox in his opinions, had " an able head, and a most amiable " heart." A remarkable testimony to his merits is also stated to have been given by one of his warmest opponents, a zealous Anti-trinitarian, who said of him, "Notwithstanding this gentle-" man's being a contender for the " Trinity, yet he was a benevolent " man, an upright Christian, and a " beautiful writer; *exclusive of his* " *zeal for the Trinity*, he was in every " thing else an excellent clergyman, " and an admirable scholar. I knew " him well; and on account of his " amiable qualities very highly ho-" nour his memory; though no two " ever differed more in religious senti-" ments."

[a] As expressive of the high estimation in which Dr. Waterland was held by the great body of the Clergy, the insertion of this eulogium may not be unacceptable to the reader.

" Formula parata præsentandi D.D. " Waterland, cum Prolocutor eligeretur, ann. 1734–35.

" Reverendi admodum Patres,

" Clerus ex mandato Reverendissimi Præsidis conveniens, hunc " virum doctum, gravem, et peritum, " qui officio Prolocutoris fungatur, " omni suffragio elegit, mihique partes, " licet indigno, illum vobis præsentandi, demandavit. In quo quidem " eligendo, non tam illius, quam suæ " gloriæ consuluit: quemque si non " elegisset, excusatione apud omnes " indigere videretur.

" Quem enim magis huic provinciæ " idoneum, quem antesignanum potius " constituere oportuit, quam illum qui " toties in arena theologica desudavit, " tantaque de universis Christi hosti-" bus reportavit tropæa? Illum, in-" quam, Articulorum Ecclesiæ Angli-" canæ, id est, Catholicæ fidei, pro-

From this period but few particulars occur in our author's history requiring especial notice. There is abundant proof, however, of his unremitting assiduity in the duties of his several stations, as Archdeacon, Pastor of a parish, and Head of a college. His Charges, his Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist, and his treatise on Regeneration, sufficient alone to have established his reputation as a Divine, succeeded each other, year by year, with scarcely any intermission; shewing a facility and readiness of composition, not less remarkable than the laborious investigation which must have been bestowed upon them.

But we shall not form an adequate conception of our obliga-

" pugnatorem celeberrimum, pene " dixeram, alterum *Athanasium?*

" Neminem enim, opinor, latet, " quanta hanc nostram Ecclesiam, ad " felicioris ævi normam optime refor- " matam, ex omni latere circumstent, " hinc infidelium, illinc prave creden- " tium agmina; quæ ruinam spirant, " illamque a fundamentis penitus " eruere meditantur. En unum in " Evangelii causa omnibus parem! Dei " maximi sub auspiciis militantem, " et panoplia Christiana undequaque " munitum; qui Papistarum, Arian- " orum, Scepticorum, errores refutare, " fallacias detegere, et primævam fidem " tam solidis argumentis confirmare, " quam eleganti stylo illustrare, " poterit. In hoc enim curriculo se " indefessus exercet, huic operi adeo " se totum noctes diesque impendit, " ut victus et somni beneficium sibi " pene invideat.

" Coeant inanis philosophiæ jacta- " tores, hujusque sæculi sophistæ " arrogantes, quibus unica est religio " denegare Deum, sola virtus volup- " tatibus indulgere, sola ratio est " magistra vitæ, et propria cuique " voluntas est summa ratio: coeant " sane, et mysteria divina, quæ " modulum nostrum longe excedunt, " humani ingenii telis conjunctim " aggrediantur: hic solo verbo Dei " instructus, debiles istorum conatus " facile repellet. Quando enim

——'arma Dei ad cœlestia ventum est,
'Mortalis mucro, glacies ceu fut lis, usu
'Dissiliet.'

" Quinetiam venerandos Patres, " quibus pretium ætas arrogavit, " quos inimici nostri aliquando nihili " faciunt, et tantum non conviciis " petunt, aliquando, prout lubet, per " insidiis ad castra sua reluctantes " trahunt, et per tormenta cogunt " fateri quæ ne somniantes quidem " cogitarunt, Hic, antiquitatis inda- " gator sagax, ex istorum manibus " aperto marte asseruit, et a nostris " partibus stare, quantique sint mo- " menti, clarissime ostendit.

" De hujus profecto et eloquentia " et doctrina dicenti, nova perpetuo " exsurgit messis; et dies me de- " ficeret, si omnia quæ de illo præ- " dicari debeant tantum delibarem: " sed in publicum peccem, si longiore " oratione vestra tempora detineam. " Hoc unum tamen nefas esset præ- " termittere, utpote summam laudis " suæ coronam, quod adeo vitæ in- " culpatæ et virtutum omnium insigne " est exemplum, ut dubitare liceat, " an Christianam veritatem illius " mores magis exornent, an scripta " (perpetua vita semper dignissima) " magis defendant.

" Hunc talem tantumque virum " vobis, reverendi admodum Patres, " præsentamus, obnixe rogantes ut " confirmare dignemini."

tions to Dr. Waterland, if we limit them to those productions, however numerous and important, which he himself submitted to the public eye. The extent of his literary aid to others is known to have been very considerable. Dr. Wm. Berriman, Dr. Felton, Dr. Trapp, Mr. Wheatly, and Mr. John Berriman, acknowledge great obligations to him in their discourses for the Lady Moyer's Lecture. Mr. John Berriman, in particular, says, in his preface, "It was by the advice of this great man, I under-"took the examination of that text which is the subject of the "following papers; a work, which increased under my hands, "to a length far beyond what I, or even he, expected. By his "assistance it was carried on: he saw every sermon soon after "it was preached; I consulted him in every doubt and difficulty "that occurred; and when I had finished the course of sermons, "he was pleased to approve of them, and insisted upon a pub-"lication. I submitted to his judgment, though that made it "necessary to go over the whole work again; and I found it "would be proper to alter the form of it, and to make further "additions and improvements, the better to prepare it for the "press. In all which I had the benefit of his help and assist-"ance, and great part of it went through his hands in the form "wherein it now appears; as the whole had done if his illness "had not prevented."

Dr. Felton was also probably assisted by some suggestions, at least, of Dr. Waterland, in a series of sermons, published after his death, "On the Creation, Fall, and Redemption of Man." In the preface by the Editor, Dr. Felton's son, it is mentioned that the sermons were composed "in pursuance of a plan settled "between him and Dr. Waterland, which they *both* promised to "execute; and that he intended to have had them revised by "his learned friend, before they should appear in public." But Dr. Felton died before they had been submitted to Dr. Waterland; and Dr. Waterland died before Dr. Felton's son had the opportunity of shewing them to him.

How largely Mr. Lewis of Mergate was indebted to Water-

land, in his collections for the lives of Wicliffe and Pecock, and his history of English translations of the Bible, the letters to Mr. Lewis now first printed, most amply prove. Incidental mention is also made in those letters of his readiness to contribute similar aid to some other designs which Mr. Lewis had in contemplation. His letters to Dr. Grey shew that he was always active in promoting and encouraging the literary undertakings of that excellent writer, and assisting him in his researches. Many valuable hints and suggestions are found in his letters to Mr. Loveday, for the information of those who were engaged in the same controversies with himself against the Arian writers. Mr. Browne and Mr. Alexander were two of those who owed him obligations of this kind; the former, in his "Brief Observa-"tions" on two of Jackson's tracts; the latter, in his "Essay "on Irenæus," written to expose and refute some of Jackson's misrepresentations. Of these Dr. W. says, "both of them went "through my hands before they went to the press." Similar assistance was given to Mr. Horbery, in his "Animadversions "on Jackson's Christian Liberty asserted." Mr. Horbery, then a young man, was at that time personally unknown to Waterland; and the communication between them was carried on through the medium of Mr. Loveday. The talent and knowledge evinced in this excellent tract gained him the friendship of our author, through whose recommendation it seems probable that he was brought under the notice of Bishop Smalbroke, and promoted to a Canonry in the Cathedral of Lichfield[b].

From his letters to Dr. Grey we find that Dr. Waterland greatly contributed to the improved edition of Dr. Cave's "Historia Literaria," published by Dr. Wharton early in the year 1740; the editor of which acknowledges, in the preface,

[b] In Mr. Nicholls's Literary Anecdotes, vol. ix. pp. 561, 562, there is an interesting memoir of Mr. (afterwards Dr.) Horbery. His Sermons, published in one volume after his decease, are among the very best compositions of our English Divines. Besides these, his dissertation on the "Eter-"nity of future Punishments," and the tract here mentioned against Jackson, are the chief, if not the only publications known to be of his writing. But he is said to have left a large collection of sermons, which have fallen into different hands.

the benefit derived from his encouragement and advice[c]. His collections for the improvement of Mr. Hearne's edition of Robert of Glocester were also very extensive; but not being made till after the edition was published, he forbore, from motives of delicacy, communicating them to Mr. Hearne himself.

Dr. Fiddes, another author of considerable distinction, was similarly indebted to Dr. Waterland. To the first part of his "Body of Divinity," book iv. ch. 1, is subjoined the following note:—"In justice to my very worthy and learned friend, Dr. "Waterland, Master of Magdalen college in Cambridge, I think "it here incumbent upon me publicly to acknowledge, that I "owe in a manner the whole exposition of the two first articles "of the Creed to the papers he was pleased to favour me with. "Yet I have taken the liberty allowed me, to his disadvantage, "I confess, of expressing myself ordinarily in my own way, and "even of inserting some few things, which I apprehended might "not be altogether unuseful. Though I have been less injurious "to him, in both these respects, upon the subject of the Trinity; "to which he has applied his thoughts with so great care and "accuracy, and to so excellent a purpose[d]." These two articles of the Creed extend through upwards of an hundred folio pages; nearly the whole of which, according to this statement, are to be ascribed to Dr. Waterland.

The translation of Archbishop King's "Essay on the Origin "of Evil" by Mr. Law, (afterwards Bishop of Carlisle,) is dedi-

c "Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum "Historia Literaria postremis olim "clarissimi autoris cura limata, "atque quarta fere parte aucta, prelo- "que destinata, jam tandem tibi, "Lector benevole, exhibetur. The- "saurum accipe nunc locupletis- "simum, studiosorum votis diu mul- "tumque expetitum, in lucem demum "a tenebris, quibus obductus per "viginti et sex annos delituerat, eru- "tum, humanitate testamenti Caveani "Curatorum perquam benevola, V. "insuper cl. DAN. WATERLAND, "S. T. P. Canonici Windesoriensis, "hortatu et consiliis sacrosanctæ Ec- "clesiæ et Reipublicæ literariæ usibus "perennibus consecratum." *Præf.* p. 1.

d Vol. i. p. 330, folio edition, 1718.

[illegible] to Dr. Waterland. In the Dedication the translator speaks of Dr. W. as "a person eminent for a thorough knowledge of these subjects, confessedly an able judge, an upright defender, a bright example of religion both revealed and natural; who is zealous to assert the truth and enforce the necessity of the principal doctrines and institutions of the one, as well as to establish the true ground and fundamental principle, and fix the proper limits of the other; and, above all, who has always the courage to maintain these great truths, howsoever unfashionable or unpopular they may be sometimes made." He adds, "These, Sir, are very obvious reasons for my being ambitious to prefix your name to the following work, and endeavouring to recommend it to the favour of one to whom the author would have been desirous to approve himself. It is with pleasure also that I take this opportunity of declaring as well my sense of the great benefits that attend the perusal of your writings, which must give equal warmth and conviction to all who have the least concern for religion; as my experience of that candid condescension and communicative temper, which is ready to encourage and instruct every young inquirer after truth." From the concluding sentence of this paragraph it may be inferred, that Dr. W. was not backward in assisting his younger friend by his advice, at least, in this publication; besides the valuable addition he made to his other work on the "Ideas of Time and Space," by the "Dissertation on the "argument *a priori*," already mentioned.

Dr. Webster, an author much less generally known, published in the year 1735, a translation of Maimbourg's "History of "Arianism;" a work, undertaken (as he states in the title-page and preface) "at Dr. Waterland's request." It had been begun by Dr. Herbert, who was concerned in the translation of Fleury's Ecclesiastical History; but was suspended for a considerable time, until Webster was induced, chiefly by Dr. Waterland, to complete it. Waterland's assistance, however, in this work, does not appear to have extended beyond that

of encouraging an author who continually laboured under pecuniary distresses, and who without such aid would not have had the means of rendering himself useful to the public[e].

Thus actively was Dr. Waterland employed, not only in the duties of the important stations he filled in the Church and in the University, but also in literary pursuits of various kinds, and in befriending the labours of others for the general good. By these services, he more than repaid the attentions of those to whom he owed his promotion; and his claims to public remuneration increased rather than diminished, as he advanced to greater eminence.

This was not unobserved by those who had the disposal of the highest stations in the Church. It was undoubtedly intended to elevate him to the episcopal bench. Mr. Seed says, "he might have been advanced much higher by the recommen-"dation and interest of that very excellent Prelate, who, in "the opinion of every true friend to the Church, deservedly "fills the highest station in it[f]." This is explained, in the Biographia Britannica, to have been the actual offer of the Bishopric of Llandaff; which, however, he declined accepting. The date of this offer is not mentioned. But, comparing that of the Archbishop's promotion to the Metropolitan See with those of the vacancies in the See of Llandaff which occurred during Waterland's life, the offer must have been made either at the time when Mr. Mawson accepted it, in December 1738, or when Dr. Mawson was translated from thence to Chichester, in May 1740. Whether he declined this honour, as he had that of the Prolocutorship, from sedentary

[e] Webster had undertaken to add, as an appendix, an account of the *English* writers in the Socinian and Arian controversies. But this part of the design failed for want of encouragement: and instead of it was substituted a short "history of So-"cinianism," chiefly from Lamy; the 27th chapter of which gives an account of its progress in England. Webster prefixed also to this work two "Dissertations" of his own; one concerning "the nature of error in "speculative doctrines," in answer to Sykes's tract on the "Innocency of "Error;" the other on "the nature "and importance of the Trinitarian "doctrine," against a discourse of Chubb's on "Persecution."

[f] Archbishop Potter.

habits of life, and a state of health (as he conceived) unsuitable to the station, does not appear. Probably, he contemplated such an elevation in the Church, if not with apprehensions of its difficulties and dangers, yet with a disinclination to relinquish the comparatively easy and tranquil enjoyments of literary labours; and, perhaps, with that diffidence of his own powers, which none but himself would have allowed to be well-founded[g]. Be that as it may, the determination, however wise and prudent with regard to himself, could not but be felt by the real friends of the Church as a matter of deep regret. The accession of such a man to the episcopal bench would at any time have been highly valuable; and more especially so, when many even of the Clergy of our Church seemed disposed to halt between the different opinions which the spirit of controversy had spread among them. His advancement to the mitre, at such a crisis, might have done much to fix the wavering, to fortify the irresolute, and to uphold those who were disposed to adhere to their profession with a well-regulated zeal.

But the labours of this distinguished ornament of his profession were not to be of much longer duration. In the summer of 1739, we find him occupied at Cambridge, as member of a Syndicate for revising and correcting the list of Benefactors to the University. At Easter in the following year he delivered his last Charge to the Clergy of the Archdeaconry of Middlesex; and from that time to July of the same year, he was again stationary at Cambridge, in the enjoyment of those rational pleasures which he so well describes in the last of the letters to Mr. Loveday. The letter is dated July 6th, 1740. "It will not be long," he says, "before I "must return to Twickenham, to stay there a month or two, "in the neighbourhood of the town. In the mean season, I "am here, in an agreeable situation, amidst plenty of books,

[g] Possibly also, (if we may judge from a witticism related of him respecting the scanty revenues of the See of Llandaff,) *prudential* motives of another kind might have their influence upon his decision.

"printed and manuscript, entertaining myself, and serving "distant friends in a literary way. We have lately lost here "an excellent man, who lived and died in that pleasurable kind "of toil: I am just come from the hearing a fine panegyric "of him from St. Mary's pulpit. Mr. Baker is the person "I mean; as you would have imagined, without my naming "him. He lived to a great age, but so lived as to make it "necessary for those he leaves behind him, to think he died "too soon." From the tenor of this cheerful letter, it could little be expected how soon the latter part of the concluding sentence would become still more applicable to himself. But not long after his Easter Visitation in this year, "a complaint "which he had many years too much neglected, (the nail grow-"ing into one of his great toes) obliged him in July to call in "the assistance of a surgeon at Cambridge, (Mr. Lunn,) under "whose hands finding no relief, and his pain still increasing, "he removed to London, and put himself under the care of "Mr. Cheselden. But it was now too late; a bad habit of "body, contracted by too intense an application to his studies, "rendered a recovery impossible; and after undergoing several "painful operations, to which he submitted without reluctance, "and bore with an exemplary patience, every thing tending to "a mortification, he expired with the same composure that he "had lived, December 23d in that year[h]."

Connected with this concluding part of our author's history, is a pitiful attempt of his adversaries, to circulate an anecdote, which, whether well-founded or not, would be unworthy of notice, had not such men as Pope, and Warburton, and Middleton, thought fit to comment upon it with an air of serious

[h] "Biographica Britannica." The same, in substance, is the account given by Mr. Cole, in a note to one of Dr. Waterland's letters to Dr. Grey; adding, that he thinks he died at Cambridge, where he had been for a long time attended by Cheselden. In a subsequent memorandum, however, Mr. Cole says, "he was attended "here at Cambridge by the famous "Mr. Cheselden for many days from "London: and removing from Cam-"bridge to *Twickenham* for change "of air, died *there*." He adds, "Mr. Cheselden attended for many "days, at a great expense, and with "Dr. Plumptre, the Professor of "Physic, attended him to Town."

animadversion. The story is related with unfeeling levity, and in the coarsest terms, in Middleton's 10th letter to Warburton[i], dated January 8, 1740–1, a fortnight only after Waterland's death. "The Church," he says, "has received a "great loss by the death of Dr. W——d. I cannot say, an "irreparable one, whilst C——n lives[k]; to whom he has "left some unfinished papers on 'Infant Communion,' and "wisely ordered all the rest to be burnt; he has bequeathed "likewise to the College, such of his printed books, as they "find scribbled by his own hand, for such, I hear, is his "own description of them. By the silence of the public "papers, upon the fall of so eminent a luminary, we are to "expect, I imagine, in a proper time, some laboured panegyric, "from a masterly hand. Though the great *Hooker* seems to "have exhausted himself, in an effort of the last week, to do "justice to the character of the excellent *Eusebius*, who is "preparing to give the *coup de grace* to that subtle and in-"genious, but infamous writer, the *Moral Philosopher*. But as "to W——d, whenever they think fit to oblige the public with "his life, they will not forget one story, I hope, which is truly "worthy of him, shews the real spirit of the man, and which "I can venture to tell you on good authority." Then follows the story; which, divested of the grossness of the narrative, and the adventitious circumstances probably engrafted upon it by the narrator himself, is simply this;—that, on his way to London with Dr. Plumptre and Mr. Cheselden, Dr. Waterland

[i] Middleton's Miscellaneous Works, vol. i. p. 404, 8vo. edit.

[k] Dr. Chapman is, doubtless, here meant, the author of "Eusebius," in answer to the "Moral Philosopher," and of other learned works; to whom, however, Waterland's papers were *not* left: neither had Waterland ordered all his other papers to be burnt, since Mr. Clarke, the editor of his posthumous Sermons and of his treatises on Justification and Infant Communion, expressly states that these were consigned to *his* care (not to Dr. Chapman's) for publication. Nor were his printed books, with his marginal notes, bequeathed to the College, only two or three having yet been found there. The rest fell into different hands, being probably sold, among the rest of his books, by public auction; and the greater number of them are now in Rawlinson's collection in the Bodleian Library. So inaccurately was Middleton informed respecting the man whom he thus treats with an affectation of contempt. "The great *Hooker*," here ludicrously spoken of, was Dr. William Webster, editor of the "Weekly Miscellany," published under the fictitious name of *Richard Hooker, Esquire*.

found it necessary to send for an apothecary in a town through which he passed, for some medical assistance; that the apothecary, mistaking the name of *Waterland* for *Warburton*, was overpowered by the supposed honour conferred upon him, and assured Dr. W.'s friends, then with him, "that he was not "a stranger to the merit and character of the Doctor, but "had lately read his ingenious book with much pleasure, "'The Divine Legation of Moses;'" that, upon this blunder being communicated to Waterland, he was "provoked by it "to a violent passion," called the poor man ill names, and, notwithstanding Dr. Plumptre's endeavours to moderate his displeasure, would not suffer him to administer the necessary aid. Middleton then adds, "with such wretched passions and "prejudices did this poor man march to his grave; which "might deserve to be laughed at, rather than lamented, if "we did not see what pernicious influence they have in the "Church, to defame and depress men of sense and virtue, who "have had the courage to despise them."

This anecdote appears to have been highly relished by Warburton and Pope. Warburton must almost immediately have communicated it to Pope; who, in a letter dated February 4, 1740-41, says, in reply, "This leads me to thank you "for that very entertaining and, I think, instructive story "of Dr. W., who was, in this, the image of ***, who never "admit of any remedy from the hand they dislike. But I am "sorry he had so much of the modern Christian rancour; "*as I believe he may be convinced by this time, that the kingdom* "*of heaven is not for such.*"

Probably, the whole of this idle tale was much exaggerated by the wanton malice of the narrator. But take it as it is told; and what does it amount to? That Waterland thought meanly of a practitioner, whom he might suspect to be as ignorant in his own profession as in that in which he pretended to play the critic; and was as unwilling to trust to his skill in one case as in the other. And where is the wonder, where the extreme

offence, if, in a moment of pain and irritation, an expression or two of contempt escaped from his lips? Yet this is to be noted as a proof of "*the wretched passions and prejudices with* "*which he marched to his grave;*" and Mr. Pope gravely infers from it the *instructive* lesson, "*that the kingdom of heaven is* "*not for such.*" This too from Middleton, the bitterest of polemics; and from Pope, the most merciless and implacable of satyrists.

But whatever credit may be given to the story itself, the inferences thus uncharitably deduced from it, are completely overthrown by the testimony of those who knew him best to his exemplary and truly Christian deportment during this lingering and painful disease. In addition to what has just been cited from the Biographia Britannica, Mr. Seed, his intimate friend, and who was with him during the last scene of his illness, speaks thus; "The meek and candid Christian was not lost in "*the disputer of this world.* I never saw him in a different "humour, no, not even in his last illness. The same unaffected "cheerfulness, the same evenness and sedateness, which was "his distinguishing character, appeared from the first commence- "ment of our acquaintance to the last. Whatever painful opera- "tions were thought necessary, he submitted to them without "reluctance, and underwent them with patience and resignation. "He was very amiable in a domestic light. Though he felt "great uneasiness, he gave none but what arose from a fellow- "feeling of his sufferings. Even then, humane and benevolent "to all about him, but especially to her with whom he had "lived in an uninterrupted harmony for twenty-one years; "bringing forth valuable things out of the good treasures of his "head and heart; communicative of any thing that was good, "he would have engrossed nothing to himself, but his suf- "ferings; which yet he could not engross. For every good- "natured person that saw him could not but suffer *with* a man, "*by* and *from* whom they were sure to suffer nothing. The "same sound principles, from which he never swerved, and of "which he never expressed the least diffidence, which he had

" unanswerably defended in his health, supported and invigorated " his spirits during his sickness: and he died, a little before his " entrance on his 58th year, with the same composure with " which he lived; and is now gone to offer up to God a whole " life laid out, or rather worn out, in His service." Such was the man, whom his opponents, in their eagerness to traduce his memory, hesitated not to represent as unfit to enter into the presence of his Maker.

Dr. Waterland's remains were interred, according to his own request, in the collegiate church, or chapel royal of St. George, at Windsor, in one of the small chapels on the south side called Bray's chapel, under a plain black marble slab, bearing his arms, with this inscription, *Daniel Waterland, S. T. P. Hujus Ecclesiæ Canonicus, ob. Decemb.* xxiii. MDCCXL. *ætat.* LVIII. His widow survived him many years. Her name was Jane Tregonwell, second daughter of John Tregonwell, Esq. of Anderston in Dorsetshire, of an ancient and highly respectable family, and lineally descended from Sir John Tregonwell, who died in the reign of Henry the Eighth. Her mother was Lewes, daughter of Lady Beauchamp[1]. She was married to Dr. Waterland in the year 1719, and died December 8th, 1761. They left no issue. Dr. Waterland's will throws no further light upon the circumstances of his own or of Mrs. Waterland's family, nor is it of sufficient interest to be here inserted. It bequeaths the whole of his property to her, and speaks of her in terms of the tenderest regard and affection.

[1] See Hutchins's "History of Dor- " setshire," vol. iv. p. 210, where the pedigrees of the Tregonwells of Milton and Anderston are given. This account is also confirmed by Mr. John Tregonwell King, now of Blandford, Dorset, whose father was nephew to Mrs. Waterland. In the Biographia Britannica, her name is said to have been *Anne Tregonway:* and Mr. Cole says she was a *Baronet's* daughter; neither of which statements is quite correct.

Mr. Tregonwell King's father had in his possession portraits of Dr. and Mrs. Waterland. That of Dr. Waterland he gave to a nephew of the Doctor, either his brother's or his sister's son; concerning whom fruitless inquiry has been made, in the hope of obtaining leave to have an engraving taken from the portrait for this edition of his Works. That which is now prefixed is copied from a good mezzotinto print by Faber, after the original picture, which was by Philips.

Of Dr. Waterland's other relations little can now be ascertained. His brother Dr. Theodore Waterland was admitted at Clare Hall, May 1699, commenced B.A. 1702, was elected Fellow of Clare Hall, March 1705-6, commenced M.A. 1706, vacated his Fellowship, January 1713-14, on being elected Fellow of Magdalene College, where he continued, holding successively the offices of Dean, President, and Bursar, till the year 1724. In 1720, he was presented to the Rectory of Stanton in Cambridgeshire; and towards the latter end of 1731, to the Rectory of St. Benet Fink in the city of London. This latter benefice is in the patronage of the Dean and Chapter of Windsor, and probably was given him by his brother as an option at his disposal. He preached the Lady Moyer's Lectures in 1734-35, but did not publish them. His only publication was an Accession Sermon preached at Cambridge in 1716.

Mr. Cole mentions another Dr. Waterland, also of Magdalene College, and afterwards Prebendary of Bristol, and Rector of Wrington in Somerset. Perhaps this was Henry Waterland, who was of Magdalene College, LL.B. 1726, and LL.D. 1743. Two persons of this name, besides Dr. Waterland's father, are found in the College books; one, the son of Henry Waterland, of Heddon or Heydon, in Yorkshire, who entered June 1721, was elected Scholar in 1722, and Fellow in 1726; the other, son of the Rev. Henry Waterland of Wrington in Somerset, who was admitted Pensioner in 1748-9, and Scholar in 1750. The former of these seems to be the Dr. W. whom Mr. Cole speaks of; and perhaps the latter was his son. But how they were related to Dr. Daniel Waterland, does not appear[m].

[m] In the Gentleman's Magazine for August 1752, occurs the death of the abovementioned —— Waterland, Esq. of Heydon, Yorkshire, father of Dr. Henry Waterland. Also, in April 1755, the marriage of a Dr. Waterland, Prebendary of Bristol, to Miss Dorrington of Old Sudbury; and in September 1757, the death of Martin Waterland, of Warwick, Esq. aged 90. In October and December 1757, are mentioned the marriage of Samuel Waterland, Esq. of Virginia, and the death of Isaac Waterland, Esq. lately arrived from Jamaica. No relationship of our author to either of these individuals has been traced; though his personal intimacy with Mr.

The loss of so valuable a member of the Church could not but be deeply felt; more especially by those who, holding high and responsible stations in it themselves, looked to him for help and support upon any great emergency. Of these none seem to have more sensibly felt it, than the excellent Primate, Archbishop Potter. In his speech addressed to the Synod of the province of Canterbury, on December 10th. 1741, within a twelvemonth after Dr. Waterland's decease, is the following tribute to his memory:—" Singulorum immorari laudibus, nec instituti me " mei, nec temporis ratio patitur. Unum silentio præterire haud " sinit insigne illud, ante septennium jam novissime elapsum, " a compresbyteris nostris præstitum testimonium [n]; qui absen- " tem, ac eorum quæ hic agerentur fortasse nescium, consiliis " actisque suis præesse voluerunt;—virum, pæne omni laude " majorem, qui Catholicam de tribus in una eademque divina " substantia personis sententiam, (cæteros enim ejus seu labores, " seu triumphos, commemorare quid opus est?) eo acumine ac " judicio defendit, quo, a magno Athanasio ad hæc usque tem- " pora, vix alius fortasse quisquam Abiit autem ille, abiit, haud " annis forsitan, (quos enim annos tot tantisque meritis pares " existimare licuisset?) honoribus tamen plenus, atque iis etiam " quos modeste, ah! nimium modeste, recusavit. Abiit, inquam, " suo licet maxime commodo, nobis tamen semper deflendus, " semper desiderandus.". . . ." Videre mihi videor cedentes ad- " versarios, et, repugnantes licet atque invitos, haud obscure " tamen vim veritatis fatentes. Jam certe tantum non obmutuit " Ariana impietas, quæ aliquot abhinc annis tam insolenter se " extulerat ut, vano licet augurio, palam jactare non vereretur, " brevi temporis spatio haud plures reperiundos fore qui Nicæ- " nam fidem, quam qui obsoleta quædam Calvini dogmata, de- " fenderent."—The allusion to the honours which Waterland had *too modestly refused*, confirms the statement that the offer

Blair, Ecclesiastical Commissary at Virginia, to whose sermons he wrote the preface, may, perhaps, warrant a conjecture that he had some family connections in that country.

[n] The nomination of Waterland to the Prolocutorship of the Lower House of Convocation, in 1734.

of a bishopric had been made to him, and that nothing but his own diffidence, or disinclination to encounter the trials and difficulties of such a station, prevented its being carried into effect.

Other testimonies of a similar kind have already been produced, tending to prove that Dr. Waterland stood high in the esteem of men of the first character and station in the Church and in the University, and at a period when literature and theology might boast of some of their brightest ornaments. We find him the associate or the correspondent of Bentley, Sherlock, Law, Jenkin, Grey, Baker, Lewis, and Chapman, at Cambridge; of Wheatly[o], Felton, Horbery, and Hearne, at Oxford; patronized or eulogized by Archbishops Potter and Dawes, and by Bishops Robinson and Gibson; and conversant with the most distinguished Divines in or near the metropolis. We find also, that even among such men as these, an extraordinary degree of deference seems to have been paid to his judgment, and the greatest confidence placed in his ability to take the lead, when matters of the first importance to the interests of religion and of learning were at issue. To have been thus foremost in the field, where men of ordinary talents and attainments could hardly have found means of being distinguished, is an indication of superiority requiring no other evidence to support it. The maxim, *noscitur a sociis*, never could have been more honourably applied.

But a man may be known, and the strength of his character tried and proved, by his opponents, as well as by his friends and associates. Dr. Waterland's opponents ranked high in the literary world; and although occasionally some friends stood forth in his support, he, for the most part, relied upon his own strength to resist the host that assailed him. He had to defend himself successively against Clarke, Whitby, and Sykes, men

[o] Mr. Wheatly was for some time his Curate at St. Austin's, London.

of distinguished ability and reputation; to say nothing of Jackson, whose attacks, though feebler, were more malignant and persevering. With Middleton, indeed, he did not directly contend; the blow aimed at him from that quarter being so effectually repelled by Dr. Pearce and others, as to leave him nothing to fear from such an adversary. In his disquisitions on the Eucharist, he stood opposed, not only to Sykes and Hoadly, upon the more general view of the subject, but also, upon some subordinate points, to Brett and Johnson; men, whose depth of learning and great theological attainments were rendered still further respectable, by that reverence for Scripture and antiquity, which no one knew better how to appreciate, or more zealously contended for, than Waterland himself.

The part which the very learned, but very eccentric Mr. Whiston took in the Arian Controversy, hardly brought him into contact with Dr. Waterland; his chief writings on that subject having appeared before Waterland took any part in it. But his zeal in the cause continued to the end of his life; and as he lived to so advanced an age as to be the survivor of our author, he could not be an indifferent observer of his labours. He appears, however, to have had much respect for Dr. W. as an open and ingenuous controversialist; though occasionally he imputes to him conduct not very consistent with such a character, and even challenges him to "lay his hand upon his "heart, and honestly declare whether he *bona fide* believed "what he had subscribed[p]." Elsewhere he insinuates, that Waterland could hardly but have suspected that the Athanasian doctrine was not the doctrine of the primitive ages; and after relating the story already mentioned respecting his opinion of the genuineness of 1 John v. 7, he adds, that he does not think Waterland ever quotes that text as genuine, and commends his omission of it as a singular instance of *honesty* and *impartiality* in so zealous and warm a Trinitarian[q]. In a subsequent part of the work[r], he styles Waterland "the grand antagonist of Dr.

[p] See his Life of Dr. Clarke, p. 102. [q] Ibid. p. 101. [r] Ibid. p. 130.

" Clarke, Mr. Jackson, and Dr. Sykes;" also, " one of the *most* " *learned*, and, he is willing to hope, the *last learned* supporter " of the Athanasian heresy."

It is difficult to account for the personal enmity which Warburton seems to have borne to Waterland. In Mr. Nicholls's " Literary Anecdotes," vol. v. p. 415, a fragment of Warburton is quoted from Maty's Review, in which, after commending some act of generosity and charity by Middleton, he says, " What think you of this? I think it more edifying than all " Waterland's books of controversy.

> " For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight;
> " His can't be wrong, whose life is in the right."

In the preface to his first edition of the 4th, 5th, and 6th, books of the " Divine Legation," he observes, that " he had to " do with men in authority; appointed, if you will believe them, " inspectors general over clerical faith: and they went forth in " all the pomp and terror of *inquisitors*, with *suspicion* before, " *condemnation* behind, and their two assessors, *ignorance* and " *insolence*, on each side." To this he subjoins, in a note, the names of " Webster, Venn, Stebbing, *Waterland*, and others." This gross personality, against an author who had taken no part in the controversy concerning the " Divine Legation," proceeded, perhaps, from a surmise, whether well or ill-founded, that Waterland had encouraged some of his opponents, and *Webster* in particular, (whom Warburton at all times speaks of in unmeasured terms of obloquy and contempt,) in their censures of that celebrated work. It is probable also, that Middleton did all in his power to increase this animosity on the part of Warburton.

Those writers of inferior note who ranged themselves among Waterland's opponents are scarcely deserving of notice. With the exception of Emlyn, one of the most respectable defenders

of Arianism, and of Chubb and Morgan among the Deists, few of their works outlived the brief existence of the most worthless pamphlet. Among other assailants of this description, the writer of the "Old Whig," a periodical paper devoted to the dissemination of libels and insults on the established Church, occasionally poured forth such calumnies and invectives upon our author as *anonymous* writers only have usually the hardihood to publish.

Any annoyance, however, which might be felt from such mean attempts to depreciate his character or his labours, must have been more than compensated, to so well-constituted a mind, by the general and unqualified approbation of those whose good opinion he would be most solicitous to obtain. Nor was this recompense derived only from his fellow-labourers in his own country. No inconsiderable portion of it was freely and honourably contributed by *foreign* Divines of high reputation. In the "Bibliotheca Theologica" of Walchius, an eminent writer of the Lutheran Church, his works are mentioned with high encomiums. In the "Acta Eruditorum" he is occasionally referred to as a writer of acknowledged authority; and wherever the controversies in which he took a part are brought under consideration, his sentiments appear to have been regarded on the continent, as a criterion of the principles and doctrines of the Church of England[s].

It is unnecessary to expatiate more largely upon the justness of

[s] Walchius says of him, Bibl. Theol. tom. i. p. 239, "Inter Anglos "præcipue DAN. WATERLANDUS se "strenuum doctrinæ de Trinitate de-"fensorem exhibuit;" and again, tom. i. p. 967, "Præcipue DANIEL "WATERLANDUS laudabilem operam "in defensione dogmatis de Trinitate "ac Divinitate Jesu Christi contra "Arianos Anglos collocavit, ac nomen "suum reddidit celebre." Similar commendations are bestowed upon his "Critical History of the Athanasian "Creed," and his "Review of the "Doctrine of the Eucharist." "DAN. "WATERLANDI 'Critical History of "the Athanasian Creed,' quæ An-"glico sermone Cantabr. 1724, et "iterum ibidem 1728, lucem ad-"spexit seque omnibus hujus rei "peritis commendavit: immo inter "hujusmodi libros principatum con-"sequutus est." Tom. i. p. 312.—"Præ aliis memorare decet DAN. "WATERLANDUM, ejusque *recog-"nitionem doctrinæ de Eucharistia "ex Scriptura et antiquitate repe-"titam.*" Tom. i. p. 279.

our author's pretensions to that well-earned reputation which attended him while living, and still survives him; and the discerning reader will be sufficiently able to judge of those pretensions from the entire perusal of his works. The full extent, however, of the obligations which the Church owed, and still owes, to his labours, it is not easy to calculate: since besides their own intrinsic value, they have doubtless contributed greatly to form the principles, and to direct the judgment, of many distinguished writers who have succeeded him. No controversial writings, perhaps, have done more for the general good, in this respect. It is characteristic of them, that they treat of the most profound subjects, not only with great powers of reasoning and great extent of knowledge, but also with a perspicuity which never leaves it doubtful what impression was intended to be left upon the reader's mind, and with a just confidence in the strength of his cause, which sets the author above every unworthy artifice to persuade or to convince others.

In his controversy with the Arians, these qualifications were put to a severe test. The perplexities to be unravelled were many and intricate; and his opponents were admirably skilled in rendering them still more so. Though the appeal, on their part, for determining the points in dispute, was professedly made to *Scripture* only, and the authority of Fathers and of other Scripture-interpreters was treated as of little worth; yet difficulties purely of a *metaphysical* kind were continually suffered to prevail, to the rejection of the most simple and obvious meaning of Scripture, no less than to the perversion of its primitive expositors. Through these labyrinths, Waterland guided himself with admirable caution. That he was no inconsiderable adept in metaphysical science, is manifest. But he forbore to apply it, either in proof, or in elucidation, of the mysteries of revealed religion, further than might shew its insufficiency to invalidate the truths of holy writ. He betrayed no fondness for abstract hypotheses or theories, to accommodate such doctrines to philosophical views; but laid their foundation deep in the authority of *Revelation* only, and grounded them upon *faith* as

their main support. To discard metaphysics altogether from such subjects is, perhaps, impossible. But to attempt either to establish or to defend purely *divine* truth, upon principles of *human* science, is to forget that our knowledge of the truths themselves originates in another source; and that they can neither be proved, nor disproved, from any extrinsic information that can be brought to bear upon them. Yet upon such grounds rest most of the subtilties of Arian writers. Metaphysical definitions, of *unity*, *person*, *substance*, and *essence*, are assumed as postulates, to establish one hypothesis, or to refute another; as if it were demonstrable, that the mode of existence perceptible to our faculties in the visible world, must necessarily be the same with that which belongs to the world invisible; or that what we discern by the testimony of sense and experience, can be an adequate criterion of that which is capable of no such testimony. Against such perversion of human ingenuity Waterland constantly protested; and if he suffered himself at any time to pursue his opponents through these *by-paths* of theology, it was to shew how wide they lay of the real object of inquiry.

The same sound judgment and discrimination may be observed in Dr. Waterland's other controversial writings, as in those on the Trinity. He marks out a plain, straight line of proceeding, from which he suffers not any artifices of his opponents to divert him. Nor does he encumber his argument with unnecessary proofs, or unnecessary points of disputation. That great excellence in controversy, to know what may or may not be safely admitted, what may be put aside as irrelevant or superfluous, what is really conducive to the strength of the argument, or would only obscure and overload it;—is one of his most striking characteristics. Hence, notwithstanding the great length of some of his disquisitions, it would be difficult to point out any thing which might with advantage be spared. No author, perhaps, ever gave his adversaries less opportunity of retreating from their own ground, and taking up some other position which any inadvertency on his part might have opened to them.

It is true, indeed, that Dr. Waterland occasionally admits into the body of some of his larger works *collateral* discussions of considerable magnitude. But these will be found essentially to contribute to a clearer conception of the general subject, although they might without much difficulty be detached, as distinct treatises, from the works to which they belong. Thus, in the "Case of Arian Subscription considered," the 4th chapter might form a separate dissertation, on the question, *in what sense our Articles of Religion ought to be subscribed;* and from the "Sup-"plement" to that tract might be extracted a very satisfactory discussion of another important subject, *whether our Articles were framed with any bias in favour of Calvinistic tenets.* Portions might be selected also from his several vindications of our Lord's divinity, illustrative of certain points of general importance to every inquirer into sacred truth, independent of the controversies which gave rise to them; such, for instance, as the *subordination of the Son to the Father*, and the impossibility that the Son should be *Creator*, and yet a *creature* only. The same may be said of the 10th and 11th chapters of the "Critical His-'tory of the Athanasian Creed;" one containing a *Commentary on the Creed,* the other a *Vindication of its admission into our Liturgy.* In his "Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity" are two entire chapters forming complete dissertations; one, on *holding communion with those who reject any fundamental articles of faith;* the other, on *the use and value of ecclesiastical antiquity with respect to controversies of faith;* each of which, but especially the latter, may be read with peculiar advantage as distinct treatises. An entire essay might also be formed on *the comparative obligation of positive and moral duties,* from the 2nd and 3rd chapters of his tract on the "Christian Sacraments," with the 1st section of the "Supplement" to that tract. His "general preface" to the three parts of "Scripture Vindicated" is another instance of a brief but comprehensive essay, purely didactic, upon a subject highly interesting to every biblical student. It would be easy to select from his writings a volume of such treatises, upon some of the most useful points of theology, which would scarcely lose any of their effect by being so

detached from the respective works in which they are found; although those works would undoubtedly be much lessened in value, had they been omitted.

But, whatever value may be set upon these collateral disquisitions, the subjects of the works themselves in which they are interwoven are of the first importance. The author had to contend with the most subtle and imposing *heresy* that ever molested the Church; with the most plausible of *deistical* writers; and with men of a far different cast, whose piety, learning, and talents he greatly esteemed, but whom he considered as injudiciously upholding some untenable opinions, respecting the highest and most solemn of Christian ordinances. He glanced, moreover, at the rising fanaticism of a party, which has since spread to a much wider extent than could have been foreseen, and produced lamentable divisions in the Church, though originating probably in motives pure and irreprehensible. On all these occasions, he manifested an ardent zeal for the truth, under the discipline of a sober and well-regulated judgment, and of feelings equally remote from lukewarmness and extravagance. A vein of genuine piety runs through all his writings, unmixed with party-spirit, unostentatious, unassuming, neither lax nor bigoted, neither fanciful nor austere.

The *style* of our author's writings corresponds with these qualities. It is that of a writer less intent upon the *manner*, than the *matter* of his productions. Simplicity, perspicuity, and vigour are its main characteristics. There is an evident consciousness of the dignity of his subjects and the weight of his reasonings, which sets him above the desire of enhancing their value by adventitious ornaments, or elaborate attempts to please. He formed distinct conceptions of what he had to deliver, thought deeply yet clearly upon the point to be discussed, and clothed his thoughts in that diction which would best enable the reader to apprehend them with facility. There is also a spirit and vivacity in his writings, which, without any effort to attract, excites attention, and sustains it, more effectually than

could be done by artificial powers of composition. Not that his writings, however, are defective in that which might satisfy even fastidious critics. There is no want of ease and grace in the turn of his periods; of correctness in their structure; or of just discrimination in the selection of his terms and phrases. In these respects, Dr. Waterland will bear a comparison with the most approved writers of his time. But whatever excellencies he attained to of this kind, they appear to have been rather the result of natural good taste, than of studied acquirements.

The *temper* and *disposition* of an author will generally more or less betray itself in his writings, especially in those of a polemical cast. Judging of him by this criterion, we should say that Dr. Waterland was frank, open, and ingenuous; warm and ardent in his cause, lively and animated in his perceptions, sagacious in discerning any advantage which an unguarded adversary might afford him; but disdaining any unworthy artifices to carry his point. That no undue warmth, or vehemence of expression should occasionally escape him, it were too much to expect; nor, perhaps, could it with truth be affirmed of any controversial writer. But less intemperance of this kind, less acrimony and bitterness of spirit, is rarely, if ever, to be met with, in any one engaged in such a warfare, and with such opponents. And, after all, the sudden and transient emotions which contests of this kind are wont to excite even in the best-constituted minds, are far less indicative of a morose and uncharitable disposition, than the wily insinuations, the taunting sneers, and the cool malignant sarcasms of those, whose words, though they be "smoother than oil, yet be they very swords." To these odious weapons Waterland never had recourse. There was a generosity, a noble-mindedness in his disposition, which if it did not always restrain him from impetuosity, never suffered him to harbour a rancorous sentiment under the mask of affected candour and forbearance[t].

[t] Dr. Aikin, whose sentiments were certainly not in unison with Dr. Waterland's, acknowledges, in his Biography, that "as a controversialist, "though firm and unyielding, he is "accounted fair and candid, free from "bitterness, and actuated by no per-"secuting spirit."

Whatever imputations of bigotry or uncharitableness may, indeed, have been cast upon him by those who felt themselves unable to cope with him, the general good-humour and even suavity of his disposition are attested in the strongest terms by those who most intimately knew him. "He was," says Mr. Seed, "very tender of men's characters: he guided his words, "as well as regulated his actions, with discretion; and at the "same time that his sagacity enabled him to discover, his cha-"rity prompted him to *cover* and *conceal a multitude of faults.*" Again: "he was a man of cool wisdom and steady piety; fixed "in his principles, but candid in his spirit; easy of access, his "carriage free and familiar;—cautious, but not artful, honest, "but not unguarded; glad to communicate, though not am-"bitious to display his great knowledge.—He hated all *party* "as such; and would never have gone the length of any. He "was not one of those narrow-spirited men, who confine all "merit within their own pale: he thought candidly, and spoke "advantageously, of many who thought very differently from "him. He had nothing violent in his nature: he abhorred all "thoughts of persecution: cool and prudential measures entirely "suited his frame of mind. Those who entertain a different "opinion of him were strangers to him. Controversy had not "at all embittered, or set an edge upon his spirits."

This testimony is corroborated by what Mr. Clarke, the editor of his posthumous sermons, has more generally intimated of his excellent qualities; and also by the writer of his memoirs in the "Biographia Britannica." The latter states, that "this happy "disposition recommended him to the notice of the late Queen "Caroline, before whom, when Princess of Wales, he held some "conferences with Dr. Clarke; and though these dropped after "our author declared his full conviction of the truth and the "importance of the doctrine of the Trinity, and his resolution "to maintain it, yet there continued a personal friendly acquaint-"ance between them till the death of Dr. Clarke, who, in one of "his last journeys to Norwich, paid a visit to Dr. Waterland at "Cambridge." This anecdote is related upon the authority of

Dr. Theodore Waterland: and it is gratifying to know that two such men, steadfastly opposed to each other upon points which each regarded as of vital importance to religious truth, should have so far subdued any feelings of personal hostility, as to meet together upon terms of courtesy and friendship. With respect to Waterland, instances have already been mentioned of the esteem which some other of his opponents seem to have had for him; and of his readiness to return their good-will. His familiar letters, now first made public, will also be found to throw additional light upon these points of his character.

A few words only remain to be added, respecting the *arrangement* of our author's works adopted in the present edition.

To have assorted them strictly in *chronological* order, would have occasioned an inconvenient separation of some of the works from others connected with them in subject and design[u]. Some

[u] The following is the chronological order in which they were published.

1713. Assize Sermon at Cambridge.
1716. Thanksgiving Sermon on the Suppression of the Rebellion.
1719. Vindication of Christ's Divinity, being a Defence of some Queries, &c.
1720. Sermons at Lady Moyer's Lecture.
—— Answer to Dr. Whitby's Reply.
—— Letters to Mr. Staunton.
1721. Case of Arian Subscription.
—— Answer to some Queries printed at Exon.
—— Sermon before the Sons of the Clergy.
1722. Supplement to the case of Arian Subscription.
—— Scripture and Arians compared.
1723. Second Vindication of Christ's Divinity.
—— Sermon on the Trinity.
—— Thanksgiving Sermon on the 29th of May.
—— Sermon for the Charity Schools.
—— Critical History of the Athanasian Creed.
1724. Further Vindication of Christ's Divinity.
1730. Remarks on Dr. Clarke's Exposition of the Catechism.
—— Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian Sacraments.
—— Supplement to Ditto.
—— Defence of the Bishop of St. David's, in Answer to Jonathan Jones.
—— Advice to a young Student.

classification, therefore, which might obviate this inconvenience, was deemed expedient. Accordingly the five first volumes comprise the whole of his controversial and didactic writings in vindication of the doctrine of the *Trinity*, and his incidental controversies arising out of them; distributed, as nearly as circumstances would permit, in the order in which they were published. The sixth volume contains chiefly those which were written in defence of Christianity against *deistical* writers, with two or three short miscellaneous tracts, not sufficient to form a separate class. The seventh volume relates to the *Eucharist* only. The eighth comprises his *Charges* and *occasional Sermons.* These eight volumes include all which the author himself published. The ninth contains all which were published immediately after his death, by Mr. Joseph Clarke, conformably with Dr. Waterland's own directions; and the remaining volume, such of those which have since fallen into the hands of the present editors as, it was thought, might be acceptable to the public, and not tend to diminish the author's reputation*.

1730. Scripture Vindicated, 1st part.
1731. Christianity Vindicated against Infidelity, 1st Charge.
—— Scripture Vindicated, 2nd part.
1732. Christianity Vindicated against Infidelity, 2nd Charge.
—— Scripture Vindicated, 3rd part.
1734. Dissertation on the Argument *à priori*.
—— Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity.
1735. Discourse on Fundamentals, substance of two Charges.
1736. Doctrinal use of the Christian Sacraments, a Charge.
1737. Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist.
1738. The Christian Sacrifice explained, a Charge.
1739. Sacramental part of the Eucharist explained, a Charge.
1740. Regeneration stated and explained.
—— Preface to Mr. Blair's Sermons.
—— Distinctions of Sacrifice set forth, a Charge.

The reader will, perhaps, observe, in the foregoing list, an interval of five years, from 1724 to 1730, in which the author appears not to have committed any work to the press. It is probable, that during that interval he was much engaged in the duties of the Rectory of St. Austin's, which he held from 1721 to 1730; and that most of the excellent Sermons published after his death were composed about that time.

* In the present edition the following arrangement is made. The three first volumes comprise the whole of his writings on the doctrine of the Trinity. The fourth, those written in defence of Christianity, two or three

In conclusion, the writer of these memoirs might be inclined to bespeak the reader's indulgence towards their many imperfections, did he not know that such apologies are more likely to incur the censure of affectation, than to produce any favourable effect. He contents himself, therefore, with committing them to the fair and impartial judgment of those who know how to make allowance for the weight and difficulty of many of the subjects here brought under consideration, as well as for the disadvantages, which the writer is entitled to plead, of prosecuting his design under almost incessant avocations of public duty, or during indisposition equally unfavourable to constant application. In circumstances of more ease and leisure, there might have been strong inducements to have gone still further into the matters which the course of reading necessary to his purpose presented to him. But, probably, a majority of his readers will rather be of opinion that too *much* has been said, than too *little*. Be that as it may, if the sketch here offered should have the effect of inclining the theological student to bestow a proportionate attention upon the great author whom he has been desirous of bringing more distinctly into public notice; the result, he confidently anticipates, will be such as cannot but essentially promote the interests of pure and sound religion. It seems, indeed, scarcely possible, that any reader of solid understanding, not warped by prejudice, or attached to error by some more unworthy motive, should rise from a careful and attentive perusal of Dr. Waterland's writings, without feeling himself more strongly rooted in the faith, better able to vindicate its truth, and more internally satisfied in adhering to it as the guide of life.

W. LLANDAFF.

September 19, 1823.

short miscellaneous Tracts, and the "Review of the Doctrine of the "Eucharist." The fifth, his Charges and occasional Sermons, published by the author before his death, and those published after his death by Mr. Clarke. The sixth, those which fell into the hands of Bp. Van Mildert, and the Index.

A VINDICATION OF

CHRIST'S DIVINITY:

BEING A

DEFENCE OF SOME QUERIES,

RELATING TO

DR. CLARKE'S SCHEME OF THE HOLY TRINITY,

IN ANSWER TO

A CLERGYMAN IN THE COUNTRY.

Ἐγώ εἰμι Ἰησοῦς ὃν σὺ διώκεις· σκληρόν σοι πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζειν.

Acts ix. 5.

PREFACE.

THE following Queries were drawn up, a few years ago, at the request of friends; when I had not the least apprehension of their ever appearing in print, as might be guessed from the negligence of the style and composition. The occasion of them was this. A Clergyman in the country, well esteemed in the neighbourhood where he lived, had unhappily fallen in with Dr. Clarke's notions of the Trinity; and began to espouse them in a more open and unguarded manner than the Doctor himself had done. This gave some uneasiness to the Clergy in those parts, who could not but be deeply concerned to find a fundamental article of religion called in question; and that too by one of their own order, and whom they had a true concern and value for. It was presumed, that a sincere and ingenuous man (as he appeared to be) might, upon proper application, be inclinable to alter his opinion; and that the most probable way to bring him to a sense of his mistake, was to put him to defend it so long, till he might perhaps see reason to believe that it was not defensible. With these thoughts, I was prevailed upon to draw up a few Queries, (the same that appear now, excepting only some slight *verbal* alterations,) and when I had done, gave them to a common friend to convey to him. I was the more inclined to it, for my own instruction and improvement, in so momentous and important an article: besides that I had long been of opinion, that no method could be more proper for the training up one's mind to a true and sound judgment of things, than that of private conference in writing; exchanging papers, making answers,

replies, and rejoinders, till an argument should be exhausted on both sides, and a controversy at length brought to a point. In that private way, (if it can be private,) a man writes with easiness and freedom; is in no pain about any innocent slips or mistakes; is under little or no temptation to persist obstinately in an error, (the bane of all *public* controversy,) but concerned only to find out the truth, which, on what side soever it appears, is always *victory* to every honest mind.

I had not long gone on with my correspondent, before I found all my measures broken, and my hopes entirely frustrated. He had sent me, in *manuscript*, an Answer to my Queries; which Answer I received, and read with due care; promised him immediately a reply; and soon after prepared and finished it, and conveyed it safe to his hands. Then it was, and not till then, that he discovered to me what he had been doing; signifying, by letter, how he had been over-persuaded to commit his Answer, with my Queries, to the press; that they had been there some time, and could not now be recalled; that I must follow him thither, if I intended any thing further; and must adapt my *public Defence* to his *public Answer*, now altered and improved, from what it had been in the *manuscript* which had been sent me. This news surprised me a little at the first; and sorry I was to find my correspondent so extremely desirous of instructing others, instead of taking the most prudent and considerate method of informing himself. As he had left me no choice, but either to follow him to the press, or to desist, I chose what I thought most proper at that time; leaving him to instruct the *public* as he pleased, designing myself to keep out of *public* controversy; or, at least not designing the contrary. But, at length, considering that copies of my Defence were got abroad into several hands, and might perhaps, some time or other, steal into the press without my knowledge; and considering further, that this controversy now began to grow warm, and that it became every honest man, according to the measure of his abilities, to bear his testimony in so good a cause; I thought it best to revise my papers, to give them my last hand, and to send them abroad into the world; where they must stand or fall, (as I desire they should,) according as they are found to have more or less truth or weight in them.

Dr. Clarke has lately published a second edition of his Scripture Doctrine: where, I perceive, he has made several additions and alterations, but has neither *retracted* nor *defended* those parts, which Mr. Nelson's learned friend had judiciously replied to, in his True Scripture Doctrine Continued. I hope, impartial readers will take care to read one along with the other.

One thing I must observe, for the Doctor's honour, that in his new edition he has left out these words of his former Introduction: "It is "plain that every person may reasonably agree to such *forms*, when-"ever he can in any sense at all reconcile them with Scripture." I hope, none hereafter will pretend to make use of the Doctor's *authority*, for *subscribing* to *forms* which they believe not according to the *true* and *proper* sense of the words, and the *known* intent of the *imposers* and *compilers*. Such *prevarication* is in itself a bad thing, and would, in time, have a very ill influence on the *morals* of a nation. If either *state oaths* on the one hand, or *Church subscriptions* on the other, once come to be made light of, and *subtilties* be invented to defend or palliate such gross *insincerity;* we may bid farewell to *principles*, and *religion* will be little else but disguised *Atheism*.

The learned Doctor, in his Introduction, has inserted, by way of note, a long quotation out of Mr. Nelson's Life of Bishop Bull. He can hardly be presumed to intend any *parallel* between Bishop Bull's case and his *own:* and yet readers may be apt so to take it, since the Doctor has not guarded against it, and since otherwise it will not be easy to make out the pertinence of it. The Doctor has undoubtedly some meaning in it, though I will not presume to guess what. He [a] observes, "That there is an exact account given, what method that "learned writer (Bishop Bull) took to explain the doctrine of *justifica-"tion*, (*viz.* the *very same* and *only* method which ought to be taken in "explaining all other doctrines whatsoever,) how zealously he was "accused by many *systematical* Divines, as departing from the doctrine "and articles of the Church, in what he had done; how *learnedly* and "*effectually* he defended himself against *all* his *adversaries;* and how "*successful* at length his explication was, it being after some years "almost *universally* received." This account is true, but defective; and may want a supplement for the benefit of common readers, who may wish to know what that excellent method of Bishop Bull's was, by means of which his explication proved so *successful*, and came at length to be almost *universally* received. It was as follows:

1. In the first place, his way was to examine carefully into *Scripture*, more than into the *nature* and *reason* of the thing abstractedly considered. He pitched upon such texts as were *pertinent* and *close* to the point; did not choose them according to the *sound* only, but their *real* sense, which he explained *justly* and *naturally*, without any *wresting* or *straining*. He neither *neglected* nor *dissembled* the utmost force of any texts which seemed to make against him; but proposed them *fairly*,

[a] Introduction, p. 25, 26.

and answered them *solidly*; without any *artificial illusions*, or any *subtle* or *surprising* glosses.

2. In the next place, however cogent and forcible his reasonings from Scripture appeared to be, yet he *modestly* declined being *confident* of them, unless he could find them likewise *supported* by the general verdict of the *primitive* Church; for which he always expressed a most *religious* regard and veneration: believing it easier for himself to err in *interpreting* Scripture, than for the *universal* Church to have erred from the beginning. To pass by many other instances of his *sincere* and *great* regard to *antiquity*, I shall here mention one only. He [b] tells Dr. Tully, in the most serious and solemn manner imaginable, that if there could but be found any one proposition, that he had maintained in all his Harmony, repugnant to the doctrine of the *Catholic* and *primitive* Church, he would immediately give up the cause, sit down contentedly under the reproach of a *novelist*, openly *retract* his *error* or *heresy*, make a solemn *recantation* in the face of the Christian world, and bind himself to perpetual silence ever after. He knew very well what he said; being able to shew, by an historical deduction, that his doctrine had been the constant doctrine of the Church of Christ [c] down to the days of Calvin, in the sixteenth century.

3. Besides this, he demonstrated very clearly, that the most ancient and valuable *confessions* of the *Reformed Churches* abroad were entirely in his sentiments. He examined them with great care and exactness, and answered the contrary pretences largely and solidly.

4. To complete all, he vindicated his doctrine further, from the concurring sentiments of our own most early and most judicious *Reformers*: as also from the Articles, Catechism, Liturgy, and Homilies of the Church of England: and this with great accuracy and strength of reason, without the mean arts of *equivocation* or *sophistry*.

5. I may add, fifthly, that his manner of writing was the most *convincing* and most *engaging* imaginable: *acute*, *strong*, and *nervous*; *learned* throughout; and *sincere* to a scrupulous exactness, without *artificial* colours or studied *disguises*, which he utterly abhorred. The *good* and *great* man breathes in every *line*: a reader, after a few pages, may be tempted almost to throw off his guard, and to resign himself implicitly into so safe hands. A man thus qualified and accomplished, having *true* judgment to take the *right side* of a question, and *learning*, *ability*, and *integrity*, to set it off to the greatest advantage, could not fail of success; especially considering that the most judicious and learned of our Clergy, and those best affected to the Church of

[b] Bull. Apolog. contr. Tull. p. 7. [c] Bull. Apolog. contr. Tull. p. 50, 51.

England, (such as Dr. Hammond, &c.) had been in the same sentiments before; and Bishop Bull's bitterest adversaries were mostly *systematical* men, (properly so called,) and such as had been bred up (during the Great Rebellion) in the *Predestinarian* and *Antinomian* tenets, as Mr. Nelson[d] observes. There was another circumstance which Mr. Nelson also takes [e]notice of, namely, his writing in Latin: which shewed his thorough judgment of men and things. He would not write to the *vulgar* and *unlearned*, (which is beginning at the wrong end, and doing nothing,) but to the *learned* and *judicious;* knowing it to be the surest and the shortest way; and that, if the point be gained with *them*, the rest come in of course; if not, all is to no purpose. This became a man who had a *cause* that he could *trust to;* and confided only in the *strength* of his *reasons*. By such *laudable* and *ingenuous* methods, that excellent man prevailed over his *adversaries; truth* over *error, antiquity* over *novelty*, the *Church* of *Christ* over *Calvin* and his disciples. If any man else has such a *cause* to defend as Bishop Bull had, and is able to manage it in such a method, by shewing that it stands upon the same immovable foundations of *Scripture* and *antiquity*, confirmed by the concurring sense of the *judicious* part of mankind; then he need not doubt but it will prevail and prosper in any Protestant country, as *universally* as the other did. But if several of those circumstances, or the most *considerable* of them, be wanting; or if circumstances be contrary, then it is as *vain* to expect the like *success*, as it is to expect *miracles*. It must not be forgot, that the same good and great Prelate, afterwards, by the same *fair* and *honourable* methods, the same strength of reason and profound learning, gained as complete a victory over the Arians, in regard to the question about the faith of the Ante-Nicene Fathers: and his *determination*, in that particular, was, and still is, among men of the greatest learning and judgment, as *universally* submitted to as the other. His admirable treatise (by which "he being "dead yet speaketh") remains *unanswered* to this day, and will abide *victorious* to the end. But enough of this.

I am obliged to say something in defence of my general title, (A Vindication of Christ's Divinity,) because I find Mr. Potter, since deceased, was rebuked by an [f]anonymous hand for such a *title*. The pretence is, that our adversaries do not disown Christ's *Divinity*, as the *title* insinuates. But to what purpose is it for them to contend about a *name*, when they give up the *thing?* It looks too like mockery, (though they are far from intending it,) and cannot but remind us of, "Hail, "King of the Jews!" Nobody ever speaks of the *Divinity* of *Moses*, or

[d] Nelson's Life of Bull, p. 98. [e] Ibid. p. 94.
[f] Apology for Dr. Clarke's Preface.

of *magistrates*, or of *angels*, though called gods in Scripture. If Christ be *God*, in the *relative* sense only, why should we speak of his *Divinity*, more than of the other? The Christian Church has all along used the word *divinity*, in the strict and proper sense: if we must change the *idea*, let us change the *name* too; and talk no more of Christ's Divinity, but of his *Mediatorship* only, or at most, *Kingship*. This will be the way to prevent *equivocation*, keep up propriety of language, and shut out false *ideas*. I know no *Divinity*, but such as I have defended: the other, falsely so called, is *really* none. So much for the *title*.

In the *work* itself, I have endeavoured to unravel *sophistry*, detect *fallacies*, and take off *disguises*, in order to set the controversy upon a *clear foot*; allowing only for the *mysteriousness* of the subject. The gentlemen of the *new way* have hitherto kept pretty much in *generals*, and avoided coming to the pinch of the question. If they please to speak to the point, and put the cause upon a short issue, as may easily be done, that is all that is desired. I doubt not but all attempts of that kind will end (as they have ever done) in the clearing up of the truth, the disappointment of its opposers, the joy of good men, and the honour of our blessed Lord; whose *Divinity* has been the rock of offence to the "disputers of this world" now for 1600 years; always attacked by some or other, in every age, and always triumphant. *To him, with the Father, and the Holy Ghost, three Persons of the same Divine power, substance, and perfections, be all honour and glory, in all churches of the saints, now and for evermore.*

A DEFENCE OF SOME QUERIES

RELATING TO

DR. CLARKE'S

SCHEME OF THE HOLY TRINITY:

IN ANSWER TO

A CLERGYMAN IN THE COUNTRY.

Compare the following Texts.

I am the Lord, and there is none else, there is no God beside me, Isa. xlv. 5.

Is there a God besides me? yea, there is no God; I know not any, Isa. xliv. 8.

I am God, and there is none like me; Isa. xlvi. 9. Before me there was no God formed, neither shall there be after me, Isa. xliii. 10.

The Word was God, John i. 1.

Thy throne, O God, Heb. i. 8.

Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 5.

Who, being in the form of God, Phil. ii. 6.

Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, Heb. i. 3.

QUERY I.

Whether all other beings, besides the one Supreme God, be not excluded by the texts of Isaiah, (to which many more might be added;) and consequently, whether Christ can be God at all, unless he be the same with the Supreme God?

THE sum of your answer to this Query is, that "the texts "cited from Isaiah, in the first column, are spoken of *one Person* "*only*, (p. 34.) the Person of the Father, (p. 39.) And there-

" fore all other persons, or beings, (which you make equivalent,) " how divine soever, are necessarily excluded; and by conse- " quence our Lord Jesus Christ is as much excluded from being " the one Supreme God, as from being the Person of the " Father." (p. 40.)

You spend some pages in endeavouring to shew, that the Person of the Father *only* is the Supreme God; and that the Person of the Son is not Supreme God. But what does this signify, except it be to lead your reader off from the point which it concerned you to speak to? Instead of answering the difficulty proposed, which was the part of a respondent, you choose to slip it over, and endeavour to put me upon the defensive; which is by no means fair. Your business was to ward off the consequence which I had pressed you with, namely, this: That if the Son be at all excluded by those texts in the first column, he is altogether excluded, and is no God at all. He cannot, upon your principles, be the same God, because he is not the same Person: he cannot be another God, because excluded by those texts. If therefore he be neither the same God, nor another God; it must follow, that he is no God. This is the difficulty which I apprehend to lie against your scheme; and which you have not sufficiently attended to.

I shall therefore charge it upon you once again, and leave you to get clear of it at leisure.

I shall take it for granted, that the design and purport of those texts, cited from Isaiah, was the same with that of the *first Commandment;* namely, to draw the people off from placing any trust, hope, or reliance in any but God, to direct them to the only proper object of worship, in opposition to all things or persons, besides the one Supreme God. "Neither Baal nor " Ashtaroth, nor any that are esteemed Gods by the nations, " are strictly and properly such. Neither princes nor magistrates, " however called Gods in a loose metaphorical sense, are strictly " or properly such. No religious service, no worship, no sacri- " fice is due to any of them: I only am God, in a just sense; " and therefore I demand your homage and adoration." Now, upon your hypothesis, we must add; that even the *Son of God* himself, however divine he may be thought, is really no God at all, in any just and proper sense. He is no more than a *nominal* God, and stands excluded with the rest: all worship of him, and reliance upon him, will be idolatry, as much as the worship of

angels, or men, or of the Gods of the Heathen would be. God the Father he is God, and he only, and "him only shalt thou "serve." This I take to be a clear consequence from your principles, and unavoidable.

You do indeed attempt to evade it by supposing, that when the Father saith, "there is no God besides me," the meaning only is, that there is no *Supreme* God besides me. But will you please to consider,

1. That you have not the least ground or reason for putting this sense upon the text. It is not said, there is no other *Supreme* God besides me; but absolutely, *no other*.

2. If this were all the meaning, then Baal or Ashtaroth, or any of the Gods of the nations, might be looked upon as *inferior deities*, and be served with a subordinate worship, notwithstanding any thing these texts say, without any peril of idolatry, or any breach of the first commandment. Solomon might sacrifice to Ashtaroth and Milcom, to Chemosh and Moloch[a], provided he did but serve the God of Israel with sovereign worship, acknowledging him *Supreme*. And this might furnish the Samaritans with a very plausible excuse, even from the Law itself, for serving their own Gods in subordination to the one Supreme God; since God had not forbidden it.

3. You may please to consider further, that there was never any great danger of either Jew or Gentile falling into the belief of many Supreme Gods; or into the worship of more than one as Supreme. That is a notion too silly to have ever prevailed much, even in the ignorant Pagan world. What was most to be guarded against was the worship of inferior deities, besides, or in subordination to, one Supreme. It cannot therefore reasonably be imagined, that those texts are to bear only such a sense, as leaves room for the worship of inferior divinities.

The sum then is, that by the texts of the Old Testament it is not meant only, that there is no other *Supreme* God; but absolutely *no other*: and therefore our blessed Lord must either be included and comprehended in the one Supreme God of Israel, or be entirely excluded with the other pretended or nominal deities. I shall close this argument with St. Austin's words to Maximin, the Arian Bishop, who recurred to the same solution of the difficulty which you hope to shelter yourself in:

"Repeat it ever so often, that the Father is greater, the Son

[a] 1 Kings xi.

"less. We shall answer you as often, that the greater and the "less make two. And it is not said, Thy greater Lord God "is one Lord; but the words are, The Lord thy God is one "Lord: nor is it said, There is none other equal to me; but the "words are, There is none other besides me. Either therefore "acknowledge that Father and Son are one Lord God; or in "plain terms deny that Christ is Lord God at all[b]." This is the difficulty which I want to see cleared. You produce texts to shew that the Father *singly* is the Supreme God, and that Christ is excluded from being the Supreme God: but I insist upon it, that you misunderstand those texts; because the interpretation you give of them is not reconcilable with other texts; and because it leads to such absurdities, as are too shocking even for yourself to admit. In short, either you prove too much, or you prove nothing.

QUERY II.

Whether the texts of the New Testament (in the second column) do not shew that he (Christ) *is not excluded, and therefore must be the same God?*

THE texts cited, if well considered, taking in what goes before or after, are enough to shew that Christ is not excluded among the *nominal* Gods, who have no claim or title to our service, homage, or adoration. He is God before the world was, *God over all, blessed for ever,* Maker of the world, and worshipped by the angels; and therefore certainly he is not excluded among the *nominal* Gods, whom to worship were idolatry. But since all are excluded, as hath been before shewn, except the one Supreme God, it is very manifest, that he is the same with the one Supreme God. Not the same *Person* with the Father, as you groundlessly object to us, but *another* Person in the same Godhead; and therefore the Supreme God is more Persons than one. You argue, (p. 40.) that "if Christ be God at all, it unavoidably "follows, that he cannot be the same individual God with the "Supreme God, the Father." By *individual God*, you plainly

[b] Clama quantum vis, Pater est major, Filius minor, respondetur tibi; duo tamen sunt major et minor. Nec dictum est Dominus Deus tuus *major* Dominus unus est: sed dictum est Dominus Deus tuus Dominus unus est. Neque dictum est, non est alius *æqualis* mihi, sed dictum est, non est alius præter me. Aut ergo confitere Patrem et Filium unum esse Dominum Deum, aut aperte nega Dominum Deum esse Christum. *August.* l. ii. c. 23. p. 727.

mean the same *individual divine Person*, which is only playing upon a word, mistaking our sense, and fighting with your own shadow. Who pretends that the Son is the same Person with the Father? All we assert is, that he is the same Supreme God; that is, partaker of the same undivided Godhead. It will be proper here briefly to consider the texts, by which you attempt to prove, that the Son is excluded from being the one Supreme God: only let me remind you, once again, that you forgot the part you was to bear. Your business was not to *oppose*, but to *respond;* not to raise objections against our scheme, but to answer those which were brought against your own. You observe [c]from John viii. 54, Matt. xxii. 31, 32, and Acts iii. 13, that God the Father was the God of the Jews, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Very right. But how does it appear that the Son was not? Could you have brought ever a text to prove, that God the Son was not God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, I must then have owned that you had argued pertinently.

You next cite John xvii. 3, 1 Cor. viii. 6, Eph. iv. 6, to prove, that the Father is sometimes styled the *only true* God; which is all that they prove. But you have not shewn that he is so called in opposition to the Son, or exclusive of him. It may be meant in opposition to idols only, as all antiquity has thought; or it may signify, that the Father is [d]*primarily*, not *exclusively*, the only true God, as the first Person of the blessed Trinity, the Root and Fountain of the other two. You observe [e]that "in "these and many other places, the one God is the Person of the "Father, in contradistinction to the Person of the Son." It is very certain, that the Person of the Father is there distinguished from the Person of the Son; because they are distinctly named: and you may make what use you please of the observation against the Sabellians, who make but one Person of two. But what other use you can be able to make of it, I see not; unless you can prove this negative proposition, that no sufficient reason can be assigned for styling the Father the *only* God, without supposing that the Son is excluded. Novatian's remark upon one of your texts, John xvii. 3, ("Thee, the only true "God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent,") may deserve your notice. [f]He applies the title of the *only true God* to

[c] Page 34.
[d] Vid. Tertull. cont. Prax. c. 18.
[e] Page 34.
[f] Si noluisset se etiam Deum intel-

both, since they are joined together in the same sentence, and eternal life is made to depend upon the knowing of one, as much as of the other. He did not see that peculiar force of the exclusive term (*only*) which you insist so much upon. He knew better; being well acquainted with the language and the doctrine of the Christian Church. His construction, to speak modestly, is at least as plausible as yours. If you can find no plainer or clearer texts against us, you will not be able to help your cause. As to 1 Cor. viii. 6, all that can be reasonably gathered from it, is, that the Father is there emphatically styled *one God;* but without design to exclude the Son from being God also: as the Son is emphatically styled *one Lord;* but without design to exclude the *Father* from being Lord also[g]. Reasons may be assigned for the emphasis in both cases; which are too obvious to need reciting. One thing you may please to observe; that the discourse there, v. 4, 5, is about idols, and nominal gods and lords, which have no claim or title to religious worship. *These* the Father and Son are both equally distinguished from: which may insinuate at least to us, that the texts of the Old or New Testament, declaring the unity and excluding others, do not exclude the Son, "by whom are all things:" so that here again you have unfortunately quoted a passage, which, instead of making for you, seems rather against you. You have another, which is Eph. iv. 6, "One God and Father of all, who is "above all, and through all, and in you all." A famous passage, which has generally been understood by the [h]ancients of the whole Trinity. *Above all*, as Father; *through all*, by the Word; and *in all*, by the Holy Ghost. However that be, this is certain, that the Father may be reasonably called the *one*, or *only* God, without the least diminution of the Son's real Divinity: a fuller account of which matter you may please to see in Dr.

ligi, cur addidit, et quem misisti Jesum Christum, nisi quoniam et Deum accipi voluit. *Novat. Trin.* c. 24.

See the same argument illustrated and improved by the great Athanasius, *Orat.* iii. p. 558. vol. i. edit. Bened.

[g] Si enim, ut existimant Ariani, Deus Pater solus est Deus, eadem consequentia, solus erit Dominus Jesus Christus, et nec Pater erit Dominus nec Filius Deus. Sed absit, ut non sit, vel in Dominatione Deitas, vel in Deitate Dominatio. Unus est Dominus et unus est Deus: quia Patris et Filii Dominatio una Divinitas est. *Hieron. Comment. in Ephes.* iv. 5.

[h] Irenæus l. v. c. 18. p. 315. ed. Bened. Hippolytus contr. Noet. c. xiv. p. 16. Fabric. ed. Athanasius Ep. ad Serap. p. 676. Marius Victorin. B.P. tom. iv. p. 258. Hieronym, tom. iv. p. 1. p. 362. ed. Bened.

Fiddes's "Body of Divinity," vol. i. p. 383, &c. As to the remaining texts cited by you, some are meant of Christ as *Man*, or as *Mediator:* and those which certainly respect him in a higher capacity, may be accounted for on this principle, that we reserve, with the ancients, a *priority* of *order* to the Father, the first of the blessed Three.

This may serve for a general key to explain the texts mentioned, or others of like import. I cannot, in this place, descend to particulars, without running too far into the defensive; and leading the reader off from what we began with. Had you pleased to observe the rules of strict method in dispute, you should not here have brought texts to balance mine; but should have reserved them for another place. All you had to do, was to examine the texts I had set down in the second column; and to give such a sense of them as might comport with your own hypothesis, or might be unserviceable to mine. You should have shewn that John i. 1, Heb. i. 8, and Rom. ix. 5, may fairly be understood of a *nominal* God only; one that stands excluded, by the texts of the first column, from all pretence or title to religious homage and adoration: for, as I have before observed, he must either be entirely excluded, or not at all: and if he be not excluded, he is comprehended in the one Supreme God, and is one with him: or, at least, you should have set before the reader your interpretation of those texts, and have shewn it to be consistent with the texts of Isaiah. For example, take John i. 1:

"In the beginning was the WORD, and the WORD was with "the ONE SUPREME GOD, and the WORD was ANOTHER GOD inferior "to him, a CREATURE of the GREAT GOD: all things were CREATED "by this CREATURE," &c.

This interpretation, which is really yours, as shall be shewn in the sequel, is what you should have fairly owned, and reconciled, if possible, with the texts of Isaiah, (purposely designed to exclude all inferior, as well as coordinate Gods,) and particularly with Isaiah xliii. 10, "Before me there was no God formed, "neither shall there be AFTER ME:" words very full and expressive against any Creature-Gods. But, instead of this, you tell us, God could not be *with himself*, as if any of us said, or thought, that was St. John's meaning. Thus you industriously run from the point, misrepresent our sense, and artfully conceal your own. In this slight manner, you pass over the three first texts already mentioned; but you think you have some advantage of the

Querist, in respect of Phil. ii. 6, and Heb. i. 3, and, not content to say, that they come not up to the point, you are very positive, that "they prove the direct contrary to that for which they are "alleged;" and express your wonder, that "they should be "offered." Whether you really wonder at a thing, which no man who is at all acquainted with books and learning can wonder at; or whether only you affect that way of talking, I determine not; but proceed to consider what you have to offer against my sense of the two texts.

Upon Phil. ii. 6, you press me with the authority of Novatian; whom, I do assure you, I very much respect, as I do all the primitive writers. As to Novatian's interpretation of Phil. ii. 6, it shall be considered presently; only, in the first place, let me observe to you, that, as to the main of my argument, built upon that and other texts, he was certainly on my side. He [i] cites Isaiah xlv. 5, and understands it of God the Father; not so as to exclude the Son from being comprehended in the *one God*, but in opposition to false Gods only. He proves the divinity of Christ from his receiving worship of the Church, and his being every where present, [k] besides many other topics; and makes him [l] *consubstantial* with God the Father. This is as much as I mean by his being *one* with the *Supreme* God; and therefore I have nothing to fear from this writer, who agrees so well with me in the main, and cannot be brought to bear evidence against me, unless, at the same time, he be found to contradict himself. This being premised, let us now see what he says to the text above mentioned, Phil. ii. 6. "He saith of the Son," (I use your own words, p. 35,) "that though he was in the form "of God, yet he never compared himself with God his Father." You have translated the last words, as if they had run thus; *Deo, Patri suo.* The words are, "Nunquam se Deo Patri aut com-"paravit, aut contulit: Never compared himself with God the "Father." The reason follows, "Memor se esse ex suo Patre:

[i] Ego Deus, et non est præter me. Qui per eundem Prophetam refert: Quoniam majestatem meam non dabo alteri, ut omnes cum suis figmentis ethnicos excludat et hæreticos. Cap. iii. p. 708. See also the citation above, p. 279.

[k] Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus, cum hæc hominis natura non sit, sed Dei, ut adesse omni loco possit? Cap. xiv. p. 715.

[l] Unus Deus ostenditur verus et æternus Pater, a quo solo hæc vis Divinitatis emissa etiam in Filium tradita et directa rursum per *substantiæ communionem* ad Patrem revolvitur. Father is here styled emphatically the *one* God, but still comprehending, not excluding the Son, consubstantial with him. Ch. xxxi. p. 730.

"Remembering he was from his Father;" that is, that he was *begotten*, and not *unbegotten*. He never pretended to an *equality* with the Father, in respect of his *original*, knowing himself to be *second* only in order, not the *first* Person of the ever blessed Trinity. You may see the like expressions in [m]Hilary and [n]Phœbadius; who can neither of them be suspected of Arianizing in that point. You afterwards cite some other expressions of Novatian, particularly this: "Duo equales inventi duos Deos me-"rito reddidissent." Which you might have rendered thus: "Had they both been equal, (in respect of original, both unbe-"gotten,) they had undoubtedly been two Gods."

See the [o]whole passage as it lies in the author himself, and not maimed and mutilated as you quote it, from Dr. Clarke. There is nothing more in it than this, that Father and Son are not two Gods, because they are not both *unoriginated*: which is the common answer made by the Catholics to the charge of Tritheism; not only before, but after the Nicene Council; as might be made appear by a cloud of witnesses, were it needful. What you are pleased to call "a most strong testimony against "an absolute coequality," (meaning this passage of Novatian,) is, if rightly understood, and compared with what goes before and after, a most strong testimony of such a *coequality* as we contend for. And therefore Dr. Whitby, having formerly cited the whole paragraph, as a full and clear testimony of the Son's *real* divinity, concludes thus: The author, says he, in this passage, "[p]does, in the plainest words imaginable, declare that "Christ is God, *equal* to the Father in every respect, excepting "only that he is God *of God*." The doctor indeed has since changed his mind; and now talks as confidently the other way, upon [q]this very passage. Whether he was more likely to see

[m] Hilary Trin. l. iii. c. 4. p. 810. ed. Bened.

[n] Phœbad. p. 304.

[o] Si enim natus non fuisset, innatus comparatus cum eo qui esset innatus, æquatione in utroque ostensa, duos faceret innatos, et ideo duos faceret Deos. Si non genitus esset, collatus cum eo (qui) genitus non esset et æquales inventi, duos Deos merito reddidissent non geniti; atque ideo duos Christus reddidisset Deos, si sine origine esset, ut Pater, inventus, et ipse principium omnium, ut Pater, duo faciens principia, duos ostendisset nobis consequenter et Deos. Cap. 31. Conf. Hilar. de Trin. p. 1040. Neque ex innascibilitate innascibili coæqualem, sed ex generatione unigeniti non disparem.

[p] Ubi verbis disertissimis ostendit (Novatianus) Christum esse Deum, Patri æqualem paremque, eo tantummodo excepto, quod sit Deus de Deo. *Whit. Tract. de Ver. Chr. Deitate*, p. 67.

[q] Whitby, Disquisitio Modest. p. 164.

clearly then, or since, I leave to others to judge, who will be at the pains to compare his former with some of his later writings.

You have given us the sum of the 31st chapter of Novatian, "as it stands collected by the learned Dr. Clarke in his excellent "answer to Mr. Nelson's friend." You may next please to consult the no less excellent reply, by Mr. Nelson's friend, p. 170, &c., where you may probably meet with satisfaction.

But to return to our text, Phil. ii. 6. The words οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ, you translate; "He did not *affect*, "did not *claim*, did not *assume*, *take upon him*, or *eagerly desire*, "to be honoured as God." Afterwards, (p. 36.) "He never "*thought fit to claim to himself divinity*," or more literally, you say, "he never *thought the divinity a thing to be so catched at by him*, "*as to equal himself with God his Father*." This you give both as Novatian's sense, and as the *true sense* of the text. And you endeavour to confirm it from the authorities of Grotius, Tillotson, Whitby, and Clarke; who, by the way, are very different from each other in their interpretations of this place, hardly two of them agreeing together. [r]However, not to stand upon niceties, I may yield to you your own interpretation of this passage, "did not affect to be honoured as God;" for the stress of the cause does not seem so much to lie in the interpretation of those words, as of the words foregoing, viz. ὃς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων. "Who being *in the form of God*," that is, "*truly* God, (which "best answers to the antithesis following, the *form of a servant* "signifying as much as *truly* man,) and therefore might justly "have assumed to *appear as God*, and to be always *honoured as* "*such*, yet did not do it, at the time of his incarnation; but for "a pattern of humility, chose rather to veil his glories, and, in "appearance, to empty himself of them, taking upon him human "nature, and becoming a servant of God in that capacity," &c. What is there in this paraphrase or interpretation, either disagreeable to the scope of the place, or the context, or to the sober sentiments of Catholic antiquity, not only after, but before the Council of Nice; as may appear from the testimonies cited in the [s]margin? Now if this be the sense of it, which I might fur-

[r] I am persuaded that the words may very justly be translated; *he did not insist upon his equality with God, but condescended*, &c.

[s] Tertullian's recital of this text, and comment upon it, are worth remarking. Plane de substantia Christi putant et hic Marcionitæ suffragari Apostolum sibi, quod phantasma carnis fuerit in Christo, quum dicit, Quod *in effigie Dei constitutus non rapinam existimavit pariari Deo, sed exinanivit*

ther confirm by the authorities of Athanasius, Jerom, Austin, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Œcumenius, and others of the ancients, besides [t] Bishop Pearson and [u] Bishop Bull among the moderns, why should you wonder to find it again cited in the same cause, being so full and pertinent to the matter in hand? Next, we may proceed to the other text, which you as groundlessly pretend to be directly contrary to that for which it is alleged. It is Heb. i. 3: "Who being the brightness of his glory, and the "express image of his person," &c. Here you are so obliging as to cite only one passage out of Eusebius against me, I would say, for me. Eusebius, writing against the Sabellians, presses them with this text, and argues thus from it: "The image, and that "whereof it is the image, cannot both be the same thing, (in the "Sabellian sense,) but they are *two substances*, and *two things*, and "*two powers*:" from whence he rightly infers, or plainly means to do, that the *Father* is not the *Son*, but that they are *really* distinct. What is there in this at all repugnant to what the Querist maintains? The force of your objection lies, I suppose, in this, that Father and Son are called δύο οὐσίαι, δύο πράγματα, and δύο δυνάμεις, inconsistently, you imagine, with *individual* consubstantiality.

I will not be bound to vindicate every expression to be met with in Eusebius: but, allowing for the time when it was wrote, before the sense of those words was fixed and determined, as it has been since; there may be nothing in all this, which signifies more than what the Catholic Church has always meant by *two persons*; and what all must affirm, who believe a real Trinity. So [x] Pierius called Father and Son οὐσίαι δύο, meaning no more than we do by two distinct Persons: and Alexander Bishop of Alexandria, the first Champion for the Catholic cause against Arius, in his letter to Alexander Bishop of Constantinople, scruples not to call Father and Son[y] δύο

semetipsum accepta effigie servi, non veritate; *et similitudine hominis*, non in homine; *et figura inventus ut homo*, non substantia, id est, non carne.—— Numquid ergo et hic qua in effigie eum Dei collocat? Æque non erit Deus Christus vere, si nec homo vere fuit in effigie hominis constitutus. *Contr. Marc.* l. v. c. 20. p. 486. Non sibi magni aliquid deputat quod ipse quidem æqualis Deo, et unum cum Patre, est. *Orig. in Epist. ad Rom.* l. 5. Θεὸς μὲν κενώσας ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ. *Concil. Antioch. Labb.* vol. i. p. 848. Ὁ μονογενὴς τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος, Θεὸς ὑπάρχων ἐκ Θεοῦ, κεκένωκεν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν ἄδοξον ταύτην σάρκα ἠμπίσχετο. *Hippolytus*, vol. ii. p. 29. Fabric.

[t] On the Creed, Article 2.

[u] Def. Fid. N. 49. 70. Prim. Trad. p. 38. Qui unus locus, si recte expendatur, ad omnes hæreses adversus Jesu Christi Domini nostri personam repellendas sufficit. *Def. Fid.* p. 37.

[x] See Phot. Cod. 119. p. 300.

[y] Apud Theod. l. i. c. 4.

πράγματα; and Tertullian intimates that they are [z] *duæ res, sed conjunctæ;* and Methodius uses [a] δύο δυνάμεις, meaning two Persons. These or the like strong expressions, occurring in the Catholic writers, were only to guard the more carefully against Sabellianism, the prevailing heresy of those times. But after Arianism arose, there was greater danger of the opposite extreme: and therefore they began to soften this manner of expression, lest any should be led to think, that the Persons of the Trinity were so distinct as to be independent of, separate from, and aliene to each other. Thus instead of δύο φῶτα, which might be innocent before, and is used by [b] Origen, they chose rather commonly to say, [c] φῶς ἐκ φωτός: yet sometimes not scrupling the former way of expression [d]. Rather than say, *duæ essentiæ*, which might be liable to mistakes; they would say, *Essentia de Essentia*, as *Deus de Deo.* The design of all which was, so to assert a *real* distinction, as not to teach three absolute, independent, or separate substances; so to maintain the distinction of persons, as not to divide the substance. Three *real* Persons is what I, what every Trinitarian, what all sound Catholics assert. Now let us return to the text, Heb. i. 3. Having shewn you that Eusebius's comment is not pertinent to our present dispute, nor at all affects the cause that I maintain, which, I assure you, is not Sabellianism: now let me proceed a little further, to vindicate my use of that text; which, you pretend, is strong against me. Origen perhaps may be of some credit with you; and the more for being admired by the Arians, and much censured by many of the Catholics, but after his own times. [e] His comment, upon a parallel text to this, together with this also, is pretty remarkable. "If he (Christ) be the image of the *invisible*, the "image itself must be *invisible* too. I will be bold to add, "that since he is the resemblance of his Father, there could "*not have been a time when he was not.*" He goes on to argue, that since God is light, and Christ the ἀπαύγασμα, or shining forth of that light, quoting this text, that they could never have been separate one from the other, but must have been coeternal.

[z] Contr. Prax. c. viii. p. 504.
[a] Phot. Cod. 235. p. 137.
[b] Comment. in Joh. p. 70.
[c] See Athanas. vol. i. p. 553.
[d] Vid. Cyril. Alex. Thess. p. 110.
[e] Apud Athan. Decret. Syn. Nic. vol. i. p. 233.

[f] Dionysius of Alexandria, another Ante-Nicene writer, draws the very same inference from the same text. And Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, in his circular letter, [g] extant in Athanasius, makes the like use of it. The latter part of the text especially, the words, "express image of his person," were very frequently and triumphantly urged by the Catholics against the Arians: by [h] Alexander of Alexandria, [i] Athanasius, [k] Hilary, [l] Basil, [m] Gregory Nyssen, [n] Gregory Nazianzen, [o] Cyril, and others.

This may satisfy you, that it was neither strange nor new, to allege this text in favour of Christ's divinity. When you have any thing further to object, it shall be fairly examined. In the mean while, let it stand, to support the second query; which returns upon you, and expects a fuller answer. That it may come to you recommended in the best manner, and in the best company, I shall here subjoin the testimonies of the Ante-Nicene writers, all declaring that the Son is not excluded from being the *one God*, but is included and comprehended therein: that is, though the one God *primarily* denotes the Father, yet not *exclusively*, but comprehends the Son too. Now, as often as the primitive writers speak of Father and Son together, as the one God, in the singular, they bear witness to this truth. See the testimonies of Irenæus, Athenagoras, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, collected in [p] Dr. Fiddes's Body of Divinity; to which may be added, [q] Hippolytus, [r] Lactantius, and even Eusebius himself, who acknowledged [s] *one God in three Persons*, as Socrates informs us.

I proceed next to other testimonies more expressly declaring,

[f] Ἀπαύγασμα δὲ ὢν φωτὸς ἀΐδιον, πάντως καὶ αὐτὸς ἀΐδιός ἐστιν. ὄντος γὰρ ἀεὶ τοῦ φωτὸς, δῆλον ὡς ἔστιν ἀεὶ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα. *Apud Athanas. de Sent. Dionys.* p. 253.

[g] Πῶς ἀνόμοιος τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ πατρός. ὁ ὢν εἰκὼν τελεία καὶ ἀπαύγασμα τοῦ πατρός. *Apud Athanas.* vol. i. p. 399.

[h] Epist. ad Alexand. Theodor. p. 17.

[i] Orat. i. p. 424. de Synod. p. 743.

[k] De Trin. p. 975. 1085. 1159.

[l] Contr. Eunom. p. 28. 89.

[m] Ibid. p. 460. [n] Orat. 36.

[o] Dial. 5. De Trin.

[p] Vol. i. p. 387, &c.

[q] Οἰκονομία συμφωνίας συνάγεται εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν, εἷς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεός· ὁ γὰρ κελεύων πατὴρ, ὁ δὲ ὑπακούων υἱὸς, τὸ δὲ συνκατίζον ἅγιον πνεῦμα. Ὁ ὢν πατὴρ ἐπὶ πάντων, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς διὰ πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐν πᾶσιν. Ἄλλως τε ἕνα Θεὸν νομίσαι μὴ δυνάμεθα, ἐὰν μὴ ὄντως πατρὶ, καὶ υἱῷ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι πιστεύσωμεν. *Hippol. contr. Noet.* p. 15, 16. Fabric. edit.

[r] Lib. iv. c. 29.

[s] Ἕνα Θεὸν ἐν τρισὶν ὑπαστάσεσι. *Socr. E.H.* l. i. c. 23. p. 48.

that the Son is not excluded from being the one Supreme God, by the several texts of Scripture, which assert the unity; but is always understood or implied, as comprehended in the same one God. [t]Irenæus says, "that the Holy Scriptures declare "the *one* and *only* God, excluding all others, to have made all "things by His Word." Others are excluded, but not his *Word*, that is, *his Son*, by whom he made all things, as Irenæus constantly understands it. At other times, he says, "God "[u]made all things *by himself*; interpreting *himself*, by *his* "*Word* and by *his Wisdom*; that is, *his Son*, and the *Holy* "*Spirit*." Certainly, he could not think that God, in his declarations of the unity, meant to exclude what was so near to him, as to be justly (not in the Sabellian sense) interpreted *himself*. Many more passages of the like import might be cited from this primitive and excellent writer. I shall only add a [v]passage or two to shew, that he looked upon the Son as the *only true* God, as well as the Father. He observes, that the Holy Scriptures never call any person absolutely God or Lord, besides the *only true God*; and yet presently after takes notice, that both Father and Son are by the same Scriptures absolutely so called. See the place in the margin: for though *absolutely* be not there expressed, yet it is necessarily implied, and is undoubtedly the author's meaning.

We may go on to Tertullian, who is so full and clear to our purpose, that nothing can be more so. Out of many passages which might be cited, I shall here content myself with one out of his book against Praxeas. "[x]There is therefore one God

[t] Universæ Scripturæ——unum et solum Deum, ad excludendos alios, prædicent omnia fecisse per *Verbum Suum*, &c. l. ii. c. 27. p. 155. Bened. edit.

[u] Fecit ea per semetipsum: hoc est per Verbum et Sapientiam suam. Adest enim ei semper Verbum et Sapientia, Filius et Spiritus, per quos et in quibus omnia libere et sponte fecit, lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253.

[v] Nunquam neque Prophetæ neque Apostoli alium Deum nominaverunt, vel Dominum appellaverunt, præter verum et solum Deum. L. iii. c. 8. p. 182. Neque igitur Dominus, neque Spiritus Sanctus neque Apostoli eum qui non esset Deus, definitive et absolute Deum nominassent aliquando nisi esset vere Deus. L. iii. c. 6.

Now see what follows.

Utrosque Dei appellatione signavit Spiritus et eum qui ungitur, Filium, et eum qui ungit, Patrem. L. iii. c. 6. p. 180.

This Father goes on, in the same chapter, to produce several other instances from the Holy Scripture, to prove that the Son is called (definitively and absolutely) God. That is plainly his meaning, as any man may see by looking into the chapter. I may add, that he applies the title of Solus Deus to Christ. L. v. c. 17. p. 314.

[x] Igitur unus Deus Pater, et alius absque eo non est: quod ipse inferens,

" the Father, and there is none *other* besides him; by which he " does not mean to exclude the Son, but *another* God. Now the " *Son* is not *another* from the Father. Futhermore, do but " observe the drift and tendency of this kind of expressions, and " you will find, for the most part, that they concern only the " makers and worshippers of idols; that the divine unity may " exclude the multitude of false gods, while it includes the Son; " who, inasmuch as he is undivided and inseparable from the " Father, is to be understood as implied in the Father, though " he be not particularly named. Further; had he named the " Son in this case, it had been tantamount to separating him " from himself: suppose he had said, There is none *other* " besides me, except *my Son;* he would in effect have declared " him to be another, (or aliene,) by excepting him in that " manner out of others. Suppose the sun to say, I am the sun, " and there is not another besides me, except my own ray; " would not you have marked the impertinence; as if the ray " were not to be reckoned to the sun, as included in it?" Here you see plainly what Tertullian means; namely, that the Son is so much one with the Father, that he cannot be supposed to be excluded among other deities: he is not *another*, but *the same* God with the Father: and yet this he asserts in a dispute against Praxeas, one of the same principles, in the main, with Noetus and Sabellius: so careful was he not to run things into the opposite extreme. He takes care so to assert the Son to be the *same God* with the Father, as not to make him the *same Person:* and on the other hand, while he maintains the distinction of Persons, he does not forget to keep up the true Catholic doctrine of the unity of substance.

I shall next cite Athenagoras: this learned and judicious

non Filium negat, sed alium Deum. Cæterum alius a Patre Filius non est. Denique, inspice sequentia hujusmodi pronuntiationum, et invenias fere ad idolorum factitores atque cultores definitionem earum pertinere; ut multitudinem falsorum Deorum unio divinitatis expellat, habens tamen Filium quanto individuum et inseparatum a Patre, tanto in Patre reputandum, etsi non nominatum. At quin si nominasset illum, separasset, ita dicens, Alius præter me non est, nisi Filius meus. Alium enim etiam Filium fecisset, quem de aliis excepisset. Puta solem dicere: Ego sol, et alius præter me non est, ni radius meus; nonne denotasses vanitatem; quasi non et radius in sole deputetur. Cap. xviii. p. 510. Compare Irenæus, l. iv. c. 6. p. 234, 235. Non ergo alius erat qui cognoscebatur, et alius qui dicebat *nemo cognoscit Patrem*, sed unus et idem, omnia subjiciente ei Patre, et ab omnibus accipiens testimonium quoniam *vere* homo, et quoniam *vere* Deus——.

writer, having proved at large that there is but one God, the Father, and that the Christians acknowledged no other God; yet immediately adds, [y] νοοῦμεν γὰρ καὶ υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, cap. ix. p. 37. as much as to say, we comprehend and include the Son in that one God; we are always to be understood with this reserve, or [z] salvo, to the divinity of the Son; as does clearly appear from what follows in the same chapter, and in the next to it, where the Son is called [a] the Mind and Word of the Father, and declared to be [b] uncreated and [c] eternal. And in [d] another place he very plainly comprehends both in the *one God*. To avoid prolixity, I shall content myself with [e] referring only to the passages in others of the Ante-Nicene writers, leaving you to consult them at your leisure, if you can make any doubt of so clear a case. As to the Post-Nicene Fathers, Athanasius, Basil, the Gregories, Jerom, Austin, Chrysostom, &c., their sentiments are well known in the present point; and how they do not only reject, but abhor the principles which you are endeavouring to revive. However, I shall transcribe one passage out of Athanasius, part whereof has been given above, which may serve as a comment upon the Catholics which went before him, whose sentiments he was perfectly well acquainted with, and had thoroughly imbibed.

"[f] When the prophet, speaking of the creation, saith, 'Which "*alone* spreadeth out the heavens,' Job ix. 8, and when God "says, 'I *alone* stretch forth the heavens,' Isa. xliv. 24, it is very "manifest to every man, that in him, who is said to be *alone*, "the *Word* of that *alone* is also signified, in whom all things "were made, and without whom nothing was made. If there-"fore the heavens were made by the *Word*, and yet God says, "*I alone*; and the Son, by whom the heavens were made, is "understood to have been with the *alone* God; for the same

[y] Parallel to which is that in Athanasius, *Orat.* iii. p. 558. Νοεῖται δὲ σὺν τῷ μόνῳ καὶ ὁ υἱός. And again: Ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ, καὶ μόνῳ, καὶ πρώτῳ συνὼν νοεῖται ὁ λόγος. See Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 19.

[z] Salvo enim filio, recte unicum Deum potest determinasse cujus est Filius. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c 18.

[a] Νοῦς καὶ λόγος τοῦ πατρός. Cap. x. p. 39.

[b] Οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον. [c] Ἀΐδιος.

[d] Θεὸν ἄγοντες τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγον. P. 122. Compare p. 40.

[e] Clemens Alexandr. p. 129. 135. 142. Origen. contr. Cels. l. viii. p. 386. et alibi. Hippolytus contr. Noet. passim. Novatian. c. 3. Dionysius Romanus, apud Athanas. Dionysius Alexand. apud Athanasium. p. 254.

[f] Athanas. Orat. 3. contr. Arian. p. 558.

" reason also, if it be said, *one God*, and *I alone*, and *I the first*, " we are undoubtedly to understand, that in the *one*, *alone*, and " *first*, is comprehended the *Word*, as effulgency, ἀπαύγασμα, is " implied in light." Athanasius's reasoning in this passage is so like [g]Tertullian's upon the same head, that one might think he had borrowed it from him. But indeed it is so entirely conformable to the true and genuine sentiments of the Catholics before him, that it may justly pass for the general sense of all.

To confirm what hath been said, I shall use one argument more, before I pass on to another query; such as, if carefully considered, may be sufficient to silence all further doubt or scruple, with regard to the sense of the Ante-Nicene writers.

It is well known, that they ever looked upon the Son, as the God of the Jews, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Many particular testimonies may be cited in proof of the fact, which, for brevity sake, I pass over; and proceed to a more general proof drawn from their citing of texts out of the Old Testament, in which the God of the Jews is certainly spoken of; and applying them to the Person of Christ, the second Person of the ever blessed Trinity.

" [h]They heard the voice of the Lord God walking in the " garden——And the Lord God called unto Adam," &c. Gen. iii. 8, 9.

" [i]The Lord appeared to Abram, and said unto him, I am " the Almighty God; walk before me, and be thou perfect," Gen. xvii. 1, 2.

" [k]And the Lord appeared unto him in the plains of Mamre. " The Lord said unto Abraham," &c. Gen. xviii. 1, 13.

" [l]The Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brim- " stone and fire from the Lord out of heaven," Gen. xix. 24.

" [m]And Abraham——stood before the Lord," &c. Gen. xix. 27.

" [n]And God said unto Abraham," &c. Gen. xxi. 12.

[g] Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 19.

[h] Theophil. Antioch. p. 129. ed. Ox. Tertullian, adv. Prax. c. 16.

[i] Clem. Alex. Pædag. lib. i. c. 7. p. 131. Euseb. Demonstr. Ev. l. v. c. 9. Eccl. Hist. l. i. c. 2.

[k] Just. Mart. p. 213. Sylburg. ed. Novat. c. 26. Tertull. Prax. c. 16, 17. Euseb. Dem. E. l. v. c. 9. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 845.

[l] Just. Mart. p. 215. Irenæus, l. iii. c. 6. p. 180. Tertull. Prax. c. 13. 16. Euseb. Eccl. Hist. l. i. c. 2. Novat. c. 21. 26.

[m] Just. Mart. p. 216.

[n] Just. Mart. Dial. p. 162. ed. Jeb. Novat. c. 26.

"[o] And, behold, the Lord stood above it, and said, I am the "Lord God of Abraham thy father, and the God of Isaac," Gen. xxviii. 13.

"[p] I am the God of Bethel, where thou anointedst the pillar," &c. Gen. xxxi. 13.

"[q] And God said unto Jacob, Arise, go up to Bethel,—— "and make there an altar to God, that appeared unto thee," &c. Gen. xxxv. 1.

"[r] God called unto him out of the bush. He said,——I am "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of "Jacob," &c. Exod. iii. 4, 6.

"[s] And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM.——The Lord "God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of "Jacob, appeared," Exod. iii. 14, 16.

"[t] I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by "the name of God Almighty, but by my name Jehovah, was I "not known unto them," Exod. vi. 3.

"[u] I am the Lord thy God, which brought thee out of the "land of Egypt," Exod. xx. 2.

"[x] God of Israel," Exod. xxiv. 10.

"[y] The Lord strong and mighty, the Lord mighty in battle. "The Lord of hosts, he is the King of glory," Psalm xxiv. 8, 10.

"[z] Be still, and know that I am God: I will be exalted," &c. Psalm xlvi. 10.

"[a] God is gone up with a shout, the Lord (Jehovah)" &c. Psalm xlvii. 5.

"[b] The mighty God, even the Lord, hath spoken——Our "God shall come, and shall not keep silence," &c. Psalm l. 1, 3.

[o] Just. Mart. p. 218. Clem. Alex. Pæd. l. i. c. 7. p. 131.

[p] Just. Mart. 218. Clem. Alex. Pæd. l. i. c. 7. p. 132. Novat. c. 27. Euseb. Demon. Ev. l. v. c. 10. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 848.

[q] Just. Mart. 218. Cyprian. Test. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35. ed. Oxon.

[r] Just. Martyr. p. 220. Irenæus l. iii. c. 6. p. 180. l. iv. c. 12. p. 241. l. iv. c. 5. p. 232. Tertull. Prax. c. 16. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 348. Origen. in Joh. p. 32.

[s] Irenæus, ubi supra. That is, he must of consequence understand this of Christ as well as ver. 4. 8. 19. (See True Scripture Doctrine continued, p. 159, 160.) Tertull. adv. Prax. c. 17. Just. Mart. Apol. i. p. 123. Ox. ed. Euseb. contr. Marcel. l. ii. c. 20, 21.

[t] Just. Mart. p. 278, Sylbur. edit.

[u] Clem. Alex. Pædag. l. i. c. 7. p. 131.

[x] Euseb. Demonstr. Ev. l. v. c. 18.

[y] Just. Mart. Dial. p. 197. Cyprian. adv. Jud. l. ii. c. 49. p. 49, 50. Orig. in Mat. p. 438. Euseb. in loc.

[z] Cyprian. adv. Jud. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35.

[a] Just. Martyr. Dial. p. 197. Euseb. in Psal. xxiii. p. 91.

[b] Iren. l. iii. c. 6. p. 180. Cyprian.

"[c] Let God arise, let his enemies," &c. "Sing unto God, "sing praises," &c. Psalm lxviii. 1, 4.

"[d] In Judah is God known," &c. Psalm lxxvi. 1.

"[e] God standeth in the congregation of the mighty; he "judgeth among gods," Ps. lxxxii. 1.

"[f] The Lord reigneth," Psalm xcix. 1.

"[g] Behold, God is my salvation: I will trust, and not be "afraid: for the Lord Jehovah is my strength," &c. Isa. xii. 2.

"[h] Behold, your God will come with vengeance, even God with "a recompense; he will come and save you," Isa. xxxv. 4.

"[i] That stretcheth out the heavens like a curtain," &c. Isa. xl. 22.

"[k] Thus saith the Lord that created thee, O Jacob, and he "that formed thee, O Israel," Isa. xliii. 1.

"[l] Thus saith the Lord the King of Israel, and his redeemer "the Lord of hosts; I am the first, and I am the last; and "beside me there is no God," Isa. xliv. 6.

"[m] I am the Lord that maketh all things; that stretcheth "forth the heavens alone; that spreadeth abroad the earth by "myself," Isa. xliv. 24.

"[n] Surely God is in thee; and there is none else, there is no "God. Verily thou art a God," &c. Isa. xlv. 14, 15.

"[o] I will save them by the Lord their God, and will not save "them by bow, nor by sword," Hosea i. 7.

"[p] The Lord also shall roar out of Zion, and utter his voice "from Jerusalem," Joel iii. 16. Amos i. 2.

adv. Jud. l. ii. c. 28. p. 48.—it. de Bono Patient. p. 220. Euseb. in Psal. p. 209.

[c] Cyprian. adv. Jud. l. ii. c. 6. c. 28. p. 35, 49.

[d] Irenæus, l. iii. c. 9. p. 184. l. iv. c. 33. p. 273.

[e] Just. Mart. Dial. p. 277. Irenæus, l. iii. c. 6. p. 180. Novat. de Trin. c. 15. Cyprian. adv. Jud. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35. Eus. in loc.

[f] Just. Mart. p. 224. Iren. l. iv. c. 33. p. 274.

[g] Irenæus, l. iii. c. 10. p. 186.

[h] Irenæus, l. iii. c. 20. p. 214. Novat. c. 12. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 845. Tertull. adv. Jud. c. 9, 14.

[i] Hippolyt. contr. Noet. c. xviii. p. 19. πήξας ὡς καμάραν τὸν οὐρανόν.

[k] Eusebius in loc.

[l] Lact. Inst. l. iv. c. 9. p. 405.

[m] Euseb. in loc.

N. B. I cite Eusebius, only as agreeing with the rest, in his application of such texts to God the Son: not determining any thing as to his other principles.

[n] Tertull. Prax. c. 13. Cyprian. adv. Jud. l. ii. c. 6. p. 34. Euseb. Dem. Ev. l. v. c. 4. p. 224. Lactan. Epitom. c. xliv. p. 116. edit. Dav. Inst. p. 404. ed. Ox. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 845.

[o] Novat. Trin. c. 12.

[p] Irenæus, l. iii. c. 20. p. 214. l. iv. c. 33. p. 273.

"[q] Who is a God like unto thee, that pardoneth iniquity" ——. Mic. vii. 18.

"[r] God came from Teman, and the Holy One from mount "Ephraim," Habakkuk iii. 3.

"[s] I am God, and not man," Hosea xi. 9.

"[t] I will strengthen them in the Lord——saith the Lord," Zech. x. 12.

"[u] This is our God, and there shall none other be accounted "of in comparison of him," Baruch iii. 35.

These several texts, besides others of like nature, the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, understood of Christ. And therefore it is exceeding clear, that, according to the doctrine of that time, the second Person of the Trinity is the "Lord;" the "Lord God;" the "Almighty God;" the "Lord God of "Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob;" the "Jehovah," the "Lord of "hosts;" the "Mighty God;" the "Only God; and besides "whom there is no God;" the "God of Israel," &c. All this, I say, Christ is, according to the doctrine of those early times: not exclusive of the Father, any more than the Father is such, exclusive of the Son; but together with the Father: that is, Father and Son both are the one Supreme God: not one in *Person*, as you frequently and groundlessly insinuate, but in *substance, power*, and *perfection*. I know you have an evasion, by which you hope to elude the force of all that has been urged. But when I have shewn you how weak and insufficient your pretence is, I hope I shall hear no more of it.

[x] In another part of your book, (p. 20,) you pretend that Christ spake only in the *Person* of the Father; and that when he said, for instance, "I am the God of Bethel," (Gen. xxxi. 13,) the meaning is no more than this; Jehovah whom I represent and in whose name I speak, is the God of Bethel. Had you given it only as your *own* interpretation of this and the like texts, it might be very excusable: but having told us what you mean by speaking "in the Person of God the Father," you afterwards add, that it was the "unanimous opinion of all

[q] Irenæus, l. iii. c. 20. p. 214. Tertull. contr. Marc. l. iv. c. 10.

[r] Irenæus, l. iii. c. 20. p. 214. l. xiv. c. 33. p. 273.

[s] Cypr. Testim. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35. Euseb. Dem. Ev. l. v. c. 22. p. 249. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 845.

[t] Cyprian. Test. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35. Eus. Dem. Ev. l. v. c. 26. p. 251.

[u] Cyprian. Test. l. ii. c. 6. p. 35. Lactant. Epit. p. 116. ed. Dav.

[x] See also Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, p. 102. alias p. 94.

"antiquity," that Christ appeared and spake "*in the person* of "God the Father," (p. 22,) leaving your English reader to believe, that your novel explication was the current doctrine of all antiquity. The thing may be true in *some sense*, such as is foreign to your purpose: but in *your sense*, it is notoriously false, as all that have looked into antiquity very well know. However, for the benefit of the common reader, I will shew that the good Fathers applied these texts to Christ considered in *his own Person*, and not in the Father's only. This shall be made clear, to a demonstration, both from particular testimonies of the same Fathers; and from the general scope, drift, and design of those writers, in quoting the texts before mentioned.

[y] Clement of Alexandria, citing Exod. xx. 2, "I am the Lord "thy God," &c. and understanding it of Christ, observes particularly, that Christ said this of himself, "in his own Person."

[z] Tertullian, interpreting Isa. i. 18, and Mic. vii. 18, of Christ, makes the like remark.

[a] Irenæus, having cited Exod. iii. 6, ("I am the God of Abra-"ham, and the God of Isaac," &c.) which he understands as spoken by Christ, goes on thus: "From hence (Christ) made it "plain, that he who spake to Moses out of the bush, and mani-"fested himself to be the God of the fathers, is the God of the "living." And after a deal more in that chapter to shew that the Father and Son are one and the same God, he concludes to this effect: "Christ himself therefore, with the Father, is the "God of the living, who spake to Moses, and was manifested to "the fathers."

Novatian, having observed that the angel which appeared to [b] Agar, Sarah's maid, was represented in Holy Scripture as Lord and God, after some reasoning upon it, suitable to the prevailing principles of his own times, as well as of the times preceding, sums up the whole in this manner: "[c] Wherefore if

[y] Πάλιν δὴ ὅταν λέγῃ διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου, ἑαυτὸν ὁμολογεῖ παιδαγωγόν. ἐγὼ Κύριος ὁ Θεός σου, ὁ ἐξαγαγών σε ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου. *Clem. Alex. Pæd.* l. i. c. 7. p. 131. edit. Oxon.

[z] Ex ipsius Domini persona &c. *Tert. contr. Marc.* l. iv. c. 10.

[a] Per hæc utique manifestum fecit quoniam is qui de Rubo locutus est Moysi, et manifestavit SE esse Deum Patrum, hic est viventium Deus—— Ipse igitur Christus cum Patre vivorum est Deus, qui locutus est Moysi, qui et Patribus manifestatus est. *Iren.* l. iv. c. 5. p. 232. See l. iii. c. 6. l. iv. c. 12.

[b] See Genesis xvi.

[c] Ergo si hic locus neque *Personæ* Patris congruit ne angelus dictus sit, neque *Personæ* angeli, ne Deus pronuntiatus sit: *Personæ* autem Christi convenit, ut et Deus sit, quia De

"the present passage cannot suit with the *Person* of the Father, "whom it would not be proper to call an angel, nor to the "*person* of an angel, which it would not be proper to call God; "but it may comport with the *Person* of Christ to be God, as "the Son of God, and to be an angel too, as sent to reveal his "Father's will: the heretics ought to consider that they run "counter to the sacred writ, while they admit that Christ is an "angel, and yet refuse to acknowledge that he is God also." Here you will observe, that, according to Novatian, it was to the Person of Christ, not to the Person of God the Father, that the title of God and Lord, in this or the like instances, belonged; and that therefore they are given to him in his own Person, in his own right, as God's Son, and consubstantial with him; than which nothing can be more diametrically opposite to yours, or to Dr. Clarke's hypothesis. It is not said, God, only as having true dominion and authority, but as God's Son; and that implies, with Novatian, *substantiæ communionem*, real and essential divinity[d].

I shall next shew you the same of Justin Martyr; and then beg your pardon for the impertinence of insisting so long upon what none, one might think, that has ever seen the ancients, could make the least question of. "Permit me," says he, "to "shew you also out of the book of Exodus, how the very "same Person, who appeared to Abraham and Jacob, as an "angel, and God, and Lord, and man, appeared to Moses in a "flame of fire out of the bush, and talked with him." A little after, he adds these remarkable words: "[e] You have seen, gen-"tlemen, that the same person whom Moses calls an angel, "and who conversed with him in the flame of fire; that very "Person being God, signifies to Moses that himself is the God "of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob." I will not so far distrust your judgment, as to add any further comment to so

Filius est, et angelus sit, quoniam paternæ dispositionis adnuntiator est; intelligere debent contra Scripturas se agere hæretici, qui Christum quum dicant se et angelum credere, nolint etiam illum Deum pronuntiare——. *Novat.* c. xxvi. p. 724.

Ὁ δὲ ἄγγελος τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱὸς ἐστὶν, αὐτὸς Κύριος καὶ Θεὸς ὤν. *Synod. Antioch. Ep.*

[d] Cap. 31. compare chap. 11. Ut enim præscripsit ipsa natura hominem credendum esse, qui ex homine sit: ita eadem natura præscribit, et Deum credendum esse, qui ex Deo sit.

[e] Ὦ ἄνδρες, νενοήκατε——ὅτι ὃν λέγει Μωσῆς ἄγγελον, ἐν πυρὶ φλογὸς λελαληκέναι αὐτῷ, οὗτος αὐτὸς Θεὸς ὢν σημαίνει τῷ Μωσεῖ ὅτι αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ. *Just. Mart. Dial.* p. 220.

Compare Apol. i. p. 123. Τὸ δὲ εἰ-

plain words. I need but just hint to any who know Justin Martyr, that he, as well as Novatian, resolves the divinity of Christ into his [f]sonship; and sonship into [g]communication of the same divine substance: which I remark chiefly against Dr. Clarke, who seems to admit that those titles belonged to the *Person* of Christ; which is more than I apprehend you do. It were very easy to add particular passages to the same purpose from other Fathers; but it was, in a manner, needless to have mentioned these. For the general scope, drift, and design of the primitive writers, in this case, shews sufficiently what I contend for. Their design was to prove Christ's Divinity; to shew that there was another *Person*, besides the Father, who was really Lord and God; and that this *Person* was Christ. This is the avowed design clear through Justin's Dialogue; and the like may be said of Novatian, Tertullian, Cyprian, Irenæus, and the rest, (except Eusebius, who sometimes varied in this matter,) where they cite these texts, which I have given you a list of.

The argument they used is this. There is a person frequently styled God and Lord, Jehovah, Almighty, &c. who conversed with Adam, appeared to the Patriarchs, and all along headed and conducted the people of the Jews. This Person could not be an angel only: such high titles could never belong to any mere angel. He could not be God the Father: his office was ministerial; he is called an angel; he appeared; he condescended to take upon him human shape, and other resemblances[h]. These things do not suit with the *first Person* of the Trinity. Well then, who could he be but God the Son? who being really God, might, in his own right, truly and justly assume those high titles; and yet being *second* only in the ever blessed Trinity, and designing, in his own due time, to take human nature upon him, might more suitably condescend to act ministerially among men, (a proper prelude to his incarnation, which should come after,) and so might be, not only God, but an angel

ρημένον ἐκ βάτου τῷ Μωσεῖ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν, ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραὰμ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Ἰσαὰκ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Ἰακὼβ, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πατέρων σου, σημαντικὸν τοῦ καὶ ἀποθανόντας ἐκείνους μένειν καὶ εἶναι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἀνθρώπους. See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 237, vol. ii. of this edition.

[f] Page 183, 75, 278, 280, Sylb. ed.

[g] Page 183, 373, ed. Jeb.

[h] I do not find, that the pure simplicity of the divine nature was ever urged, in this case, as a reason why it could not be the Father: nor, that the human affections and actions ascribed to this angel were understood literally, or otherwise than by way of figure. Tertullian gives a very different account of it, shewing how all might be understood *θεοπρεπῶς*. *Cont. Marc.* l. ii.

too. This is their argument, as every one knows, that knows any thing of these matters. Now, suppose that these good Fathers had understood, Gen. xxxi. 13, as you do; "I am the "God of Bethel;" that is, My Father, whom I represent, is the God of Bethel; what a trifling argument would you here put into their mouths? "Christ declares that the Person whom he "represents is God and Lord: therefore Christ is God," &c. Or propose the argument thus, upon your hypothesis: "The "Lord God (the Father) called unto Adam, Gen. viii. 9. God said "unto Abraham, &c. Gen. xxi. 12. that is, God the Father spoke "by his Son; therefore the Son is called God, and is God." Can any thing be more ridiculous? The conclusion which Justin Martyr draws from the whole, and which he triumphantly urges against Trypho, is this; that Christ is really Lord and God, [i] Θεὸς καλεῖται, καὶ Θεός ἐστι καὶ ἔσται. The other writers draw the same conclusion from the same premises; a conclusion without any thing to support it, had they understood these texts, as you pretend they did. In short, the very ground and foundation of all they say upon this article is built upon a supposition diametrically opposite to yours; so little countenance have you from antiquity. Further, they all conclude that the Person declaring himself to be God and Lord, &c. could not be an angel; not a mere angel. There is some sense in this; if you suppose an angel declaring, *in his own person*, that he is God and Lord. It is blasphemous and absurd for any mere angel to make such declaration. But, supposing it meant of the Person of the Father, why might not any angel declare, what is certainly true, that the Father is God, or deliver God's errand in his own words? Had the Fathers thought as you do, they must have argued thus, very weakly: It could not be a mere angel that appeared, or that spoke thus and thus. Why? because the Person who sent him, and who undoubtedly is the God of the universe, is called God and Lord. Of all the silly things that ignorance and malice have combined to throw upon the primitive martyrs and defenders of the faith of Christ, I have not met with one comparable to this. I am therefore willing to believe that you did not mean to charge them with it, but only expressed yourself darkly and obscurely; which yet should not have been done, by one who would be careful not to mislead even an unwary reader.

[i] Just. Dial. p. 176. ed. Jebb. See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 237, &c. vol. ii. of this edition.

I would here make one remark, and leave it with you; and that is, of the [k] strict sense wherein the ancients used the word *God*, as applied to the Son. They argued that it could not be an angel that appeared. Why? Because the Person appearing was called God. Thus Novatian, who speaks the sense of all the rest. "Quomodo ergo *Deus* si angelus fuit, cum non sit hoc nomen "angelis unquam concessum[l]? But how then is he God, if no "more than angel, since angels never had the privilege of so high "a title?" Novatian allows (ch. 15.) that angels have been called Gods, meaning in the loose figurative sense: but here he plainly signifies that the word *God*, when applied to the *Son*, is to be understood in the strict and proper sense: and thus the ancients in general understood it. Angels, the very highest order of creatures, were not by them thought worthy of the name and title of *God*. It would have been highly absurd, in their judgment, to have given it them, in such a sense, and in such circumstances, as they applied it to the *Son*. They knew nothing of your relative sense of the word: they knew better. But this by the way: let us return to our subject. You will ask me now, perhaps, what did some of the Fathers mean, those especially whom you have quoted in the margin, (p. 22.) by the *Son of God's* appearing, and speaking in the *Person of God the Father*? I have shewn you what they certainly did *not* mean: and if I could not so readily account for the other, it is of less moment; the cause being little concerned in it. But I shall endeavour to satisfy you in this point also.

You have but two quotations which are any thing to the purpose; one out of Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, and the other from Tertullian. And they indeed, *verbally*, may seem to countenance your notion; though, in *reality*, they meant nothing like it. But what did they mean; one by, [m] ἐν προσώπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ, the other by, [n] *auctoritate et nomine* (*Patris*)? Let it be considered, that the second Person, in the texts above cited, is not represented under his own personal distinguishing character, as a Son, or second Person, or Messiah, or Mediator, as he has been since. It is not said, that the *Son* of the *Lord God* called unto Adam; but the "*Lord God* called," &c.[o] It is not, I am

[k] Other arguments of the strict sense of the word *God*, as used by the Ante-Nicene writers, and applied to the Son, may be seen in Dr. Fiddes, p. 374, &c.

[l] Cap. 26.

[m] Theoph. ad Autol. l. ii. p. 229. Ox. ed.

[n] Tertull. adv. Marc. l. ii. c. 27.

[o] Gen. iii. 9.

the *Son* of the God of Bethel, &c. but "I am the *God of Bethel*;" and so in the rest. Christ therefore, in these, or the like texts, is not represented under his own peculiar character; but under such a character as is common to the Godhead, to the Father and him too. This character, since the distinction of persons has been revealed to us, has been, in a more eminent and peculiar manner, reserved to the Father. He is represented eminently now as *God*; and Christ, as *Son of God*, or *Mediator*, or *Messiah*. Christ having before took upon him that part, character, or office, which since that time has been reserved, in a peculiar manner, to the Father, may be said to have acted in the *Person* of the Father, or *in the name* of the Father; that is, under the same character or capacity which the Father now chiefly bears with respect to men. This he might well do, being equally qualified for either. As Son of God, he was really God; and as Son of the Almighty, he was Almighty, in his own right, as [p]Tertullian expresses it: and therefore might as justly bear the style and title of "Lord God," "God of Abraham," &c. while he acted in that capacity, as he did that of "Mediator," "Messiah," "Son of the Father," &c. after he condescended to act in another, and to discover his personal relation.

You cited these words of Tertullian: "Cujus auctoritate [q]et "nomine ipse erat Deus, qui videbatur, Dei Filius." Which might have been rendered thus: "The Son of God who appeared, "he was God (acting) in his (the Father's) name, and with his "authority." And had you but cited the next immediate words, you might have discovered the true meaning of that passage. "Sed et penes nos, Christus in persona Christi, quia et hoc modo "noster est:" that is to say, But with us (Christians) Christ is also understood under the character or Person of the Messiah; because he is ours in this capacity also; that is, he is not only our God, but our Mediator and Redeemer; and under that character we receive him, as being more peculiar to him, beyond what he has in common with the Father. Formerly he was received and adored under the one common character of God, Lord, and Jehovah; not merely as representative of God the Father, or as invested with his authority, but as strictly and truly *God, consubstantial* with God the Father; according to the unanimous

[p] Suo jure omnipotens qua Filius Omnipotentis—— cum et Filius Omnipotentis tam omnipotens sit, quam Deus Dei Filius. *Prax.* c. xvii. p. 520.

[q] Contr. Marc. l. ii. c. 27.

opinion of all the ancients, and[r] of those in particular who speak of his acting in the name or Person of the Father. But now, having a new title to distinguish him by, we receive him in both capacities; as God, by *nature;* and as Messiah, or Mediator, by *office.*

The sum then of the case is this: when Christ appeared to the Patriarchs, and claimed their obedience, homage, and adoration, he did not do this under the name and character which he has since discovered to be personal and peculiar to him; but under another, which is his too, but in common with the Father; namely, that of "Lord God," "God Almighty," &c., and being since discovered not to be the Father himself, but the Son; not *unoriginated*, but *God of God;* all that he did must be referred back to the Father, the Head and Fountain of all; whose authority he exercised, whose orders he executed, and whose Person, Character, or Office, he (in some sense) represented and sustained. Thus, under the [s]New Testament also, he referred all that he did to the authority of the Father, as the first original, and fountain of all power, preeminence, dignity, &c. acting in his name, executing his will, and representing his Person. ("I and "my Father are one," John x. 30. "He that hath seen me "hath seen the Father," John xiv. 9. "I can of mine own self "do nothing," John v. 30.) And yet whatever is said of Christ is to be understood of him in his own Person, and not of the Father only, whom he represented. In fine, it is not necessary, that every one who acts in the name, or by the authority, or in the person of another, should usurp the style of that other, and speak in the first person; e. g. a viceroy, or an ambassador, speaks in the king's name, and by his authority, and represents his person: but does not personate the king, in the strictest sense; does not pretend to say, I am the king. And therefore you can draw no certain conclusion from the two passages of Theophilus and Tertullian. On the contrary, I have shewn you, from the whole drift, tenor, and tendency, as well as from particular testimonies of the primitive writings, that they are far from favouring your pretences in this case, but are a perfect contradiction to them. From what hath been said, these three things are very plain and evident:

[r] See True Script. Doct. continued, p. 196.

[s] Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. xxi. p. 512. *Ego veni in Patris mei nomine*——Adeo semper Filius erat in Dei et Regis et Domini, et Omnipotentis, et Altissimi nomine.

1. That, according to the mind of the ancients, the Son was *God*, and so called *in his own Person.*

2. That he was *God in his own Person*, as being *God's Son.*

3. That he was *God's Son*, as having the divine substance communicated from the Father.

These three considerations entirely take off the force of whatever either you or Dr. Clarke hath offered to perplex and puzzle a very clear and manifest truth.

I have insisted chiefly on the first particular, as was proper in this place; though I have, in passing, hinted enough of the two latter also; especially considering that they will often be glanced at again, in the process of our dispute.

Thus, I hope, I have sufficiently vindicated the argument of this second Query, having shewn from plain scripture texts, that Christ is not excluded from being the one Supreme God in conjunction with the Father; and taken off your exceptions: and lest this should seem insufficient, I have confirmed it further, from the unanimous consent of all antiquity, before the Council of Nice; which is what yourself appeal to in the case. This article indeed has hereby been drawn out into a disproportionate length; but the importance of it is a sufficient apology. Were you able satisfactorily to answer the following queries, this one, while it stands unanswered, would be enough for all. But I proceed.

QUERY III.

Whether the word (God) *in Scripture can reasonably be supposed to carry an* ambiguous *meaning, or to be used in a* different *sense, when applied to the* Father *and* Son, *in the same Scripture, and even in the same verse? See John* i. 1.

HERE you make answer; that "the word (God) in Scripture "hath a relative signification, and is used in a supreme and a "subordinate sense." And you appeal to Exod. vii. 1. "I "have made thee a god to Pharaoh;" and to Psalm lxxxii. 1. "God standeth in the assembly of gods; judgeth among gods;" and you desire that John x. 34, 35, may be compared; "Is it "not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods?" &c. You are impatient, I perceive, to come to your distinction of supreme and subordinate, which, you imagine, clears all difficulties; and you will not stay to consider what ought to be said first. The first and most general distinction of the senses

of the word *God*, should be into proper and improper; after which it will be soon enough to come to your famed distinction of supreme and subordinate. Dr. Clarke indeed would persuade us, that the proper Scripture notion of *God* is *dominion;* and that therefore any person having dominion, is, according to the Scripture notion, truly and properly God. This shall be examined; but it will be convenient here to set down the Doctor's own words. "The word Θεὸς, *God*, has in Scripture, and in all "books of morality and religion, a relative signification; and "not, as in metaphysical books, an absolute one: as is evident "from the relative terms, which in moral writings may always "be joined with it. For instance, in the same manner as we "say, *my* Father, *my* King, and the like; so it is proper also to "say, *my* God, the God *of Israel*, the God *of the universe*, and "the like: which words are expressive of dominion and govern-"ment. But, in the metaphysical way, it cannot be said, *my* "infinite substance, the infinite substance *of Israel*, or the like[a]." He repeats the observation (p. 290)[b]; and is very positive, that the word *God*, in Scripture, is always a relative word of office, giving the same pretty reason for it as before. This shall be carefully considered; and the manner of speaking accounted for, in the sequel.

I shall only observe here, by the way, that the word *star* is a relative word, for the same reason with that, which the doctor gives for the other. For, the "star of your God Remphan," (Acts vii. 43,) is a proper expression: but, in the metaphysical way, it cannot be said, the luminous substance "of your God "Remphan." So again, *water* is a relative word; for it is proper to say, the water *of Israel:* but, in the metaphysical way, it cannot be said, the fluid substance *of Israel;* the expression is [c] improper. By parity of reason, we may make relative words almost as many as we please. But to proceed: I maintain that *dominion* is not the full import of the word *God* in Scripture; that it is but a part of the idea, and a small part too; and that, if any person be called *God*, merely on account

[a] See Dr. Clarke's Reply, p. 284.

[b] Compare also Script. Doctr. p. 296. alias 264.

[c] It is very obvious to perceive where the impropriety of such expressions lies. The word *substance*, according to the common use of language, when used in the singular number, is supposed to be intrinsic to the thing spoken of, whose substance it is; and indeed, to be the thing itself. *My substance* is *myself:* and *the substance of Israel* is *Israel*. And hence it comes to be improper to join *substance* with the relative terms, understanding it of any thing extrinsic.

of *dominion*, he is called so by way of figure and resemblance only; and is not properly God, according to the Scripture notion of it. We may call any one a *king*, who lives free and independent, subject to no man's will. He is a king so far, or in some respect; though in many other respects nothing like one; and therefore not properly a king. If by the same figure of speech, by way of allusion and resemblance, any thing be called *God*, because resembling God in one or more particulars; we are not to conclude, that it is properly and truly God.

To enlarge something further upon this head, and to illustrate the case by a few instances. Part of the idea which goes along with the word *God* is, that his habitation is sublime, and "his "dwelling not with flesh," Dan. ii. 11. This part of the idea is applicable to angels or to saints, and therefore they may thus far be reputed *Gods;* and are sometimes so styled in Scripture, or ecclesiastical writings. Another part of the complex idea of God is giving orders from above, and publishing commands from heaven. This was in some sense applicable to Moses; who is therefore called "a God unto Pharaoh:" not as being properly a God; but instead of God, in that instance, or that resembling circumstance. In the same respect, every prophet, or apostle, or even a minister of a parish, might be figuratively called *God. Dominion* goes along with the idea of God, or is a part of it; and therefore kings, princes, and magistrates, resembling God in that respect, may, by the like figure of speech, be styled *Gods:* not properly; for then we might as properly say, God David, God Solomon, or God Jeroboam, as King David, &c. but by way of allusion, and in regard to some imperfect resemblance which they bear to God in some particular respects; and that is all. It belongs to God, to receive worship, and sacrifice, and homage. Now, because the heathen idols so far resembled God, as to be made the objects of worship, &c. therefore they also, by the same figure of speech, are by the Scripture denominated *Gods*, though at the same time they are declared, in a proper sense, to be no Gods. The belly is called the *God* of the luxurious, (Phil. iii. 19,) because some are as much devoted to the service of their bellies, as others are to the service of God; and because their lusts have got the *dominion* over them. This way of speaking is in like manner grounded on some imperfect resemblance, and is easily understood. The prince of the devils is supposed, by most interpreters, to be called the "God of this world,"

2 Cor. iv. 4. If so, the reason may be, either because the men of this world are entirely devoted to his service, or that he has got the power and dominion over them.

Thus we see how the word *God*, according to the popular way of speaking, has been applied to angels, or to men, or to things inanimate and insensible; because some part of the idea belonging to God has been conceived to belong to them also. To argue from hence, that any of them is properly God, is making the whole of a part; and reasoning fallaciously, *a dicto secundum quid*, as the schools speak, *ad dictum simpliciter*. If we inquire carefully into the Scripture notion of the word, we shall find, that neither *dominion* singly, nor all the other instances of resemblance, make up the idea, or are sufficient to denominate any thing properly God. When the prince of Tyre pretended to be God, (Ezek. xxviii. 2,) he thought of something more than mere *dominion* to make him so; he thought of strength invincible, and power irresistible: and God was pleased to convince him of his folly and vanity, not by telling him how scanty his *dominion* was, or how low his office; but how weak, frail, and perishing his nature was; that he was man only, and "not God," ver. 2, 9, and should surely find so by the event. When the Lycaonians upon the sight of a miracle wrought by St. Paul, (Acts xiv. 11.) took him and Barnabas for Gods, they did not think so much of *dominion*, as of power and ability, beyond human: and when the Apostles answered them, they did not tell them that their *dominion* was only human, or that their office was not divine, but that they had not a divine nature; they were weak, frail, and feeble men, of like infirmities with the rest of their species, and therefore no *Gods*.

If we trace the Scripture notion of one that is truly and properly God, we shall find it made up of these several ideas; infinite wisdom, power invincible, all-sufficiency, and the like. These are the ground and foundation of *dominion*; which is but a secondary notion, a consequence of the former: and it must be dominion supreme, and none else, which will suit with the Scripture notion of God. It is not that of a governor, a ruler, a protector, a lord, or the like; but a sovereign Ruler, an almighty Protector, an omniscient and omnipresent Governor, an eternal, immutable, all-sufficient Creator, Preserver, and Protector. Whatever falls short of this is not properly, in the Scripture notion, *God*; but is only called so by way of figure; as has before been explained. Now, if you ask me why the

[illegible]

[illegible]

From what has been said, I may appear how useless and insignificant your distinction is of a supreme and a subordinate God. For but to mention that the most unreasonable [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

said, not properly or truly God. But I can see no manner of ground for this inference from the words before us. Our blessed Lord had insinuated that he was really and truly God; but had not asserted it in plain and express terms: upon this bare innuendo, the Jews charge him with direct blasphemy: he to evade their malice, and to keep to the truth, neither affirms nor denies that he meant it in the sense which they apprehended. However, his discourse being in general terms, and not explicit enough to found a charge of blasphemy upon, he appeals to their Law, in order to shew, that it is not always blasphemy to make one's self *God*, or to apply the title of *God* even to mortal men, and men inferior to himself, considered only as man. This was answer sufficient to them; who could not from his own expressions clearly convict him of meaning more, than that he was God in the improper sense of the word, as it had been used, Psalm lxxxii. 6. Nevertheless, he leaves the point of his divinity undecided; or rather, still goes on to insinuate, in words which they could not directly lay hold on, the very thing which they charged him with. This enraged them so much the more: and therefore they again "sought to take him," ver. 39. "But he "escaped out of their hand." This interpretation may suffice to take off the force of your argument. Yet the words may admit of other, and perhaps better interpretations, consistent with the principles which I here maintain[f].

You proceed to cite Heb. i. 8, 9, and argue thus: "He who "being God, calls another his God, and is sanctified by him, "must needs be God in a subordinate sense;" that is, God improperly so called, or no God. To an old objection, I might return an old answer, in the words of Hilary, or words to the same effect. "[g]This may signify only his subordination, as a "Son, or as God of God, without any inferiority of nature. The "Father is his God, as he is God by being begotten of him." This answer is direct and full, upon the supposition that the text cited is meant of the divine nature of Christ, or of Christ in his highest capacity. But if it be meant, as [h]probably it may, of his human nature only, there is no weight in the objection.

As to the Son's being sanctified, I should hardly have thought

[f] See True Script. Doct. continued, p. 178. Bisterfield contr. Crell. p. 317. Surenhus. in loc. p. 359.

[g] Ad nativitatem refertur; cæterum non perimit naturam; et idcirco Deus ejus est, quia ex eo natus in Deum est. *Hil. de Trin.* l. iv. c. 35. p. 848.

[h] See Bennet's Discourse on the Trinity, p. 31. 33, &c.

it of any importance to the cause, had it not been twice insisted on by you. May not the Father design, appoint, consecrate his Son, considered in either capacity, to the office of Mediator, without supposing him of a different and inferior nature to him? Or suppose the sanctifying may be meant of the human nature, which the Father has sanctified, by uniting it to the Λόγος, what force will there remain in your objection? Having answered your pleas and pretences for a subordinate God, I proceed to shew, that Christ is not called God in a subordinate or improper sense, but in the same sense, and in as high a sense, as the Father himself is so styled.

1. Because he is called the *Jehovah*, which is a word of absolute signification, and is the incommunicable name of the one true God.

[i] He is, very probably, called *Jehovah*, Luke i. 16, 17. "Many "shall he" (viz. John the Baptist) "turn to the Lord their God, "and he shall go before him." The Doctor owns that, in strictness of construction, the words (*the Lord their God*) must be understood of Christ. And therefore Christ is *Lord God*, or *Jehovah Eloim*, which comes to the same.

He is likewise called the "*Lord God* of the Prophets," as appears from Rev. xxii. 6. compared with ver. 16. of the same chapter. This may be further confirmed by comparing the texts following:

Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth, Ps. cii. 25, &c. Addressed to the Jehovah.	[k] Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, Heb. i. 10.
And the Lord (Jehovah) said unto me, Cast it unto the potter: a goodly price that I was prised at of them, Zech. xi. 13.	[l] Then was fulfilled that which was spoken, &c. Matth. xxvii. 9, 10.
They shall look on me (Jehovah speaking by the prophet) whom they have pierced, Zech. xii. 10.	Another Scripture saith, They shall look on him (Jesus Christ) whom they have pierced, John xix. 37.
The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, (Jehovah,) Is. xl. 3.	[m] The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, Mark i. 3.
The Lord said—I will have mercy on the house of Judah, and will save them by the Lord (Jehovah) their God, Hos. i. 6, 7.	——is born in the city of David a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord, Luke ii. 11.

[i] See this text excellently defended and illustrated in True Scripture Doctrine continued, p. 132, 133, &c. See also my Sermons, Serm. VI. vol. ii. p. 120 of this edition.

[k] See Surenhusii Conciliation. in loc. p. 600.

[l] Surenhus. in loc. p. 280.

[m] Surenhus. in Matt. iii. 3. p. 207. I refer to this author, to obviate the pretence, that these texts might be understood only by way of accommodation.

I have produced the texts again, in order to take notice of the very peculiar way which you have of evading. It is your avowed principle, that Christ is not *Jehovah* in his own Person (p. 24. and elsewhere;) and that the Person called Jehovah is the Father only. What then must be said to these texts, which are so very plain and express to the contrary; insomuch that [n] Dr. Clarke himself owns, that the name "*Jehovah* is given to that "visible Person (meaning Christ) who appeared as representing "the Person of the invisible God?" He does not say, it was given to the Person represented only, but to the Person representing also; which you seem to deny. But you confound yourself with your [o] own comment upon Hos. i. 7. "*Jehovah* would— "save them by *Jehovah* their God;)" "that is," say you, "that "*Jehovah* himself would save them, but not in his own Person." Well then, it is by another Person, which Person the text expressly calls *Jehovah*.

Upon Zech. xii. 10. compared with John xix. 37. you comment thus, (p. 26.) "The sufferings of Christ might well be called the "sufferings of *Jehovah*, being pierced in effigy in his Son, who is "the express image of his Person." What a fanciful turn is here, merely to elude the force of plain Scripture. Say rather, that since Christ is the effigies, the express image of the Father, he might justly be called *Jehovah*, which indeed he is, as well as the Father. I shall dwell no longer on so clear and indisputable a point. What you hint, that the Father and Son cannot both be *Jehovah*, or, as you express it, one individual being, meaning one person, is hardly deserving notice; because it is nothing but playing with the word *individual*, and disputing against nobody: either take the word in our sense of it, or pretend not that you oppose us. It has been observed above, that antiquity is every where full and express in this matter; never questioning, but constantly asserting, that the Son is *Jehovah*; and so called, in Scripture, in his own Person, and in his own right, as coessential Son of God. The next thing which I have to observe, is, that *Jehovah* is a word of absolute signification. The relative terms do not suit with it, as with the other. We do not read, *my Jehovah*, or *your Jehovah*, or *the Jehovah of Israel*, as is pertinently remarked by a learned [p] gentleman; and the same gentle-

[n] Reply, p. 163.
[o] Page 25.
[p] The True Script. Doct. of the Trin. continued, p. 134.

man observes, that it is sometimes rendered by Θεὸς, or *God:* from whence we may just take notice, by the way, that the word Θεὸς, or *God*, in Scripture, is not always, perhaps very rarely, a mere relative word. That *Jehovah* is a word of absolute signification, expressing God, as he is, may be proved both from [q] Scripture itself and the [r] authorities of the best critics in this case. What you have to object against it shall be here examined with all convenient brevity. [s] You make the import of the name *Jehovah* to be, giving being to (i. e. performing) his promises. For reasons best known to yourself, you slip over Exod. iii. 14, 15, which might probably give us the most light into the matter, and choose to found all your reasonings upon Exod. vi. 2, 3, &c., an obscure place, on which you have made almost as obscure a comment. The words are, "I am the Lord, (*Jehovah:*) and I "appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the "name of God Almighty, (*El Shaddai,*) but by my name *Jehovah* "was I not known to them."

You do not, I presume, so understand this text, as if this was the first time that God revealed himself by the name *Jehovah:* that he had done before, Exod. iii. 14, and even long before that, to Abram, Gen. xv. 7, and Abram had addressed him, under that name, sooner, Gen. xv. 2, nay, it may be run up yet higher, even to Adam and Eve, Gen. iv. 1.[t]

Your meaning therefore, I suppose, must be, that God had given many instances of his power before, conformable to his name *El Shaddai:* but now, he was to give them instances of his veracity and constancy in performing promises, conformable to his name *Jehovah.* This, I think, either is or should be your sense of this obscure passage. That it is not the true sense of the place is next to be shewn.

1. It appears to be a very strained and remote interpretation. The primary signification of *Jehovah* is *Being,* by your own con-

[q] See this proved in the Appendix to the Considerations on Mr. Whiston's History. Pref. p. 101.

[r] See the authorities cited in the second part of the Considerations, by the same author, p. 2, 3, and referred to in True Scripture Doctrine continued, p. 133, 134.

[s] Page 19.

[t] M. Le Clerc thinks that all this may be solved by a prolepsis. *Com. in Exod.* iii. 15. To which it is sufficient to answer, that it may be otherwise; and that it is highly improbable, that Moses, who was particularly careful not to introduce the name of Abraham and Sarah before the proper time, should not be as careful in respect of a more venerable name, the name of God himself.

fession, and as all know, that know any thing: and the most obvious reason of the name is, that God is *Being itself*, necessarily existing, independent, immutable, always the same; according to that of Mal. iii. 6, "I am the Lord, (*Jehovah*,) I change "not." After this, in the natural order, he may be considered as the fountain of being, or giving being to all other things: so that this seems but a secondary notion of *Jehovah*. Yours is more remote still: it is *giving being*, not to the world, to angels, or to men, but to words and promises; that is, fufilling them. And this metaphorical sense, of *giving being*, you would put upon us, for the proper and special import of the name *Jehovah*, expressing *Being*. Who does not see that this is strained and far-fetched?

2. The reason which you assign for this interpretation is as lame as the interpretation itself. God, it seems, was now coming to fulfil the promise made to Abraham; and therefore reminds his people of the name *Jehovah*, as importing one faithful and punctual to his word. But what if *Jehovah* should import one eternal and immutable God, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever; might not the consideration thereof be very proper to raise in men's minds the greatest confidence and assurance imaginable, that he should never fail of his word?

3 Besides, what account will you give of many other places of Scripture, where God reminds his people, that he is *Jehovah*, and where there is no reference at all to promises or the like?

Thus, in this very chapter, Exod. vi. 29; "I am the Lord, "(*Jehovah*;) speak thou unto Pharaoh king of Egypt all that "I say unto thee." Again; "Against all the gods of Egypt I "will execute judgment: I am *Jehovah*," Exod. xii. 12. "None "of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him——I "am *Jehovah*," Lev. xviii. 6. "I am the Lord, (*Jehovah*:) that "is my name; and my glory will I not give to another, "neither my praise to graven images," Is. xlii. 8. [u] Many more places of like nature might be cited; but I choose to

[u] Mons. Le Clerc, upon the place, endeavours by quirk and subtilty to turn several passages, wherein the *Jehovah* is mentioned, to one particular sense, in favour of the Sabellians. But that author and his manner are well known, and with what bias he writes. The very instances which he brings are enough to confute him.

refer you to a concordance for them. What I intend from them is this; that if yours be the true account of the special import of the name *Jehovah*, it will be hard to find any sense or pertinency in those, or other frequent repetitions of it. But understanding the word as it has been generally understood by persons of the greatest learning and judgment, all is clear, pertinent, and consistent.

But, you will say, why then does God so particularly take notice, that by his name *Jehovah* he was not known to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob? Exod. vi. 3. Did not they know him, and worship him, as the true, eternal, independent, immutable God, the Creator of all things? Yes, certainly they did, and under the name *Jehovah* too; and probably understood the import of it. The most probable solution of the whole difficulty is this; that the words, in the latter part of the text, ought to be understood by way of interrogation, thus: But by my name *Jehovah* was I not also known unto them? that great and venerable name, which expresses more than *El Shaddai*, or any other name, and which I have chosen for my memorial to all generations?

If you please to consult the critics, you will find this interpretation supported by such reasons as will bear examining. It has been observed by the learned, that some of the Greek writers read the words, Καὶ τὸ ὄνομά μου, Κύριος, ἐδήλωσα αὐτοῖς; [x] that is, "My name, *Jehovah*, I made known unto them;" which interpretation is likewise favoured by the Arabic version. This at least we may say; that from a passage so obscure, and capable of several constructions, no certain argument can be drawn, for the special import of the word *Jehovah*, in opposition to the best critics in the language, whether ancient or modern. Now, to resume the thread of our argument, since it appears that Christ is, in his own proper Person, called *Jehovah*, a word of absolute signification, expressing the Divine nature or essence, it must follow, that he is God, strictly so called, and not in the relative or improper sense, as is pretended.

This will appear further, if it be considered that *Jehovah* is the incommunicable name of the one true God. This may be proved from [y] several texts, which I shall only point to in the

[x] Just. Martyr reads, Τὸ ὄνομά μου οὐκ ἐδήλωσα αὐτοῖς. *Dial.* p. 266. Jebb. vid. Gen. xxxii. 29. comp. Pseud. Athanas. tom. ii. p. 499, 503, 505.

[y] Exod. iii. 14, 15. Deut. xxvi. 17, 18. Psal. lxxxiii. 18. Is. xlii. 8. Hosea xii. 5.

margin; referring you to [z] a learned author, who has abundantly made good the assertion. I may remark, that this and the foregoing observation serve to support and confirm each other: for if *Jehovah* signify the eternal, immutable God, it is manifest that the name is incommunicable, since there is but one God; and if the name be incommunicable, then *Jehovah* can signify nothing but that one God to whom, and to whom only, it is applied. And if both these parts be true, and it be true likewise that this name is applied to Christ, the consequence is irresistible, that Christ is the same one God; not the same *Person* with the Father, to whom also the name *Jehovah* is attributed, but the same *substance*, the same *Being*; in a word, the same *Jehovah*; thus revealed to be more Persons than one. So much for my first argument, to prove that the word *God*, when applied to the Father and Son, in Scripture, does not bear a double meaning, one proper, and the other improper; but is to be understood in one and the same true and proper sense in respect of both.

2. My second argument for it shall be from John i. 1. pursuant to the words of the Query. "In the beginning was the "*Word*, and the *Word* was with *God*, and the *Word* was *God*," ver. 1. "All things were made by him," &c. ver. 3. Here we find the Son expressly called *God*; and the only question is, whether in a proper or improper sense. The circumstances of the place must determine us in this inquiry. Here are three marks to direct us how to form a judgment. 1. The word Θεὸς, *God*, is used in a proper sense in the very same verse. 2. The Word was *God* in the beginning, that is, before the creation. 3. The work of creation is attributed to him.

I say, first, the word Θεὸς, *God*, is once used, in a proper sense, in the very same verse. I have before shewn, that the pretended relative sense is only an improper and figurative sense of the word *God*, according to the Scripture notion of it; and therefore, certainly, that cannot be the meaning of it here, being applied to the Father, who, without dispute, is properly *God*. Besides, that since Θεὸς in the Septuagint is frequently the rendering of *Jehovah*, as you may readily see by turning to Trommius's Concordance; and since St. John himself follows that rendering, as you may observe by comparing John vi. 45.

[z] Second Letter to the Author of the History of Montanism, p. 5, &c.

with Is. liv. 13, we may reasonably think that ὁ Θεὸς, in the text, is of the same signification with *Jehovah*: which is a further proof, that it is to be understood absolutely, and not relatively, as you term it, or as I, improperly. If therefore the word Θεὸς, *God*, be once used by St. John in the strict and proper sense, how can we imagine, that immediately after, in the very same verse, he should use the same word in a sense very different from that of the former? You remark, that "the article is "prefixed before Θεὸς, in an absolute construction, when spoken "of the Father; but omitted when predicated of the Λογός." But if the want of the article be sufficient to prove that Θεὸς, *God*, when applied to the Word, is of a different meaning; by the same argument you might prove that the same word, Θεὸς, without an article, in no less than four places more of this chapter, (ver. 6. 12. 13. 18.) is not to be understood of the *one true God*. I cannot help thinking a remark trifling, which signifies so little, as either to prove too much, or to prove nothing. Could you shew that Θεὸς, without the article, was always taken in a relative or improper sense, you would do something. All that you attempt to shew is, that ὁ Θεὸς is no where, in the New Testament, predicated of the *Word* in an absolute construction. And what if it is not? then it is not: for that is all you can make of it. Θεὸς without the article, in many places, confessedly means as much as Θεὸς with the article; which is enough for our purpose. Or, admitting that there is some reason and significancy in it, that the Son is not styled ὁ Θεὸς in an absolute construction, but that the title is generally reserved to the Father, as the title ὁ Πατήρ; all that it signifies is, that the first Person of the Holy Trinity is eminently distinguished by an article; but not that the addition, or the omission, of an article makes any alteration in the sense of the word Θεός. You say, that "three of the most learned "Ante-Nicene Greek Fathers insist upon this remark about the "article; [a]Clemens of Alexandria, [b]Origen, and [c]Eusebius."

[a] Clem. Alex. Strom. iii. p. 558. ed. Ox. Clemens does not make his remark on John i. 1, nor does he mention, that the Article is put to distinguish the Father's supereminent dignity of nature above the Son; as your reader, or perhaps yourself, might imagine. His design was only to prove, against Tatian, that the true God (and not the Devil) was the author of conjugal procreation; for which he cites Gen. iv. 25. observing, that Θεὸς in that place has the article ὁ before it; and therefore must be understood of the true God, the παντοκράτωρ. By the very same rule, Christ must be true God, in the same sense, according to Clemens. He is ὁ Θεός.

But what do they gather from it, or what do they mean by it? Do they mean that the Son is not *God* in the proper sense? Nothing like it. Do they mean that the article can never be properly applied when the Son is spoken of, or that the Scripture observes it as an invariable rule? That does not appear, but rather the contrary: for they understood many texts of the Old Testament, where Θεὸς occurs with the article, of Christ, as may appear, in some measure, from the texts before laid down; and might be more amply set forth by other evidence, were any needful in so clear a case.

The truth of the whole matter is, the title of ὁ Θεὸς, being understood in the same sense with Αὐτόθεος, was, as it ought to be, generally reserved to the Father, as the distinguishing *personal* character of the first Person of the Holy Trinity. And this amounts to no more than the acknowledgment of the Father's prerogative, as Father. But as it might also signify any Person who is truly and essentially God, it might properly be applied to the Son too: and it is so applied sometimes, though not so often as it is to the Father. However, it is hardly worth the while to dispute this point. The sum and substance of all is, that [d] the Father is absolutely and eminently styled ὁ Θεὸς, as the fountain of all; the Son, Θεὸς, God of *God*; which is sufficient to our purpose. You observe, (p. 42,) that the LXXII have Θεὸς without the article, wherever mention is made of God, in what you call the subordinate sense. The inference I should draw from thence is, that when Θεὸς has the article prefixed, the supreme God is meant thereby. By this rule, if the concurrent sense of the Ante-Nicene writers be of any force or weight with you, our dispute would be at an end. For they apply innumerable texts, wherein Θεὸς occurs with the article, to our Saviour Christ. But if you slight their authorities, yet I presume you will be concluded by the inspired writers,

See p. 72, 132, 251, 273, 436, 832; and likewise ὁ παντοκράτωρ, p. 277. See also p. 148, 647.

[b] In Joh. p. 46. Origen means no more than that the Father is Αὐτόθεος, God unoriginated; the Son, God of God.

[c] Eccl. Theol. l. ii. c. 17. Eusebius makes no further use of the observation than to prove, against Marcellus, that the Λόγος is a distinct *real* Person; and not the Father himself.

[d] See this more fully explained and illustrated in Dr. Fiddes's Body of Divinity, vol. i. p. 383, &c. and 397, &c.

who apply some texts of the Old Testament, which have Θεὸς with the article, to our blessed Lord. Compare

Numb. xxi. 5, 6, 7.	1 Cor. x. 9.
Isa. xlv. 22, 23.	[e] Rom. xiv. 11. Phil. ii. 10.

I had almost forgot to take notice of one pretence more you have, for the subordinate sense of Θεὸς, in John i. 1. You word it thus, (p. 41.) "He who is *God*, and at the same time is *with* "*God* who begat Him, must needs be God in a different mean-"ing; unless the same God could be *with himself*," &c. To this it is readily answered, that being *with God* is the same as being *with the Father*, (compare 1 John i. 2,) who is God, and eminently so styled, as being first in order[f]. If he were not always with him, and inseparable from him, he could not be God in a proper sense. God and God, or God of God, supposes two *Persons*; and therefore there is no foundation for the objection of the Son's being with *himself*. Having thus endeavoured to obviate your exceptions, I now proceed in the proof of my position. The *Word* is here (John i. 1.) said to have been God *in the beginning*; that is, *before the creation*; from whence it is further probable, that he is God in the strict and proper sense. This circumstance may at least be sufficient to convince you, that the relative sense, which you contend for, is not applicable. He could have no relation to the creatures before they were made; no *dominion* over them when they were not: and therefore could not be God in the sense of *dominion* or *office*. But what most of all demonstrates the *Word* to be here called God in the proper sense is, that the creation of all things is ascribed to him. Creation is an indisputable mark of the one true God; the [g] distinguishing character by which he was to be known, and for which he was to be reverenced above all Gods; and on [h] account of which he claims to himself all homage, worship, and adoration. But of this I shall have occasion to say more hereafter, and

[e] Vid. Surenhus. Conciliation. p. 511.

[f] There is no inconsistency in admitting a priority of order, and yet denying the Son to be God in a subordinate or improper sense. There was a priority of order in respect of Adam and Seth; and yet Seth was not man in a subordinate sense, but in the same sense as Adam was. I use not the similitude, as if it would answer in other respects; but it may serve so far to illustrate my meaning; which is sufficient. See *Exposit. Fid.* attributed to Justin. Mart. p. 293. Sylb. ed.

[g] Jerem. x. 11.

[h] Rev. iv. 10, 11.

therefore shall dismiss it for the present. I must not forget to add, that, besides what I have here urged, by virtue also of what hath been proved under Query the first, I may come at my conclusion. For no question can be made but that the *Word* is called God, by St. John, in a higher sense than any nominal God can pretend to. And therefore, since he is not excluded with the nominal Gods, he is included and comprehended in the one Supreme God; and consequently is coeternal and coessential with the Father. Enough hath been said in vindication of the argument contained in this Query; and so now I return it upon you, standing in full force, and expecting a more complete and more satisfactory answer.

QUERY IV.

Whether, supposing the Scripture-notion of God to be no more than that of the Author and Governor of the universe, or whatever it be, the admitting of another to be Author and Governor of the universe, be not admitting another God, contrary to the texts before cited from Isaiah, and also to Isa. xlii. 8, xlviii. 11, *where he declares, he will not give his glory to another?*

YOUR answer is, (p. 42.) "Supposing the revealed sense of "the word God, to imply *dominion*, and that he is *the Author* "*and Governor of the universe*, the admitting a *second Person*, "distinct from the one supreme God, to be *Author and Governor*, "doth by no means contradict the passages cited from Isaiah, "or any other, or introduce two Gods, viz. two supreme Beings "or Persons." Give me leave to produce the texts of Isaiah once more, and to place others in an opposite column to them, only *mutatis mutandis*, putting *Author and Governor of the universe* instead of the word *God;* which, with you, amounts to the same.

I am the Lord, and there is none else, there is no *Author and Governor of the universe* beside me, Isa. xlv. 5.	The Word was *Author and Governor of the universe*, John i. 1.
Is there an *Author and Governor of the universe* beside me? yea, there is no *Author*, &c. Isa. xliv. 8.	Christ came, who is over all, *Author and Governor of the universe*, blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 5.

I hope you see plainly how the texts in the two opposite columns confront and contradict each other; and that two *Authors and Governors of the universe*, whom you suppose two

distinct separate Beings, are as plainly *two Gods*, as if it were said so in terms. For indeed there is no difference more than that of putting the definition for the thing defined. But you have an evasion after, that they are not two *supreme Beings*. And what if they are not? Are they not still two *Authors and Governors of the Universe?* and is not every such *Author and Governor*, by your own account, a God? This pretence then comes too late. Or admitting that *supreme* must be added to Author and Governor, to make a true definition of God, then *Author and Governor of the universe*, without *supreme*, is not sufficient to denominate a person God; and so you *ungod* the second Person; and what you gave with one hand, you take away with the other.

What you should have said is, (for it is what you really mean,) that there are *two Gods;* one supreme, and the other subordinate: which being a proposition utterly repugnant to the texts of Isaiah, and to the whole tenor of Scripture, and to all antiquity, you do not, I suppose, care to speak it at length. I have before endeavoured to expose this notion of two Gods, one supreme, and the other inferior; and have shewn it to be unreasonable and unscriptural. I may add, that if there really be two Gods (supreme and inferior) in the proper scriptural sense of the word, the good Fathers of the three first centuries argued against the heathen Polytheism upon a very false principle, and died martyrs for an error; the angel in the Revelations may seem to have imposed upon St. John with an erroneous maxim, Rev. xix. 10, our Saviour's answer to the devil to have been defective, and not pertinent, Luke iv. 8, and the many declarations of the Unity, scattered through the Old Testament, to be unintelligible and insignificant. But this shall be more distinctly explained when I come to the argument concerning worship.

Here let me only ask you, where does the Scripture give you the least intimation of two true Gods? Where does it furnish you with any ground for the distinction of a sovereign and an inferior Deity? What foundation can you find for adding *supreme* wherever the Scripture says absolutely there is but *one* God? You are apt to complain of us for adding to the text, and for pretending to speak plainer than the Holy Spirit has dictated; why do you add here, without any warrant? If the sacred writers intended to limit the sense by *supreme*, why could

not they, in one place at least among many, have said so, and have told it us as plainly as Dr. Clarke and you do? I argue indeed here *ad hominem* only; and let it have just as much force with you, as the same way of arguing, when you take it up in your turn, ought to have with us. But further; what account can you give of your leaving room for inferior Deities, when the reason of the thing, the drift, scope, and design of the Scripture seems plainly to have been to exclude not other Supremes only, or other independent Deities, (which few have been weak enough to suppose,) but other lesser, inferior, and dependent Divinities? Besides, God has declared that "he will not give "his glory to another," Isa. xlii. 8, xlviii. 11. This you say "has "no difficulty." How so, I beseech you? It seems to me a very great difficulty in your scheme. You add, that "his glory is, "his being the one supreme independent cause and original of "all things or beings." Now I thought it was his peculiar glory to be truly *God*, and to be acknowledged as such, exclusive of other Gods. This, I am sure, is what the one God inculcates and insists upon very particularly in the Old Testament. He discovers himself to be a jealous God, and looks upon it as the highest indignity to have any admitted as partners and sharers with him. All acts of worship, all homage, service, adoration, and sacrifice, he claims, he challenges as his due, and due to him only, and that because he *only* is God. Now put the case of *another God*, another *Author and Governor of the universe;* that other will have a share, and divide, though unequally, with him in glory. Was this then the meaning of Isaiah xlii. 8. "I will not give *all* my glory to another?" I will have the greater share in every thing? How consistent might this be with the worship of inferior Deities, or with the rankest Polytheism! For many of the Pagans themselves paid their highest veneration to the one supreme God; only they defiled his worship with a multitude of inferior Deities; they gave not God the *sole* glory, but admitted others as sharers and partners with him. You add, that "whatever divine honour is justly given to any other, "redounds ultimately to the glory of him, who commanded it to "be given."

But what if God, who best knows what redounds to his glory, has already and beforehand engrossed all divine honour to himself, as being the only God, and the *sole Author and Governor of the universe?* then all others are precluded from receiving any

divine honour; and there is no more room left for God's commanding it, than there is for his confronting and contradicting himself. But more of this hereafter, under the head of *worship*. I shall close this article with Grotius's comment upon the text which we have been considering. The meaning of it is, says he, [1] "That God will take severe vengeance on those who give "that name, which belongs to him, to Bel, Nebo, Merodach "and others, which by nature are no Gods."

QUERY V.

Whether Dr. Clarke's pretence, that the authority of Father and Son being one, though they are two distinct Beings, makes them not to be two Gods, as a king upon the throne, and his son administering the father's government, are not two kings, be not trifling and inconsistent? For if the king's son be not a king, he cannot truly be called king; if he is, then there are two kings. So if the Son be not God in the Scripture-notion of God, he cannot truly be called God; and then how is the Doctor consistent with Scripture, or with himself? But if the Son be truly God, there are two Gods upon the Doctor's hypothesis, as plainly as that one and one are two: and so all the texts of Isaiah cited above, besides others, stand full and clear against the Doctor's notion.

YOU trust, it seems, that "upon a second consideration of "this fifth Query, the objector himself will not think it very "pertinent or conclusive." But I can see no reason for your being so sanguine upon it. For as an argument so plain and strong needs not so much as a second consideration; so if the objector were to consider it ever so often, he could not but think it to be, as he finds it, both very pertinent and very conclusive. You add, that "he will not ask a second time, "whether one divine Person exercising the authority of another, "to whom he is subordinate, and by whom he is sent, proves "that the two Persons are two Gods."

But let me entreat you, in a subject of this importance, not to trifle at this rate; talking backwards and forwards, saying and unsaying, asserting and then recanting, and contradicting yourself. What is Dr. Clarke's intention, and what is yours, in

[1] Vult enim dicere, se vindicaturum severe in eos qui nomen, quod ipsius est, dant Belo, Neboni, Meraducho, et aliis τοῖς μὴ φύσει οὖσι Θεοῖς.

insisting so much on the *relative* sense of the word *God*, but to find a salvo for the divinity of the Son, that he may be acknowledged, consistently with your hypothesis, to be *truly, really, properly* God? Read but over again what you yourself have written, (p. 113.) and then deny this if you can. Well then, if the Son, a distinct separate Being, be *truly* and *really* God, and if the Father be so too, what can be plainer than that there are, upon your hypothesis, *two* Gods? But you say, one is supreme, the other subordinate. I understand it; I consider it: and do not you allow that a subordinate being may be properly God? Do not you expressly plead and contend for it? Is it not essential in Dr. Clarke's Scheme, and yours too? What mean you then to deny that there are two Gods? Can you deny it, without recanting all that you had said before; without striking out every subordinate being from being *truly* and *properly* God; without disowning the very principle upon which you assert the Son to be *God;* in short, without manifestly confronting and condemning yourself? I do not charge you with asserting two supreme Gods; but I do charge you with holding two Gods, one supreme, another inferior; two real and true Gods, according to the Scripture-notion of the word *God,* as explained by yourself. This you cannot truly and sincerely, you should not otherwise, deny: and therefore, instead of shifting it off, your business should be to maintain your assertion, and to reconcile it, as far as possible, to Scripture, antiquity, and reason. I am sensible something may be pleaded, having seen what has been pleaded, for the notion of two Gods, as you understand it. But I think it is upon such principles, as will leave you no pretence from Scripture to object *Tritheism* to others; nor any just ground for insisting, as you generally do, upon the strict force of the exclusive terms, in order to *ungod* the Son. I will not however anticipate what you may have to say further on this head; nor what may be pertinently replied to it. Let me see first, how far you will in good earnest espouse the notion of two Gods: in the interim I may fairly leave you to consider of it. I shall be content at present to follow you in the way that you are in, endeavouring to clear yourself of the charge of asserting two Gods, and yet, all the while, pleading for a subordinate God. To countenance your notion, you produce, [a]after the learned Doctor, the authority of Tertullian; the same Tertullian whom

[a] Script. Doctr. p. 333.

I have quoted above [b]as declaring expressly against any such vain imagination as that of a subordinate God, and throwing it off as a Pagan dream; the same that says, the Divinity has no *degrees*, being *one* only. Will you bring him for a voucher, so directly against himself? True, he uses the similitude of a king upon a throne, and a son administering his father's kingdom; but to a very different purpose from what you would have it serve. The objection against more Persons than one in the Godhead (as Tertullian resolves it) was, that the *authority* would not be *one;* that there would not be *unicum imperium:* see the place in the [c]margin. The similitude is pertinent to shew how the *authority*, or *government*, may be *one* in the hands of *several* Persons. But if you ask Tertullian how Father and Son can be reputed *one God*, he tells you in the [d]chapter before, and in that very passage which the Doctor quotes, that it is by *unity* of *substance*, and *original*. *Unity of authority*, and *unity of Godhead*, are, with Tertullian, distinct things, however you may please to confound them: God and his angels have, according to him, *one authority;* but he does not therefore say, that the angels are *Gods;* or that if they were, there would still be but *one God*.

[e]Athenagoras makes use of the same similitude for the same purpose with Tertullian, to illustrate the unity of *authority* and

[b] See above, Qu. iii. p. 306.

[c] *Monarchiam*, inquiunt, tenemus. Et ita sonum vocaliter exprimunt Latini, etiam opici, ut putes illos tam bene intelligere monarchiam, quam enuntiant. Sed monarchiam sonare student Latini; et œconomiam intelligere nolunt etiam Græci. At ego, si quid utriusque linguæ præcerpsi, *monarchiam* nihil aliud significare scio, quam *singulare et unicum imperium:* non tamen præscribere monarchiam, ideo quia unius sit, eum, cujus sit, aut filium non habere, aut ipsum se sibi filium fecisse, aut monarchiam suam non per quos velit administrare. Atquin, nullam dico *dominationem* ita unius sui esse, ut non etiam per alias proximas personas administretur—— Si vero et filius fuerit ei, cujus monarchia sit, non statim dividi eam, et monarchiam esse desinere, si particeps ejus adsumatur et filius. *Contr. Prax.* c. iii. p. 502.

The sense of this passage is very clear: the Praxeans (I suppose taking advantage of this, that the Church had always rejected tria principia, and τρεῖς ἀνάρχους) pleaded for themselves, and against a real Trinity; μοναρχίαν tenemus. Tertullian tells them, that they misunderstood μοναρχία: (as it might signify *unum principium*, he had answered the objection before, c. 2.) Here, he says, it signifies only one authority; and he shews that, taken in that sense, it was no just objection against a Trinity of Persons. Thus, having maintained, first, unity of principle, and afterwards unity of authority, he sufficiently guarded the doctrine of the Trinity against the cavils of Praxeas.

[d] Unus omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiæ scilicet unitatem, p. 501.

Filium non aliunde deduco, sed de substantia Patris, c. iv. p. 502.

[e] Legat. c. xv. p. 63.

power common to Father and Son; not the unity of *Godhead.* It was the [f]government divine which he undertook, in some measure, to illustrate by that comparison of a king and his son, (which however would argue an equality of nature, contrary to your tenets.) But as to unity of *Godhead*, he resolves it into [g]other principles, the same with Tertullian's; namely, *unity of substance* and *original*, making the Holy Ghost (and the reason is the same for the Son) to be a substantial [h]emanation from the Father, as light from fire. The common answer to the charge of Tritheism, or Ditheism, as well of the Post-Nicene as Ante-Nicene Fathers, was, that there is but one Head, Root, Fountain, Father of all; not in respect of *authority* only, but of *substance* also; as Tertullian before expresses it: "Non aliunde deduco, "sed de substantia Patris." This was the concurrent sense of [i]all in general; and into this chiefly they resolved the unity of Godhead, as they must needs do, since they believed *God* to be a word denoting *substance*, not *dominion* only; and one *Divinity*, Θεότης, was with them the same thing as one *Divine substance.* The learned Doctor, after his manner of citing, [k]produces, I think, thirteen vouchers (ten ancient, three modern) for his notion of the Unity. Tertullian, Athenagoras, and Novatian, (three of them,) evidently resolve the Unity, as before observed, into *communion of substance.* Justin, Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Pearson, Bull, Payne, (seven more,) most of them, in the very passages which the Doctor cites; all of them, somewhere or other, are known to resolve it into Sonship, or unity of principle; either of which comes to the same with the former. None of these authors so understood the Father to be one God, as to exclude the Son from being one God with him in nature, substance, and perfection: nor would they have scrupled to call Father and Son together one God; most of them doing it expressly, all implicitly.

Origen, another of the Doctor's authors, resolves the Unity into communion of Godhead, in the [l]passage cited. Θεότης is the word he uses; [m]generally, if not constantly, signifying substance in that very comment from whence the citation is taken;

[f] ἐπουράνιον βασιλείαν.

[g] Page 38, 39, 96.

[h] Νοῦς, λόγος, σοφία, υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ ἀπόῤῥοια, ὡς φῶς ἀπὸ πυρὸς, τὸ πνεῦμα, p. 96.

[i] Some pretended exceptions will be considered in another place, Qu. 23.

[k] Script. Doctr. p. 334, 335, &c. alias p. 301, &c.

[l] Comm. in Joh. p. 46.

[m] See ibid. p. 35, 133, 154, 228, 262.

agreeably to the most usual sense of Θεὸς, in the Ante-Nicene writers; and of *Divinitas*, in Tertullian; and of Θεότης in other [n] authors.

Lactantius, the twelfth of the number, would have spoken fully to our purpose, in the very [o] chapter referred to, if the Doctor would have suffered him. He would have told us, (however unhappy he may otherwise be in his explications of that mystery,) that Father and Son are *one substance*, and *one God;* so far, at least, contrary to what the learned Doctor cites him for. There remains only Eusebius, whose expressions are bold and free; and so far favourable to the Doctor, as they are different from those of the Catholics of his own time, or of the times before, and after. If they are really to be understood, so as to exclude the Son from being one God with the Father, they *un-god* the Son, and contain plain Arianism. But perhaps they may admit of such a favourable excuse as, [p] Gelasius tells us, Eusebius, in effect, made for himself, in respect of any uncautious expressions, which, in the warmth of dispute, or out of his great zeal against Sabellianism, had dropped from him: "That he did not "intend them in the impious sense, (of Arius,) but had only "been too careless and negligent in his expressions." One may be the more inclined to believe it, since he admitted, at other times, (as I have observed above,) *one God in three Persons:* and elsewhere [q] speaks very orthodoxly of the holy undivided Trinity, illustrating the *equality* of the Persons by a very handsome similitude. But to return to the learned Doctor. In the [r] close of this article he has a peculiar turn, which should be taken notice of. "The Scholastic writers," says he, "in later ages, have "put this matter" (meaning the Unity of the Godhead) "upon "another foot:" that is, different from what himself, and perhaps Eusebius in those passages, had put it upon. They have not, it

[n] Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 847. Eusebius Comm. in Psalm. p. 323, 592. et in Isa. p. 375, 382, 551. Athanas. passim. Epiphan. Hæres. lxiv. c. 8.

[o] Una utrique mens, unus Spiritus, *una substantia* est; sed ille quasi exuberans fons est; hic tanquam defluens ex eo rivus: ille tanquam sol; hic quasi radius a sole porrectus.——Ad *utramque Personam* referens intulit, et *præter me* non est Deus; cum possit dicere, *præter nos;* sed fas non erat plurali numero separationem tantæ necessitudinis fieri. Lib. iv. c. 29. p. 403, 404.

[p] Οὐ μὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀσεβῆ ἐκείνου ἔννοιαν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀπεριέργου ἁπλότητος. *Gelas.* l. 2. *de Syn. Nic.* c. i. p. 11.

[q] Εἰκὼν δὲ ταῦτα μυστικῆς καὶ παναγίας καὶ βασιλικῆς τριάδος. ἡ τῆς ἀνάρχου καὶ ἀγεννήτου φύσεως ἠρτημένη, τῆς τῶν γεννητῶν ἁπάντων οὐσίας τὰ σπέρματα, καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, ἀπείληφε. *Orat. de Laud. Const.* p. 511. ed. Vales.

[r] Script. Doctr. p. 349.

seems, put it upon a *real, proper numerical individuality*, as the learned Doctor would have had them do. They do not make the Godhead *μονοπρόσωπος*, one single hypostasis; which, in the main, is all one with the Sabellian singularity.

The reader should be told, that those Scholastic writers are as old as Tertullian, Irenæus, or Athenagoras; which brings it up almost to the middle of the second century. So early, at least, Father and Son together have been called, and all along believed to be *one God*. Let but the reader understand, and take along with him, what I have now observed, and I shall not differ with you about names. Scholastic may stand for Catholic, as I perceive it often does with you also, if you think the Catholic faith may, under that borrowed name, be more safely or more successfully attacked. The Scholastic notion then, which has prevailed for fifteen centuries at least, is, that Father and Son are *one God:* yours, on the other hand, is, that the Father is one God, and the Son another God: and I am to convince you, if I can, that one God, and another God, make two Gods. You ask me seriously, [s] "whether Herod the Great was not king of Judea, "though the Jews" (that is, when the Jews) "had no king but "Cæsar?" I answer, he was not: for Herod the Great had been dead above thirty years before; and the Jews had really no king but Cæsar when they said so. However, if there had been one king under another king, there would have been two kings. The same I say for one God under another God; they make *two Gods*. You ask, next, "whether there were more kings of "Persia than one, though the king of Persia was king of kings?" I shall not dispute whether king of kings was titular only to the kings of Persia, or whether they had other kings under them. I shall only say thus: either the supposed kings of Persia were kings of Persia, or they were not: if they were, then there were more kings of Persia than one: if they were not kings of Persia, they should not be so called. To apply this to our present purpose; either there are two Authors and Governors of the universe, that is, *two Gods;* or there are not: if there are, why do you deny it of either? If there are not, why do you affirm it of both?

After all, please to take notice, that I do not dispute against the notion of one king under another; a petty king under a

[s] Page 45.

supreme. There is no difficulty at all in the conception of it. But what I insist upon is this: that a great king and a little king make two kings; or else one of them is no king, contrary to the supposition. The same I say of a *supreme* and a *subordinate* God, that they make *two Gods*; or else one of them is *no God*, contrary to the supposition.

Texts proving an unity of divine attributes in Father and Son; applied

To the one God.	*To the Son.*
Thou, even thou only, knowest the hearts of all the children of men, 1 Kings viii. 39.	He knew all men, &c. John ii. 24. Thou knowest all things, John xvi. 30. Which knowest the hearts of all men, Acts i. 24.
I the Lord search the hearts, I try the reins, Jer. xvii. 10.	I am he that searcheth the reins and the heart, Rev. ii 23.
I am the first, and I am the last; and beside me there is no God, Isa. xliv. 6.	I am the first, and I am the last, Rev. i. 17.
I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, Rev. i. 8.	I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, Rev. xxii. 13.
King of kings, and Lord of lords, 1 Tim. vi. 15.	Lord of lords, and King of kings, Rev. xvii. 14. xix. 16.
The mighty God, Is. x. 21.	The mighty God. Is ix. 6.
Lord over all, Rom. x. 12.	He is Lord of all, Acts x. 36. Over all, God blessed &c. Rom. ix. 9.

QUERY VI.

Whether the same characteristics, especially such eminent ones, can reasonably be understood of two distinct Beings, and of one infinite and independent, the other dependent and finite?

IN this sixth Query (for so I choose to make it, thinking that method most convenient, on several accounts) are couched two arguments for the Son's being the *one true God*, as well as the Father.

The first is; That the characteristics, applied to the *one true God*, are applied likewise to the Son: which consideration alone is of great force.

The second is; That the attributes here applied to the Son are such eminent ones, that we might safely conclude they belong to no creature, but to God only.

How shall we know who or what the one God is, or what honour, and to whom, due; but by such marks, notes, and distinguishing characters as are given us of him in Scripture? If those are equally applied to two or more *Persons*, the honour

must go along with the attributes; and the attributes infer an equality of nature and substance to support them. In a word; if divine attributes belong to each *Person*, each *Person* must be God; and if God, since God is one, the same God. This is the sum of the argument: now let us see what answer you give to it.

You admit that the attributes, specified in the texts, belong to both: only you observe, that "all powers and attributes are "said to be the Father's only, because they belong to him prima-"rily, or originally, as the self-existent [a]cause." This I can readily admit, as well as you, provided only the word *cause* be interpreted to a just, sober, and catholic sense, (as the Greek writers especially have understood it,) and *self-existent* be interpreted, as it should be, negatively. You add, "Our Lord Jesus "Christ, having all communicable divine powers derived to him, "with his being, from the Father, is said to do the same things "which the Father doth, and to be, in a subordinate sense, what "the Father is."

Here are many things in this answer liable to just exception. First, your using the word *divine* in an improper sense. *Angelical* powers are such as are peculiar to angels; and *divine* powers such as are proper to *God* only: but here you understand it in the same sense as one might call any kingly power or authority *divine*, because derived from God; and so any thing that comes from God is, in your sense, *divine*. In the next place, you clog it further with the term *communicable*, telling us, that all *communicable divine* powers are derived to Christ Jesus: whereas I contend, that the attributes in the text are strictly *divine*; and therefore incommunicable to any creature. Next, you speak of a *subordinate* sense, in which those attributes belong to Christ; which is the same as to say, (because you mean so,) that they belong not at all to him. For, I suppose, omniscience, or eternity, &c. in your subordinate sense, are very different from the other; and therefore are not the same attributes. It were better to deny roundly, that the same attributes belong to both; and then we should clearly apprehend each other. Lastly, I observe to you, that you understand the word *subordinate* very differently from what catholic writers do in this controversy, and therefore, instead of it, should rather have said, in a *restrained, limited* sense; which is your meaning, otherwise you contradict not me.

[a] Page 46.

Now then I must ask you, what ground or warrant you have from Scripture, or right reason, for putting restrictions and limitations upon the texts applied to Christ Jesus, more than to those applied to the one God? The expressions are equally general, and, seemingly at least, equally extensive. You are so sensible that you can give no solid proof of a restrained and limited sense, that you do not so much as offer at it; but only covertly insinuate your meaning, under dark and obscure terms. You speak of *subordination*, and quote Fathers for it, who understood it in the sober and orthodox sense: if you agree with those Fathers, you agree with me. But do not use their venerable names as a cover for what they never meant, but would have greatly abhorred[b]. I allow the second Person to be *subordinately* wise, good, powerful, &c. That is not the question between us: he is *sapientia de sapientia*; as *lumen de lumine*, and *Deus de Deo*. What I contend for further is, that his attributes are strictly divine, and his perfections infinite. I prove it from hence; because the attributes which belong to the *one God*, and are therefore undoubtedly infinite, belong to him also; from whence it follows, that the Godhead belongs to him too; and that there are more persons than one in the *one God*. Whatever I can find in your answer tending in the least to invalidate this reasoning, I shall take notice of; though you have been pleased to be very sparing in this article. You observe, that "the exercise of these attributes being finite, they "do not necessarily infer an infinite subject." I understand not what you mean by the *exercise* of eternity and omniscience, which are two of those attributes; nor how it can be finite, without an express contradiction; nor how either of them can be *exercised*, whatever you mean by it, but by an infinite subject. As little do I understand how infinite power, which, I presume, is what you chiefly allude to, must be finite in the exercise of it; as if there could not be an act of infinite power, or as if God could not do something which should infinitely exceed any finite power. These things very much want explaining; and so I leave them to your further thoughts.

The clearest expression you have under this article is this:

[b] The testimonies which you have cited from Dr. Clarke, I take no notice of; because they have been already considered by a learned Gentleman, and shewn to be foreign to your purpose. *True Script. Doctr. continued*, p. 11.

"When Christ is styled *Lord of all*, see it explained, Matt. "xxviii. 18. and Ephes. i. 22, where Christ is said to *have all* "*power given him.*" Here, I think, I do understand your meaning; and am sorry to find that it falls so low. Would your [c] predecessors in this controversy, the ancient Arians, or Eunomians, have ever scrupled to acknowledge that our blessed Saviour was *Lord over all*, long before his resurrection, or even his incarnation? That he was "*Lord of all*" before his resurrection, is very plain from the Scriptures, which carry in them irrefragable proofs of it. "By him were all things created, that are in "heaven, and that are in earth, visible, and invisible, whether they "be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things "were created by him, and for him: and he is before all things, "and by him all things consist," Col. i. 16, 17. "Thou, Lord, "in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and "the heavens are the works of thine hands," [d] Heb. i. 10.

[c] Antequam faceret universa, omnium futurorum Deus et Dominus, Rex et Creator erat constitutus. Voluntate et præcepto (Dei et Patris sui) cælestia et terrestria, visibilia et invisibilia, corpora et spiritus, ex nullis exstantibus, ut essent, sua virtute fecit. *Serm. Arianor. apud August.* tom. viii. p. 622.

[d] It is not without good reason that we understand Heb. i. 10. of Christ:

1. The context itself favours it. The verse begins with *καὶ σὺ*, which properly refers to the same who was spoken of immediately before, in the second Person. The *σοῦ* preceding and *σὺ* following, answer to each other. A change of person, while the same way of speaking is pursued, must appear unnatural.

2. The scope and intent of the author was to set forth the honour and dignity of the Son above the angels; and no circumstance could be more proper than that of his *creating* the world.

3. If he had omitted it, he had said less than himself had done before, in verse the 2nd, of which this seems to be explanatory; and as he had brought proofs from the Old Testament for several other articles, nothing could be more proper or more pertinent, than to bring a proof from thence of this also.

4. Declaring him to be *Jehovah*, and *Creator* of the universe, might be very proper to shew that he was no *ministering spirit*, but *σύνθρονος*; to *sit at the right hand of God*, which immediately follows.

5. To introduce a passage here about God's immutability or stability, must appear very abrupt, and not pertinent; because the angels also, in their order and degree, reap the benefit of God's stability and immutability. And the question was not about the duration and continuance, but about the sublimity and excellency of their respective natures and dignities.

6. I may add, that this sense is very consonant to antiquity; which every where speaks of the Son as *Creator*, and in as high and strong terms: such as these, *τεχνίτης, δημιουργός, ποιητής: ἀνθρώπων, ἀγγέλων, τῶν πάντων, τῶν ὅλων, τοῦ κόσμου*, and the like; testimonies whereof will occur hereafter. Barnabas, speaking of the sun in the heavens, calls it *ἔργον χειρῶν αὐτοῦ*, meaning Christ; though there is some dispute about the reading: of which see *Grab. Not. in Bull. D. F.* p. 23.

These considerations seem sufficient to overthrow the pretences of a late writer, Examin. of Dr. Bennet

Can you imagine that the Son could be *Creator* and *Preserver* of all things from the beginning, and yet not be *Lord over all* till after his resurrection? If this does not satisfy you, return to John i. 1. He was Θεὸς before the world was, by your own acknowledgment; which being a word of office, and implying dominion, he was certainly *Lord*, as soon as ever there was any thing for him to be Lord over. And when he came into the world, the world that was made *by him*, (John i. 10,) he came unto *his own*, (John i. 11.) Surely then he was *Lord over all* long before his resurrection.

You will ask, it may be, what then is the meaning of those texts which you have quoted? How was *all power given him*, according to Matt. xxviii. 18? Or how were *all things* then *put under his feet*, according to Ephes. i. 22? Nothing is more easy than to answer you this. The Λόγος, or Word, was from the beginning, *Lord over all;* but the God incarnate, the Θεάνθρωπος, or God-Man, was not so, till after the resurrection. Then he received, in that capacity, what he had ever enjoyed in another. Then did he receive that *full power* in both natures, which he had heretofore possessed in one only. This is very handsomely represented by Hermas, in his fifth Similitude: where the [e] Son of God is introduced under a double capacity, as a son and as a servant, in respect of his two natures, divine and human.

"[f] The father calling his son and heir whom he loved, and "such friends as he was wont to have in council, he tells them "what commands he had laid upon his servant, and moreover "what the servant had done; and they immediately congratu-"lated that servant, for that he had received so full a testimony "from his lord."——(Afterwards the father adds,) "I will "make him my heir together with my son.——This design of "the lord both his son and his friends approved, namely, that "this servant should be heir together with his son."

It is much to the same purpose that Origen says to Celsus;

on Trin. p. 40. As to former exceptions to this verse, they are considered and confuted by Bishop Bull, Jud. Eccl. p. 43. See also Surenhus. in loc. p. 600.

[e] See Bull. D. Fid. N. p. 38.

[f] (Pater) adhibito filio quem carum et hæredem habebat, et amicis quos in consilio advocabat; indicat eis quæ servo suo facienda mandasset, quæ præterea ille fecisset. At illi protinus gratulati sunt servo illi, quod tam plenum testimonium domini assecutus fuisset——volo eum filio meo facere cohæredem.——Hoc consilium domini, et filius, et amici ejus comprobaverunt, ut fieret scilicet hic servus cohæres filio. *Herm. Past. Sim.* v. c. 2. p. 104. Cot. edit.

" [g] Let those our accusers (who object to us, our making a God " of a mortal man) know, that (this Jesus) whom we believe to " have been God, and the Son of God from the beginning, is no " other than the Word itself, Truth itself, and Wisdom itself: " but we say further that his mortal body, and the human soul " that was therein, by means of their most intimate connection " to, and union with the Word, received the greatest dignity " imaginable, and, participating of his divinity, were taken into " God." It is difficult to express the full force of this passage in English: but you may see the original in the margin.

From hence you may perceive, how easy it is to account for our Lord's having *all power given him*, after his resurrection; given him in respect of his human nature, which was never so high exalted, nor assumed into such power and privilege, till that time; having before been under a state of affliction and humiliation. There is a notable fragment of Hippolytus, which Fabricius has lately given us in the second volume; and which is so full to our purpose, that I cannot forbear adding it to the former. Speaking of that famous passage in the Epistle to the Philippians, chap. ii. and particularly upon these words; " Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him," ver. 9, he comments upon it thus: " [h] He is said to be *exalted*, as having " wanted it before; but in respect only of his *humanity*; and he " has a name *given* him, as it were a matter of favour, *which is* " *above every name*, as the blessed (Apostle) Paul expresses it. " But in truth and reality, this was not the *giving* him any thing, " which he naturally had not from the beginning: so far from " it, that we are rather to esteem it his returning to what he " had in the beginning [i] essentially and unalterably; on which " account it is, that he having condescended, *οἰκονομικῶς*, to put " on the humble garb of humanity, said, Father, glorify me with " the glory which I had &c. For he was *always* invested with " divine glory, having been coexistent with his Father before all " ages, and before all time, and the foundation of the world [k]."

[g] *Ἴστωσαν οἱ ἐγκαλοῦντες ὅτι ὃν μὲν νομίζομεν καὶ πεπείσμεθα ἀρχῆθεν εἶναι Θεὸν καὶ υἱὸν Θεοῦ, οὗτος ὁ αὐτολόγος ἐστι, καὶ ἡ αὐτοσοφία, καὶ ἡ αὐτοαλήθεια· Τὸ δὲ θνητὸν αὐτοῦ σῶμα, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴν, τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, οὐ μόνον κοινωνίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑνώσει καὶ ἀνακράσει, τὰ μέγιστά φαμεν προσειληφέναι, καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου θειότητος κεκοινωνηκότα εἰς Θεὸν μεταβεβηκέναι.* *Orig. contr. Cels.* l. iii. p. 136, &c.

[h] Hippolytus, vol. ii. p. 29. Fabric. edit. See a parallel place in Origen, Com. in Joh. p. 413.

[i] *Οὐσιωδῶς καὶ ἀναποβλήτως.*

[k] I may add a passage of Novatian: Ac si de cœlo descendit Verbum hoc, tanquam sponsus ad carnem, ut per

I hope this may suffice to convince you how much you mistake; and how contrary your sentiments are, both to Scripture and catholic antiquity, if you imagine that the Λόγος, or Word, then first began to be *Lord over all,* when that honour was conferred on the Man Christ Jesus.

QUERY VII.

Whether the Father's omniscience and eternity are not one, and the same with the Son's, being alike described, and in the same phrases?

See the text above, p. 326.

YOUR answer, [1] with respect to the Son's omniscience, is, "that he hath *a relative omniscience* communicated to him from "the Father; that *he knows all things relating to the creation and* "*government of the universe;* and that he is ignorant of the day "of judgment."

The Son then, it seems, knows *all things,* excepting that he is ignorant of many things; and is omniscient in such a sense, as to know infinitely less, than one who is really omniscient. Were it not better to say plainly, that he is not omniscient, than to speak of a *relative* omniscience, which is really no omniscience; unless an angel be omniscient, or a man omniscient, because he knows all things which he knows? What ground do you find in Scripture or antiquity for your distinction of *absolute* and *relative* omniscience? Where is it said, that he knows all things *relating to his office,* and no more? Or how can he be so much as omniscient, in this low sense, if he knows not, or knew not, the precise time of the day of judgment; a thing which, one would imagine, should belong to his office as much as any? Matt. xxiv. 36. as well as Mark xiii. 32. is plainly meant only of the *human nature;* and is to the same effect with Luke ii. 52, "That he "increased in wisdom," which cannot be literally understood of the Λόγος with any tolerable consistency, even upon the Arian hypothesis [m]. You tell us further, that "all the Ante-Nicene

carnis adsumptionem *Filius Hominis* illuc posset ascendere, unde *Dei Filius,* Verbum, descenderat: merito, dum per connexionem mutuam, et caro Verbum Dei gerit, et Filius Dei fragilitatem carnis adsumit; cum sponsa carne conscendens illuc unde sine carne descenderat, recipit jam claritatem illam, quam dum ante mundi constitutionem habuisse ostenditur, Deus manifestissime comprobatur. *Novat.* c. 13.

[1] Page 48.

[m] A late writer acquaints us, in the name of Dr. Clarke and the Arians, (I presume, without their leave,) "that "the Word really emptied itself, and "became like the rational soul of an-

" writers understand by these two texts, that our Lord as the " Λόγος, or Son of God, did not then know the day of judgment," (p. 49.) This is very new indeed; if you have read the Ante-Nicene writers, you must know better: if you have not, how unaccountable a thing is it to talk thus confidently without book? If what you say was true, we should, without delay, give you up all these writers to a man; and never more pretend to quote any Ante-Nicene Father, in favour of the present orthodoxy. But as the point is of great moment, we must require some proofs of it: for writing of history by invention is really romancing. You cite Irenæus from [n] Dr. Clarke, who could find no other: or else we should have heard of it from the first hand. And yet you cry out, *all;* which is more than the learned Doctor pretended to say; who had his thoughts about him, and would not have let slip any fair advantage to the cause which he espouses.

But has the Doctor really proved that Irenæus meant so? Perhaps not: and then your *all,* which was but *one,* is reduced to *none.* Two things the Doctor, or you, should have proved: first, that Irenæus understood those texts of the Λόγος, or Word, in that capacity: and secondly, that he supposed him *literally* ignorant of the day of judgment. The Doctor knew full well what solutions had been given of the difficulty arising from this passage. Yet he barely recites Irenæus's words; and neither attempts to prove that such was his sense, nor to disprove it. You indeed do observe, from some learned person, that this passage of Irenæus " will admit of no evasion. For " he evidently speaks not of the *Son of man,* but of the *Son of* " *God;* even of that Son with whom, as it follows, *in omnibus* " *Pater communicat.*" Let this have its due weight: the argument may look so far plausible on that side: but let the other

" other man, which is limited by the " bodily organs; and is, in a manner, " dormant in infancy; and that the " Word may be deprived of its former " extraordinary abilities——in reality, " and grow in wisdom, as others do." This is making the Λόγος, that greatest and best of beings, (upon the Arian scheme,) next to God himself, become a child in understanding; though once wise enough to frame and govern the whole universe. The author calls it, (I think very profanely,) " the true " and great mystery of godliness, God " manifest in flesh." One would think, instead of *manifest,* it should have been, *confined, locked up* in flesh; which is the author's own interpretation of this mystery, (p. 16.) What design he could have in all this, I know not; unless he considered what turn Arianism took, soon after its revival at the Reformation. See *Exam. of Dr. Bennet on the Trin.* p. 15, 16.

[n] Script. Doctr. p. 146. alias 132.

side be heard also, before we determine. [d] Bishop Bull has given some reasons, and weighty ones too, to shew, that if Irenæus attributed any ignorance to Christ, he did it in respect of his *human nature* only. His reasons are,

1. Because Ironæus, in the very same chapter, [e] ascribes *absolute omniscience* to the *divine nature* of Christ.

2. Because he every where else speaks of the Son, as of one *perfectly* acquainted with the nature and will of the Father.

3. Because the same [f] Irenæus upbraids the Gnostics for their folly, in ascribing any degree of ignorance to their pretended Sophia, or wisdom. How then could he imagine that the true Sophia, wisdom itself, could be ignorant of any thing?

4. Because the same Irenæus [g] uses an argument against the Valentinians, who pretended to know all things, which plainly supposes that Christ is omniscient. The argument is this. You are not *eternal* and *uncreated*, as the Son of God is; and therefore cannot pretend to be *omniscient*, as he is.

It might have concerned you to answer these reasons, and to make the good Father, at least, consistent with himself, before you lay claim to his authority for your side of the question. However, I am persuaded, that as Bishop Bull is very right in determining that Irenæus could not mean to ascribe any degree of ignorance to the Λόγος, or *divine nature* of Christ; so you are right so far in the other point, that Irenæus is to be understood of the Λόγος, in what he says. And now the question will be, whether he really ascribes ignorance to him, or only seems to do so, to an unattentive reader.

Irenæus's words, I conceive, will most naturally bear this following interpretation, or paraphrase. [h] "If any one inquires on

[d] Def. F. N. p. 82. Comp. Brev. Animadv. in G. Cl. p. 1056.

[e] Spiritus Salvatoris, qui in eo est, scrutatur omnia, et altitudines Dei. L. ii. c. 28. p. 158.

[f] See l. ii. c. 18. p. 140. Iren. Quomodo autem non vanum est, quod etiam Sophiam ejus dicunt in ignorantia——fuisse? Hæc enim aliena sunt a Sophia, et contraria —— ubi enim est improvidentia et ignorantia utilitatis, ibi Sophia non est.

[g] Iren. l. ii. c. 25. p. 152. ed. Bened. In quantum minor est, ab eo qui factus non est et qui semper idem est, ille qui hodie factus est et initium facturæ accepit: in tantum, secundum scientiam et ad investigandum causas omnium, minorem esse eo qui fecit. Non enim infectus es, O homo, neque semper coexistebas Deo, sicut proprium ejus Verbum: sed propter eminentem bonitatem ejus, nunc initium facturæ accipiens, sensim discis a Verbo dispositiones Dei, qui te fecit. The whole passage is fuller to the point.

[h] Si quis exquirat causam, propter quam in omnibus Pater communicans Filio, solus scire et horam et diem a Domino manifestatus est; neque aptabilem magis, neque decentiorem, nec

" what account the Father, who communicates in *all things with* " *the Son*, (and consequently in *all knowledge*, and particularly in " that of the day of judgment,) is yet here set forth as the only " Person knowing that day and hour, he cannot, so far as I at " present apprehend, find any fitter or more decent, or indeed " any other safe answer than this, (considering that our Lord is " a teacher of truth, and must mean something by it,) that it " was to instruct us, as from himself, that the Father is above " all, according to what he says elsewhere, ' for the Father is " greater than I.' And therefore the Father is declared to " have the priority and preference in respect of knowledge, by " our Lord himself, for an example to us; that we also, while " we live and converse here below, may learn to refer the perfec- " tion of knowledge, and all intricate questions to God."

The design of Irenæus was to check the vain presumption and arrogance of the Gnostics, pretending to search into the deep things of God. And the argument he had used was this; that our Lord himself was pleased to refer the knowledge of the day of judgment to the Father only, as it were on purpose to teach us, that while we converse here below, it becomes us not to pretend to high things; but to leave the deep things of God, to God alone. This is his argument, and a very good one it is. But the good Father apprehending that what he had said of our blessed Saviour might be liable to exception, and be misunderstood, comes afterwards to explain his sense more at large. He is sensible of the danger of ascribing any thing like ignorance to our blessed Lord, on one hand, and as sensible of the danger of contradicting the text, on the other. " Quoniam enim solus " verax magister est Dominus;" inasmuch as what Christ has said must be true, in some sense or other. Dr. Clarke slipped over these words in his translation of the passage, I suppose by

sine periculo alteram quam hanc inveniat, in præsenti, (quoniam enim solus verax magister est Dominus,) ut discamus per ipsum super omnia esse Patrem. Etenim Pater, ait, major me est. Et secundum agnitionem itaque præpositus esse Pater annuntiatus est a Domino nostro; ad hoc, ut et nos, in quantum in figura hujus mundi sumus, perfectam scientiam, et tales quæstiones concedamus Deo: et ne forte quærentes, &c. *Iren.* l. ii. c. 28. p. 158, 159.

He had said before;

Dominus, ipse Filius Dei, ipsum judicii diem et horam concessit scire solum Patrem, manifeste dicens: " De die autem illo et hora nemo scit, " neque Filius, nisi Pater solus." Si igitur scientiam diei illius, Filius non erubuit referre ad Patrem, sed dixit quod verum est; neque nos erubescamus, quæ sunt in quæstionibus majora secundum nos, reservare Deo, p. 158.

inadvertency; but they may serve to give light to the rest; for the difficulty lay here: how can it be true that the Father communicates in *all* things, and consequently in the knowledge of the day of judgment, to the Son, and yet our Saviour say true, in ascribing that particular knowledge to the Father only? His answer is, that we are thereby taught to refer every thing to the Father, as the *original* of all things. To him knowledge ought to be *principally*, and in the *first place*, ascribed: our Saviour therefore himself yields to him the *preference*, as became him, especially here on earth: not as if he knew less, but because what he knew, he knew by communication from the Father; to whom therefore he refers such secrets as it was not proper to reveal, nor fit for men to inquire after.

That this is all that Irenæus meant, may reasonably be thought; not only because otherwise it would be utterly inconsistent with many other parts of his writings, as has been before observed; but also because several expressions in this very passage lead to it. Had he really believed the divine Λόγος, or *Word*, to be *literally* ignorant, why should he be so apprehensive of the difficulty of those texts? Why so concerned about the fitness and decency of his interpretation; and that it might be *sine periculo?* The danger was, in interpreting seemingly against the text, to find a salvo for the Son's omniscience. For this reason, he does not ask, why the Father only *knew*, (not, *cur Pater solus scivit*,) but why, or on what account (*solus scire manifestatus est*) he was *represented* as alone knowing; or, he only was *said* to know. He does not say, as the Doctor's translation insinuates, that the Father is more knowing than the Son, but *præpositus* only; which signifies *set before, having the preference*, or the like; which may be conceived, though he be equally knowing: and, for the greater caution, it is not said absolutely *præpositus est*; but *præpositus esse annunciatus est:* he is *declared* to have the preference. So that the question, with Irenæus, is not why the Father is superior in knowledge; but why, since Father and Son are equally knowing, our Saviour makes such a declaration as gave the preference to the Father. And the reasons which he assigns are very much to the purpose.

1. To instruct us, that the Father is the fountain and original, even of the Son himself.

2. Because, in his then present state of condescension, it became him to refer all to the Father.

3. Because it may be an useful example of humility and modesty to us, that we, much rather, while we are here below, may not pretend to high things.

Upon the whole, it may appear, that Irenæus's solution of the difficulty is the very same with that which the [i] Doctor quotes from St. Basil, who had learned it from a child: namely this, "That our Lord meant to ascribe to the Father the first (i. e. "the primary, original) knowledge of things present and future; "and to declare to the world, that he is in all things the first "[k] cause." As the Son is *God of God*, and *Light of Light*; so it is proper to say, *Omniscience of Omniscience*, &c., the attributes being derivative in the same sense as the essence is: which is St. Basil's meaning; and, I think, Irenæus's.

This defence may be fairly and justly made for Irenæus, supposing that what he said was meant of the Λόγος, or divine nature, as such: to which opinion I incline. Nevertheless, I should not affect to be dogmatical in that point, since learned and judicious men have been of both sides of the question. Petavius [l] observes, that the sense is *ambiguous*; and that there are not *certain* grounds to determine us either way. If he understood it of the human nature only, then the difficulty is nothing: if of both, I have shewn how fair an account may be given of it. Having thus got over Irenæus, I have at once taken from you all your Ante-Nicene writers. You will observe, that the texts might be understood of the Λόγος, or *divine nature*, as Basil understands them, in the place above cited; and yet that they, who so understood them, might be far from thinking that the Λόγος, or *Word*, was ever ignorant of any thing. [m] Dr. Clarke, to do him justice, is, in the main, so very fair and reasonable in his account of those two texts, that we have no occasion at all to differ with him. I wish, as you have in most other matters, so you had here also copied after him.

I will not leave this article, without giving you a specimen of the sense of the Ante-Nicene writers in regard to the Son's omniscience, that you may have a better opinion of those good

[i] Script. Doctr. p. 147, 148. alias 134, 135.

[k] Basil. ad Amphiloch. Ep. 391. Conf. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. xxxvi. p. 584.

[l] Irenæus, libro secundo capite 29, *ambigue* loquitur; ut nescias inscitiam illius diei Christo, saltem qua est homo, tribuat, an non ac possit ad utramque deflecti sententiam.

[m] Reply to Mr. Nelson's Friend, p. 171.

and great men. We may begin with Ignatius. [n] "There is nothing "hid from the Lord: but our very secret things are nigh unto "him. Let us therefore do all things, as having him dwelling "in us; that we may be his temples, and he our God in us."

I proceed to Clement of Alexandria, who says thus: "[o] The "Son of God never goes off from his watchtower: never parted, "never separated, nor moving from place to place; but is "always every where, and contained nowhere: all mind, all "light, all eye of his Father, beholding all things, hearing "all things, *knowing all things*."

[p] In another place: "Ignorance (*in any degree*) cannot affect "God, him that was the Father's counsellor before the founda-"tion of the world."

[q] Origen is pretty large upon the very texts whereof we have been speaking. He gives several interpretations: but it is observable, that he studiously endeavours to find some solution, which may acquit the Λόγος from the imputation of being literally ignorant of the day of judgment. What Origen's opinion was of Christ's *omniscience*, you may also see [r] elsewhere. To confirm what hath been said, one general remark I will leave with you.

The Sabellian controversy began early, and lasted long in the Church. The dispute was, whether Father and Son were one and the same *hypostasis* or *Person*. Had the Catholics inter-

[n] Οὐδὲν λανθάνει τὸν Κύριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κρυπτὰ ἡμῶν ἐγγὺς αὐτῷ ἐστιν. *Ignat. Ep. ad Ephes.* c. xv. p. 17. Ox. ed. That Κύριον is meant of Christ, is very highly probable from the use of the word in this author, and from the context.

[o] Οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταταί ποτε τῆς αὐτοῦ περιωπῆς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ· οὐ μεριζόμενος, οὐκ ἀποτεμνόμενος, οὐ μεταβαίνων ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, πάντῃ δὲ ὢν πάντοτε, καὶ μηδαμῇ περιεχόμενος, ὅλος νοῦς, ὅλος φῶς, Πατρῷος ὅλος ὀφθαλμὸς, πάντα ὁρῶν, πάντα ἀκούων, εἰδὼς πάντα——— *Clem. Alex. Strom.* l. vii. c. 2. p. 831. See also p. 113, 611, 832.

[p] Ἄγνοια γὰρ οὐχ ἅπτεται τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦ πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου συμβούλου γενομένου τοῦ Πατρός. P. 832.

N. B. The Doctor's criticisms (Script. Doctr. p. 326, alias 294.) upon Clemens are very slight. I need only hint, that παντοκράτωρ is applied to the Son at least twice, (p. 148, 277,) and παγκρατὴς once (p. 647.) by Clemens: and that παντοκράτωρ may as well signify *omni-tenens* as *omnipotens;* and that *omni-tenente voluntate* is not improper, but agreeable to Clemens's philosophy, (see the Notes to Clemens, p. 431. ed. Ox.): and that therefore Christ might be supposed *naturally omniscient*, by Clemens, notwithstanding the Doctor's pretences: besides that the passages themselves referred to, if well considered, can bear no other sense. See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 161 of this edition.

[q] Hom. 30. in Mat.

[r] Comm. in Joh. p. 28. Huet. ed. He puts the very question, whether the Son knows *all* that the Father knows, and determines in the *affirmative;* blaming those who, under pretence of magnifying the Father, presumed to deny it. The passage is rather too long to be here inserted.

preted these two texts, as you pretend they did, there could not have been any thing more decisive against the Sabellians. Tertullian, you know, encountered them in a pretty large book, his book against Praxeas; Hippolytus entered the lists against Noetus; and his book is still extant; Eusebius's famed piece, against Marcellus, is to the same purport; several fragments besides, of other authors, remain. Please to look them over; and see if [s]you can find any one of them combating the Sabellians with these texts: and if you cannot, either be content to own, that it was a very strange and unaccountable omission in those writers; or else that they had quite other notions of things than you have hitherto imagined. The Arians you find afterwards, perpetually almost, teasing the Catholics with those texts: strange they should never have been insisted on against the Sabellians, being so full to the purpose; especially if, as you suppose, the Ante-Niceno writers were themselves of that persuasion, which was afterwards called Arian. It is evident that the Sabellians must have understood the texts, if they are to be taken literally, of the man Christ Jesus only; otherwise there had been a manifest repugnancy, in the words, "not the Son, but "the Father;" since they supposed Father and Son one and the same *hypostasis*. It is as plain, that they must have thought that the Catholics agreed with them in that exposition; otherwise they would have charged them, not only with *Tritheism*, but with the denial of the Son's *essential Divinity*. It does not appear that those texts ever came into controversy betwixt them, or were ever urged by the Catholics; so that both seem to have agreed in the same interpretation. So much for the point of *omniscience*.

I come next to consider what you have to object to my argument for the Son's *eternity*. I had put it upon this; that it is described in the same phrases with God the Father's; which, one would think, should be high enough. You tell me that "the Son's *metaphysical eternity* is nowhere expressly revealed." What the fine word, *metaphysical*, signifies here, I know not. If his *eternity* is revealed, it is enough for me. That I understand to be revealed in these two texts, Rev. i. 17, xxii. 13. "I am the first, and I am the last:" "I am Alpha and Omega,

[s] Tertullian indeed cites the text, in passing; not drawing any such argument, as I mean, from it. What he meant will be shewn hereafter, under Query 26th.

"the beginning and the end." That these and the like phrases respect duration, appears from Isaiah xliii. 10. compared with Isaiah xliv. 6. In the latter, the words are; "I am the first, and "I am the last; and besides me there is no [t]God." The former expressing the same thought, runs thus: "Before me was there "no God formed, neither shall there be after me." The phrase of "Alpha and Omega, first and last," is, in like manner, explained Rev. i. 8: "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning "and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and "which is to come." The phrase then respects duration; and it is applied to our blessed Saviour, as hath been shewn, Rev. i. 17, xxii. 13. Therefore there was no God before him: therefore he is, in the strictest sense, *eternal*. You say, "the "objector hath not brought one text of Scripture that at all "proveth it." I did not produce all the texts proper upon that head: I designed brevity. Besides, I had a mind to remove the cause, from criticism upon words, to one plain and affecting argument; viz. that the proof of the *Son's* eternity stands upon the same foot, in Scripture, with the proof of the *Father's;* and is expressed in as strong words. And for this I appeal, as to the texts above cited, so also to Prov. viii. 22, &c., which you allow to be spoken of the Messias. The original word, which we translate, "from everlasting," is the very same with what we meet with in Psalm xc. 2, where also we find a parallel description of *eternity,* applied to the *one God.* See also Psalm xciii. 2. I allow your observation, that the Hebrew word may, and sometimes does, signify a *limited,* as well as it does, at other times, an *unlimited* duration. And therefore I do not lay all the stress of my argument upon the critical meaning of the word; but upon that, and other circumstances taken together: particularly this circumstance; that the *eternity* of the Father is described in the same manner, and in the same phrases, with the other; as by [u]comparing Psal. xc. 2. with Prov. viii. 22, &c. and Rev. i. 8. (supposing that text to be meant of the Father) with Rev. xxii.

[t] Compare also Isa. xlviii. 12. See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 144, of this edition.

[u] Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God, Ps. xc. 2.

The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was——— Before the mountains were settled, before the hills was I brought forth, Prov. viii. 22, &c.

13. may fully appear. I do not argue from a single phrase, or the particular force of it; but from several; and these equally applied to both: as it were on purpose to intimate, that though these phrases singly might bear a limited sense; yet considering that God had made choice of them, as most significant to express his *own* duration; and again made choice of the very same, out of many others, to express his *Son's* duration too, we might from thence be taught to believe that the Son is *coeternal* with him.

You are sensible of the objection lying against you; namely, that there is no certain proof, according to your way of reasoning, of the *eternity* of the Father, in the Old Testament: and so resolute you are in this matter, that, rather than admit the Son to be *eternal* too, you are content to leave us in the dark, so far as the Old Testament goes, about the other. But, for a salvo to the Father's *eternity*, you observe, that it is emphatically expressed in the New Testament, (Rom. i. 20,) forgetting that the word ἀΐδιος occurs but [x]once more in the New Testament; and then signifies *eternal* in a limited sense only, or a *parte post*, as the schools speak. Well then, for any thing I see to the contrary, we must contentedly go away, without any Scripture proof of the *eternity* of the Father, for fear it should oblige us to take in the Son's also. And this, indeed, is what you are beforehand apprehensive of, and prepared for; and therefore it is that you tell us, that "there appears no necessity "at all, that the attribute of eternity should be distinctly "revealed with respect to the *Father*; whose eternity our "reason infallibly assures us of," (p. 50.) Infallibly assures: so you say; and, I believe, in my own way, I might be able to maintain your assertion. But I profess to you, that I do not, at present, apprehend how, upon your principles, you will be able to make any complete demonstration of it. It would be ridiculous to talk of proving from reason only, without revelation, that the Person whom we call the Father, the God of Jews and Christians, is the *eternal* God. I will therefore presume that you mean by *reason*, reason and revelation both together; and if you effectually prove your point from both, it shall suffice. You can demonstrate that there must be some *eternal God*, in the *metaphysical* sense, as you call it, of these words: but since

[x] Jude 6.

the Father, the God of Jews and Christians, has not declared, either that he is eternal, or God, in the *metaphysical* sense, it does not appear how he is at all concerned in it. He has said, indeed, that there is no God besides him; but as he did not mean it in the *metaphysical* sense, there may be another, in that sense, besides him, notwithstanding: nay, it is certain there are and have been other Gods; even in the *same* sense: for Moses was a *God* unto Pharaoh; and Christ is *God;* and therefore this cannot be literally true. It can only mean, that he is emphatically God, in some respect or other; perhaps as being God of our system; or God of the Jews and Christians, his *peculium*. It is true, he has called himself *Jehovah;* which if it signified necessary existence and independence, it would be an irrefragable proof of his being the *eternal* God. But it unfortunately happens that *Jehovah* signifies no more than a person of honour and integrity, who is true to his word, and performs his promises, (p. 19.) He has further declared himself to be *Creator* of the world: but this "exercise of *creating*, being "finite, does not necessarily infer an infinite subject," (p. 48.) Besides "that this office and character, relative to us, presup-"poses not, nor is at all more perfect for, the eternal past "duration of his being," (see p. 50.) What shall I think of next? I must ingenuously own, I am utterly nonplused: and therefore must desire you, whenever you favour me with a reply, to make out your demonstration. But let us proceed.

Having given us a reason, why it was not necessary that the *supposed eternity* of the Father should be revealed, you go on to acquaint us, why it was not needful to declare the *supposed eternity* of the Son. And here you give either two reasons, or one; I hardly know whether. "His office and character," you say, "relative to us, does not presuppose it." I know that very wise and judicious men have thought, that it does presuppose it. Bishop Bull, for instance, has spoke admirably well upon that head: but the passage being too long to transcribe, I shall only refer to it. How you come to take for granted a thing which you know nothing of, and which it is impossible either for you or any man else to prove, I know not. It is very manifest that, unless you have a full idea of the whole work of redemption, and can tell as well what belongs to a Redeemer, and a Judge

[y] Judic. Eccl. p. 12.

of the whole universe, as you can what belongs to a rector of a parish, you can pass no certain judgment. No man can certainly define the utmost of what was needful in the case; because no man can dive into the utmost depth of it. There may be more than you, or I, or perhaps angels, can see in that mysterious dispensation; and therefore it is the height of presumption to pronounce, that any power, less than infinite, might be equal to it. I do not say that the argument for Christ's Divinity, drawn from the greatness of the work of Redemption, and the honours consequent upon it, amounts to a perfect demonstration: but this I say, and am very clear in what I say, that it is much surer arguing for the affirmative, from what we know; than for the negative, from what we know not. It is possible our proof may not be sufficient: but it is, *à priori*, impossible that yours should. Whether we can maintain our point may perhaps be a question: but it is out of all question, that you cannot maintain yours.

Having answered this your first reason, why it was not necessary to reveal the Son's eternity, I proceed to the remaining words; which if I perfectly understood, I might know whether they are a distinct reason, or only an appendage to the former. They are these: "Nor is it" (Christ's office and character) "at "all more perfect for the eternal past duration of his being," (p. 50.) I have been considering why that word *past* was inserted, and what it can mean, in that place. It seems to be opposed either to *present*, or else to, *to come*, tacitly understood. At first, I thought thus: that it might be put in to prevent our imagining that Christ's office might not be at all more perfect for the eternal duration of his being *to come*. But considering again, that if he does but continue till the office is completed and perfected, it is all one, in respect of that office, whether his duration hold longer or no, I thought, that could not be the meaning. Reflecting again, I conceived that *past* might possibly have relation to the office considered as *present*, or commencing at such a time; suppose six thousand years ago: and you might think, what could it signify to date his being higher? If he did but exist soon enough for the office, it is sufficient. All the time run out before is of no consideration, having no relation to an office which was to commence after, and would still be but the selfsame temporal office, commencing at such a time. If I have hit your thought at length, I assure you it has cost me

some pains; and I wish you would express yourself more clearly hereafter.

Now then let us apply this manner of reasoning to another purpose: by parity of reason we may argue, that the office of God the Father, *commencing* at the creation; I say, the office of sustaining, preserving, and governing the world, has no relation to the time *past*, being but just what it is, whether a longer or a shorter, or no time at all be allowed for any *prior* existence; nor is it at all more perfect for the eternal past duration of his being. But does not this argument suppose that the office is such as may be discharged by a finite creature, or one that began in time? Certainly. And is not that the very thing in question in this, and in the other case too? Undoubtedly. How then comes it to be taken for granted? Besides, is not a person of unlimited, that is, eternal powers and perfections, more capable of discharging an office, than any creature? Well then, by necessary consequence, the *past* duration of the person is of great moment in the case; and the office must be thought as much more perfect, for the eternal past duration of his being, as God's perfections excel those of his creatures; and that is infinitely.

QUERY VIII.

Whether eternity *does not imply* necessary existence *of the Son; which is inconsistent with the Doctor's Scheme? And whether the* [a] *Doctor hath not made an elusive, equivocating answer to the objection, since the Son may be a* necessary emanation *from the Father, by the will and power of the Father, without any contradiction?* Will *is one thing, and* arbitrary will *another.*

TO the former part of the Query you answer, that "simple "and absolute eternity is the same with *necessary* or *self-existence;* "which is nowhere supposed of the Son, by Dr. Clarke." Here are several mistakes: for, first, the idea of *simple eternity* is not the same with that of *necessary existence*. Nor, secondly, is it the same with both *necessary existence* and *self-existence*, supposing it were the same with the former; because these two are not the same. The idea of eternity is neither more nor less than duration without beginning and without end. Some have supposed it possible for God to have *created* the world from

[a] Reply, p. 227.

all eternity; and they use this argument for it; that whatever he could once do, he could always do. Not that I think there is much weight in the argument; but it is sufficient to shew, that the ideas are distinct; and that, though eternity may, in sound reasoning, infer or imply *necessary existence*, as is intimated in the Query; yet the ideas are not the same: for if they were, it would be nonsense to talk of one inferring or implying the other. Then for the second point; it is very manifest that the ideas of *necessary existence* and *self-existence* (however they may be imagined with or without reason to imply each other) are not the same ideas. [b] Aristotle and the later Platonists supposed the world and all the inferior Gods (as Plato and the Pythagoreans, some supramundane deities) to proceed, by way of emanation, without any temporary production, from a superior cause: that is, they believed them to be *necessary*, but not *self-existent*. Something like this has been constantly believed by the Christian Church, in respect of the Λόγος: which shews, at least, that the ideas are different: and not only so, but that, in the opinion of a great part of mankind, they do not so much as infer and imply each other; one may be conceived without the other. However, that is not the point I insist on now. All that I affirm at present is, that the ideas are distinct; and not the very same. After you had laboured to confound these things together, you proceed to argue against the Son's being *eternal*. But what is that to the Query? I supposed Dr. Clarke (Reply, p. 227.) to understand the word *eternal*, as I or any other man should; and objected the inconsistency of acknowledging the *eternity* of the Son, and yet denying his *necessary existence*; which, *eternity*, I thought, inferred and implied. You admit my reasoning to be just, if the Doctor meant the same, by *eternal*, as I do. But if he meant by *eternal*, *temporary*, then my argument fails; as most certainly it must. But why are we thus imposed on with so manifest an abuse of words? What occasion is there for putting the epithets of *simple*, *absolute*, or *metaphysical* to the word *eternal*; which every one, that knows English, understands better without? Unless you suppose that there is an unlimited and a limited eternity, which is, in reality, an eternity and no eternity. You proceed to dispute against the *eternity* of the Son; which though it be something foreign to the purport

[b] See Cudworth, Intellect. System, p. 250, &c.

of the Query, yet being pertinent to the cause in hand, I shall here consider it. You argue that, if the Son be *eternal*, he is *necessarily existing*; which I allow: and if *necessarily existing*, then *self-existent*; which I [c]deny; and you cannot prove. You go on to a new consideration; which, put into syllogism, stands thus:

Whatever has a *principium* is not eternal: The Son has a *principium*, the Father being *principium Filii*—Therefore, &c.

The middle term, *principium*, is equivocal, and bears two senses; wherefore the syllogism consists of four terms. If *principium* be understood in respect of time, the minor is not true: if it be taken in any other sense, the major is not true: so that both cannot be true. You might, in the same way, argue that the sun's light is not coeval with the sun; nor thought coeval with the mind, supposing the mind to think always. For in both cases a *principium* is admitted; but no priority in respect of time. You add, that there is a reasonable sense in which the Son may be said to be *eternal*. I hope there is: but not your sense; which is just as reasonable as to say, an angel is *eternal*, only because you determine not the time when he came into being. I should think it most reasonable to use words according to their obvious and proper signification; and not to fix new ideas to old words, without any warrant for it. In this way of going on with the abuse of words, we shall hardly have any left full and express enough to distinguish the catholic doctrine by. It was once sufficient, before the rise of Arianism, to say, the Son is *God*: but by a novel sense put upon it, the word *God* was made ambiguous. To that were added, *truly* and *really*; to be more expressive: but the [d]Arians found out a sense for these terms too; and could gravely say, that the Son was *truly*, *really* God. God *by nature*, one might think, is full and strong enough: but you are stealing away the sense of that expression

[c] Ἀλλὰ μή τις, τὸ ἀεὶ, πρὸς ὑπόνοιαν ἀγεννήτου λαμβανέτω, ὡς οἴονται οἱ τὰ ψυχῆς αἰσθητήρια πεπηρωμένοι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἦν, οὔτε τὸ ἀεὶ, οὔτε τὸ πρὸ αἰώνων, ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ. *Alex. Ep. apud Theod.* l. i. c. iv. p. 17. This was said in opposition to the Arians, who were willing to confound the idea of *eternity* and of *necessary existence* with *self-existence*. The learned Doctor cites this passage directly against himself. (*Script. Doctr.* p. 283. alias 250.) It was intended, and is diametrically opposite to the Doctor's leading principle, or rather fallacy, which runs through his performance, viz. That the Son cannot be strictly and essentially God, unless he be *self-existent*, or *unoriginate* in every sense.

[d] See Socr. Eccl. Hist. l. ii. c. 19. p. 82. Theod. l. i. c. 28.

from us. We can add no more, but *eternally* and *substantially* God; and yet, I perceive, unless we put in *simply, absolutely, metaphysically*, or the like, even these words also may lose their force and significancy. But to what purpose is all this? Might you not better say plainly, that the Son is not *eternal;* not *by nature;* nor *truly* God; in a word, not *God?* No; but Scripture reclaims; and the whole Catholic Church reclaims; and Christian ears would not bear it. So then, it seems, it is highly necessary to speak orthodoxly, whatever we think; to strip the words of their sense, and to retain the sound. But to proceed.

As to the latter part of the Query, I am to expect no clear or distinct answer: because "what is meant by a necessary "emanation by the will of the Father, you understand not; "nor what again by the difference of *will* and *arbitrary will*," p. 52. Had you but retained in mind what you must have observed when you read the ancients, you could not have been at a loss to apprehend my meaning. You may please to remember, that one of the principal arguments made use of by the [e]Arians against the Catholics was this:

"[f]Either the Father begat the Son *with* his consent and will, "or *against* his will and consent." If the former, then that act of the will was *antecedent* to the Son's existence; and therefore he was not eternal: the latter was plainly too absurd for any Christian to own.

The Catholics took two ways of answering the dilemma. One, which was the best and safest, was, by [g]retorting upon the Arians the dilemma, thus: "Was God the Father *God, with* "or *against* his will?" By this short question, that so famous objection of the Arians was [h]effectually silenced.

But besides this answer, they had also another. They ad-

[e] See Athanas. Orat. contr. Arian. 2, 3, 4. Hilary, p. 1184. Greg. Nyss. p. 625. Petav. de Trin. p. 128.

[f] Interrogant (Ariani) utrum Pater Filium *volens* an *nolens* genuerit; ut si responsum fuerit quod *volens* genuerit, dicant, *prior* est ergo *voluntas* Patris; quod autem *nolens* genuerit, quis potest dicere? *August. contr. Serm. Arian.* l. i. p. 626. Bened. ed.

[g] Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 611. Bened. ed. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 565. August. de Trin. l. xv. c. 80. p. 994.

[h] Vicissim quæsivit ab eo, utrum Deus Pater *volens* an *nolens* sit Deus: ut si responderet, *nolens*, sequeretur illa miseria quam de Deo credere magna insania est; si autem diceret, *volens*, responderetur ei, ergo et ipse Deus est, *sua voluntate*, non *natura*. Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut obmutesceret, et sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili vinculo se videret. *August.* ibid.

See this further explained in the Postscript, p. 561 of this volume.

mitted that the generation of the Son was *with the will and consent* of his Father; in the same sense that he is wise, good, just, &c. necessarily, and yet not against his will. Some thought it reasonable to say, that the Father might *eternally* will the generation of the Son, and that he could not but will so, as being *eternally good.* [i]See Petavius. This way of reasoning [k]Bishop Bull mentions, hardly approving it: and one would almost think that [l]Dr. Clarke was once inclinable to subscribe to it, understanding *eternal,* as we do. But he thought fit [m]afterwards to explain himself off into another meaning. There was another notion which [n]some of the primitive writers had; namely, this: "That since the *will* of God is God himself, as "much as the *wisdom,* &c. of God is God himself; whatever is "the fruit and product of God, is the fruit and product *of his* "*will, wisdom,* &c., and so the Son, being the perfect image of "the Father, is substance of substance, wisdom of wisdom, will "of will, as he is light of light and God of God:" which is St. Austin's doctrine, in the [o]place cited in the margin.

By this time, I presume, you may understand what I meant by the latter part of the Query. There is a sober, Catholic sense, in which the Son may be acknowledged to be *by,* or *from,* the *will* of the Father, and yet may be a *necessary emanation* also. And therefore Dr. Clarke did not do well in opposing those two, one to the other; as if they were inconsistent: especially considering that he produces several authorities to prove the generation to be by a [p]*power of will,* in opposition to *necessity of nature,* from writers who asserted both; and denied only such a supposed *necessity* as might be against, and a force upon the Father's will. This is manifest of his citations from the [q]Council of Sirmium, Marius Victorinus, Basil, and Gregory Nyssen; and hath been clearly shewn by his learned [r]antagonist. The

[i] Pag. 591, 592.

[k] D. F. N. p. 222.

[l] Script. Doctr. p. 280, &c. Reply, p. 113. Paper given in to the Bishops.

[m] Clarke's Lett. N. 8.

[n] See the testimonies collected by Cotelerius, in his Notes upon the Recognitions of Clem. p. 492. and by Petavius, l. vi. c. 8. l. vii. c. 12. See especially Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 613. Bened. ed. Epiphan. Hæres. 74. p. 895.

[o] De Trin. l. xv. c. 8.

[p] Script. Doctr. p. 281, &c. alias, 247, &c.

[q] Script. Doctr. p. 285, 286. alias, 252, 253.

[r] True Script. Doctr. continued, p. 119, &c.

N. B. The Doctor manifestly perverts the sense of the Council of Sirmium, and of Hilary's comment upon it, by mistranslating them; putting *without his will,* instead of *against his will.* See the Preface to my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 13 of this edition.

sum of all is, that the generation of the Son may be by *necessity of nature*, without excluding the concurrence or approbation of the will. And therefore *will* (i. e. consent, approbation, acquiescence) is one thing; and *arbitrary will* (that is, free choice of what might otherwise not be) is another. You endeavour to prove, that the Son derives his being from the *will* of the Father, in this latter sense; which is the same thing with the making him a *creature*. You recite some scraps of quotations, as collected by Dr. Clarke and Dr. Whitby, in your Notes, p. 51. Not one of the citations is to your purpose, or comes up to your point. For instance; "Ignatius says, [s] Christ is the Son of "God, *according to the will and power of God*." Supposing this not to be meant of his [t] miraculous conception and incarnation, (which the context has been thought to favour, and which Bishop Pearson inclined to, in his Notes,) yet see how many several interpretations it may bear, besides what you would fix upon it.

1. *The fruit and offspring of the will and power of God:* signifying no more than *God of God*, in the sense intimated above, p. 348.

2. By the *eternal* will and power of God, in a sense likewise before intimated, and owned by some of the Post-Nicene writers.

3. With the approbation and acquiescence of God, in the same sense that he is pleased with, and acquiesces in, his own wisdom, goodness, and other perfections.

4. The passage may relate, not to the Son's *generation* in the highest sense; but to his *manifestation*, or *coming forth*, in order to create the world; which is a kind of [u] *filiation* mentioned by

[s] Ἀληθῶς ὄντα ἐκ γένους Δαβὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, υἱὸν Θεοῦ κατὰ θέλημα καὶ δύναμιν Θεοῦ. *Ignat. Ep. ad Smyrn.* c. i. p. 1.

[t] I can by no means think that the Son is here called υἱὸς Θεοῦ, in respect of his incarnation; which was really his nativity κατὰ σάρκα, to which this other is opposed, and which must therefore be understood of some higher sonship. The phrase of κατὰ σάρκα has been constantly so interpreted by the ancients; Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen, Novatian, the Synod of Antioch in the case of Paul of Samosata, Hippolytus, Eusebius, Lactantius, all explaining Christ's being the Son of David *according to the flesh*, by his birth of the blessed Virgin; and the phrase κατὰ σάρκα as opposed to a prior sonship, in his *divine* nature before the world was: in which respect he was *Son of God* before he became *Son of man*. That Ignatius intended the same is highly probable, not to say evident, from his own words elsewhere: Πρὸ αἰώνων παρὰ πατρὶ ἦν. *Magnes.* c. 6. Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀΐδιος. *Ibid.* c. 8. Χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ γενομένου, ἐν ὑστέρῳ, ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβίδ. *Rom.* c. vii. Compare *Apostol. Constit.* l. viii. cap. 1. Εὐδοκίᾳ Θεοῦ ὁ πρὸ αἰώνων μονογενὴς, ἐν ὑστέρῳ καιρῷ ἐκ παρθένου γεγέννηται.

[u] Clement of Alexandria seems to intend the same, (p. 654. ed. Ox.)

Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tertullian, Tatian, Novatian, and Hippolytus, and supposed as *voluntary* a thing as the incarnation afterwards; though the same authors asserted the *eternity* and *consubstantiality* of the Λόγος, or Divine nature of Christ; of which more hereafter.

From these four particulars, you may perceive how little you can be able to prove from that passage in Ignatius. As to Justin Martyr, I have already hinted in what sense he made the generation *voluntary*. But why you should choose to do that good Father a double injury, first in curtailing his words, and next in misrepresenting his sense, you can best account. The whole passage is this, literally translated: "[x] Who, according "to his (the Father's) good pleasure, is God, being his Son; "and an angel too, as ministering to his Father's will." The meaning is not, as you represent it, "that Christ is *God, by the* "*will of the Father*," (though even that might bear a good sense according to what has been observed above;) but that it was the Father's good pleasure that he should not only be *God*, as he always was, being God's Son; but that he should take upon him besides, the office of an angel. That he was *God*, was a [y] *necessary* thing, as he was God's Son, of the same nature with him: but that he should be both; i. e. God and an angel too; this was entirely owing to God's good pleasure. However, you have been something civiller to this ancient Father than Dr. Whitby has been, in his "Modest Disquisitions;" who, to serve a bad cause, uses a worse art; [z] cuts the quotation short at υἱὸν αὐτοῦ; and then, to make his own sense out of that passage, inserts *et* in his translation, rendering it thus: "Qui ex "voluntate ipsius et Deus est, *et* Filius;" leaving out "et

expressing it by the word προελθών. And it is extremely probable that Ignatius had the very same thought. Λόγος ἀΐδιος οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών. *ad Magnes.* cap. 8. Ἕνα Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, τὸν ἀφ' ἑνὸς πατρὸς προελθόντα, καὶ εἰς ἕνα ὄντα καὶ χωρήσαντα. *Ibid.* cap. 7.

[x] Τὸν κατὰ βουλὴν τὴν ἐκείνου καὶ Θεὸν ὄντα, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἄγγελον, ἐκ τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ αὐτοῦ. P. 280. *Sylb. Jebb.* 370. Parallel to which is that of Novatian. Personæ autem Christi convenit ut et Deus sit, quia Dei Filius; et angelus sit, quoniam paternæ dispositionis adnuntiator est. *Novat.* c. 26.

[y] For, though he was God, as being God's Son, and a Son κατὰ βουλὴν, according to Justin, and other writers before mentioned; yet they did not think that he was *God* κατὰ βουλήν. But because he *came forth*, as a Son, from the Father; and was not produced ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, (as all *creatures* are;) therefore he was *God*, having ever existed, before his *coming forth*, in and with the Father. Hic ergo quando Pater voluit, processit ex Patre: et qui in Patre fuit, processit ex Patre. *Novat.* c. 26.

[z] Whitby's Disq. Modest. p. 32.

"angelus," to which the former *et* referred. Strange that any should be so resolutely eager to *ungod* their Saviour, as not to permit the cause to have a fair hearing. It were pious, at least, to let the reader know what has, or what can be said on the other side of the question; and to give it its due weight and force. This is reasonable in any the most trifling matter that can come before us: but certainly much more so, where *his* honour is concerned, whom all men are commanded to "honour, even "as they honour the Father," John v. 23. For my own part, I declare once for all; I desire only to have things fairly represented, as they really are; no evidence smothered or stifled on either side. Let every reader see plainly what may be justly pleaded here or there, and no more; and then let it be left to his impartial judgment, after a full view of the case: misquotations and misrepresentations will do a good cause harm; and will not long be of service to a bad one. But to return. The second citation which you bring from Justin, you give such an account of, as must make one think, either that you never saw the book you mention; or else—but see the passage in the [a]margin. Your words are, "He hath all these titles (before-"mentioned, viz. that of Son, Wisdom, Angel, God, Lord, and "Word) from his being begotten of the Father by his will;" directly contrary to the whole tenor of the dialogue, and the very immediate words preceding those you cite. In your third quotation, you are pleased for the sake of English readers, to mistranslate *προελθόντα*, "produced," instead of, "coming forth," or "proceeding." Your next citation is from Clement of Alexandria: in which I find no fault but your referring to Strom. 5, instead of Strom. 7, and bringing a passage not certainly pertinent to the point in question. If you please to look into the [b]author himself, you will find it at least doubtful, whether he be speaking of the *generation* of the Son; or only shewing how he, by the Father's good pleasure, was at the head of

[a] Ἔχειν γὰρ πάντα προσονομάζεσθαι, ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ πατρικῷ βουλήματι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς θελήσει γεγεννῆσθαι. *Dial.* p. 183. Jeb. It is not from his being begotten of the Father that he hath *all* these titles; but from that, and his administering to his Father's will. Both together (not either *singly*) will account for all these titles.

[b] Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. p. 833. Ox. edit. Ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, θελήματι τοῦ παντοκράτορος πατρὸς, αἴτιος ὁ υἱὸς καθίσταται, πρωτουργὸς κινήσεως, δύναμις ἄληπτος αἰσθήσει· οὐ γὰρ ὃ ἦν, τοῦτο ἄφθη τοῖς χωρῆσαι μὴ δυναμένοις διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός. αἰσθητὴν δὲ ἀναλαβὼν σάρκα, &c.

affairs, and administered his Father's kingdom. Your next author is [c] Tertullian, who is indeed speaking of the generation, that is, *manifestation*, or *coming forth*, of the Son: and here you render *protulit*, "produced," meaning "into being," or "into a "state of existence:" which is not Tertullian's sense, nor of any of the Fathers who speak of that matter. Tertullian expressly [d] excepts against it: so does [e] Tatian, the next author which you name: and so likewise [f] Athenagoras, and [g] Hippolytus, whom you have not named: but I choose to mention them, as being useful to explain the former. [h] Eusebius may reasonably be interpreted by those that went before him; or by the emperor Constantine's explication of this matter, which shall be cited hereafter: or by his own account of the holy undivided Trinity, before mentioned: if not, his authority against the Catholics before and after him, and against himself, must appear of small weight. The rest of your authorities I have already spoke to; and you may perceive by this time, I presume, that none of them speak home to the purpose for which they were cited. However, for the sake of such who, being little acquainted with these matters, may be liable to be imposed upon by a few specious pretences, I shall now go a little deeper into the point before us, and endeavour to set it in a true light.

The distinction of a [i] *threefold generation* of the Son is well known among the learned, and is thus explained:

1. The first and most proper *filiation* and *generation*, is his eternally existing in and of the Father; the eternal Λόγος, of the eternal *mind*. In respect of this, chiefly, he is the *only begotten*, and a distinct Person from the Father. His other generations were rather condescensions, first to creatures in general, next to men in particular:

2. His second generation was his *condescension, manifestation, coming forth*, as it were, from the Father (though never separated or divided from him) to create the world: this was in time, and

[c] Tunc cum Deus voluit, ipsum primum *protulit* Sermonem. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* c. 6.

[d] Contr. Prax. c. 5.

[e] Tatian. sect. vii. p. 20. Ox. edit.

[f] Legat. sect. x. p. 39. Ox. ed.

[g] Contr. Noet. sect. x. p. 13. vol. ii. ed. Fabric.

[h] See True Script. Doctr. continued, p. 123.

[i] Bull. D. F. p. 232. Brev. Animadv. in Gil. Clerke, p. 1054. Fabric. Not. in Hippol. vol. i. p. 242.

a voluntary thing; and in this respect properly he may be thought to be πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, *first-born of every creature;* or before all creatures.

3. His third generation, or filiation, was when he condescended to be born of a Virgin, and to become man. These things I here suppose or premise only, for the more distinct apprehension of what is to follow; not expecting to be believed further than the proofs can justify. We may now proceed to speak of the doctrine of the ancients.

It is observable, that the Ante-Nicene writers are more sparing than those that came after, in speaking of the *first*, the *eternal generation;* sparing, I mean, as to the term, or phrase; not as to the thing itself. The eternity of the Word, or Λόγος, and the distinction of Persons, they all held; together with the consubstantiality, and unity of principle; which together are as much as can be meant by *eternal generation.*

Irenæus is a [k] frequent and constant asserter of the *eternity* of the *Word;* but *eternal generation* we do not read in express terms. Yet we find what amounts to it, by necessary implication. In one particular place [l] he censures those who pretended to ascribe *any beginning* to the nativity of the Word; which is in effect asserting an eternal *prolation*, or *generation;* for he makes these words [m] equivalent.

Origen, commenting upon the words of the second Psalm; "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee;" proceeds thus: "[n] They are spoken to him by God, with whom it is "always to-day: for, I conceive, there is no evening nor morn-"ing with him; but the time coextended, if I may so speak, "with his unbegotten and eternal life is the *to-day* in which the "Son is begotten; there being no beginning found of his "generation, any more than of the *to-day.*" This is further

[k] Pag. 153, 163, 209, 253. ed. Bened. We do not pretend to argue merely from the force of the word *semper*, or ἀεὶ, but from that and other circumstances: as when *infectus* goes along with it, or the like, p. 153. And as "*semper* aderat generi hu-"mano," p. 209, intimates that he was with men, as soon as any men existed; so, "existens *semper* apud Patrem," intimates his being *coeval* with the Father.

[l] Prolationis initium donantes. L. ii. c. 14. p. 132.

[m] L. ii. c. 28. p. 158.

[n] Λέγεται πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ᾧ ἀεί ἐστι τὸ σήμερον, οὐκ ἔνι γὰρ ἑσπέρα Θεοῦ. ἐγὼ δὲ ἡγοῦμαι ὅτι οὔδε πρωΐα· ἀλλ' ὁ συμπαρεκτείνων τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ καὶ ἀϊδίῳ αὐτοῦ ζωῇ, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, χρόνος, ἡμέρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ σήμερον, ἐν ᾗ γεγέννηται ὁ υἱὸς, ἀρχῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ οὕτως οὐχ εὑρισκομένης, ὡς οὐδὲ τῆς ἡμέρας. *Com. in Joh.* p. 31. Compare with this, the citation from Origen, in Pamphilus's Apology.

confirmed by what [o]Athanasius quotes from him, where Origen calls it presumption "[p]to ascribe any beginning to the Son;" and speaks of the *only begotten*, as being [q]*always* with the Father.

To Origen I may subjoin [r]Novatian, who says, the Son must have *always* existed in the Father, or else (which he takes to be absurd) the Father would not have been *always Father*. This, I think, can bear no sense, unless *always* be understood strictly. And it is very manifest that [s]Novatian supposes the Son to have existed before that *procession*, *coming forth*, or *nativity*, which he speaks of in that chapter. Some indeed have thought, that Novatian understands not the word *semper* there in the strict sense of unlimited duration; wherein I humbly conceive they are mistaken. I have transcribed the [t]passage into the margin, and shall proceed to explain its meaning. After the author had said, "*semper* est in Patre," he immediately adds a sentence which shews that he understood *semper*, as we say, *a parte ante*. But withal there is a seeming restriction: "Sic dico, ut non "innatum, sed natum probem." There might be some then, as well as now, who knew not how to distinguish between ETERNITY and SELF-EXISTENCE. The Sabellians in particular might pretend that the Son, being *eternal*, must be the *self-existent* Father himself. It was therefore necessary for the author to guard, in the manner he does, against any such mistake or misconstruction. So Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, while he maintains the strict eternity of the Son, to guard against the invidious misconstruction of the Arians, inserts the like caution[u]. "Let no "man," says he, "mistake *eternal*, as if it were the same with "*self-existent*, as the Arians, having their minds blinded, are "wont to do." This may serve for a good comment upon Nova-

[o] De Decret. Synod. Nic. p. 233. ed. Bened.

[p] Ἵνα τολμήσας τις ἀρχὴν δῷ εἶναι υἱοῦ πρότερον οὐκ ὄντος.

[q] Τοῦ ἀεὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ λόγου μονογενοῦς.

[r] Semper enim in Patre, ne Pater non semper Pater. C. 31.

[s] Et qui in Patre fuit, processit ex Patre: et qui in Patre fuit, quia ex Patre fuit, cum Patre postmodum fuit, quia ex Patre processit. C. 31.

[t] Hic ergo cum sit genitus a Patre, *semper* est in Patre. *Semper* autem sic dico, ut non innatum, sed natum probem; sed qui *ante omne tempus est*, *semper* in Patre fuisse dicendus est: nec enim tempus illi assignari potest, qui *ante tempus* est. *Semper* enim in Patre, ne Pater non *semper* sit Pater; quia et Pater illum etiam præcedit, quod necesse est prior sit qua Pater sit: quoniam antecedat necesse est eum, qui habet originem, ille qui originem nescit.

[u] See above, p. 345, 346. Vid. etiam Hilar. p. 1166, 1354. Prudent. Apoth. p. 172.

tian. To proceed: Novatian adds, "Qui ante omne tempus est, "semper in patre fuisse dicendus est." Here he explains *semper* by, *ante omne tempus*. Now this is the very same with him, as if he had said of the Son, "quod non aliquando cæperit;" as may appear by the [x]account he gives of the *eternity* of the Father; explaining it by his not being *posterior to time:* and his having no time before, is the very same with having nothing [y]*preceding*. Wherefore, when Novatian speaks afterwards of the Father's being *precedent* to the Son, he can mean it only in order of nature, not in respect of duration. And this I take to have been the meaning of the Catholic writers, before and after the rise of Arianism, by the phrases *ante tempus*, πρὸ αἰώνων, πρὸ πάντων αἰώνων, or the like, as applied to God the Son. So [z]Hilary, in the name of the generality of the Christians of his time, interprets it: so [a]Alexander of Alexandria, in his letter extant in Theodoret; the [b]Sardican Fathers in their synodical epistle; and the [c]Catholic bishops upon the opening of the council of Ariminum. Thus also we are to understand, πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων, in the Constantinopolitan creed. The [d]Arians indeed, equivocating upon the words *time* and *ages*, eluded the Catholic sense, still retaining the Catholic expression: but the Ante-Nicene Catholics were sincere, plain, honest men; and do not seem to have known any thing of those subtle distinctions. They understood those phrases as they would be commonly understood by the people; otherwise they would not have used them, without greater caution and reserve. [e]Sisinnius of the Novatian sect long ago observed, (which confirms what I have been mentioning,) that the ancients never would attribute any beginning to the Son of God, believing him to have been *coeternal*

[x] Nisi forte (quod absit) *aliquando esse cæperit*, nec super omnia sit, sed dum post aliquid esse cæperit, intra (leg. infra) id sit quod ante ipsum fuerit, minor inventus potestate, dum posterior denotatur *etiam ipso tempore*. *Novat.* c. 2. Mark the force of the words, *etiam ipso;* intimating that posteriority in time is a low degree of posteriority, and that a thing might be said to be *posterior* in a higher sense than that; viz. in *order of nature*, as we term it.

[y] Id quod sine origine est, præcedi a nullo potest, dum non habet tempus. *Ibid.* *Tempus* here manifestly signifies *duration*, in the largest sense; not *time*, in the restrained sense, as the Arians afterwards understood it.

[z] Audiunt *ante tempora;* putant id ipsum, *ante tempora*, esse quod *semper* est. *Contr. Aux.* p. 1266. *Comp. Trin.* l. xii. p. 1129, 1136.

[a] Eccl. Hist. l. i. c. 4. p. 13, &c.

[b] Apud Theod. E. H. l. ii. c. 8. p. 80, 81.

[c] Hilar. Fragm. p. 1343. ed. Bened.

[d] See Athanas. vol. i. p. 418. Hilar. 1129. Epiphan. Hær. lxxiv. p. 887.

[e] Socrat. E. H. l. v. c. 10.

with the Father. The inquisitive reader may observe the use of those phrases, in the places referred to in the [f]margin; all of them admitting, most of them requiring, the sense I contend for. I mention not the interpolator of Ignatius's Epistles, an Arian, probably, of the fourth century, or later. To return to Novatian: when he adds, "tempus illi assignari non potest;" he does not mean only, that no particular time of the Son's existence is assignable; but, that it was before all time, as himself expounds it, "ante tempus est," i.e. strictly *eternal;* [g]which agrees with what follows, and makes it sense: "Semper enim "in Patre, ne Pater non semper sit Pater." What can be more express for the *eternity* of the Son, than to declare that the Father was never without him? He plainly supposes it absurd to say, that the Father was ever no Father, or, which comes to the same, that ever the Son was not. What follows therefore, in that chapter, of the Father, "præcedit," and "antecedat necesse est," &c. can only be understood of a *priority of nature*, [h]not of *time*, or *duration;* and in this all Catholics agreed. You will excuse my dwelling so long upon Novatian: it was necessary, to clear his sense, and to obviate some [i]specious pretences, not only against Novatian, but other Catholic writers of whose meaning there is less dispute. From hence may be understood in what sense all the oriental bishops (if the fact be true, relying only on the doubtful credit of [k]Arius) might teach, προϋπάρχειν τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν Θεὸν ἀνάρχως. That it could not be meant in Arius's sense, is sufficiently evident from the determination of the Nicene Fathers, which has infinitely more weight in it than his single testimony, and shews the sense of the whole Church, in a manner, at that time. But enough of this: I shall only remark, before I part with Novatian, that he is an evidence both for the *first* and *second* nativity, or

[f] Ignatius ad Magnes. c. vi. p. 22. Justin. Fragm. in Grab. Spic. vol. ii. p. 199. Melito in Cav. H. L. vol. ii. p. 33. Origen. in Pamph. Apolog. Hippolytus Fragm. Fabric. vol. ii. p. 29. Concil. Antioch. contr. Paul. Sam. Lab. tom. 1. Dionys. Alexandr. Resp. contr. Paul. Q. 4. Lucian. Symb. apud Socr. l. ii. c. 10. Apost. Constit. l. viii. c. 5. Vid. etiam Suicer. Thesaur. in voce Αἰών.

[g] Hilary's words may serve as a comment upon Novatian's. Quod ante tempus natum est, semper est natum. Quia id quod est ante æternum tempus, hoc semper est. Quod autem semper est natum, non admittit ne aliquando non fuerit: quia aliquando non fuisse, jam non est semper esse. *Hilar. de Trin.* p. 1127.

[h] Vid. Origen. apud Pamph. Apolog. p. 230. Zen. Veron. in Exod. Serm. 9.

[i] Whitby, Modest Disq. Pref. p. 29, 30. Proem. p. 5. lib. p. 166.

[k] Apud Theodorit. E. lib. i. c. 5. p. 21.

generation, of the Son. As he supposes the Son existing before the *procession*, (which is the *voluntary* nativity he speaks of,) and preexisting *as a* [l]*Son*, he cannot be understood otherwise. See this more fully explained in [m]Bishop Bull. If any other writers, who expressly held an *eternal* generation, any where speak also of a *temporal procession*, or *nativity*, the same may be true of them also. I only give this hint by the way, and pass on.

[n] Dionysius of Alexandria, who lived about the same time with Novatian, asserts the same doctrine; viz. That the Father was *always* Father, and *never* was without his Son; which is the same as to maintain *eternal generation*, which he afterwards asserts in terms.

[o] Dionysius, Bishop of Rome, contemporary with the other, declares that "the Son is eternal, and that there never was a "time when the Son was not;" adding in confirmation of it, that "he is the Word, the Wisdom, and the Power of God." This, though it be express for the eternity of the Son, yet is not full for *eternal generation;* unless it had been said, "eternal, *as* "*a Son.*" He might be supposed eternal, as the Λόγος, and his sonship commence afterwards. And therefore I do not put this among the clear unexceptionable authorities for *eternal generation;* though hardly any reasonable doubt can be made of it, since he supposed the Father, the *Head, Root, Origin*, of the Λόγος.

[p] Methodius speaks more close and home to the point. For, upon the words of the Psalmist; "Thou art my Son, this day "have I begotten thee;" he comments thus: "It is observable

[l] Sive dum *verbum* est, sive dum *virtus* est, sive dum *sapientia* est, sive dum *lux* est, sive dum *Filius* est; non ex se est, quia nec innatus est. That is, he is *natus*, considered under any capacity; whether as λόγος, δύναμις, or σοφία, or φῶς, or υἱὸς, whether before the procession, or after. This seems to be the most probable construction of the passage; and most consonant to what he had said before. *Comp. Athanas.* vol. i. p. 222.

[m] Def. Fid. p. 222.

[n] Οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὅτε ὁ Θεὸς οὐκ ἦν πατήρ.——οὐ γὰρ δὴ, τούτων ἄγονος ὢν ὁ Θεὸς, εἶτα ἐπαιδοποιήσατο. αἰώνιον πρόκειται καὶ συνέστιν αὐτῷ, τὸ ἀπαύγασμα ἄναρχον καὶ ἀείγενες. *Athan.* vol. i. p. 253.

[o] Εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν υἱὸς, ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν· ἀεὶ δὲ ἦν εἴ γε ἐν τῷ πατρί ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτός φησι, καὶ εἰ λόγος, καὶ σοφία, καὶ δύναμις ὁ Χριστός. *Apud Athanas. Decret. Syn. N.* 232. Εἰ τοίνυν γέγονεν ὁ υἱὸς, ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα· ἦν ἄρα καιρὸς, ὅτε χωρὶς τούτων ἦν ὁ Θεός· ἀτοπώτατον δὲ τοῦτο. *Ibid.* This and Novatian's testimony, both of the same age, may serve to illustrate each other.

[p] Παρατηρητέον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν υἱὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ἀορίστως ἀπεφήνατο, καὶ ἀχρόνως· εἴ γὰρ υἱὸς, αὐτῷ ἔφη, καὶ σύ, γέγονας· ἐμφαίνων, μήτε πρόσφατον αὐτὸν τετυχηκέναι τῆς υἱοθεσίας, μήτε αὖ προϋπάρξαντα τέλος ἐσχηκέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀεὶ τὸν αὐτόν. *Apud Phot. Cod.* 237. p. 960. Comp. Athanas. Fragm. in Psalm. p. 75. Cyril. Cateches. iii. p. 46. Bened.

"that his being a Son, is here indefinitely expressed without "any limitation of time. For he said. *Thou art*, not, *Thou be-* "*camest* my Son: signifying that he did not acquire any *new* "*filiation*, nor should ever have an end of his existence, but that "he is *always the same*." He [q]goes on to speak of his after *filiation*, intimated in the words, "This day have I begotten "thee;" and observes, that it was more properly a *manifestation* of him, consonant to what he had said before, that he could not have a *new* filiation. This may relate either to what I before called his *second*, or to his *third* generation: the words are ambiguous, and capable of either sense.

To Methodius I may subjoin Pamphilus, who, while he delivers Origen's sense, in his Apology, does undoubtedly speak his own too. He is very [r]clear and full for the *eternal* generation, if we may rely on the translator.

Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, [s]reckons it among the singularities of Arius, that he would not own the Father to have been *always* so; but pretended that God was once *no Father*, and that the Λόγος was produced in time. I observe, that these two things are here joined together, as being explanatory one of the other, according to the reasoning of that age at least. And if the same reasoning held before, as may be probably inferred from [t]other passages of the ancients, then it will follow that as many as asserted the *eternity* of the Λόγος, or Word, which were all without exception, did implicitly maintain the *eternal generation*. It appears to have been a maxim in the Church at this time, that is, about the year 315, ten years before the Council of Nice, that *the Father was always Father*. The same we have seen, about sixty years before, from what has been cited out of Dionysius of Alexandria, and Novatian. The testimony of [u]Origen, cited by Pamphilus, with others mentioned, carry it up forty years higher, to about the year 210. Irenæus above

[q] Προόντα ἤδη πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, ἐβουλήθην καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ γεννῆσαι, ὁ δή ἐστι, πρόσθεν ἀγνοούμενον γνωρίσαι. *Ibid.*

[r] Inter Op. Orig. ed. Basil. p. 877.

[s] Οὐκ ἀεὶ ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ ἦν. ἀλλ' ἦν ὅτε ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ οὐκ ἦν. οὐκ ἀεὶ ἦν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γέγονεν. *Alexand. Ep. apud Socr. E. H.* l. i. c. 6. p. 10. Ἀσεβεστάτης οὖν φανείσης τῆς ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ὑποθέσεως, ἀνάγκη τὸν πατέρα ἀεὶ εἶναι πατέρα. *Alexand. Ep. apud Theod.* l. i. c. 4. p. 13.

[t] The charge brought against Dionysius of Alexandria, and which he cleared himself of, was this: Οὐκ ἀεὶ ἦν ὁ Θεὸς πατήρ. οὐκ ἀεὶ ἦν υἱὸς, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Θεὸς ἦν χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου. αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ υἱὸς οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γεννηθῇ, ἀλλ' ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν. *Athan. Ep. de Sentent. Dionys.* p. 253.

[u] Non enim Deus, cum prius non esset Pater, postea Pater esse cæpit, &c. *Pamphil. Apol.* p. 877. Comp. Orig. in Joh. p. 44, 45.

thirty years higher, to about 173, within less than fourscore years of St. John. Tertullian, betwixt the two last named, seems to have understood this matter differently: for he says plainly, that "[x]there was a time when the Son was not;" meaning, *as a Son;* and that "God was not *always* Father." And this is agreeable to his principles, who always speaks of the *generation* as a voluntary thing, and brought about in time; as do several other writers. From hence a question may arise, whether there was any difference of doctrine between those writers, or a difference in words only. This is a point which will deserve a most strict and careful inquiry.

The authors who make the generation *temporary,* and speak not expressly of any other, are these following: Justin, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tatian, Tertullian, and Hippolytus. Novatian I mention not with them, because he asserted both. Let ut then carefully examine what their doctrine was: and that it may be done the more distinctly, let us reduce it to particulars.

1. They asserted the *coeternity* of the Λόγος, or *Word,* though not considered precisely under the formality of a *Son.* This, I presume, is so clear a point, that I need not burden my margin with quotations for it. It shall suffice only to refer to the [y]places, if any should doubt of it. It was a maxim with them, that God was always Λογικὸς, never Ἄλογος; that is, never without his *Word* or *Wisdom.* So far they agreed perfectly with the other writers, either before, or after, or in their own time. The ancients, supposing the relation of the Λόγος to the Father to be as close and intimate as that of thought to a mind, and that this was insinuated in the very *name,* rightly concluded that the Father could not be Ἄλογος, or without the Λόγος, any more than an eternal Mind could be without eternal thought[z]. Some have pretended that the Ante-Nicene writers, who used that kind of reasoning, meant only an *attribute,* by the Λόγος, and not a *real Person.* But there is no ground or colour for this pretence, as shall be shewn presently. I shall only note

[x] Pater Deus est, et Judex Deus est, non tamen ideo Pater et Judex *semper,* quia Deus semper. Nam nec Pater esse potuit ante Filium, nec Judex ante delictum. Fuit autem tempus cum et delictum et *Filius* non fuit. *Tertull. contr. Hermog.* c. 3.

[y] Justin. Martyr. Apol. i. p. 122. Ox. ed. Athenag. Legat. c. x. p. 39. ed. Ox. Theophilus Antioch. p. 82, 129. ed. Ox. Tatian. p. 20, 22. ed. Ox. Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 209. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. v. p. 503. c. 27. Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 245. Hippolyt. contr. Noet. c. 10. p. 13. edit. Fabric.

[z] See Bull. D. F. p. 206. See this further explained, serm. VII. vol. ii. p. 145, &c. of this edition.

here, that the [a]later writers, who, undoubtedly and confessedly, took the Λόγος to be a *Person*, a *real*, *eternal Person*; yet make use of the same maxim, and the very same way of reasoning.

2. They did not mean by the Λόγος, or *Word*, any *attribute*, *power*, *virtue*, or *operation* of the Father; but a real, subsisting *Person*: whom they believed to have been always in and with the Father, and distinct from him, before the *temporary* generation they speak of. If this be well proved, other matters, as we shall see presently, will be easily adjusted.

The learned and judicious [b]Bishop Bull has sufficiently shewn of every author singly, (except Justin, whom he reckons not with them,) that he must be understood to have believed the real and distinct *personality* of the Son; before the temporary *procession*, or *generation* mentioned. His reasonings upon that head have not been answered, and, I am persuaded, cannot: so that I might very well spare myself the labour of adding any thing further. But for the sake of such as will not be at the pains to read or consider what he has said at large, I shall endeavour to throw the substance of it into a smaller compass, in the following particulars; only premising this, that since all these authors went, in the main, upon the same hypothesis, they are the best commentators one upon another; and whatever explication we meet with in any one, two, or three, may reasonably stand for the sense of all: if they have nothing contradictory to it. Now to proceed.

1. [c]Before the *procession*, or *generation*, of which they speak, they suppose the Father *not* to have been *alone*; which it is hard to make sense of, if they only meant that he was with his own attributes, powers, or perfections: as much as to say, he was *wise*, and *great*, and *powerful by himself*; therefore he was

[a] Alex. Epist. Encyc. Ath. Op. vol. i. p. 399. Athanas. vol. i. p. 221, 424, 500, 619. et alibi. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 574. Greg. Nyss. Cat. Orat. c. 1. Cyrill. l. iv. in Joh. c. 48. Thesaur. p. 12, 23. Damasc. l. i. Marc. Diadoch. p. 115.

[b] Defens. F. N. sect. iii. c. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

[c] Μόνος ἦν ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος. *Theoph.* p. 130. Αὐτὸς δὲ μόνος ὢν πολὺς ἦν, οὔτε γὰρ ἄλογος, οὔτε ἄσοφος, οὔτε ἀδύνατος, οὔτε ἀβούλευτος ἦν. All which words correspond to the several names of the Son or Holy Spirit; λόγος, σοφία, δύναμις, βουλή, (τοῦ πατρὸς) and mean the same thing. *Hippolyt.* p. 13. *contr. Noet.* Comp. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 574.

Solus autem, quia nihil extrinsecus præter illum, cæterum ne tunc quidem solus. Habebat enim secum, quam habebat in semetipso, rationem suam scilicet. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* c. v. p. 503.

not alone. *Alone*, indeed, they own him to have been, with respect to any thing *ad extra*; but with respect to what was in himself, he was not *alone*; not *single*, but consisting of a *plurality*, having the Λόγος always with him.

2. The same Λόγος, or *Word*, was always [d] with him; conversed with him; was, as it were, assisting in council, according to those writers; and therefore, certainly, a distinct Person. It would be very improper to say that God was [e] *in*, or *with* one of his attributes, or *consulted* with it: all such expressions must denote a distinct personality.

3. The same individual Λόγος, who after the *procession* was undoubtedly a *Person*, is supposed to have existed before. [f] Novatian is express. "He who was in the Father, proceeded "from the Father." It is the same individual Λόγος, according to [g] Theophilus, who is διαπαντὸς, always, both before and after his procession, with the Father; and therefore, if he was a *real Person* after, which is not disputed, he must have been so before. That [h] very Λόγος, or Word, which had been from all eternity ἐνδιάθετος, ἐν καρδίᾳ Θεοῦ, becomes afterwards προφορικός. If therefore he was ever a *Person*, he must have been so always. So again: the Λόγος that spake to the Prophets, and who was undoubtedly *a Person*, is the [i] very same individual Λόγος, which was always with the Father; ὁ ἀεὶ συμπαρὼν αὐτῷ. Tertullian, who distinguishes between *ratio* and *sermo*, and asserts the former to be *eternal*, and the latter to be a *person*; yet [k] con-

[d] Σὺν αὐτῷ γὰρ, διὰ λογικῆς δυνάμεως, αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὃς ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὑπέστησε. *Tatian*. c. vii. p. 20. Ὁ ἀεὶ συμπαρὼν αὐτῷ. *Theoph*. p. 82. Τὸν ὄντα διαπαντὸς ἐνδιάθετον ἐν καρδίᾳ Θεοῦ. *Id*. p. 129. A little after, Τοῦτον εἶχε σύμβουλον, ἑαυτοῦ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν ὄντα——τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ διαπαντὸς ὁμιλῶν. *Idem*, p. 29.

Si necessaria est Deo materia ad opera mundi, ut Hermogenes existimavit; habuit Deus materiam longe digniorem——*Sophiam* suam scilicet. ——Sophia autem Spiritus: hæc illi *consiliarius* fuit. *Tert. contr. Hermog.*

[e] Θεὸς ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ. τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν λόγου δύναμιν παρειλήφαμεν. *Tat*. p. 19.

[f] Qui in Patre fuit, processit ex Patre. P. 31. Zeno Veronensis, of the following century, expresses it thus: "Procedit in nativitatem, qui erat an-"tequam nasceretur, in Patre." Which I add for illustration. Vid. etiam Pseud. Ambros. de Fid. c. ii. p. 349. Prudent. Hymn. xi. p. 44.

[g] Page 129.

[h] Τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησε προφορικόν. *Theoph*. p. 129. Φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς γεννῶν, προῆκεν τῇ κτίσει κύριον, τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν αὐτῷ μόνῳ πρότερον ὁρατὸν ὑπάρχοντα. *Hippol*. c. x. p. 13. Νοῦς, ὃς προβὰς ἐν κόσμῳ ἐδείκνυτο παῖς Θεοῦ. C. xi. p. 14. Compare Theoph. p. 129. before cited.

[i] Theoph. p. 81, 82.

[k] In usu est nostrorum—*sermonem* dicere in primordio apud Deum fuisse, cum magis *rationem* competat antiquiorem haberi; quia non sermonalis a principio, sed rationalis Deus etiam ante principium, et quia ipse quoque

nects both in one; and makes them, in substance, the very same; the selfsame *person* both: only supposed under different capacities and different names, before and after the procession. It was one and the same hypostasis; once *ratio*, (according to this writer,) and as such, eternal; afterwards *sermo*, and as such, [l]*a Son*. The seeming difference between the ancient Fathers upon this point is easily reconciled, says a [m]very worthy and learned Prelate of our Church. "One saith, God was not "*sermonalis a principio*, or his *Word* did not exist till the "creation; others say, Christ is Λόγος ἀΐδιος, *the eternal Word* "of the Father. They may all be understood in a sound sense, "with the help of this distinction. The *Word*, as he is *inward* "speech formed from the eternal Mind, was for ever with God: "but as God's agent to display and sound forth the wisdom of "God in external works, *as such*, he existed not till the creation— "the creation being, as it were, a *verbal* explication of what *reason* "had first silently thought, disposed, and resolved within itself."

4. If there still remains any doubt of this matter, there is a further argument to be urged, which may be justly looked upon as clear, full, and decisive in the case. Had these Fathers believed that the Λόγος, or Word, was an attribute only, or power, &c. before the *procession*, or *generation*, which they speak of; then it would follow, that the Son began first to be, and was properly a *creature*, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, in their opinion; and that *procession* was but another word for being *created*. But these writers do expressly guard against any such notion. [n]Novatian very clearly distinguishes between *procession* and *creation*. Athenagoras is still more express to the same purpose; [o]declaring that the Son was not then *made*, but had existed in the Father, as the Λόγος, or Word, from all eternity.

Justin Martyr is the first and the most considerable of those writers; and therefore it will be proper to examine his sentiments with a more particular care and exactness. I have selected the most material passages I could find, which may help to give us a just idea of his doctrine; and have placed

sermo ratione consistens, priorem eam ut *substantiam suam* ostendat. *Contr. Prax.* c. 5. Comp. Origen. in Joh. p. 43, 44.

[l] See Bull, sect. iii. c. 10.

[m] Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry, Serm. p. 13, 14.

[n] Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo dicit, "Ego ex Deo prodii," Joh. xvi.——cum constat, hominem a Deo *factum esse*, non ex Deo *processisse?* c. xxiii.

[o] Οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς νοῦς ἀΐδιος ὢν, εἶχεν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον ἀϊδίως λογικὸς ὤν. c. x. p. 39.

them in distinct columns in the P margin. It would signify little to translate them, because the arguments arising from them are proper only to scholars. I have distinguished the several citations by figures, for the more convenient referring to them.

1. I observe, first, (see notes 1, 2) that he joins ἀγέννητος with ἄφθαρτος and ἀΐδιος; opposing them to φθαρτὸς, γενόμενος, δημιουργητὸς, and ἀπολλύμενος: here therefore q ἀγέννητος is not considered as the personal character of the Father, and as signifying *unbegotten*; but as it belongs to the τὸ θεῖον, and denotes eternal, uncreated, immutable existence. Either Justin must have believed that ἀγέννητος in this latter sense is applicable to the Son, or else he must have supposed him not only γεννητὸς, but γενόμενος, δημιουργητὸς, and φθαρτὸς also, which must appear highly absurd to any one who has ever considered Justin's writings.

P 1. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Μωϋσῆς, ὁ ὤν, ἔφη· ὁ δὲ Πλάτων, τὸ ὄν. ἑκάτερον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι Θεῷ προσήκειν φαίνεται· αὐτὸς γάρ ἐστι μόνος ὁ ἀεὶ ὢν γένεσιν δὲ μὴ ἔχων—εὑρήσομεν γὰρ αὐτὸν—τὸν μὲν ἀγέννητον ἀΐδιον εἶναι λέγοντα· τοὺς δὲ γεννητοὺς ἢ δημιουργητοὺς—γινομένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους. *Paræn.* p. 90, 91, Ox.

2. Ὅσα γάρ ἐστι μετὰ τὸν Θεὸν ἢ ἔσται ποτὲ, ταῦτα φύσιν φθαρτὴν ἔχειν, καὶ οἷά τε ἐξαφανισθῆναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἔτι μόνος γὰρ ἀγέννητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος Θεὸς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θεός ἐστι. *Dial.* p. 21. Jebb.

3. Ἐγὼ γὰρ, φησὶν, εἰμὶ ὁ ὤν. ἀντιδιαστέλλων ἑαυτὸν δηλονότι ὁ ὢν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν. *Paræn.* p. 87.

4. Ὄνομα τῷ πάντων πατρὶ θεῖον, ἀγεννήτῳ ὄντι, οὐκ ἔστιν. ᾧ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύηται, πρεσβύτερον ἔχει τὸν θέμενον τὸ ὄνομα. τὸ δὲ Πατὴρ, καὶ Θεὸς, καὶ Κτίστης, καὶ Κύριος, καὶ Δεσπότης, οὐκ ὀνόματά ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εὐποιϊῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων προσρήσεις. *Apol.* ii. p. 13. Θεῷ δὲ οὔτε ὁ τιθεὶς ὄνομα, προϋπῆρχεν, οὔτε αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ὀνομάζειν ὠήθη δεῖν. εἷς καὶ μόνος ὑπάρχων. *Paræn.* p. 87.

5. Ἰουδαῖοι οὖν ἡγησάμενοι ἀεὶ τὸν πατέρα τῶν ὅλων λελαληκέναι τῷ Μωσεῖ, τοῦ λαλήσαντος αὐτῷ ὄντος υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὃς καὶ ἄγγελος καὶ ἀπόστολος κέκληται, δικαίως ἐλέγχονται καὶ διὰ τοῦ προφητικοῦ πνεύματος, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὡς οὔτε τὸν πατέρα οὔτε τὸν υἱὸν ἔγνωσαν——ὃς καὶ λόγος πρωτότοκος ὢν τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ Θεὸς ὑπάρχει. *Apol.* i. p. 122, 123.

Compare the citations before given in p. 296. of this volume.

6. Ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἐκείνου, ὁ μόνος λεγόμενος κυρίως υἱὸς, ὁ λόγος πρὸ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ συνὼν, καὶ γεννώμενος ὅτε τὴν ἀρχὴν δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔκτισε καὶ ἐκόσμησε, Χριστὸς μὲν κατὰ τὸ κεχρίσθαι καὶ κοσμῆσαι τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ τὸν Θεὸν, λέγεται, ὄνομα καὶ αὐτὸ περιέχον ἄγνωστον σημασίαν· ὃν τρόπον καὶ τὸ Θεὸς προσαγόρευμα οὐκ ὄνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πράγματος δυσεξηγήτου ἔμφυτος τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξα. *Apol.* ii. p. 14 Ox.

q I need but hint that the words ἀγέννητος and ἀγένητος, with double or single ν, have been used very promiscuously in authors; and hardly came to be accurately distinguished, till the Arian controversy gave occasion for it. See *Suicer's Thesaurus*, upon the ecclesiastical use of these words; and *Cudworth* for profane writers, p. 253, 254. and *Montfaucon animad. in Athan. Decret. Syn. N.* p. 207. The Son is properly ἀγένητος, as well as the Father; so Ignatius, so Irenæus, so Origen expressly styles him; and Athenagoras's οὐ γενόμενος is to the same effect. The similitude of the word and sound was, very probably, the chief reason why the title of ἀγένητος was not oftener applied to the Son; which omission however is compensated by other equivalent expressions.

2. I observe (see note 2.) that God's being ἀγέννητος and ἄφθαρτος is supposed, as it were, the very ground and foundation of his being *God;* on account of which he is Θεός; and without which, consequently, he could not be Θεός. If therefore the Λόγος be not, in this sense, ἀγέννητος and ἄφθαρτος, he is not Θεὸς, according to Justin Martyr: and yet no man is more express than Justin, every where, in making the Son Θεὸς, and insisting very much upon it.

3. Justin makes ὁ ὢν to answer to the Platonists' τὸ ὄν. (see note 1.) And either of them equivalent to ἀεὶ ὢν, and that to γένεσιν μὴ ἔχων, uncreated, immutable, necessarily-existing. Now compare note 5. and two more citations given above, p. 296. and from thence it is manifest that Justin makes the Λόγος to be ὁ ὢν, in his own proper person. And he gives the reason here why, or on what account, he might justly style himself Θεός; (and the same must hold for ὁ ὤν;) it is because *he is* Θεὸς, as God's Son; πρωτότοκος ὢν τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ Θεὸς ὑπάρχει[r].

4. Justin Martyr, having taken notice that the Father had properly no name, (see not. 4, 6.) as having nothing antecedent or preexistent, does immediately after repeat the observation of having no name, and applies it to the Son; observing that neither he, properly, has any name, but only some titles or appellations given him, from what he did in time; particularly from his coming forth to create and put into beautiful order the whole system of things. This seems to insinuate his *coeternity* with the Father; and the more so, because Justin observes, at the same time, that he is *emphatically* Son of the Father, (ὁ μόνος λεγόμενος κυρίως υἱὸς,) and *coexistent* (συνὼν) with his Father before the world; though begotten, or sent forth, in time, to create the universe. These considerations convince me, that Justin as well as Athenagoras taught the strict *coeternity* of the Son; which is equally true of all the other writers.

Besides this, the several [s]similitudes, which these authors

[r] Compare Dial. p. 364, 183, 371, 184. ed. Jebb. I add for illustration these words of Cyril. Ὅπερ ἂν ἐξ ἀγεννήτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου γεγέννηται, τοῦτο πάντως ἄφθαρτον, καὶ ἀγένητον. *Cyril. Alex. Thesaur.* p. 34. Much to the same purpose is that of Philo before Justin. Ὃς τοῦ ἀϊδίου λόγος ὤν, ἐξ ἀναγκῆς καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἄφθαρτος. *Phil. de Conf. Lingu.* p. 326.

[s] Justin. M. Dial. p. 183, 373. Jebb. Athenagoras, p. 40, 96. Ox. ed. Tatian, c. viii. p. 21, 22. Ox. ed. Tertull. Apol. c. 21. adv. Prax. c. 8. Hippolytus contr. Noet. c. xi. p. 13. contr. Jud. p. 4. Fabric. vol. 2.

used to illustrate the nature of that *procession*, such as the *sun and its rays*, the *fountain and its streams*, the *root and its branches*, one *fire lighting another*, and the like, manifestly shew that they never dreamed of the Son's being *created*. Then, the care they took lest any one should imagine there was any *division* of the Father's substance, and their inculcating that he was *prolatus, non separatus*, brought forth, but not separated from the Father, demonstrate their meaning to be, that here was no production of a new substance, but an *emanation*, *manifestation*, or *procession* of what was before. Further, their declaring that, though he proceeded from the Father, he was still in the Father, (taken together with the [t]maxim, that "nothing is in God but what is "God,") sets the matter beyond all reasonable scruple. In a word; as they all held the *consubstantiality* of the Son with the Father, which is as clear as the light, in their writings; they must have been the most inconsistent men in the world, had they thought that the *procession*, or *generation*, of the Son was a *creation*, or *new production*, of him; or had they not firmly believed that he existed, the *living* and *substantial Word*, from all eternity.

Justin Martyr seems to have spoke the sense of all, in saying, "That the Λόγος coexisted with the Father before the creatures; "and was then begotten, when the Father at first created and "put into beautiful order the frame of things." See the passage above[u]. The emperor Constantine afterwards expresses the same thought something more fully and distinctly, thus. "[x]The "Son, who was *always* in the Father, was *begotten*, or rather "*proceeded forth*, for the orderly and ornamental methodising of "the creation." I choose to follow the sense, rather than the strict letter. Whether those writers went upon any solid reasons, in assigning such or such parts, in the work of creation, to Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, is not very material. It is manifest they supposed the whole Trinity to be concerned in it; and to create, as it were, in concert. Their ascribing the orderly

N. B. Athenagoras's words are, in strictness, meant of the *Holy Ghost* only, in both places. But the reason being the same for one as the other, they are equally applicable to either; and it is thus only I would be understood, wherever I apply either of the passages to the *Son*.

[t] Vid. Bull. D. F. N. p. 198.

[u] P. 363, above, note [u], par. 6.

[x] Ἐγεννήθη, μᾶλλον δὲ προῆλθεν αὐτὸς, καὶ πάντοτε ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ὢν, ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων διακόσμησιν. *Apud Gelas. Act. Syn. Nic.* part. iii. p. 58.

adjustment and beautifying part to the Son, seems to have been in allusion to his names of Λόγος, and σοφία, and φῶς. In respect of the last of them, Hippolytus supposes the *generation* to be posterior to the creation, upon God's saying, "Let there be "light." Then did the Son *proceed* φῶς ἐκ φωτός. [y]Tertullian seems to have had the same thought; and perhaps [z]Origen. Athenagoras likewise supposes the *procession* to be after the creating of the unformed mass of things. And yet nothing is plainer than that [a]all these writers believed the *prior* existence of the Son; and that things were at first created by him, as well as afterwards adorned and regulated. In short, whatever the Father is supposed to have done, was by his Son and Holy Spirit; therefore frequently styled *manus Patris:* but the αὐθεντία, the designing part, was thought most properly to be reserved to the Father, as the first Person. These are things not to be too curiously inquired into, or too rigorously interpreted; but to be understood θεοπρεπῶς. In the whole they have a very good meaning, and were founded in the belief of a *coessential* and *coeternal* Trinity.

From what hath been said, I presume it is evident that there was no difference at all, in the main of the doctrine, between these and the other Catholic writers; but a different manner only of expressing the same things. The question was not whether the *hypostasis*, or *Person*, of the Son was from all eternity, coeval with the Father, and consubstantial with him; in that they all perfectly agreed. Nor was there any difference about the *procession:* for the [b]latter writers acknowledged it, as well as those before them; and made it *temporary* and *voluntary*, as those did. But the question was, whether the Son's eternal coexistence (I should rather say the coeternal existence of the Λόγος) should be deemed sonship and filiation or no; or whether the *procession* might not more properly be so styled. Tertullian (and perhaps others) was of opinion that this latter was

[y] Contr. Prax. c. vii. 12.

[z] Vid. Huet. Origenian. p. 41.

[a] As to Athenagoras, vid. supra. Tertullian says: Deum immutabilem et informabilem credi necesse est, ut æternum; quodcunque transfiguratur in aliud, desinit esse quod fuerat, et incipit esse quod non erat. Deus autem neque desinit esse, neque aliud potest esse; Sermo autem Deus, &c. *Contr. Prax.* c. 27. Hippolytus hath these words: Πατρὶ συναΐδιος, *adv. Jud.* p. 4. Υἱὸς ἐποίησεν, *contr. Noet.* p. 16. Ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν ἐν δόξῃ θεοπρεπεῖ, τῇ ἰδίῳ συνυπάρχων γεννήτορι πρὸ παντὸς αἰῶνος, καὶ χρόνου, καὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου καταβολῆς. *Fabric.* vol. ii. p. 29. Origen we have seen before.

[b] Vid. Bull. Def. F. N. sect. iii. c. 9.

[c]*perfecta nativitas Sermonis,* the perfect nativity or birth of the Word; who had been, as it were, *quiescent* and *unoperating* from all eternity, till he came forth to *create* the world. And [d]Hippolytus carried this notion so far, as to think the filiation not *completed* till he had run through the last sort of sonship, in becoming man. All this is true, in some sense, and when rightly explained. But other Fathers, thinking this way of speaking liable to abuse and misconstruction; and considering, probably, that the Λόγος, or Word, might [e]properly be called *Son,* in respect of that eternal existence which he ever enjoyed *in* and *from* the Father, as the head, root, fountain, and cause of all; they chose to give that the name of *generation:* and to call the other two [f]*condescensions, manifestations, proceeding forth,* or the like. So we have seen it in Methodius, before cited for the eternal generation: and he very probably had the notion from [g]Justin Martyr; who, in like manner, interprets generation, in the secondary sense, by *manifestation.* And even [h]Hippolytus, as before observed, explains the procession, or generation of the Son, a little after the creation, by *manifestation* of him.

After Arius arose, the Catholics found it highly necessary to

[c] Contr. Prax. c. 8.

[d] Contr. Noet. c. xv. p. 17. Οὔτε γὰρ ἄσαρκος καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὁ λόγος τέλειος ἦν υἱὸς, καί τοι τέλειος λόγος ὢν μονογενής. It is remarkable, that he makes the Son perfectly μονογενὴς, though not perfectly υἱὸς, before the *incarnation.* Others might perhaps reason, in like manner, with regard to the προέλευσις; thinking him to have been λόγος, or μονογενὴς, before it, but not υἱός.

[e] Omnis origo parens est; omne quod ex origine profertur, progenies est. *Tertull. contra Prax.* c. 8. See Novat. above, p. 356.

Γεννᾷ μὲν οὖν καὶ ὁ ἥλιος τὴν αὐγήν. *Eus. Eccl. Th.* l. i. c. 12. p. 73.

Τὸ ἔκ τινος ὑπάρχον υἱός ἐστιν ἐκείνου, ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἔστιν. *Athan. Orat.* iv. p. 628.

[f] It is observable that Justin Martyr applies the word προβάλλω to the *latter* of them, as well as to the former. *Dial.* 228. Jebb.

And, in like manner, Clement of Alexandria uses προελθὼν of both, p. 654. and Hippolytus, of the latter. *Contr. Noet.* c. 17.

[g] On the words "Thou art my Son, "this day have I begotten thee," he comments thus: Τότε γένεσιν αὐτοῦ λέγων γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐξότου ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ ἔμελλε γίνεσθαι. *Dial.* p. 270. ed. Jebb.

[h] Τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν αὐτῷ μόνῳ πρότερον ὁρατὸν ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ γινομένῳ κόσμῳ ἀόρατον ὄντα, ὁρατὸν ποιεῖ. C. x. p. 13. A little before he had said, Τῶν δὲ γινομένων ἀρχηγὸν καὶ σύμβουλον καὶ ἐργάτην ἐγέννα λόγον, ὃν λόγον ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀόρατόν τε ὄντα, τῷ κτιζομένῳ κόσμῳ, ὁρατὸν ποιεῖ, προτέραν φωνὴν φθεγγόμενος, καὶ φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς γεννῶν.

The words of Zeno Veronensis may be added, as a good comment upon the former. Cujus (*Patris*) ex ore, ut rerum natura, quæ non erat, fingeretur, prodivit unigenitus Filius, cordis ejus nobilis inquilinus: exinde *visibilis* effectus, quia humanum genus visitaturus erat, &c.

insist much on the *eternal generation*. For, the Arians, taking advantage of it, that the *temporary condescension* of the Son, to create the world, had been often called his *generation*, were for looking no higher; but artfully insinuated that this was the first *production* of him; and that it was absurd to talk of the Son's existing before he was *begotten:* in opposition to which pretence we find the Nicene Fathers anathematising such as should say, that the "[i]Son existed not before he was *begotten;*" meaning in the sense now explained. However, the Arians might have known that the eternal existence of the Λόγος was universally taught, and even by those who asserted a temporal generation. Nor indeed were they ignorant of it; but [k]they contrived, for a salvo, to maintain, that the Λόγος, or Word, which was held to be *eternal*, was not the same with the Λόγος, or Word, begotten; the former being only the Father's own proper *Word*, and no substantial thing; the latter a *created* substance, directly contrary to all antiquity, which has nothing to countenance any such notion of a *twofold* Λόγος. Upon this it became necessary to explain in what sense any *temporal* generation had been asserted; and to keep up the true Catholic doctrine, which had obtained from the beginning; namely, of the eternal Λόγος distinct from the Father; *Son* of the Father, as partaking of the same divine substance from all eternity; [l]going out from the Father to create the world; and, lastly, condescending to become man: *Son*, in all these respects, but primarily and chiefly in respect of the first. From the whole we may remark, that an explicit profession of *eternal generation* might have been dispensed with; provided only that the eternal existence of the Λόγος, as a *real subsisting person, in, and of* [m]*the Father*, which comes to the same thing, might be secured. This was the point; and this was all. In this all sound Catholics agreed; and to dispute it was accounted heresy and blasphemy. If any one, disliking the name or the phrase of *eternal generation*, thinks it better to

[i] Ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν.

[k] See Bull. Def. F. p. 198. Athan. Orat. ii. p. 507.

[l] This is well expressed by the Antiochian Fathers, against Paul of Samosata; and by Clement of Alexandria; Τοῦτον πιστεύομεν σὺν τῷ πατρὶ ἀεὶ ὄντα, ἐκπεπληρωκέναι τὸ πατρικὸν βούλημα, πρὸς τὴν κτίσιν τῶν ὅλων. *Labb. Conc.* tom. i. p. 845. Τέκνον αὐτοῦ γνήσιον, καὶ κληρονόμον, ὥσπερ ἐπί τινα ξενιτείαν ἐνταῦθα πεμπόμενον, ὑπὸ μεγάλης οἰκονομίας, καὶ ἀναλογίας τοῦ πατρὸς, δι' οὗ καὶ τὰ φανερὰ καὶ τὰ ἀφανῆ τοῦ κόσμου δεδημιούργηται. *Clem. Alex. Quis Div.* p. 955. Ox.

[m] Vid. Athan. vol. i. p. 222, 619, 628.

assert an *eternal Word*, instead of an *eternal Son*, (meaning thereby a distinct person, and *consubstantial* with God, whose Word he is,) and refers the generation to his first and last *manifestation*, at the *creation* and *incarnation*; there seems to be no further harm in it, than what lies in the words, and their liableness to be misconstrued, or to give offence. Here therefore every man is left to his own discretion and prudence: only the safer way seems to be, to follow the most general and most approved manner of expression, together with the ancient faith; being, in all probability, the surest means to preserve both. I designedly said, first *and* last, not first *or* last. For such as interpret the generation of the *last* only, stand, I think, [n] clearly condemned by Scripture; many places whereof can never fairly be accounted for by the *miraculous conception* solely: besides that from Barnabas and Clemens Romanus, down to the Council of Nice, all the Christian writers speak unanimously of a higher, antecedent sonship; and, generally, even found *worship* upon it.

I shall just observe to you, in the close of this article, that, from what hath been said, you may know what judgment to make of an assertion of Dr. Clarke's[o], viz. "That the learnedest "of the most orthodox Fathers, who asserted the *eternal* "*generation of the Son*, did yet nevertheless assert it to be an "act of the Father's eternal *power* and *will*." By which the Doctor seems to insinuate, that the good Fathers did not understand *eternal* in the strict sense. If the learned Doctor can shew, that those who maintained only the voluntary and temporary procession of the Son, believed that the Λόγος was *eternally* preexisting in the Father, by an act of his will; or that those who expressly asserted an *eternal* generation, believed also that it was an *arbitrary* thing, and might have been otherwise, (which I suppose is the Doctor's sense of an "act of the "will,") then he will do something. But as none of his authorities prove any thing like it, it would have been a prudent part, at least, not to have produced them to so little purpose. But

[n] Sane in ista ex Maria Virgine nativitate, suprema et singularis ἐξοχὴ atque excellentia filiationis Domini nostri adeo non consistit, ut ea ipsa nativitas ad ejus stupendam συγκατάβασιν omnino referenda sit. Hoc nos satis aperte docent, si modo a Spiritu Sancto edoceri velimus, multis in locis, S. literæ.——Ita semper credidit inde ab ipsis Apostolis Catholica Christi Ecclesia. *Bull. J.* p. 39. See also *Dr. Fiddes*, vol. i. b. iv. ch. 2.

[o] Script. Doctr. p. 280. alias 247.

enough of this matter: I have, I hope, sufficiently explained myself upon this head; and have therefore the more reason to expect a distinct answer from you, whenever you think proper to reconsider this subject.

QUERY IX.

Whether the divine attributes, Omniscience, Ubiquity, &c. those individual attributes, can be communicated without the divine essence, from which they are inseparable?

THE intent of this Query was to prevent equivocations, and to make the next clearer. You agree with me, that the *individual* divine attributes cannot be communicated without the *individual* nature in which they subsist. You add, that "Dr. "Clarke, in the 230th page of his Replies, hath plainly shewn, "that *individual attributes*, divine or not divine, cannot possibly "be communicated at all." Well then; we know what the Doctor means by "all divine powers," in his Scripture Doctrine, (p. 298.) which is one point gained: for when words are stripped of their ambiguity, we may be able to deal the better with them. As to the Doctor's aphorism laid down, (p. 230.) I may have leave to doubt of it: notwithstanding that it is set forth to us with the utmost assurance. It is not unusual with the Doctor to lay down maxims, in relation to this controversy, which himself would not allow at another time, or in another subject. For instance; "[a] necessary agents are no causes," that is, they do not so properly act, as are acted upon. This is very true of all *finite* necessary agents; for all their necessary or natural acts proceed not so properly from them, as from God the author of their natures. But does it therefore follow, that if God acts by a necessity of nature in some instances, he is therein *acted upon* likewise? or that all the acts of the divine nature are voluntary and free; none natural and necessary? This should not be said by one who, elsewhere, speaks so much of God's being "infinitely wise," and "infinitely good, infinitely "happy," &c. by an "absolute necessity of nature;" unless he could be certain that knowing, loving, contemplating, and enjoy-

[a] Whatever proceeds from any being, otherwise than by the will of that being, doth not in truth proceed from *that being;* but from some other cause or necessity extrinsic and independent of that being. Necessary agents are no *causes*, but always *instruments* only in the hand of some other power. *Reply*, page 227. Compare p. 113.

ing himself, do not imply perpetual *acting*, or that an infinitely active being can ever cease to *act*. I shall not scruple to assert, that by the same absolute necessity of nature that the Father *exists*, he exists as a Father; and *coexists* with his *coessential* Son proceeding from him. If you say, this supposes the Son *self-existent*, or *unoriginate*; I desire it may not be *said* only, but *proved*. [b]In the interim, I take leave to suppose, that *unbegotten* and *begotten*, *unoriginate* and *proceeding*, are different ideas. Again, (p. 228.) [c]he finds fault with "the author of "some Considerations," for supposing that "the Son is some-"thing more than a mere name, and yet not a real distinct "being:" and upon this lays down another aphorism; that there is no medium between *a being*, and *not a being*: which indeed is a very true one, if *being*, and *being*, are taken in the same sense, but not otherwise. For let me mention almost a parallel case. Upon the Doctor's hypothesis, that God's *substance* is *extended* every where; and that the same is the *substratum* of *space*; we may imagine two *substrata*, one pervading the sun, and the other the moon, which are both distinct and distant. Will you please to tell us, whether these two are *real distinct beings*, or no? If they are, you may leave it to others to prove them *intelligent* beings, that is, *persons*: and, perhaps, the very next consequence will make them two Gods, upon the Doctor's own principles. If they are not *real distinct beings*, then here is something admitted "between a being and not a "being;" contrary to the Doctor's maxim: unless he makes them *nothing*; and supposes two spaces, without any substratum at all; two *extensions*, without any thing *extended*.

But let us consider, whether something may not be thought on, to help both the learned doctor and us out of these difficulties. The truth of this matter, so far as I apprehend, is, that *being* may signify, either simply what *exists*, or what exists *separately*. This distinction seems to be just and necessary; and such as you will the more readily come into, having occasion for it, as well as we. I hope none are so weak, as to deny the *Persons* to exist in

[b] Οὔτε δύο ἀγέννητοι, οὔτε δύο μονογενεῖς, ἀλλ' εἷς ἐστι πατὴρ ἀγέννητος (ἀγέννητος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ πατέρα μὴ ἔχων) καὶ εἷς ἐστι υἱὸς, ἀϊδίως ἐκ πατρὸς γεγεννημένος. *Cyril. Catech.* x. p. 141. Ox.

[c] To avoid this consequence, he is forced to suppose (p. 29.) that the Son is something more than a *mere name*, and yet not a *real distinct being*; that is to say, that he is something between *a being* and *not a being*. *Cl. Reply*, p. 228.

reality. The very schoolmen themselves never scruple to call them *tres res, tres entes*, or the like, in that sense; though at the same time, in the other sense of *being*, they are all but one being, *una summa res*, and *una res numero;* which comes much to the same with Tertullian's *una* (indivisa) *substantia in tribus cohærentibus*, (only setting aside his particular manner of explication,) and is the sense of all antiquity. Upon the foot of this distinction, you may readily apprehend those words of Gregory Nazianzen, spoken of the three Persons. *Ζωὰς καὶ ζωὴν, φῶτα καὶ φῶς, ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν, δόξας καὶ δόξαν—Θεὸν ἕκαστον, ἂν θεωρῆται μόνον, τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος τὰ ἀχώριστα*[d]. By the same distinction, you may probably understand a very noted Creed, which seems to have cost the learned Doctor some pains in explaining. To return to our instance of the two *substrata*. I suppose the Doctor, or yourself, will be content to allow, that this is *substance*, and that *substance;* and yet not *substances*, but one substance. In like manner also, this is *being*, and that *being;* and yet not two beings, but one being: this eternal, and that eternal; and yet not two eternals, but one eternal. I might go on almost the length of an Athanasian Creed. This must be your manner of speaking, if you come to particulars; and that because the *substrata* are supposed to have no separate existence independent on each other, but to be united by some common ligaments, which perhaps you will call *personal* attributes. And why then should you be severe upon us, for using the like language, and upon better reasons? We believe the three Persons to have no separate existence independent on each other; we suppose them more united in some respects, than the *substrata* are supposed in your Scheme, because equally present every where: we admit some common ties or bands of union, which we call *essential* attributes and perfections. Either therefore allow us our way of speaking, which we think decent and proper; suitable to the idea we have, and to the circumstances of the case; founded in the very nature and reason of things: or else find out a better for your own, that we may, at length, learn from you how we ought to speak in this matter.

You will say, it may be, that the instance I have chosen is not exactly parallel in every circumstance. No; God forbid it should. But it agrees so far as is sufficient for my purpose. There is this manifest difference, that you suppose the several *substrata* so many

[d] Orat. xiii. p. 211. Paris. ed.

parts of God; though every one of them infinitely wise, infinitely good, infinitely powerful, infinitely every thing, but *extended*. We, more consistently, suppose three Persons *equal*, in all respects; none of them *singly* part of God; but every one perfect God.

A second difference is, that you suppose all the *finite* parts, making one *infinite*, to be one being, one God, and one *Person*; by *continuity*, I presume, and a *personal* union of the parts. We suppose three Persons to be one God, by their *inseparability* and the *essential* union of the Persons: which, I humbly conceive, we are as able to explain, as you are to explain the other; and, I hope, more able to prove it.

A third difference permit me to mention, that you suffer your imaginations to wander, where you can find no footing; we are content to *understand* only, and that imperfectly, without *imagining* at all.

In fine, you have philosophized so far in these high and deep matters, that you really want all the same favourable allowances, which we are *thought* to do. Others may object several things to us, which would bear equally hard upon us both. The *simplicity* of the divine nature, for instance, is one of the strongest and most popular objections: but the learned Doctor has broke through it; and has contrived a solution, a very good one, both for himself and us[e]. I have often thought no hands so proper to be employed against the doctrine of the blessed Trinity, as those which are good only at pulling down, and not at building up. If once you come to settling and determining points of a mysterious nature, there will be as fair a plea for *this* also: and I doubt not, but the same thread of reasoning, which first brought you to question it, will, when carefully pursued, and as soon as you perceive the like difficulties almost in every thing, bring you to make less scruple of it. But lest others should imagine, from what hath been said, that they may have some advantage over us, let me add these few considerations further.

1. That what hath been urged is not purely arguing *ad hominem;* but it is appealing to what good sense and impartial reason dictates equally to you or us, on such or such suppositions.

2. That if we come to reason minutely on any other matter,

[e] Answer to the Sixth Letter, p. 39, 40.

alike incomprehensible as this of the holy Trinity, we may soon lose ourselves in inextricable mazes.

3. That if they please to take any other hypothesis of the *omnipresence*, they may meet with difficulties there also, perhaps not inferior to the former.

4. That if they choose to rest in *generals*, without any hypothesis at all, and without descending to the *modus* and *minutia* of it: this is the very thing which we desire and contend for, in regard to the blessed Trinity, (which ought certainly to be equally dealt with,) and then we may soon come to a good agreement.

By pursuing this point, I had almost neglected the learned Doctor's third aphorism; "That nothing individual can be com-"municated." Here is as great a fallacy and ambiguity in the word *individual*, as before in the word *being*. I shall make this plain to you. That particular substance, which is supposed to pervade, and to be commensurate to the sun, is an *individual* being, in some sense; unless there be a *medium* between *a being* and *not a being*, which the learned Doctor admits not: the whole substance likewise is one *individual* being, and *Person* too, upon the Doctor's hypothesis: and we say further, that three Persons may be one *individual* being; having, we think, a very good meaning in it. So here are plainly three senses of the word *individual;* and till you can fix a certain *principle of individuation*, (a thing much wanted, and by which you might oblige the learned world,) any one of these senses appears as just and reasonable as another. Now the Doctor's maxim, rightly understood, may be true in all these senses. For, in respect of the first, what is peculiar and *proper* to one part, is not *communicated* or *common* to other parts: in respect of the second, what is *proper* to one *Person*, is not *common* to other *persons:* and so, in respect of the third, what is *proper* to one *essence* or *substance*, is not *common* to other *essences* or *substances*. All this is very true: but to what purpose is it, or whom does the learned Doctor contradict? This is only telling us, that *so far*, or *in such respect*, as any thing is supposed *individual* or *incommunicable*, it is supposed *individual* or *incommunicable;* which nobody doubts of. But whether this or that be communicable, or how far, or in what manner (which is all the difficulty) remains a question as much as ever; and the Doctor's maxim will not help us at all in it. It may be the safest way, first to try the strength and the use of it

upon the Doctor's own hypothesis. Let it be asked, whether the wisdom, &c. residing in that part which pervades the sun, (for it seems that it must be *intelligent*, and *infinitely* so; unless one infinite intelligent be made up of *unintelligents*, or *finite intelligents*;) I say, let it be asked, whether that be the very *individual* wisdom which resides in another part, at any given distance. I presume, to this question you must answer, *yes:* and then we are to observe, that here is but one *individual* infinite wisdom, which is *entirely* in the *whole*, and *entirely* in every *part; proper*, in some sense, to each single part, (since it can have only such attributes as inhere in it,) and yet *common* to all; *diffused* through extended substance, yet not *coextended;* nor *multiplied*, because but *one*. If you admit thus far, as I think you must, we shall have nothing to apprehend, in point of reason, (which nevertheless is what you chiefly trust to,) against the doctrine of the Trinity. The *communication* of *essential* attributes, which we speak of, is at least as intelligible as what I have been mentioning; and every whit as consistent with the Doctor's maxim, that nothing which is *individual* can be *communicated*. Only you have your sense of *individual*, and we have *ours;* and you can account no better for so many and infinitely distant parts making *one Person*, than we for three Persons making *one substance*, or one God. Let us therefore be content to stop where it becomes us; and frankly confess our ignorance of these things: for by pretending further, we shall not discover less ignorance than before, but much greater vanity. I would not have presumed to discourse thus freely of the tremendous substance of the eternal God, (infinitely surpassing human comprehension,) were it not, in a manner, necessary, in order to expose the folly and the presumption of doing it. If the doctrine of the blessed Trinity is to stand or fall by this kind of reasoning, it was very proper to make some trial of it first, where it might be done more safely, to see how it would answer. You, I presume, cannot complain of me, for treating you in your own way, and turning upon you your own artillery. But to proceed. You are positive in it, "that the Son of God hath not the individual attributes of God "the Father; for then," say you, "he must be the Father." On the contrary, I affirm, that he hath the *individual* attributes of God the Father, as much as he has the *individual* essence: for otherwise he must be a *creature* only: and therefore the question between you and me in plain terms is, whether the Son be *God* or a *creature?*

QUERY X.

Whether if they (the attributes belonging to the Son) be not individually the same, they can be any thing more than faint resemblances of them, differing from them as finite *from* infinite; *and then in what sense, or with what truth, can the Doctor pretend, that* "[a] *all divine powers, except absolute supremacy and independency,*" *are communicated to the Son? And whether every being, besides the one supreme Being, must not necessarily be a* creature, *and* finite; *and whether* "*all divine powers*" *can be communicated to a creature,* infinite *perfection to a* finite *being.*

I HAVE put under one Query what before made two, because the substance of them is nearly the same, and contains but one argument. I have two things upon my hands at once; first to clear and fix your sense, which is industriously disguised; and next to confute it. The present Query relates chiefly to the former, to draw you out of general and ambiguous terms, that so we may come up the closer, and fall directly to the point in question. You tell me, in answer to the former part, that the divine "attributes of the Son are not *individually* the same "with those of the Father[b]." By which you mean, that they are not *divine:* and so here you have discovered, that the Doctor does not understand *divine*, as others do in this controversy; and as a candid and ingenuous reader might be apt to understand him. You add, that "they (the attributes of the Son) "are *notwithstanding*, more than faint resemblances; the Son "being the brightness of his Father's glory, and the express "image of his Person." I allow that this text does set forth a great deal more than a "faint resemblance:" but you have not shewn that your hypothesis supposes so much; and therefore the quoting of this text is only arguing against yourself. The inference we draw from this text, consonant to all antiquity, is, that the resemblance between Father and Son is complete and perfect; and that therefore they do not differ as *finite* and *infinite*, since that supposition would set them at an *infinite* distance from any such perfect and complete resemblance. You

[a] Script. Doctr. p. 298. [b] Page 64.

observe further, that there can be but one "intelligent being" (the same with you, as *person*) "absolutely infinite in all "respects," (p. 55.) which, though an assertion of great importance, you are pleased barely to lay down, without the least tittle of proof, or so much as pretence to it. Nay, you admit in your [c]Notes, that there may be *two infinite* beings, in the sense of *immense*; that is, two beings *omnipresent*, or *infinitely extended*. And why not as well two Persons infinitely perfect in all other respects, as well as *presence?* For, to use your own way of arguing in that very place, if *finite* power, wisdom, goodness, &c. do not exclude *infinite;* it is plain that *infinite* power, wisdom, goodness, &c. of one, do not exclude the *infinite* power, goodness, &c. of another. Besides, that two, infinite in all respects, are as easily conceived as two, infinite in any: and therefore here you seem, by your too liberal concessions, to have unsaid what you had said before; and to have unravelled your own objection. You are aware, that an adversary may take advantage of what you say; and endeavour, lamely, to prevent it, by telling us, (p. 56.) that though it be possible to suppose two *distinct* immense beings, yet it is impossible there should be two immense beings of the *same individual nature;* for so, they must *coincide, and be but one Person.* But what if those who assert *the same individual nature,* in more persons than one understand the words in a larger sense than you here take them in? It is very certain they do not understand the phrase of *the same individual nature,* as you, who make it equivalent to *the same Person,* understand it: for they assert more persons than one to have *the same individual nature.* In the mean while, what a wonderful discovery is this, which you have laid such a stress on; that *two* persons cannot be *one* person, without *coinciding* and making *one* person. This is all that you have really said; and very true it is; only I am at a loss to find out the pertinency of it. To conclude this head: as to *infinite,* in the sense of *extension,* (into length, breadth, and height,) you will give me leave to suspend my judgment. I do not find either

[c] *One infinite,* in the sense of *immense,* does not (by taking up all space) exclude (necessarily) another immense, any more than it excludes any *finite.* For if a *finite* being doth not exclude (God) from a *finite* place, it is plain that an *infinite,* that is, an *immense* being, cannot exclude him from *infinite,* that is, from *immense* place. So that perhaps it is no such absolute *impossibility,* as some have thought it, to suppose *two distinct* immense beings. Note, p. 56.

that it is asserted in Scripture, or generally maintained by the Fathers; but that it is liable to many difficulties, in point of reason, more than I am, at present, able to answer. See what a [d]late thoughtful writer has said, and what [e]Cudworth had before collected on that subject. In my humble opinion, such intricate questions are too high for us, and are what our faculties were not made for. However that be, you and I need not differ. For if you can admit the possibility of *two infinite extended beings*, you can have nothing considerable to object against the *one infinity* of three infinite Persons, which I assert, and without determining the *modus* of it.

You proceed to observe, that "the Son's office and character "doth not require infinite powers:" to which I shall only say, that it may, for any thing you know; so that this is only guessing in the dark. Last of all, you come to interpret Dr. Clarke; supposing him to mean by *divine powers*[f], all divine powers *relating to the Son's character*. If he meant so, he might easily have said so: and yet if he had, he had still left us in uncertainties as much as ever; to muse upon a distinction which he has no ground for; and which, when admitted, will make no man wiser. You "hope the Querist is so good a philosopher as "to perceive, (though he doth not consider it,) that absolute "infinite perfections include and infer *supremacy* and *indepen-* "*dency*. And therefore, when Dr. Clarke excepted supremacy "and independency, he plainly, in reason and consequence, ex- "cepted absolute infinite powers."

Now I am persuaded, that Dr. Clarke would have thought it hard measure to have been charged by his adversaries with this so *plain consequence*, which you here so freely lay upon him. The Querist was aware that the Doctor's words might bear an orthodox sense; namely, that to the Son are communicated all things belonging to the Father, excepting only what is *personal;* that is, excepting that he is not the *first in order;* not *supreme*, in that sense, nor *unoriginate*. The Doctor well knew that his words might bear this construction; and perhaps would not have took it well of any, but a friend, that should have tied down a *loose* and *general* expression to a *strict particular*

[d] Impartial Inquiry into the Existence and Nature of God, by S. C. part ii. c. 1, 2, 3.

[e] Intellectual System, p. 828—834.

[f] Script. Doctr. p. 298.

meaning; and then have loaded it with consequences too shocking to be admitted in plain and express terms. But to proceed. You seem to be much offended at the Querist for asking, "whether all divine powers can be communicated to "a creature, infinite perfection to a finite being?" This, you say, is "an evident contradiction, which ought not to have been "put by one scholar upon another." But, after this rebuke, you will please to hearken to the reason of the case. The difficulty, you know, with the Querist was, how to come at the Doctor's real sense, couched under general and ambiguous expressions; that so the controversy might be brought to a point; and it might be seen plainly what was the true state of the question: which, as appears now, is only this; whether God the Son be a *creature* or no. The Doctor talked of the Son's having *divine* powers, and *all* divine powers. It was very proper to ask you, whether he hereby meant *infinite* powers or no; and withal to shew, if you should not answer directly, that he could not mean it, consistently with the Arian hypothesis; which he seemed, in other parts of his performance, to espouse. You will not yet say directly, that the Son's perfections are *finite*, nor deny them to be *infinite*: so hard a thing it is to draw you out of your ambiguous terms, or to make you speak plainly what you mean. All you are pleased to say is, that the powers or perfections of the Son are not *absolutely* infinite: as if *infinity* were of two sorts, *absolute* and *limited*; or might be rightly divided into *infinity* and *not infinity*. Instead of this, I could wish that words may be used in their true and proper meaning. If you do not think the perfections of the Son are *infinite*, and yet are unwilling to limit them; let them be called *indefinite*, which is the proper word to express your meaning; and then every reader may be able to understand us, and may see where we differ. We are both agreed that the Doctor, by *divine* powers, did not mean *infinite* powers. Now let us proceed to the next Query.

QUERY XI.

Whether if the Doctor means by divine *powers, powers given by God (in the same sense as angelical powers are* divine *powers) only in a higher degree than are given to other beings; it be not equivocating, and saying nothing; nothing that can come*

up to the sense of those texts before cited[a], *or to these following?*

Applied to the one God.	To God the Son.
Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their hosts, the earth, and all things that are therein, &c. Neh. ix. 6.	All things were made by him, John i. 3. By him were all things created: he is before all things, and by him all things consist, Colossa. i. 16, 17.
In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, Gen. i. 1.	Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands, Heb. i. 10.

IF the Doctor means, by *divine* powers, no more than is intimated in this Query, I must blame him first for equivocating and playing with an ambiguous word; and next for restraining and limiting the powers of the Son of God; not only *without*, but *against* Scripture; and consequently for giving us, not the "Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity," but his *own*. That there is no ground, from the texts themselves, for any such limitation as is now supposed, is tacitly implied in the Doctor's own confession, that the Son is excluded from nothing but absolute supremacy and independency: "So naturally does truth some-"times prevail, by its own native clearness and evidence, against "the strongest and most settled prejudices." Indeed the thing is very clear from the texts themselves cited above; especially when strengthened with those now produced under this Query. That the Son was and is endowed with *creative powers*, is plain from these texts, and others which might be added; and is confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of Catholic antiquity. And that the title of *Creator* is the distinguishing character of the one supreme God, is so clear from [b] Scripture, that he who runs may read it. Now let us consider what you have to except, in order to elude the force of this argument.

"The Son of God," you say, "is manifestly the Father's "agent in the creation of the universe;" referring to Ephes. iii. 9. and to Heb. i. 2. from whence you infer, that he is "subordi-"nate in nature and powers to him." This you have, (p. 58.) and in your Notes (p. 55.) you insist much upon the distinction between δι' αὐτοῦ and ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, explaining the former of an *instrumental*, and the latter of an *efficient* cause; of which more in due time and place. As to the Son's being *agent with*,

[a] Query V. p. 326 of this volume.
[b] Nehem. ix. 6. Isa. xl. 12, 13. 18, 19, 20, 21, &c. Isa. xlii. 5, 8. Isa. xliii. 1, 10. Jer. x. 10, 11, 12. See Serm. iii. vol. ii. p. 74, &c. of this edition.

or *assistant to* the Father, in the work of creation, we readily admit it; and even contend for it. The Father is *primarily*, and the Son *secondarily*, or *immediately*, Author of the world; which is so far from proving that he is *inferior*, in nature or powers, to the Father, that it is rather a convincing argument that he is *equal* in both. A *subordination* of *order*, but none of *nature*, is thereby intimated. [c] Eusebius, whom you quote (p. 55.) out of Dr. Clarke, and [d] mistranslate to serve your purpose, does not deny the proper *efficiency* of the Son in the work of creation. All he asserts is, that the creation is *primarily* and *eminently* attributed to the Father, because of his *αὐθεντία*, his *prerogative*, *authority*, *supremacy*, as Father, or first Person; not denying the Son's *proper efficiency*, but only (if I may so call it) [e] *original* efficiency; that is, making him the *second* and not the *first* Person; not *Father*, but *Son*. Indeed, the [f] general opinion of the ancients centred in this; that the Father, as supreme, issued out orders for the creation of the universe, and the Son executed them. And this was asserted, not only by the Ante-Nicene writers, but [g] Post-Nicene too; and such as strenuously defended the Catholic faith against the Arians. I have before observed, that the ancients had a very good meaning and intent in assigning (as it were) to the three Persons their several parts or provinces in the work of creation: and let no man be offended, if, in this way of considering it, the Son be sometimes said *ὑπηρετεῖν*, or *ὑπουργεῖν*, or the like [h]. This need not be thought any greater disparagement to the dignity of the Son, than it is, on the other hand, a disparagement to the dignity of the Father to be represented as having the counsel and assistance of two other Persons; or as leaving every thing to be wisely ordered, regulated, and perfected by the Son and Holy Spirit. These things are not to

[c] See Euseb. contr. Marcel. l. i. c. 20. p. 84.

[d] The learned Doctor, and, after him, you construe, *ὑπ' αὐτοῦ*, and *δι' αὐτοῦ*, by *efficient* and *ministering* cause. As if a *ministering* cause might not be *efficient*, or must necessarily be opposed to it.

[e] This is excellently illustrated by the elder Cyril. *Πατρὸς βουληθέντος τὰ πάντα κατασκευᾶσθαι, τῷ τοῦ πατρὸς πνεύματι ὁ υἱὸς τὰ πάντα ἐδημιούργησεν· ἵνα τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα τηρῇ τῷ πατρὶ τὴν αὐθεντικὴν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς δὲ πάλιν ἔχῃ ἐξουσίαν τῶν ἰδίων δημιουργημάτων· καὶ μήτε πατὴρ ἀπαλλοτριωθῇ τῆς δεσποτείας τῶν ἰδίων δημιουργημάτων, μήτε ὁ υἱὸς τῶν ὑπ' ἄλλου δημιουργηθέντων βασιλεύῃ, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Catech.* xi. p. 160. ed. Bened.

[f] See Irenæus, p. 85. Tertullian. contr. Prax. c. 12. Hippolyt. contr. Noet. c. 14.

[g] See Petavius de Trin. l. ii. c. 7. Bull. D. F. p. 80, 111.

[h] Vid. Cotelerii Not. ad Herm. Mandat. v. p. 91, et ad Apost. Const. l. v. c. 20. p. 326.

be strictly and rigorously interpreted according to the letter; but οἰκονομικῶς, and θεοπρεπῶς. The design of all was; 1. To keep up a more lively sense of a real distinction of Persons. 2. To teach us the indivisible unity and coessentiality of all Three, as of one [i] Creator. 3. To signify wherein that unity consists, or into what it ultimately resolves, viz. into unity of *principle*, one Ἀρχὴ, Head, Root, Fountain of all. As to the distinction between δι' αὐτοῦ and ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, *per quem* and *ex quo*, or the like, it can be of very little service to your cause. The preposition διὰ, with a genitive after it, is frequently used, as well in Scripture, as in ecclesiastical writers, to express the *efficient* cause, as much as ὑπὸ, or ἐκ, or πρὸς, or any other. So that the argument drawn from the use of the prepositions is very poor and trifling, as was long since observed by [k] Basil the Great, who very handsomely exposes its author and inventor, Aëtius, for it. Please but to account clearly for one text, out of many, (Rom. xi. 36,) "Of him, and through *him*, (δι' αὐτοῦ,) and to him, are "all things: to whom be glory for ever." If you understand this of the Father; then, by your argument from the phrase δι' αὐτοῦ, you make him also no more than an *instrumental* cause: if you understand it of more persons, here is an illustrious proof of a Trinity in Unity. If it be pretended, which is the [l] Doctor's last resort, that although the use of those prepositions singly be not sufficient, yet when they are used "in express contradistinction to each other," they are of more significancy; I answer, first, that I desire to know of what significancy they are in Rom. xi. 36, where they seem to be used in *express contradistinction* to each other; and secondly, admitting that they are of significancy, they may signify only a *real* distinction of Persons, as [m] St. Basil well observes; or some *priority* of *order* proper to the *first Person:* this is all the use which any Catholic writer ever pretended to make of the distinction. However, to countenance the distinction between the Father as the *efficient*, and the Son as the *instrumental* cause, you are pleased to say further, (p. 56,) "it is remarkable, that (according to the sense of the foregoing "distinction) though Christ is frequently styled by the ancients "Τεχνίτης and Δημιουργὸς, yet Ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων is (to the best of "my remembrance) always confined by them to the Father only."

[i] So Origen, who makes the Father δημιουργὸς, and the Son δημιουργὸς, contr. Cels. p. 317. yet, in the very same treatise, denies that the world could have more *Creators* than one. Μὴ δαναμένου ὑπὸ πολλῶν δημιουργῶν γεγονέναι, p. 18.

[k] De Spir. Sanct. p. 145, &c.

[l] See Script. Doctr. p. 90.

[m] De Spir. Sanct. p. 148.

Had your remark been true and just, yet it would not be easy to shew that τεχνίτης, or however δημιουργὸς, may not signify as much as [n] ποιητής. But your *memory* has much deceived you in this matter; and you should be cautious how you make your readers rely upon it. Those words (especially the two last of them) seem to have been used by the ancients promiscuously; and to have been applied indifferently to Father or Son, as they had occasion to mention either. If they are oftener applied to the Father, it is only because he is the *first Person;* and is therefore *primarily* and *eminently* τεχνίτης, δημιουργὸς, or ποιητής; not that the Son is not *strictly*, *properly*, and *completely Creator* also, according to the fullest sense and import of any, or of all those words. They were intended to signify that the Son is the *immediate* and *efficient* cause of all things; had [o] *creative* powers; and was, with the Father, *Creator* of men, of angels, of the whole universe. A late [p] writer is pleased to express himself, upon this head, in such a manner as may deceive ignorant and unwary readers. "I know not" (says he) "that either Arians, or any "primitive Christian writers, ever adventured to give the charac-"ter of *great Architect of the universe* to Jesus Christ; choosing "rather, with the sacred writings, to say, in softer language, that "*through him* God created all, and reserving the absolute title of "*Creator of the universe* to another."

If he *knows not* these things, he might forbear to speak of them. What he says, even of the sacred writings, is *misrepresentation:* for they do not constantly follow that *soft* language, which he so much approves of. They do it not in John i. 3, 10, Coloss. i. 16, Heb. i. 10. Neither can that construction be ascertained, in any one of these texts, from any *necessary* force of the preposition διά. As to antiquity, which this gentleman pretends to, he may *know*, hereafter, that the character of, "[q] great Architect of the uni-"verse," is expressly given to *Jesus Christ*, by Eusebius; who

[n] See Origen. contr. Cels. p. 317. where the Son is said ποιῆσαι τὸν κόσμον, and the Father to be πρώτως, that is, *primarily*, or *eminently*, δημιουργός. If ποιητὴς signified more than δημιουργὸς, Origen spoke very unaccurately.

Cyril of Alexandria supposes God the Father to have been in reality τεχνίτης from everlasting; δημιουργὸς in power and intention only. *Thesaur. ass.* iv. p. 34. Yet Athanasius makes ποιητὴς to signify more than τεχνίτης. *Orat. contr. Arian.* ii. p. 489. Authors do not always observe a critical exactness in the use of words.

[o] The Arians themselves would say, *sua virtute fecit*, meaning it of the Son. See the citation above, p. 329.

[p] Mr. Emlyn, Exam. of Dr. Bennet, p. 12. first edit.

[q] Ὁ μέγας τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς λόγος. *Euseb. E. H.* l. x. c. 4. pag. 316.

was never suspected of carrying orthodoxy too high. A man must be a very stranger to the ancients, who can make any question whether they attributed the work of creation to the Son, as much as to the Father. They ascribed it equally to both; only with this difference, as before observed, that, for the greater majesty and dignity of the Father, as the *first Person*, they supposed him to [r] issue out orders, or to give his *fiat*, for the creation, and the Son to execute. From hence we may easily understand in what sense the title of *Creator* was [s] *primarily* or *eminently* attributed to the Father; and yet, as to any real *power* or *efficiency*, the Son is as truly and properly *Creator*; and is frequently so styled, by the primitive writers, in the [t] fullest and strongest terms. You may see some testimonies, in the margin, from Athenagoras, Tatian, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen. It would be easy to add more, from Hippolytus, Gregory of Neocæsarea, Novatian, and indeed from the generality of the Church writers down from Barnabas to the Council of Nice. I must observe to you, that even your admired [u] Eusebius, (whom you before quoted in your favour, mistaking him very widely,) he applies the title of ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων, (the highest which you think the Father himself can have,) to the Son, no less than thrice;

[r] Τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς εὐδοκοῦντος καὶ κελεύοντος, τοῦ δὲ υἱοῦ πράσσοντος καὶ δημιουργοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ πνεύματος τρέφοντος καὶ αὔξοντος. *Iren.* p. 285. ed. Bened.

Πατὴρ ἠθέλησεν, υἱὸς ἐποίησεν, πνεῦμα ἐφανέρωσεν. *Hipp. contr. Noet.* p. 16.

[s] Πρώτως δημιουργόν. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 317.

[t] Πρὸς αὐτοῦ γὰρ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο, ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ. *Athenag.* p. 38. ed. Oxon. Observe πρὸς αὐτοῦ, as well as δι' αὐτοῦ.

Αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ τὴν ὕλην δημιουργήσας. Ἀγγέλων δημιουργός. *Tatian.* p. 22, 26. ed. Ox.

Τοῦτον μονογενῆ, τοῦτον πάντων ποιητήν. *Iren.* p. 44. ed. Bened. Τοῦτον κόσμου ποιητὴν——εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἐληλυθότα. *Ibid.* Τὸν τῶν πάντων κτιστὴν, καὶ δημιουργὸν, καὶ ποιητὴν, λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ, p. 79. Τῶν ἁπάντων τεχνίτης λόγος, p. 190. Fabricator omnium, p. 219. Fabricator universorum, p. 307. Mundi factor, p. 315.

Ὧι τὰ πάντα δεδημιοῦργηται. *Clem. Alexandr.* p. 7. edit. Oxon. Συμπάντων Θεὸν ἕνα μόνον——δημιουργὸν υἱὸν ἐν πατρὶ, p. 142. Πάντα ὁ λόγος ποιεῖ——τὰ ὅλα δημιουργεῖ——τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργὸς, p. 310. Ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ, p. 669. Ὁ λόγος δημιουργίας αἴτιος, p. 654. Πάντων δημιουργοῦ, p. 768.

Τὸν λόγον πεποιηκέναι πάντα, ὅσα ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ ἐνετείλατο. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 63. Comp. Athanas. de Decret S. N. p. 216.

Δημιουργὸν τῶν πάντων, κτιστὴν, ποιητὴν, τῶν πάντων. *Origen. apud Huet. Origenian.* p. 38.

N. B. This last citation, from a *catena*, is of less authority; but the citations from his other *certainly* genuine works are, in sense, equivalent.

[u] Euseb. in Psalm. p. 125. de Laud. Const. c. 14. in Ps. p. 630. See also in Psalm. 631. in the first of the three places the words are remarkably full and strong. Ὁ δημιουργὸς λόγος, ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων. The other two are equivalent in sense. Ἁπάντων ποιητὴς, and ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτῶν: where ὅλων is understood.

as Irenæus had done, thrice also, before, in words equivalent; and Origen, probably, once; as also [x] Hippolytus, not to mention that all the Fathers, by interpreting Gen. i. 26. (ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον, &c.) of Father and Son jointly, have implicitly and consequentially, though not expressly, said the same thing. To proceed.

You have an argument to prove that *creating* does not imply *infinite* power. "For," you say, "was the extent of those powers "then exercised, infinite, it is evident, the world must be in-"finite also," (p. 58.) This indeed is doing the business at once: for, if this reasoning be just, the Father himself, as well as the Son, is effectually excluded from ever giving any sensible proof, or from exerting any act, of *infinite* power. St. Paul's argument from the creation, for the *eternal power and Godhead* of the Creator, is rendered inconclusive: for it will be easy to reply, in contradiction to the Apostle's reasoning, that the things which are made are *finite*, and therefore cannot prove the maker of them to be *infinite*: so that atheists and unbelievers were not so entirely *without excuse*, as the good Apostle imagined. If you think there is some difference between *infinite power*, and *eternal power and Godhead*; and therefore that the Apostle's argument is not pertinent to the point in hand; I shall be content, if *creating* be allowed a sufficient proof of the Son's *eternal power and Godhead*; since it brings me directly to the point I aim at: besides, that *infinite power* will come in of course afterwards, by necessary inference and implication. I had almost forgot to take notice of your way of wording your argument, which looks not very fair. You say, "was the *extent* of those powers infinite;" as if any one said it was, in the sense wherein you understand the word *extent*. For reasons best known to yourself, you do not distinguish between extent of power *ad intra*, in respect of *degree*; and extent of power *ad extra*, in respect of the exercise of it. It may require an *infinite degree* of power to *create* a grain of sand; though the *extent* of that outward act reaches no further than the thing created. Now, you know, our dispute is only about infinite *extent* of power in the first sense. Let us therefore put the argument into plain words, and see how it will bear.

"Was the power exercised in the creation *infinite in degree*, or "exceeding any *finite* power, *then it is evident that the world must*

[x] Contr. Beron. et Hel. p. 226. Comp. contr. Noet. p. 16.
The genuineness of the first is somewhat doubtful; but the last is not questioned.

"*be infinite.*" Make this out, with any tolerable sense, or connection, and you will do something. Next let us put the argument in the other light.

"If the power exercised in the creation extended to an *infinite* "*compass*, or to an *infinite* number of things, then *it is evident* "*that the world must be infinite.*" Right: if the creation had been *infinite in extent*, the creation must have been *infinite in extent*. But who is it that you are disputing against? or whom do you oblige by these discoveries? The question is, whether the *creating*, that is, producing out of nothing, any one single thing, however small in extent, be not an act proper to God only; exceeding any *finite* power; incommunicable to any *creature*. It is sufficient for *you*, to put *us* upon the proof of the *affirmative*: no considering man would ever attempt to prove the *negative*. As to the affirmative, there are many very probable presumptive proofs, such as ought to have great weight with us: particularly, *creation* every where in Scripture looked on as a *divine* act; not so much as a grain of sand, or a particle of matter, said to be created by an angel, or archangel, or any creature whatever; reasonable to suppose that nothing can come into being by any power less than his, who is the Author and Fountain of all being. To this agrees the general sense of the more sober and thinking part of mankind. This was the doctrine of the [y]Ante-Nicene Catholic writers, so far as appears, as well as of those that came after. Wherefore the Arians, in ascribing creation to a *creature*, [z]innovated in the faith of Christ, copied after the Gnostics, [a]and exposed their cause. Since they resolved to make a *creature* only, of the Son of God, they should not have allowed him any power of *creating*; but should have interpreted all those texts which speak in favour of it, as the Socinians have done since, of a *metaphorical* creation. That indeed had been novel, and strained enough; but accompanied with less absurdity than the other. However, this use we may make of what the Arians so generally granted; first, to observe, that Scripture and tradition must have

[y] Hoc Deus ab homine differt, quoniam Deus quidem facit, homo autem fit: et quidem qui facit, semper idem est. *Iren.* p. 240. ed. Bened.

Nihil enim in totum Diabolus invenitur fecisse, videlicet cum et *ipse creatura* sit Dei, quemadmodum et reliqui angeli. *Iren.* p. 228. See also Bull. D. F. Epilog. p. 291, 292.

[z] Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἄγγελοι δημιουργεῖν δυνήσονται, κτίσματα ὄντες καὶ αὐτοὶ, κἂν Οὐαλιντῖνος, καὶ Μαρκίων, καὶ Βασιλείδης τοιαῦτα φρονῶσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων ζηλωταὶ τυγχάνητε. *Athan. Orat.* ii. p. 489.

[a] See Serm. iii. vol. ii. p. 76 of this edition.

appeared to run very strong, at that time, for it: and it may further shew, "how easy and natural that notion must be allowed "to be, which so many could not forbear expressing clearly and "distinctly; even frequently when, at the same time, they were "about to affirm, and endeavouring to prove, something not very "consistent with it." But we shall have more of this matter in the following Queries.

QUERY XII.

Whether the Creator of all things was not himself uncreated; and therefore could not be ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, made out of nothing?

THIS and the four following Queries, "are," you say, "all, "at most, but arguments *ad ignorantiam*, or *verecundiam*, "(p. 59.) to put us upon determining things, on either side, "not clearly revealed." To say the truth, you seem here to be very much perplexed; and therefore have reason to complain: and I am not to expect any very clear and distinct answers. You admit (p. 60.) that "the Creator of all things must be "himself uncreated." Well then; the Son is *Creator* of all things; therefore he is *uncreated*. The premises are both your own; the conclusion mine: and, one might think, it should be yours too. But you are, it seems, very loath to come into it; and discover a strong inclination to elude and evade it, if it were any way possible for you to do it. Let us see what you can say; "If the *Scripture-sense* be the true and only proper "sense of the word *creature*, (to wit, the visible and invisible "worlds brought into being by the power of the Λόγος, or Son "of God, in subordination to the will and power of the Father,) "then it is manifest that the Λόγος, who thus created them, "must (whatever is the nature of his own production or "generation) be, in this way of speaking, uncreated." This is something mysterious. It is however very plain that you are straining hard for some *odd, peculiar sense* of the word *creature*, or *created*; which is to be *called* the *Scripture-sense*; and if this does not relieve you, all is lost.

You give us the "Scripture Doctrine" of the *creation*; expressing both the *creation* itself, and the *Person* by whom it was *wrought*: and that whole doctrine, though set forth in *many* words, you call the "Scripture-sense" of that *one* word, *creature* or *created*. As if I should say, the Scripture-account of the ark

is, that it was made by Noah; therefore the "Scripture-sense" of the word *ark* implies the making of it by Noah. Or, the Scripture-account of the temple is, that it was built by Solomon; therefore the Scripture-sense of the word *temple* supposes it to be something made by Solomon: and if there were ever so many temples besides that one, yet they could not properly be called *temples*, unless built by Solomon. This is just as good as your pretence, that *creating* does not signify simply *creating*; but creating by the Λόγος. Give me leave to ask, whether the Jews, who kept their sabbath in memory of the *creation*, and undoubtedly took their notion of it from *Scripture*, understood the word constantly in your sense, as created by the Λόγος? If they did, that is a point I may make some use of another time: if they did not, then the "Scripture-sense" of the word *creature*, before the coming of the Messiah, was something different from what you have given us. I shall only add, that your pretended sense of the word *creature*, or *created*, does not seem to have prevailed so early as St. John's time. He tells us, all things were made *by him*, that is, by the Λόγος; and "without him "was not any thing made that was made." Might he not better have said, in short, all things were *created*, neither was there any thing but what was *created*? It was perfectly needless, if your pretence be true, to insert, *by him*; because, in the "Scripture-sense" of the word, it was implied, and the addition of it only renders it tautology.

You go on to say, "It is, I think, for this reason, that the "Scriptures never say that he is created." Ingenuously confessed; and therefore I hope you will not presume, either to *say*, or to *believe*, that *he is created*. As to the *reason* you assign for it, it is mere fancy and fiction: I hope, out of pure reverence to the sacred Writ, you will bethink yourself of some better. You add, on the other hand, that the Scriptures "never say "that he is uncreated;" forgetting what you had acknowledged, in the same page, viz. "that the Creator of all things must be "himself uncreated, is an unavoidable consequence in reason:" and that the Λόγος had *created* all things you admit, immediately after, as delivered in Scripture. Wherefore, if Scripture, by *unavoidable consequence*, does say, that he is *uncreated*; I hope Scripture does *say* it. The Scriptures, every where, carefully keep up the distinction between *Creator* and *creature*; and never confound both in one. They tell us not of any creature of the

Father's, which is not a creature of the *Son's* also. They say, that "all things were made by him;" and to be more expressive and emphatical, "without him was not any thing made that was "made." How can this be, if he himself was made? "Si ipse "factus est, non per illum sunt *omnia* facta, sed *cætera*;" saith St. Austin.

As to the sense of the Ante-Nicene writers, in this particular, it is well known that they do *implicitly* and *consequentially*, almost every where, declare the Son to be *uncreated*. You may see some [a] testimonies referred to in the margin, where they do it also *directly*, and in *express* words. I scruple not to put Origen amongst them: his orthodoxy has been effectually defended by the incomparable Bishop Bull, in the opinion of the ablest and most impartial judges. The learned Doctor, notwithstanding, has been pleased to revive the dispute about Origen's sentiments: with what success, shall be here examined, as briefly as may be. The words of Origen, which [b] he lays hold on, are these. [c] Πρεσβύτατον πάντων τῶν δημιουργημάτων, applied to the Son. Bishop Bull, like a skilful and a candid man, who did not care to set *one ambiguous* sentence against *many plain* ones, nor to make an author manifestly inconsistent, without as manifest a necessity, rendered the words, very rightly, "ancienter than "all creatures." The Doctor himself is forced to [d] admit that the words might bear this construction: and yet [e] afterwards says, that "Origen expressly reckoned the Son among the δημι-"ουργήματα." But how *expressly?* This can never be proved merely from the force of πρεσβύτατον, as a *superlative:* unless [f] Eusebius *expressly* reckoned the Son among times and ages; or [g] Justin Martyr *expressly* reckoned the Pentateuch among *profane*

[a] Athenagoras, Legat. p. 39. ed. Ox. Ignat. ad Ephes. c. vii. p. 14. ed. Ox. Irenæus, l. ii. c. 25. p. 153. ed. Bened. Orig. contr. Cels. l. vi. p. 287. Dionys. Rom. apud Athanas. de Decret. Syn. N. p. 232. Dionysius Alexandr. apud Eund. 230, 253, 257. Theognostus —— apud Eund. 230. Methodius apud Phot. p. 960. Hippolytus (probably) de Theol. et Incarn. p. 228.

[b] Script. Doctr. p. 184, 278, 282, alias 164, 245, 249.

[c] Orig. contr. Cels. l. v. p. 257.

[d] Script. Doctr. p. 184, alias 164.

[e] Script. Doctr. p. 282, alias 249.

[f] Παντὸς χρόνου καὶ πάντων αἰώνων πρεσβύτατος. *De Laud. Constant.* c. i. p. 501. Vales. Ἡ καὶ αὐτῶν αἰώνων ἐστὶ τεχνῖτις καὶ χρόνου παντὸς τὸ πρεσβύτατον. *Cyril. Alex. Dial.* ii. de Trin. p. 446. Vid. contr. Jul. l. i. p. 18. Et Theod. ad Græc. tom. iv. p. 462, 493.

[g] Ἀρχαιοτάτην πασῶν τῶν ἔξωθεν Ἱστοριῶν τὴν Μωϋσέως Ἱστορίαν. *Paræn.* c. xii. p. 70. ed. Oxon.

histories; or the same [h] Justin *expressly* reckoned Moses and the Prophets among the *wise men* of Greece: which is ridiculous. The superlative, we see, hath been used sometimes comparatively; and why not by Origen? He may only *appear* to say what he *really* does not. There is certainly a wide difference between *verbally* seeming to assert, and *expressly* asserting; as much as between being barely capable of such a sense, and being capable of no other sense. How then will the learned Doctor be able to make good his pretensions? He [i] alleges the "whole tenor of Origen's opinion;" in which he greatly mistakes: for the *whole tenor* of Origen, especially in that treatise from whence the passage is taken, is altogether contrary; as the learned well know, and Bishop Bull hath clearly shewn. But the Doctor has a further plea from a passage in [k] Athanasius, which he seems to be much pleased with; referring to it, once, and again, in his "Scripture Doctrine." The principal words are these: Τὸν καὶ τῆς κτίσεως κύριον, καὶ πάσης ὑποστάσεως δημιουργόν. The Doctor thinks he has here discovered a [l] *contradistinction* between τῆς κτίσεως (he neglects κύριον) and πάσης ὑποστάσεως δημιουργόν. We are to *suppose* πάσης ὑποστάσεως of larger extent and signification than πάσης κτίσεως would have been: and, because δημιουργὸν goes along with it, we are to *suppose* that δημιούργημα was understood, by Athanasius, in a larger sense than κτίσις: lastly, we are to *suppose* that Athanasius is, in this instance, the best interpreter of Origen; though it does not appear from Origen's own writings, that he knew any thing of this peculiar sense of δημιούργημα, but the contrary. The bare recital of so many *suppositions*, advanced without proof, or any shadow of it, might suffice for an answer. But we may observe,

1. That if Athanasius, being then a young man and an orator, intended only to vary his phrase, either to be more emphatical, or to give the better turn and cadence to a period, (and this

[h] Πρεσβύτατος Μωϋσῆς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ προφῆται γεγόνασι πάντων τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν σοφῶν. *Paræn.* c. xxxv. p. 118. Μωσῆς πάντων μὲν Ἑλλήνων πρεσβύτατος. *Euseb. Præp. Evang.* l. xiv. c. 3.

[i] Script. Doctr. p. 184, alias 164.

[k] Τοῦτον μόνον εἶναι Θεὸν ἀληθῆ, τὸν καὶ τῆς κτίσεως κύριον, καὶ πάσης ὑποστάσεως δημιουργόν. Τίς δὴ οὖν ἐστιν οὗτος ἀλλ' ἢ ὁ πανάγιος καὶ ὑπερεπέκεινα πάσης γενητῆς οὐσίας, ὁ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πατήρ. *Orat. contr. Gent.* p. 39. ed. Bened.

[l] Script. Doctr. p. 184, alias 164.

might be all, for any thing that appears to the contrary,) then the Doctor's *criticism* falls to the ground.

2. If any *contradistinction* was intended, it should seem, that the same must hold with respect to κύριον and δημιουργόν: the consequence whereof is, that God the Father is not κύριος so far and wide as he is δημιουργός. It will be some satisfaction to us, that if the Son be δημιούργημα, he has no *Lord over him*.

3. The constant use of δημιούργημα and δημιουργὸς, in other authors, and even in [m] Athanasius himself, and in this very [n] treatise, is another strong presumption against the Doctor's *criticism*.

4. The consequences following from the supposition of such a sense, as the Doctor would impose upon Athanasius, may be demonstrably confuted from the same treatise; nay, from the very same page where that remarkable passage is[o].

For, you must know, that, if the Doctor understands him right, Athanasius included the Son under πάσης ὑποστάσεως, whereof the Father is δημιουργός: and so the Son must be δημιούργημα according to Athanasius. Not only so, but he must also come under πάσης γενετῆς οὐσίας; which, for the purpose, the learned Doctor took care to render "all derivative being," answering to his rendering of δημιούργημα [p] afterwards. This might look fair and plausible, had we only that single sentence of Athanasius to form a judgment by: but it stands in a pretty large treatise; wherein we find that Athanasius is so far from supposing the Son to be δημιούργημα, that he makes him [q] ποιητὴς of *all the invisible powers*; nay, and [r] δημιουργὸς τοῦ παντὸς, which, I think, comes to as much as δημιουργὸς πάσης ὑποστάσεως; and that therefore the learned Doctor may almost as reasonably bring the Father in, among the δημιουργήματα of the Son, as *vice versa*. To conclude; Athanasius, within a few lines of that passage which the Doctor makes use of, exempts the Son,

[m] See Athanas. de Decret. Syn. Nic. pag. 235. where he expressly pleads that the Father cannot be said to be δημιουργὸς, in respect of the Son.

[n] Τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐθεοποίησαν, τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα λατρεύοντες πρᾶγμα πάσχοντες ἀνόητον καὶ δυσσεβές. Ὅμοιον γὰρ εἴ τις τὰ ἔργα πρὸ τοῦ τεχνίτου θαυμάσειε, καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει δημιουργήματα καταπλαγεὶς τὸν τούτων δημιουργὸν καταπατοίη, p. 46. The words δημιουργήματα and δημιουργὸν answer, in the similitude and analogy, to κτίσει and κτίσαντα, going before. Wherefore, I conceive, that, according to Athanasius, the two former, when understood with relation to God, are equivalent to the two latter.

[o] Script. Doctr. p. 4, alias p. 5.

[p] Script. Doctr. p. 278, alias 245.

[q] Page 43.

[r] Page 29.

clearly and expressly, from the rank of such *derivative beings*, as the Doctor would place him with: [s] Ἄλλος μέν ἐστι τῶν γενετῶν, καὶ πάσης τῆς κτίσεως. So much for Athanasius, and the Doctor's criticisms upon him. Now, if you please, let Origen be ours again, till you can better make out your title to him. I do not know that the Doctor has said any thing considerable to weaken the evidence of any other of the authors, referred to in the margin. So we may leave them as they are, and proceed to another Query.

QUERY XIII.

Whether there can be any middle between being made out of nothing, and out of something; that is, between being out of nothing, and out of the Father's substance; between being essentially God, *and being a* creature; *whether, consequently, the Son must not be either* essentially God, *or else a* creature?

HERE, again, I have run two Queries into one, (being nearly allied to each other,) for the conveniency of method. Questions of this kind you like not: "It is," you say, pressing you to "determine things not clearly revealed:" as if you had not *determined* already upon the points in question, or were at all afraid of doing it. Permit me to say, you have determined: but because the conclusion is too shocking to appear in broad terms, and too weak to bear; therefore you keep it under cover, and lay colours upon it, the better to deceive and draw in an unwary reader: this is what I complain of. Let every reader be apprised, that the only question between us is, whether his Creator and Redeemer be a *creature*, or no: and then the cause will be brought to a short issue; and it will soon be seen where the truth lies. It is not that I desire to draw you into danger of *censure*, of which you are apprehensive; I could not have a thought so mean: besides that I intended, and desired, for the greater freedom of debate, to be private: and you, perhaps, may be so still, if you please. It concerns every honest man to have the cause fairly laid open. While you are endeavouring to expose the *received* opinion, as much as you are able, let *your own* be shewn in its *true colours*, and then set against it; that so we may the more easily judge, which has the advantage upon

[s] Page 39.

the comparison. You are very sensible, I doubt not, that the arguments against the Son's being a *creature* bear upon you with such strength, force, and full light, that you had rather have the pinch of the question concealed from the reader, or disguised under other terms. The ancient Arians, the immediate successors of Arius, found it absolutely necessary to *refine* upon their leader, to refine, I mean, *in language*; for their faith was the same. When the world was in a manner their own; and when they were so far from fearing *censure* themselves, that they employed the secular power to [a]plunder, persecute, and destroy as many as opposed them; even *then*, those men durst not say *directly*, that the Son of God was *a creature*. We have creed after creed drawn up by them; and Arius's positions [b]expressly disclaimed by some of them; though, at the same time, they meant the same things. And what was the meaning of this wary proceeding; this walking in disguise, while they had nothing to fear from the powers in being? The reason is plain: their doctrine was *new*, and [c]*shocking* to Christian ears. It was not fit to appear in [d]clear and plain words. It was to be insinuated only in remote hints, and dark *innuendos*. People were to be decoyed, and gradually drawn into a *new* faith; which if they had fully understood, and seen what it led to, they would immediately have detested. See to this purpose a [f]passage of Hilary worth remarking; which I have thrown into the margin.

The Arians, or Semi-Arians, (for both come to one at last,) were so sensible that their tenets would not bear the light, that they were forced to disguise and conceal them under Catholic forms of speech, with all imaginable art and subtilty; as was much complained of by the Catholics, [g]who abhorred such arti-

[a] See Athanas. vol. i. p. 110, 317, 321, 345, 362, 386. Hilar. p. 1291. Basil. Ep. 70, 71, 282. Greg. Naz. Orat. 20, 23, 25, 32.

[b] Athanas. vol. i. p. 176, 275, vol. ii. p. 735. Socrat. l. ii. c. 10. Sozom. E. Hist. l. iii. c. 5. Epiphan. Hæres. lxxiii. p. 845.

[c] Athanas. vol. i. p. 234, 283. Alexand. Epist. Theod. H. p. 26, 30.

[d] See Athanas. vol. i. p. 288.

[f] Hujus quidem usque adhuc impietatis fraude perficitur, ut jam sub antichristi sacerdotibus Christi populus non occidat, dum hoc putant illi *fidei* esse quod *vocis* est. Audiunt *Deum* Christum; putant esse quod dicitur. Audiunt *Filium Dei*; putant in Dei Nativitate inesse Dei veritatem. Audiunt *ante tempora*, putant id ipsum *ante tempora*, esse quod semper est. Sanctiores aures plebis quam corda sacerdotum. *Hilar.* p. 1266. See also Sozom. E. H. l. iii. c. 5.

[g] Athanas. p. 235, 224, 895. Theod. E. H. p. 27. Socrat. E. H. l. ii. c. 45. Sozom. E. H. l. iv. c. 29. Epiphan. Hæres. lxxiii. p. 845. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. 21. p. 387.

fices. The mystery of these disguises has been already intimated. Had they ventured to speak out, they could not have deceived any great numbers. The greater part of their deluded followers were blinded and hoodwinked; and hardly knew what their leaders intended, or whither they were driving. These were the arts by which Arianism prevailed; and yet hardly prevailed above forty years. Whether these or the like prudential reasons determine some now to proceed with the like caution, and to avoid declaring, in terms, that the Son of God is a *creature*, I know not. But this I know, that every careful reader ought to be well apprised of the tendency of your main doctrine. It should be told, that you assert, though not *directly* and *plainly*, yet *tacitly* and *consequentially*, that the Maker, Redeemer, and Judge of the whole world, is no more than a *creature;* is mutable, and corruptible; depends entirely upon the favour and good pleasure of God; has a precarious existence, and dependent powers, finite and limited; and is neither so perfect in his nature, nor so exalted in privileges, but that it is in the Father's power, according to his own good pleasure, to create another equal, or even superior to him. These are your tenets, if you please to speak out; and these, in the main, are what Arius, being a plain, open, and consistent man at the beginning, very frankly professed. But if these positions appear so harsh and shocking, that you yourselves, who admit them, do not care to own them in *plain terms;* it may be very excusable in *others* to contradict them; and to assert, upon so great evidences of truth from Scripture and antiquity, that God the Son is *infinitely* removed from the condition of a *creature;* is *really*, *truly*, and *essentially* God.

You have, perhaps, some few specious difficulties to urge against a "Trinity and unity, eternal generation," or the like; points too sublime for men, or, it may be, angels to comprehend. But why must these be thought to weigh down the many and unanswerable objections against your own scheme; or to be esteemed sufficient to bear up against the united voice of Scripture and Catholic antiquity, nowhere asserting that the Son of God is a *creature;* but every where intimating, inculcating, proclaiming, that he is the *Creator*, *Preserver*, and *Sustainer* of all things; very and eternal God? You will pardon me this excursion, necessary to give the common reader a just idea of the dispute betwixt us, and of the *true state* of the question. A stranger in this controversy, finding how near we come to each other in *expres-*

sion, might be apt to wonder wherein we differ, or what it is that we dispute about; not being aware of the artifice you make use of, in giving an *uncatholic* meaning to *catholic* expressions. We say, the Son is not *self-existent*, meaning that he is not *unoriginate*: you do not only say the same, but contend for it; meaning, not *necessarily-existing*. We say, *not unoriginate*, meaning that he is not the *head* or *fountain*, not the *first Person* of the Trinity: you take up the very same word, and zealously contend that the Son is not *unoriginate*; understanding it in respect of *time*, or *duration*. We say, the Son is *subordinate*, meaning it of a subordination of *order*, as is just and proper: you also lay hold of the word *subordinate*, and seem wonderfully pleased with it; but understanding by it, an *inferiority* of *nature*. We say, that the Son is not absolutely *supreme* nor *independent*; intimating thereby that he is *second* in order as a Son, and has no *separate*, *independent* existence from the Father, being *coessentially* and *coeternally* one with him: you also take up the same words, interpret them to a *low* sense, and make the Son an *inferior dependent* Being; *depending* at first on the *will* of the Father for his existence, and afterwards for the continuance of it. This is the way you choose to insinuate your heterodoxy into weak readers. In the mean while, notwithstanding our *seeming* or *verbal* agreement, there is as wide a difference between what you teach, and we, as between *finite* and *infinite*, *mutable* and *immutable*, a *dependent creature* and the *eternal God*. From what hath been said, you may perceive what the "*concessions* of *Catholics*," which the Doctor often boasts of, amount to. The Catholics have used some phrases in a *good* sense, which artful men have perverted to a *bad* one: that is all the case. But I return.

You was to find a *medium* between being *essentially God*, and being a *creature*: or else to declare in plain terms, that the Son is a *creature*. A *medium* you find not, nor indeed can there be any: and yet, instead of frankly acknowledging so plain and manifest a truth, you are pleased to shift, double, and wind about, in a manner unbecoming a grave disputant, or a sincere and ingenuous writer. In the first place, you put on an air of courage, and give me *one caution*, viz. "not to say or attempt to prove, "that every being that is derived must be, for that reason, a "creature," for fear of making my "own notion," which supposes the Son *generated*, that is, *derived*, to favour the Arians: but, admitting the Son to be *derived*, as it may be understood in

a Catholic sense, yet what is that to your purpose? Does not my argument turn upon the words, *out of nothing?* Point me out any being *so derived*, a being which now is, and once *was not*; and deny him to be a *creature*, if you can. But you go on; "As "to what is said in the Queries, that either the Son of God must "be the *individual* substance of the Father, or else ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "with the Arians; I answer, if both Scripture and reason clearly "demonstrate that the Son is not the *individual* substance of "the Father, who must look to that consequence, if it be one?"

Here, at a strait, (as usual,) the word *individual* comes in; a word capable of several meanings, and so necessary to help invention, that you would often be at a loss what to say, if you wanted that poor pretence for equivocation. It is evident, that you all along use the word in a Sabellian sense, different from what either the Schoolmen, or more ancient Catholics intended by it. The thing which I assert is this; that you must either own the Son to be of the same *undivided* substance with the Father; or else declare him *a creature*. If you deny the former, you must, of consequence, admit the latter; and you *really* do so. The consequence *you* are to look to, as necessarily flowing from *your* premises; which you pretend to found on Scripture and reason, without any ground or warrant from either. You are resolved, it seems, to disown the "certainty of "the disjunction," (p. 61.) so afraid you are of determining the Son to be *a creature* ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων. Let us hear what a disputant may have to plead against a thing as clear and evident as any axiom in geometry.

You say, "[h]The Nicene Fathers thought the Son to be "neither the οὐσία τοῦ Πατρὸς, the substance of the Father, nor "ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, but ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς, from the substance "of the Father." The Nicene Fathers explain their meaning, both in the Creed itself, and in the anathemas annexed to it; determining the Son to be no *creature*, nor a different God from the Father; but of the same *undivided* substance with him, "*God of God, Light of Light*," *consubstantial* with him, and a distinct Person from him.

Next, you say, "you dare not determine that God produced "all things, or any thing, (strictly and metaphysically speaking,) "out of nothing." Extreme modesty! That you dare not

[h] See Dr. Clarke's Reply to the Convocation, p. 29.

determine whether God has properly *created* any thing; or whether all things were not *necessarily-existing*. *Matter* itself may have been *coeval* and *coeternal* with God the Father; any thing, it seems, but his own *beloved* and *only-begotten* Son: or else why are you so shy, at other times, of acknowledging his eternity? Or why so resolute in disputing against it? An *eternal Son*, methinks, is much better sense than an *eternal substance, not divine*, and a *Son made* out of it; which is what you must mean, or mean nothing. But to proceed. You add, "how God "brings beings into real existence we know not, because we "know not their essences." Therefore, I suppose, we know not, whether he brings them into existence at all; or whether they had a being before they were *created*. That is the consequence you intend, if any thing to the purpose. You go on: "or "whether it be a contradiction to predicate existence of them "before their coming into that state which they now are in, "and which we call their creation, we know not." Very ignorant! And yet you can be positive in things which you know a great deal less of; presuming to make the *generation* of the Son of God *temporal*; and determining it [i]a contradiction to predicate *existence* of him before his *generation*. Such things as these carry their own confutation with them; and only shew that truth is too stubborn to bend. Let it be said then plainly, and without disguise, that the Son of God is either *consubstantial* with God the Father, or else a *creature*. There is no *medium*, neither can there be any, consistent with Scripture and with the truth and reason of things. This being settled, our dispute may be brought into a narrower compass; and we may hereafter dismiss doubtful and ambiguous terms.

QUERY XIV.

Whether Dr. Clarke, who every where denies the consubstantiality of the Son, as absurd and contradictory, does not, of consequence, affirm the Son to be a creature ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, and so fall under his own censure, and is self-condemned?

IT hath been questioned by some, whether Dr. Clarke has really given into the Arian scheme, or no. From what he saith, in some places of his Scripture Doctrine, (particularly [a]Prop. 14 and 16.) one might imagine that he stood *neuter*, neither determining for nor against the Catholic Faith in that Article:

[i] Page 51, 63. [a] Script. Doctr. p. 276, 279.

but, from his declaring [b] expressly against the *consubstantiality* of the Son, whether *specific* or *individual*, (between which he allows no *medium*,) and from his reckoning the Son among the δημιουργήματα, (though he gives an artificial gloss to it;) as also from his excluding the Son out of the *one* Godhead; from these considerations, to mention no more, it is exceeding clear, that he has determined against the Church, and declared for Arianism. He has, by necessary consequence, asserted the Son to be ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, which is the very essence and characteristic of Arianism. By so doing, he is self-condemned, (see Prop. 14.) unless affirming a thing *expressly* be highly blamable; and affirming the same thing, *implicitly* and *consequentially*, be just and good. It is unaccountable to me, how there comes to be such a charm in words, that a man should be blamable for saying a thing of this nature, plainly and directly, which he may affirm indirectly and consequentially, without any fault at all. Doth the offence lie only in sounds or syllables? Or was Arius more culpable for saying, the Son was a *creature*, and *from nothing*, than another who says, he is not *consubstantial* with the Father, nor *one God* with him, or the like; when it is so very manifest, and hath been proved above, that they are only different expressions of the same thing? I can think but of three *reasons* (I speak not of particular *views*, or *motives*) why any man should condemn Arius for declaring the Son to be ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων. Either because the proposition is *false;* or because it is *dubious;* or because it is not, in *express* words, contained in Scripture.

If the Doctor believed it *false*, he could not, consistently, disown the *consubstantiality* and *coeternity;* if he thought it *dubious*, he must have observed a *neutrality*, in this controversy; which he has not done: the *third* reason would bear too hard upon many of the Doctor's fifty-five Propositions. The conclusion, which I draw from these premises, pursuant to the Query laid down, is, that the learned Doctor, in condemning Arius, has implicitly condemned himself. It was as necessary to take notice of this, as it is to take off disguises, and to prevent a reader's being misled by *fair* pretences. Let things appear what they really are, without art or colouring; and then, if you can make any advantage of them, in God's name, do so; and, if your cause be just, it will thrive the better for it.

[b] See Script. Doctr. p. 465. first ed.

QUERY XV.

Whether he also must not, of consequence, affirm of the Son, that there was a time when he was not, *since God must exist before the* creature; *and therefore is again self-condemned,* (see Prop. 16. Script. Doctr.) *And whether he does not* equivocate *in saying,* [a] *elsewhere, that the second Person has been* always *with the first; and that there has been* no time, *when he was not so: and lastly, whether it be not a vain and weak attempt to pretend to any middle way between the* orthodox *and the* Arians; *or to carry the Son's divinity the least higher than they did, without taking in the consubstantiality?*

I COULD have been willing to have had this, and other the like Queries, relating more to the Doctor himself, than to the cause, dropped. But since you have thought fit to *publish* them, presuming yourself able to defend the Doctor in every thing; you have brought a kind of necessity upon me, of shewing how little ground you have for your assurance in this particular; and that the Doctor will still want some better advocate.

He condemns, in his [b] Scripture Doctrine, those "who pre-"tending to be wise above what is written, and intruding into "things which they have not seen, have presumed to affirm, "that there WAS A TIME WHEN THE SON WAS NOT." Who would think, after this, that he should be the man who should *presume* to do it? Yet nothing is more evident than that he denies the *eternity* of the Son; which is the very same as to affirm, that "there was a time when the Son was not." He denies it, by plain consequence, in supposing the Son to be ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, as was shewn under the last Query; and besides, he expressly says, in his [c] comments on the Athanasian Creed, (which contain what himself subscribes to,) that "there are not three eternal "Persons." It must indeed be owned, that in his paper laid before the Bishops, July 2, 1714, he professes that the Son was "eternally begotten by the eternal will and power of the "Father." But, after a friend of his had discovered some uneasiness at that passage, as looking like a *retractation* of his

[a] Script. Doctr. p. 438. first ed.
[b] Prop. vi. p. 279. alias 246.
[c] Script Doctr. p. 429. This part is left out in his second edition.

former opinion, and as admitting the Son's *eternity*, he [d]took care to explain it away, and to signify that, though he had said the Son was *eternally* begotten, he did not mean it in the strict and proper sense. "My intention," says he, "was not to "assert any thing different from what I had before written; "but only to shew that I did not in any of my books teach (as "had by many been industriously reported) the doctrine of "Arius, (viz. that the Son of God was a creature made out of "nothing, just before the beginning of the world,) but that he "was begotten *eternally*, that is, without any limitation of time, "(ἀχρόνως, πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων, προαιωνίως, πρὸ πάντων αἰώνων,) "in the incomprehensible duration of the Father's eternity." This is too plain to need any comment.

I shall only observe to the reader, how the Doctor singles out one particular point, wherein he differs from Arius; whereas it is justly questionable whether that was Arius's settled opinion or no. Any one that will be at the pains to read over Arius's Letters, extant in [c]Theodorit and [f]Athanasius, will easily see, that the principal thing which stuck with him was the τὸ ἀΐδιον, or συναΐδιον, the strict *eternity* or *coeternity* of the Son. As to other lesser matters, he would easily have compounded with the Catholics; and would never have scrupled in the least to carry the point as high as the Doctor does. He was content, for the most part, to say, "There was a time when the Son was not," without defining the *precise* time of his *generation*, or *creation*. To make it the more clearly appear that he was perfectly of the Doctor's sentiments, in this particular, it is observable, that he uses nearly the very same words which the Doctor does: ([g]ἀχρόνως, [h]πρὸ χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων, [i]πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων·) words, though not exactly the same, yet full as high and strong as those which the Doctor explains his own sense of *eternity* by. So that the Doctor has no reason to disclaim Arius; or to endeavour to persuade the world that he differs from him in any thing material relating to this controversy. But to return. The words *eternal, always*, or the like, are plain English words, and should either not be used in this case at all, or used in their *true* and *proper* sense. You apologize for it, as far as the matter will bear; but it would be wiser, and better, and more ingenuous,

[d] Letters, Numb. 8.
[c] E. H. lib. i. cap. 5.
[f] De Synod. Arim. p. 729.
[g] Epist. apud Athanas. p. 730.
[h] Athanas. ibid. Theod. cap. v. p. 21.
[i] Confess. Arii et Euz. apud Sozom. l. ii. c. 27. p. 395.

to give that point up. Let us hear, however, what you have to say.

"God could eternally act; that is, could in any point of "duration of his own existence exercise his eternal power and "will in producing beings——and therefore beings distinct from "the one supreme God may be said to be *eternal*, as far as we "are able to reason about eternity, (I mean as it is a negative "idea,) so that we cannot conceive time when they were not." (P. 61.) What a number of words are here, only to tell us, in a roundabout way, that the Son is *not eternal*. What is this *negative* eternity, but no eternity? And why are not angels or archangels called *eternal*, since we know not precisely when they were made, nor in what time they began to exist; which is all the meaning of this new sort of eternity. Besides, is not every *creature* produced in some "point of duration," in which God exercises his "eternal power and will" upon them? Are they therefore *eternal?* As to your intimating of the Son, that "we "cannot conceive time when he was not," it is not true, upon your principles. We can conceive it as well of him as of any other creature, angel, or archangel; if he was made in time, that is, if he was made at all. We can conceive, and must conceive, that there were millions and millions of ages backwards; an eternity, *a parte ante*, before he came into being. I hope you intended not any equivocation in the word *time:* but if you did, it is only putting *duration* in the room of it, and then all will be right. The Arians would have been content to have had but one moment of time admitted for the Father to be *prior*, and to *will* the existence of the Son. This would have been enough to make the *generation* of the Son sit easy upon their minds. But the misfortune was, that one moment's *priority* of time must infer an *infinite priority*. The Arians saw it, and submitted to it: the Catholics abhorred the thought, and could not bear the impiety of making the Son of God a *creature*.

You endeavour to shew that Dr. Clarke takes a middle way between the *orthodox* and the *Arians;* by which you only happen to shew how little you have been acquainted with the *forms*, *creeds*, and *confessions* of the ancient Arians. The first [k] instance you give of the Doctor's middle way is, that he does

[k] Pag. 60.

not plainly and directly say that the Son was *created;* he denies him to be ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων. But herein he only copies after many of the ancient Arians; who, when accused by the Catholics of making the Son a *creature*, rejected the charge with great disdain; having this reserve, [l]*not a creature*, like other creatures which are created *mediately* by the Λόγος; the same evasion, which you are pleased to adopt for your own, (p. 60.) And it was [m]frequent with the Arians to deny the Son to be ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, or even to *anathematize* those that should affirm it. A second instance you give, of the Doctor's refining upon the Arians, is in the point of the Son's *eternity*, (p. 61.) But I have shewn you that he does not so much as go beyond Arius himself in that point: besides that the [n]ancient Arians condemned those that should presume to say, that "there was a "time when the Son was not," equivocating upon the word *time*. Both your instances, you see, fail you, being neither of them sufficient to the purpose.

But, to set this matter in a somewhat clearer light, it may not be improper, in this place, to exhibit a draught or representation of the Arian tenets or principles; by which it will appear what Arianism really is, when pursued in its remotest consequences; and what the difference is between those who only admit some part of it, (as the Doctor and yourself,) and those who receive the whole.

[o]*Positions of some or other of the Arians in respect of the Son.*

1. *Not* [p]*consubstantial* with God the Father.

2. *Not* [q]*coeternal*, however begotten before all ages, or without any known limitation of time.

3. Of a *distinct inferior nature*, however otherwise perfectly like the Father.

4. *Not strictly and essentially God*, but partaking of the Father's divinity.

[l] See Socrat. E. H. l. ii. c. 10. p. 73. Hieron. Dial. contr. Lucif. p. 300.

[m] See Arian Creeds. Athanas. p. 738. Socrat. l. ii. c. 8, 19, 30. Sozom. l. iii. c. 11.

[n] See Arian Creeds. Athanas. p. 738. Socrat. l. ii. c. 18, 19. Sozom. l. iii. c. 11.

[o] Athanas. p. 282, 398, 728. Sozom. l. i. c. 15. Theod. Hæret. Fab. l. iv.

[p] This was agreed to unanimously.

[q] This point disputed by the Psathyrians. Theod. Hæret. Fab. l. iv. c. 4. p. 238.

5. *A creature of the Father's*, however unlike to the rest of the creatures, or superior to them.

6. [r] *Not like the Father;* but in nature and substance like other creatures.

7. [s] *Made in time;* there having been a time when he was not, made from nothing.

8. [t] *Far inferior to the Father* in knowledge, power, and perfections.

9. *Mutable in his nature*, as a creature, though unchangeable by decree.

10. *Dependent* on the good pleasure of the Father, for his past, present, and future being.

11. *Not knowing the Father* perfectly, nor himself: his knowledge being that of a *creature*, and therefore *finite*.

12. *Made a little before the world was made;* and for the sake of those that should be after him.

These are the Arian principles brought down as low as they can well go. Arius, the author and founder of the sect, seems to have gone through all those steps at the first: and indeed all of them, except the last, hang together; and are but the necessary consequences of each other. Those that stopped in the midway, or sooner, might be more pious and modest, but less consistent men. A little experience convinced, as well Arius himself as his followers, that those positions, all together, were too grating upon, and too shocking to every pious Christian at that time. And therefore (without considering how one depended on another, or how a principle could be maintained, and yet its plain, necessary consequences disowned) they immediately went to work, to cut off what should appear most offensive, and retain only what might sound tolerably; especially when worded in *ambiguous* or *Catholic* terms.

The nine last particulars were for some time, and by the Arians in general, waved, dropped, not insisted on, (as being too gross to take,) or else artfully insinuated only, under specious and plausible expressions. The *first* they all owned, and insisted the most upon; having many pretences to urge against *consubstantiality*, either name or thing. The *second* and *third* they divided

[r] This denied by all but those called Anomœans.

[s] This denied, in words, by many.

[t] Few bold enough to maintain expressly this or any of the following propositions.

upon, as to the way of expression; some speaking their minds plainly, others with more reserve; not so much denying the *coeternity*, as forbearing to affirm it. This was the method which the Arians took to propagate their heresy. We need not wonder if they were often forced to make use of collusions, equivocations, and double entendres. For, being obliged, for fear of offence, to use *Catholic* words, though without a *Catholic* meaning; and to maintain their main principle, without seeming to maintain its necessary consequences; (nay, seeming to deny and reject them;) it could not be otherwise. And not only the Catholics frequently complain of those smooth gentlemen, but some even of their [u] own party could not endure such shuffling; thinking it became honest and sincere men, either to speak out, or to say nothing. Of this kind were Aëtius and Eunomius, with their followers, called Anomæans, and Exoucontii; being indeed no other, in respect to the Son's divinity, than such as Arius was at first; and speaking almost as plainly and bluntly as he did. After the disguises, and softenings, and colourings had been carried on so long, till all men of sense saw plainly that it was high time to leave off trifling, and to come from words to things; and that there was no *medium*, but either to settle into orthodoxy, or to sit down with the pure Arians and Anomæans, (if they would determine any thing, and be *sincere* and *consistent* men,) some chose the former, and some the latter, according as they more inclined to one way or the other. There is certainly no *medium* betwixt *orthodoxy* and *Arianism*, (for [x] Semi-Arianism, if so understood, is perfect nonsense and contradiction,) there being no *medium* between *God* and *creature*, between *unmade* and *made*. Men may conceal their sentiments, suppress consequences, and speak their minds but by halves; and so one Arian may be more cautious or more artful than another: but, in truth and reality, every man that disowns the *consubstantiality*, rightly understood, is as much an Arian as Eunomius or Aëtius, or any of the ancient Arians were; or even as Arius himself, excepting only some few particulars, which were not his standing and settled opinions.

In fine, there is but one middle way to take between the

[u] See Epiphan. Hæres. lxxvi. p. 916.

[x] Semi-Arianus, et Semi-Deus, et Semi-creatura perinde monstra et portenta sunt, quæ sani et pii omnes merito exhorrent. *Bull.* D. F. p. 284.

orthodox and the *Arians*, and that is, to avoid determining on either side; to leave the point *in medio*, and to suspend assent to either; to believe as much, and as high, as any of the Arians did; and as to the rest, neither to believe nor disbelieve it. But this is not the case, either with the Doctor or yourself. You have declared against the *consubstantiality*, and the proper *divinity* of Christ, as well as *coeternity:* and are therefore so far from refining upon, that you really come short of many of the ancient Arians; though, to do you justice, you are the more consistent with yourselves for it. I have now sufficiently vindicated every part of the Query; having shewn, that the *equivocation,* in respect of the Son's *eternity,* is justly chargeable upon the Doctor; and that he has not observed a *neutrality* in this dispute; nor carried the point higher than the ancient Arians; but has really and fully given into their sentiments, and therein determined against the Catholic Church. The use which I make of this, at present, is to observe to the reader;

1. That the Doctor has not invented any new or more excellent scheme than was *thought of, considered,* and *condemned,* near fourteen hundred years ago, by a very wise, numerous, and unbiassed council. 2. That he cannot justly cite any Catholic, Post-Nicene writer, (nor perhaps Ante-Nicene,) as certainly favouring his *main* doctrine. 3. That his attempt to reconcile the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds to Arianism, formed in direct opposition to it, is endeavouring to bring light and darkness, and the most irreconcilable inconsistencies to meet together. This for the present: the future use I shall make of it is to come directly to the point in question: for when it is certainly known what the drift, design, and meaning of an author is, much pains may be spared, and a dispute shortened.

I hardly know whether strict method would permit me to take notice of the latter part of your Reply, (contained in pages 62, 63, 64,) it is so wide and foreign. You must have had a great mind to say something of *eternal generation;* otherwise you would never have introduced it in a place so improper. The pretence is, that we *equivocate* in talking of eternal generation; and therefore it is proper to retort it upon us, in answer to a charge of *equivocation.* But wherein do we *equivocate,* or do any thing like it? Is it in the word *eternal?* But we undoubtedly mean it in the strict and proper sense. Is it in the word *generation?* That is a word of latitude, capable of more senses than

one. We use it in the sense which has prevailed in the Church fifteen hundred years; and in a proper sense, according to the rule of Tertullian, *Omnis origo parens est.* And where then is the impropriety or *equivocation* in the word *generation,* as used by us? True, it is not the same with human *generation.* But who will pretend that *human* is to be the measure and standard of all *generation? Generation,* you say, implies *beginning;* and yet we call it [y] *eternal.* Admit that it did so; yet, till that can be made appear, we may be very *sincere* in calling it *eternal,* intending no *equivocation:* you have not proved that all *generation* implies beginning; and what is more, cannot. You endeavour to make the notion of it absurd; but, unless you can demonstrate the absurdity of it, how will you charge us with *equivocation;* which was the point? All you have to say turns only upon your misconstruction of, I should say *equivocation* in, the word *individual;* which, you must needs know, we understand not in your sense of it; unless we are weak enough to suppose Father and Son to be *one Person.* You make another argument, by *equivocating* in the word *production;* which if we use at all, we always take care to explain to a good sense; and never once imagine, that the *eternal* generation is a *temporal* production. You are very unhappy, to *equivocate* all the way, while you are retorting the charge of *equivocation;* besides that, could you have retorted it in a handsomer manner, it would not have been pertinent, because it comes out of place. For your proper part here is, not so much to object against our scheme, as to defend your own: please to clear your own hypothesis first; and then we may hear what you can say against ours. The Church of Christ has been in possession of the present prevailing doctrines, at least, for fourteen hundred years: it concerns us, before we part with them, to see that we may have something better in their stead. What if the Catholic doctrine has some difficulties? Has Arianism none? Or must we change the former for the latter? No; let us first consider whether Arianism has not more and greater; and then perhaps we may see reason enough to keep as we are.

It is an usual thing with many, (moralists may account for

[y] Μὴ χρονικὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ καταδέξῃ τινὸς λέγοντος, ἀλλὰ ἄχρονον ἀρχὴν γίνωσκε τὸν πατέρα. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ υἱοῦ ἄχρονος, ἀκατάληπτος, ἄναρχος ὁ πατήρ· πηγὴ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ποταμοῦ, τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὁ πατὴρ, ὁ γεννήσας αὐτὸν, καθὼς οἶδεν αὐτὸς μόνος. *Cyril. Catech.* xi. p. 145.

it,) when they meet with a difficulty which they cannot readily answer, immediately to conclude that the doctrine is false, and to run directly into the opposite persuasion: not considering that they may meet with much more weighty objections there than before; or that they may have reason sufficient to maintain and believe many things in *philosophy* or *divinity*, though they cannot answer every question which may be started, or every difficulty which may be raised against them. As to the point we are upon; while some are considering only the objections against the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, (how *three* can be *one;* how the *Son* could be *generated;* how *person* and *being* can be different; and the like;) they imagine presently, that the world, in a manner, has been hitherto miserably mistaken; and that they are the happy men, who see clearly *how*, and *why*. Let but the very same men have patience a while, and not embark in the opposite cause, till they are able to find out a truer and a juster scheme, and to clear it of all considerable difficulties; I say, let them but do thus, and then, I am persuaded, they will be much less sanguine in their pursuit of novelties. In the present controversy there are three schemes, which I may call Catholic, Sabellian, and Arian: one of the three must, in the main, be true. The way to know which, is to weigh and consider the difficulties attending each respectively; and to balance them one against another. The advocates of the two latter have performed reasonably well, in the *offensive* part; and especially against *each other:* but have neither of them yet been able to *defend* tolerably their respective schemes; nor, I suppose, ever will be. Bnt I proceed.

Divine worship due

To the one God.	To Christ.
Thou shalt have no other Gods before me, Exod. xx. 3.	They worshipped him, Luke xxiv. 52. Let all the angels of God worship him, Heb. i. 6.
Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve, Matt. iv. 10.	That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father, John v. 23.

QUERY XVI.

Whether by these (of the first column) *and the like texts, adoration and worship be not so appropriated to the one God, as to belong to him only?*

THIS is a very material inquiry, relating to the object of

religious worship; than which nothing can be of greater concernment. Here, therefore, if any where, we might expect and demand of you a very full, clear, and satisfactory answer. I shall examine your answer, in due time and place. But, first, it will be proper to shew what reasons we have to think that all *religious* worship is appropriated to God only. I shall inquire into the sense of Scripture, in this article; and next proceed to the judgment and practice of the ancient Church, the best comment upon Scripture.

Exod. xx. ver. 3. hath been already produced. The words are, "Thou shalt have no other gods before (or besides) me." Which is further explained, ver. 5, (the reason being the same, both with respect to images and false gods,) "Thou shalt not "bow down to them, nor serve them[z]." All acts of religious worship are forbidden to be offered to any other *being*, besides the one supreme God: to him they are appropriated, to him only. So Deut. vi. 13. "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, "and serve him:" and again, Deut. x. 20. "Thou shalt fear "the Lord thy God; him shalt thou serve." Which is quoted and explained by our blessed Lord himself, in these words: "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt "thou serve," Matth. iv. 10. This was said in answer to Satan, who did not pretend to be *supreme*, nor desire to be acknowledged as such (see Luke iv. 6.): all he required was, that a solemn outward act of adoration and worship should be paid him: and the reason given for refusing it is not that he was a *bad spirit*, an enemy to God; or that God had *not commanded* that he should be worshipped; but the reason is general, that none are to be worshipped, but God only. And that these and the like texts were intended to exclude all beings, beside the one supreme God, from being worshipped, either at *that time*, or at any time *after*, appears, not only from the reason of the thing, but from plain Scripture. "Before me was there no "God formed, neither shall there be after me," Isa. xliii. 10. "If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, "and giveth thee a sign or wonder, and the sign or wonder "come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, *Let us go* "*after other gods*, (which thou hast not known,) and let us *serve* "*them*; thou shalt not hearken," &c. Deut. xiii. 1, 2, 3. The

[z] See also Exod. xxii. 20. xxxiv. 14. Dan. iii. 28.

worship of the same one God, exclusive of all others, is by this for ever made unchangeable: miracles could not be sufficient to give credit to any one who should pretend to introduce another object of worship, or to set up another god, beside the one supreme God. All creatures whatever are hereby effectually precluded from receiving any religious homage and adoration. This is confirmed by St. Paul, (Rom. i. 21,) &c. who censures those that "knew God," (that is, acknowledged one supreme God,) "and yet glorified him not as God," because "they "served the creature more than (or besides) the Creator, who "is blessed for ever." Wherein the Apostle plainly intimates, that the *Creator* only is to be *served;* and that the idolatry of the heathens lay in their worshipping of the *creature.* He does not blame them for giving *sovereign* or *absolute* worship to the *creatures,* (they could hardly be so silly as to imagine there could be more than one supreme God,) but for giving any *worship* at all, sovereign or inferior, absolute or relative, to any thing but the *Creator.* To the same purpose, Gal. iv. 8, he condemns those who "did service unto them, which by nature "were no gods:" which text I shall take care to explain particularly in another place. All this is confirmed and illustrated by the angel, (Rev. xix. 10. xxii. 9,) who refused to receive so much as the outward act of adoration; giving this rule and maxim upon it, "Worship God:" intimating thereby, that God only is to be *worshipped;* that all acts of *religious* worship are appropriated to God only. He does not say, Worship God, and *whom God shall appoint to be worshipped;* as if he had appointed any besides God: nor, Worship God with *sovereign* worship; as if any *inferior* sort of worship was permitted to be paid to creatures: but simply, plainly, and briefly, *Worship God.* To this I may add, that the reasons which God insists upon and inculcates, in the Old Testament, why he, and he alone, in opposition to all others, is to be *worshipped,* are such as exclude all *creatures.* His being Jehovah, [a] Creator, Sustainer, Preserver of all things, having no God before him nor after him, and the like.

This is the Scripture-account of the object of worship: there is neither rule nor example in it for the worshipping any creature whatever; but all the texts relating to this matter are full,

[a] See Isa. xl. xlv. 5, 6, 7. 2 Kings xix. 15. Jer. x. 10, 11, 12.

strong, and clear for the worship of God only. Now, whatever reasons human wisdom may invent for the worshipping of creatures, besides the Creator, (as Celsus and Porphyry of old, and the Romanists of later times have pretended,) those are never to be set against a clear and plain law; or opposed to the unerring wisdom of God, who best knows to whom worship is proper to be paid, and to whom not.

I shall not here argue the point from the nature of the thing itself. I will suppose (without granting) that creatures may be wise enough to know, ready enough to hear, and able to relieve our wants, at any distance. I will suppose also, that one creature may be appointed to bear rule, and to have dominion over many; as some have thought particular *angels* to preside over such and such kingdoms or countries. I will suppose likewise, that it may seem to human wisdom very fit and proper, that such creatures as can assist, or have the charge of others, should be respected, *worshipped*, and *adored* by them. I will suppose also, that we may be so ignorant as not to perceive any great harm in these suppositions, from the nature of the thing, barely and singly considered. But God's "thoughts are not our "thoughts:" he has been pleased to enter an express *caveat* and prohibition in the case; and has, no doubt, good reason for it. Possibly he may apprehend it to be more for his own glory, and more for our good, that our *whole* worship and service be paid to him, than a *part* only. Possibly he may know, (such is human infirmity,) that if any part, or kind, or degree of religious worship was permitted to be given to *creatures*, it might insensibly alienate our minds from the *Creator;* or eat out all our reverence and respect for God. Or, it may be, that while our acknowledgments are ordered to be paid to him, and to him *alone*, we may thereby be induced to live more in dependence on him; become more immediately united to him; and have the greater love and esteem for him. He will not, perhaps, leave his favours in the hands, or in the disposal of his *creatures*, lest we should forget whom we are principally obliged to; or lest we should imagine that he is not always every where present, to hear all our petitions, and to answer them, according to his own good pleasure. These, or a thousand better reasons, infinite Wisdom may have, for appropriating all acts of religious worship to God. It is sufficient for us to know that he has done it: and of this holy Scripture has given abundant proof, as we have before seen.

Now I come to consider what you have to except against so clear a truth. All is comprised in one short sentence; one remarkable distinction. "Absolute supreme honour is plainly "appropriated to the person of the Father only, (by Exod. "xx. 3. Matt. iv. 10.) as the absolute supreme Being, or the "one God." (p. 94.) From which I am to infer, that *relative inferior* worship may be paid to the *creatures*, notwithstanding what has been urged, from the whole tenor of Scripture and antiquity, to the contrary. This is the famed *distinction*, pleaded by the heathens of old, for *Pagan*, by the Romanists of late, for *Popish*, and by you, for *Arian* idolatry. I shall endeavour to convince you how little there is, either of truth or probability, in this so celebrated *distinction*; and then put an end to the argument of this Query.

You set out unfortunately under a mistake, as if we were inquiring about respect and esteem, when the question is entirely about *acts* of *religious* worship. My words were *worship* and *adoration*: instead thereof you put *honour*, an ambiguous word; and so slip over the difficulty, which you was pinched with; and insensibly lead your reader off from the point it concerned you to speak to. Please to remember that we are disputing about *acts* of worship, *religious* worship. Let us keep to the *terms* we began with; lest, by the changing of words, we make a change of *ideas*, and alter the very state of the question. This being premised, now I come directly to the point in hand. Your pretence is, that *ultimate, absolute, supreme, sovereign* worship is due to the *Father* only; *mediate, relative, inferior, petty* worship may be paid to *creatures*: the outward acts and circumstances supposed alike in both, so far as to make them *religious*, not *civil* worship. Your *considering* the Father as *supreme*, and your *intending* him the *highest* respect imaginable, are to make *his worship* become *supreme, absolute, sovereign* worship: but your *considering* another being as *inferior, dependent*, and a *creature* only, and your *intending* him no more than a *proportionate* respect, are to make the worship of him become *inferior, relative, petty* worship. Worship therefore is to take its quality from the *esteem* and *intention* of the worshipper, and is to be supposed *higher* and *lower* accordingly. This, I think, is your real and full meaning, in as few and as plain words as I am capable of expressing it. In answer to it, I observe as follows:

1. I can meet with nothing in Scripture to countenance those

finespun notions. *Prayer* we often read of; but there is not a syllable about *absolute* and *relative, supreme* and *inferior* prayer. We are commanded to pray *fervently* and *incessantly;* but never *sovereignly* or *absolutely*, that I know of. We have no rules left us about *raising* or *lowering* our *intentions*, in proportion to the *dignity* of the *objects*. Some instructions to this purpose might have been highly useful; and it is very strange, that, in a matter of so great importance, no directions should be given, either in Scripture, or at least in antiquity, how to regulate our *intentions* and *meanings*, with *metaphysical* exactness; so as to make our worship either *high*, *higher*, or *highest* of all, as occasion should require.

2. But a greater objection against this doctrine is, that the whole tenor of Scripture runs counter to it. This may be understood, in part, from what I have observed above. To make it yet plainer, I shall take into consideration such acts and instances of worship, as I find laid down in Scripture; whether under the old or new dispensation.

Sacrifice was one instance of worship required under the Law; and it is said, "He that sacrificeth unto any god, save unto the "Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed." Exod. xxii. 20. Now suppose any person, considering with himself that only *absolute* and *sovereign* sacrifice was *appropriated* to God, by this law, should have gone and *sacrificed* to other gods, and have been convicted of it before the judges; the apology he must have made for it, I suppose, must have run thus: "Gentlemen, "though I have sacrificed to other gods, yet I hope you will "observe, that I did it not *absolutely:* I meant not any *absolute* "or *supreme* sacrifice, (which is all that the Law forbids,) but "*relative* and *inferior* only. I regulated my *intentions* with all "imaginable care, and my *esteem* with the most critical exact-"ness: I *considered* the other gods, whom I sacrificed to, as "*inferior* only, and *infinitely* so; reserving all *sovereign* sacrifice "to the *supreme* God of Israel." This or the like apology must, I presume, have brought off the criminal with some applause for his acuteness, if your principles be true. Either you must allow this, or you must be content to say, that not only *absolute supreme* sacrifice, (if there be any sense in that phrase,) but *all sacrifice* was, by the Law, *appropriate* to God only.

Another instance of *worship* is making of *vows*, *religious* vows. We find as little appearance of your famed distinction here, as

in the former case. We read nothing of *sovereign* and *inferior*, *absolute* and *relative* vows; that we should imagine *supreme* vows to be appropriate to God, *inferior* permitted to *angels*, or *idols* or to any *creature*.

Swearing is another instance much of the same kind with the foregoing. Swearing by *God's name* is a plain thing, and well understood: but if you tell us of *sovereign* and *inferior* swearing, according to the inward respect or intention you have, in proportion to the dignity of the person by whose name you swear, it must sound perfectly new to us. All swearing which comes short in its respects, or falls below *sovereign*, will, I am afraid, be little better than *profaneness*.

Such being the case in respect of the acts of religious worship already mentioned, I am now to ask you, what is there so peculiar in the case of *invocation* and *adoration*, that they should not be thought of the same kind with the other? Why should not *absolute* and *relative* prayer and prostration appear as absurd as *absolute* and *relative* sacrifice, vows, oaths, or the like? They are acts and instances of *religious* worship, like the other; appropriated to God in the same manner, and by the same laws, and upon the same grounds and reasons. Well then, will you please to consider, whether you have not begun at the wrong end, and committed an ὕστερον πρότερον in your way of thinking? You imagine that acts of *religious* worship are to derive their signification and quality from the *intention* and *meaning* of the worshippers; whereas the very reverse of it is the truth. Their *meaning* and *signification* is fixed and determined by God himself; and therefore we are never to use them with any other meaning, under peril of profaneness or idolatry. God has not left us at liberty to fix what sense we please upon *religious* worship, to render it *high* or *low*, *absolute* or *relative*, at discretion; *supreme* when offered to God, and if to others *inferior*; as when to angels, or saints, or images, in suitable proportion. No; religion was not made for *metaphysical* heads only; such as might nicely distinguish the several degrees and elevations of respect and honour among many objects. The short and plain way, which (in pity to human infirmity, and to prevent confusion) it has pleased God to take with us, is to make all *religious* worship his *own*; and so it is *sovereign* of course. This I take to be the true *scriptural*, as well as only *reasonable* account of the object of worship. We need not concern ourselves (it is but vain to pre-

tend to it) about determining the sense and meaning of *religious* worship. God himself has took care of it; and it is already fixed and determined to our hands. It means, whether we will or no, it means, by divine institution and appointment, the *divinity*, the *supremacy*, the *sovereignty* of its object. To misapply those marks of dignity, those appropriate ensigns of divine majesty; to compliment any *creature* with them, and thereby to make *common* what God has made *proper*, is to deify the works of God's hands, and to serve the *creature* instead of the *Creator*, God blessed for ever. We have no occasion to talk of *sovereign*, *absolute*, *ultimate* prayers, and such other odd fancies: *prayer* is an address to God, and does not admit of those novel distinctions. In short, then, here is no room left for your distinguishing between *sovereign* and *inferior* adoration. You must first prove, what you have hitherto presumed only and taken for granted, that you are at liberty to fix what meaning and signification you please to the acts of *religious* worship; to make them *high* or *low* at discretion. This you will find a very difficult undertaking. Scripture is beforehand with you; and, to fix it more, the concurring judgment of the earliest and best Christian writers. All *religious* worship is hereby determined to be what you call *absolute* and *sovereign*. *Inferior* or *relative* worship appears now to be contradiction in sense, as it is novel in sound; like an *inferior* or *relative* God. To what hath been said I may add a few further considerations from Scripture. The Apostles Barnabas and Paul, when the [b] Lycaonians would have done *sacrifice* unto them, did not tell them that *sacrifice* was of *equivocal* meaning; and that they might proceed in it, provided only that they would rectify their *intentions*, and *consider* them as *apostles* only; but they forbade them to *sacrifice* to them at all. The *angel*, in the Revelations, did not direct St. John to *consider* him only as an *angel*, and then to go innocently on in his *worship* of him; but he ordered him to *worship* God. Our blessed Lord did not tell the Devil that all external worship was *equivocal*, and might be offered to angels or men, provided the *intention* was regulated, and respect *proportioned;* but he told him plainly that all *religious* worship was appropriate to God. In fine, nothing is more evident, than that the design, both of the Law and the Gospel, was to establish this great truth, and

[b] Acts xiv.

to root out *creature-worship*. "And this was," as Dr. Cudworth rightly observes, "the grand reason why the ancient Fathers so "zealously opposed Arianism; because that Christianity, which "was intended by God Almighty for a means to extirpate "*Pagan idolatry*, was thereby itself *paganized* and *idolatrized*; "and made highly guilty of that very thing which is so much "condemned in the Pagans, that is, *creature-worship*. This "might be proved by sundry testimonies of Athanasius, Basil, "Gregory Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, "Hilary, Ambrose, Austin, Faustinus, and Cyril of Alexandria; "all of them charging the Arians, as guilty of the very same "idolatry with the Gentiles, or Pagans, in giving *religious wor-* "*ship*, even to the *Word* and *Son of God* himself, (and conse- "quently to our Saviour Christ,) as he was supposed by them "to be a *creature*[c]."

But in answer, perhaps, to this, it may be said, by such as run things off in a confused manner, and do not stay to distinguish, that certainly there is a wide and great difference between giving honour to heathen idols, and doing it to our Saviour Christ, though a *creature* only. No doubt but there is; and God forbid that any Christian should say or think otherwise. But that is not the point. The worship even of *saints* and *angels* is much preferable to Pagan worship. But still they are both *equally*, though not equally *culpable*, *idolatry*; and are breaches of the first Commandment. Whatever love, respect, gratitude, &c. may be due for what our Lord and Saviour has wrought for us, if he be still a *creature*, all cannot come up to *worship*, which is appropriate to God alone. Well, but it may be further pleaded, that here is God's *command* in the case, which makes it widely different from any of the former. Very true; there is so; and we shall make a proper use of that hereafter: but the question is, what is the fundamental rule of *religious* worship? Is it *to worship God only?* Or is it to worship God, *and whomsoever besides, God shall appoint to be worshipped?* They who pretend the latter must shew some foundation, if they can, in Scripture for it. Where is it intimated, either in the Old or New Testament, that worship should be paid to any besides God? Neither the Law nor the Prophets, neither Christ nor his Apostles ever intimated any thing like it. Our Saviour did not

[c] Cudw. Intell. Syst. p. 628.

say, Worship God, and *whomsoever God shall order to be worshipped;* nor did the angel, in the Revelations, insinuate any such thing: St. Paul never told us of *serving* the *Creator*, and whom the Creator should nominate besides; but *Creator* only. The like may be observed upon other occasions, where this might have been properly intimated, but is constantly omitted. Nothing therefore can be plainer, than that the fundamental rule for worship is, that *God only is to be worshipped.* All worship, inconsistent with this *primary* and perpetual law, must, of consequence, appear *idolatrous*, either in the practice or the principle: and it is thus that the Arians, following a *Scripture-command,* but not upon *Scripture-principles*, and practising a *Christian* duty upon a *Pagan* foundation of *creature-worship,* and *polytheism*, stand charged with idolatry.

2. To confirm us further in the truth of the principles here asserted, I shall subjoin a second consideration, drawn from the practice of the primitive martyrs; who may be presumed to have understood the principles of that religion, for which they cheerfully laid down their lives. It is well known, that they readily submitted to all kinds of torment, and to death itself, rather than offer adoration, incense, or sacrifice, to the heathen deities. Now, if *sovereign* worship be all that is appropriated to God; and if no worship be *sovereign*, but what the inward *intention*, and secret *esteem* of the worshipper make so; how thoughtless were they, to resist even unto blood, for fear of committing a sin, which it was not possible for them to have been guilty of? They could never have blundered so egregiously, as to have *considered* the heathen deities (which they heartily despised) as *supreme* gods; or to have *intended* them *sovereign* worship; and therefore could not have been guilty of giving them that *worship* which is appropriate to God. They had so mean and despicable an opinion of the Pagan deities, that if the quality of the worship is to be estimated from the secret *esteem* and *intention* of the *worshipper*, such acts of worship must have dwindled into no worship in reality; hardly amounting to so much as an empty ceremonious compliment. Where then was the harm of *sacrificing* to idols? What law had condemned it, if your principles be true? The outward act being *equivocal*, this could not be interpreted *sacrifice*, such as God had forbid to be offered to any but himself. But those primitive saints were unacquainted with your refined subtilties, having learned

their logic from Scripture, and the plain common sense and reason of mankind. They knew that the signification of worship and sacrifice depended not on their arbitrary esteem, or secret intention; but had been before fixed and determined by God. To offer sacrifice to the heathen deities, was, by construction and implication, declaring them to be *immutable, eternal, supreme*, and strictly *divine*. They could not be guilty of such a solemn lie, or commit such barefaced profaneness and idolatry. They would not prostitute the marks and characters of divinity to those who were *by nature no Gods*; nor give that to idols, which was appropriated to God only. This was their manner of reasoning; and this was right: for, indeed, upon the other hypothesis, there is nothing so mean or low, but what a man might pay *religious* worship to. For instance; pray to *angels*, but *consider* them as *angels*, with *proportionate* respect, and there will be no harm in it. Worship saints departed, but *intend* them only such respect as is due to *saints*, and all is right. Fall down before a crucifix with humble prostration, but *consider* it as a *crucifix*, and *intend* little or nothing by it, and all is well. These seem to me the unavoidable consequences of this famed distinction, and these are the uses which have actually been made of it, since men have learned to be subtle, instead of wise; and have departed from the fundamental maxim of revealed religion, that *God alone is to be worshipped with religious worship*. The sum of what hath been said, on this important article may be comprised in the following particulars:

1. That, under the Old Testament, all *religious* worship was declared to belong to God only; and upon such reasons as exclude all *creature-worship*; namely, because he is God, Jehovah, Eternal, Immutable, Creator, Preserver, Sustainer, and Governor of all things.

2. That our blessed Lord made no alteration in this law, but explained and confirmed it: his Apostles, after him, inculcated the same thing, long after our Saviour's *exaltation* and *ascension*; and an angel from heaven reinforced it, thereby proclaiming its perpetual obligation. No distinction of worship, *mediate* and *ultimate*, was ever intimated; nor of *inferior* and *sovereign*: but all *religious* worship supposed to have one *meaning*, one *significancy*, one *object*, viz. the *divine nature*; whether subsisting in one Person, or more.

3. Such being the rule and standing law for *religious* worship,

none can have any right, title, or claim to *worship*, but in conformity to the same rule.

4. If the Son of God be *very* God, *Jehovah*, *Creator*, *Sustainer*, and *Preserver* of all things; then he both may, and ought to be worshipped, in conformity to the Scripture-rule, and upon Scripture-principles: but if he be a *creature* only, the worship of him is not consistent with the fundamental rule both of the Law and the Gospel. In a word; if the Son of God is to be *worshipped*, he is not a *creature*: if a *creature*, he is not to be *worshipped*.

It remains now only to inquire, whether the primitive Church, which had the same Scriptures that we have, and better opportunities of knowing and understanding them, made the same or the like conclusions from them. It is an argument of no small importance; and therefore I shall think it worth the while to give you a brief summary of the sentiments of the earliest Christian writers, and in their own words, that every impartial reader may be able to judge for himself.

Justin Martyr, giving account of the Christian worship, says plainly, "[c] We worship God alone;" and, "None but God ought "to be worshipped."

[d] Athenagoras, in like manner, speaks to this effect: "We "are not to worship the world, but the *Maker* of it; we "worship not the *powers* of God, but their *Creator* and "*Governor*."

Theophilus says, "I will *honour* the king, but I will not "*worship* him. [e] I will worship God, the real and true God: "no one ought to be worshipped but God alone."

[f] Tatian, to the same purpose, though not so fully, says; "The *works* of God, made for our sakes, I will not worship."

[g] Tertullian says, "What we worship is one God, who made "the whole mass of things purely from nothing. I am com-

[c] Θεὸν μὲν μόνον προσκυνοῦμεν. *Apolog.* i. c. 23. Τὸν Θεὸν μόνον δεῖ προσκυνεῖν. c. 21.

[d] Οὐ τοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τεχνίτην αὐτοῦ προσκυνητέον, p. 55. Οὐ τὰς δυνάμεις (τοῦ Θεοῦ) προσίοντες θεραπεύομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτῶν καὶ δεσπότην, p. 56.

[e] Θεῷ δὲ τῷ ὄντως Θεῷ καὶ ἀληθεῖ προσκυνῶ——οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἐξόν ἐστι——προσκυνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ μόνῳ Θεῷ, p. 30, 33.

[f] Δημιουργίαν τὴν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγενημένην χάριν ἡμῶν προσκυνεῖν οὐ θέλω, p. 18. Vid. et p. 79.

[g] Quod colimus, Deus unus est; qui totam molem istam——de nihilo expressit. *Apol.* c. 17.

Præscribitur mihi ne quem alium *Deum* dicam,——ne quem alium adorem, aut quoquo modo venerer, præter unicum illum qui ita mandat. *Scorp.* c. iv. p. 490. Rigalt.

"manded not to call any other, God, nor to *adore*, or in anywise "*worship* any other besides that one."

[h] Clement of Alexandria has more to this purpose: "Angels "and men" (says he) "are the works of God's hands: let none "of you worship the *sun*, but let him set his heart upon the "*sun's Creator:* neither let him deify the world, but to the "*Maker of the world* let his desires be. I seek after God, the "*Creator* of the world, him that lighted up the *sun*, and not "after the *creatures* (ἔργα) which God hath made. The Gentiles "ought to learn, from the Law and the Prophets, to worship "the one only God, the necessarily-existing Almighty. This it "is to worship the *divine Being* in true righteousness of practice "and knowledge."

[i] Irenæus expresses himself thus: "You ought to worship the "Lord your God, and to serve him alone, and to give no credit "to him who deceitfully promised things which were not his "own, saying; 'All these things will I give thee, if thou wilt "fall down and worship me'——The system of creatures is not "under his dominion, since he himself is one of the *creatures*."

[k] Origen has a great deal to our purpose, in his book against Celsus. I shall select a few passages: he blames the Gentiles, "who from the stupendous greatness of the things in the world, "and the beautiful order of *creatures*, (δημιουργημάτων,) could "not look up and consider that they ought to admire, worship, "and adore him only that made them." In another place he says, "To worship the *sun* and the *creatures* of God (Θεοῦ δημιουρ-"γήματα) is forbidden us, who are taught, not *to serve the*

[h] Ἄγγελοι καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἔργα τῶν δακτύλων αὐτοῦ——μὴ τὸν ἥλιον τις ὑμῶν προσκυνείτω, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἡλίου ποιητὴν ἐπιποθείτω. μηδὲ τὸν κόσμον ἐκθειαζέτω, ἀλλὰ τὸν κόσμου δημιουργὸν ἐπιζητησάτω, p. 53. ed. Ox. Τὸν κόσμου δημιουργόν, τὸν ἡλίου φωταγωγὸν Θεὸν ἐπιζητῶ, οὐ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ, p. 59. Τοὺς Ἕλληνας χρὴ διὰ νόμου, καὶ προφητῶν ἐκμανθάνειν ἕνα μόνον σέβειν Θεὸν τὸν ὄντως ὄντα παντοκράτορα, p. 825. Τὸ δ' ἐστὶ θρησκεύειν τὸ θεῖον διὰ τῆς ὄντως δικαιοσύνης ἔργων τε καὶ γνώσεως, p. 778.

[i] Dominum Deum tuum adorare oportet, et ipsi soli servire, et non credere ei qui falso promisit ea, quæ non sunt sua, dicens: *Hæc omnia tibi dabo, si procidens adoraveris me.*—— Neque enim conditio sub ejus potestate est, quandoquidem et ipse unus de *creaturis* est, p. 320. ed. Bened.

[k] Οἱ ἐκ τοῦ τηλικούτου μεγέθους τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τοῦ κάλλους τῶν δημιουργημάτων μὴ δυνάμενοι ἀναβλέψαι καὶ θεωρῆσαι, ὅτι προσκυνεῖν καὶ θαυμάζειν καὶ σέβειν χρὴ μόνον τὸν ταῦτα πεποιηκότα, p. 158.——σέβειν δὲ τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ δημιουργήματα ἅπερ ἡμῖν ἀπηγόρευται διδασκομένοις μὴ λατρεύειν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, p. 375.

I shall add another passage.

Οὐδεὶς γὰρ βλέπων τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ σέβει τὸ θεῖον παρὰ τὸν ὑποδεικνύντα ἑνορᾷν ἀεὶ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργῷ, καὶ πᾶσαν εὐχὴν ἀναφέρειν ἐκείνῳ, p. 367.

"*creature besides the Creator.*" He observes, a little after that; "We ought not to honour those in the place of God, or of the "*Son of God.*" Which I take notice of here particularly, that you may see how clearly Origen distinguishes the Son from the δημιουργήματα Θεοῦ: as, indeed, he does every where. In another place, he observes that Christians are bred up to thoughts elevated [l] far *above all creatures*, and might very justly disdain to worship any of them. The like he remarks of the Jews, "that "they were taught to [m] ascend up to the *uncreated nature* of "God; to fix their eyes upon him only; and on him alone to "rest all their hopes and expectations."

I might add many more testimonies, to the same effect, from the Ante-Nicene writers; but these are sufficient to give us a just idea of their principles, in relation to the object of worship. This we shall find run through them all, that God alone is to be worshipped; the *Creator*, in opposition to all *creatures* whatever; the τὸ Θεῖον, (as Clement of Alexandria and Origen sometimes accurately express it,) which also Tertullian seems to intimate, in the words, *quod colimus*, above cited. The sum then of the case is this: if the Son could be included, as being *uncreated*, and very God; as *Creator*, *Sustainer*, *Preserver* of all things, and one with the Father; then he might be worshipped upon their principles, but otherwise could not. What their practice was, shall be considered in its proper place. For the present, let it be a rule and maxim with us, fixed, as far as Scripture and the concurring judgment of antiquity can fix it, (besides what might be justly pleaded from the reason of the thing,) that no kind or degree of *religious* worship is due, or can be lawfully paid, to any creature. The conclusion from all is; if our blessed Lord is a *creature*, [n] he is not to be worshipped; if he is to be worshipped, he is not a *creature*. Now we may pass on.

[l] Τοὺς διδαχθέντας μεγαλοφυῶς ὑπεραναβαίνειν πάντα τὰ δημιουργήματα, &c. p. 237.

[m] Ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγένητον τοῦ Θεοῦ φύσιν κἀκείνῳ μόνῳ ἐνορᾷν, καὶ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μόνου ἐλπίδας προσδοκᾷν, p. 189.

Compare p. 160, where Origen insists upon the necessity of elevating our thoughts and devotions above and beyond all *created* being, ὁ, τιποτοῦν γενητὸν, in one place, παντὸς γενητοῦ in the other. See also Clem. Alex. p. 809, 816. Ox. ed.

[n] Κτίσμα γὰρ κτίσματι οὐ προσκυνεῖ, ἀλλὰ δοῦλος δεσπότην, καὶ κτίσμα Θεόν. *Ath. Orat.* ii. p. 491.

QUERY XVII.

Whether, notwithstanding, worship and adoration be not equally due to Christ; and consequently, whether it must not follow, that he is the one God, and not (as the Arians suppose) a distinct inferior being?

YOU answer, that "equality of divine honour is never "attributed in Scripture to the Son with the Father;" and then, in proof of a matter of fact, you assign a reason of your own devising; "for then the Son would be absolutely equal "with the Father, which is contrary to Scripture and reason," (p. 94.) But why do you not keep close to the words of the Query, and to the point in question? *Worship* and *adoration* are my words; not *divine honour*, which is ambiguous, and leads us off from the argument in hand. Suppose it had been said *sacrifice:* would you answer thus? Equality of *divine sacrifice* is never attributed, &c. Do not you see the impropriety? Well, but, as it is, you must say, *equality of divine worship* is never attributed, &c. And then, pray tell me, what you mean by *equality* or *inequality of worship;* whether you mean longer or shorter prayers, more or less frequent addresses, or any thing else. Be that as it will, *worship*, *religious* worship, greater or smaller, longer or shorter, has the same import and significancy; and speaks the Person addressed to, to be *divine:* just as *sacrifice*, whether offered once a year only or once a day, or whether it were a *lamb* or only two *young pigeons*, carried the same acknowledgment with it, of the *divinity*, *sovereignty*, and *supremacy* of the person to whom it was offered. Now, *worship* being, as hath been said, an acknowledgment of the true God, in opposition to all *creatures* whatever, which are by nature no gods; and being offered to the Father, not for the recognising his *personal* properties, as he stands distinguished from the *Son* and *Holy Spirit*, but his *essential* perfections, common to all, and by which he is distinguished from the *creatures;* it is very manifest, that if the Son is to be *worshipped* too, he is equally God, and true God, with the Father; has all the same essential excellencies and perfections which the Father hath, and is at as great a distance from the creatures; in opposition to whom, and as a mark of his superior and infinitely transcendent excellency, he is *worshipped.* If then *honour* consists in the acknowledgment of his essential perfections, *equality of divine*

honour is attributed in Scripture to the Son with the Father; because *worship* is attributed to both, and is always of the same import and significancy, by God's own order and appointment. But then you will say, the Son will be *absolutely* equal with the Father; which you think inconsistent with Scripture and reason. If you mean by *absolutely* equal, that the Son must be the *first Person*, as well as the Father, I deny your inference: if any thing else, I allow it to be true. The Son will be *equal* in all those respects, for which worship is due to the Father himself. He will be *equally divine*, equally *eternal*, *immutable*, *wise*, *powerful*, &c., in a word, equally *God and Lord*. As to the *subordination* of Persons in the same Godhead, that is of distinct consideration; and we may never be able perfectly to comprehend the relations of the three Persons, *ad intra*, amongst themselves; the ineffable order and economy of the ever blessed coeternal Trinity. You have many things to say, in hopes to lessen the honour and worship attributed to the Son in holy Scripture. But unless you could prove that no worship at all is to be paid him, you prove nothing. However, that I may not seem to pass any thing slightly over, I shall take the pains to examine your exceptions.

As to what you say, to weaken the force of John v. 23, the answer to it will properly fall under a distinct Query; which is entirely upon it. You [a]cite Phil. ii. 11. John xiv. 13. against the Querist; as if it was any question betwixt us, whether God was *glorified in his Son;* or whether the honour of either did not redound to both. "It was," you say, "the prayer of Christ to "glorify his Father, and the Father only." But read that part of the prayer again, and believe your own eyes, John xvii. 1. "Father, the hour is come, *glorify thy Son*, that thy Son also "may glorify thee." How familiar, how equally concerned, as well for his *own*, as his *Father's* glory. So again, a little after; "I have glorified thee on the earth: I have finished the work "which thou gavest me to do. And now, O Father, glorify "thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with "thee before the world was," John xvii. 4, 5. See also John xiii. 31, 32. and then tell me whether it was Christ's design, or desire, that his Father *only* might be *glorified*. How could you miss such plain things? You go on; "The Father is the object,

[a] Page 90.

"to which he commands us to direct our prayers." What! Will you dispute whether Christ is to be worshipped, or invocated? Consider, I beseech you, John v. 23. mentioned above; recollect with yourself, that he is sometimes distinctly and personally [b] *invocated*. *Grace, mercy, and peace*, or *grace and peace*, or *grace* only, are frequently, in twenty places of the New Testament [c], implored of him, together with the Father. He is to be worshipped and adored, as well as the Father, by men, by [d] *angels*, by the [e] *whole creation*. *Glory and dominion for ever and ever* are [f] ascribed to him, as well as to the Father. This is the sense of Scripture: I need not add, it being a thing so well known, the sense also of the earliest and best Christian writers, who unanimously declare for the worship of Christ; and their practice was conformable thereto. And now, that you may see how consistent those good men were (suitably to their strict sincerity) with Scripture, with themselves, and with each other; I shall step a little aside, to shew you upon what principles they might and did give religious worship to Christ.

We have heard Justin Martyr, before, declaring that "God "alone is to be worshipped." Very true: but then he constantly teaches us that the Son is God; and therefore might consistently say, that the Son is to be [g] *worshipped*, and, in the name of the whole Church, "we [h] worship Father, Son, and the "prophetic Spirit."

Athenagoras has before intimated that nothing less than the [i] *Creator* of the world is to be worshipped. But then he tells us too, that all things were [j] created by the *Son*: and therefore no wonder if, giving account, to the emperor, of the God whom the Christians worshipped, he [k] joins the *Son* with the Father.

Theophilus declares, as before seen, for the worship of God only; and says, the king is not to be worshipped, because *he is not God*. But then, as to the *Son*, he [l] owns him to be God;

[b] Acts vii. 59. 1 Thess. iii. 11. Rom. x. 13. 1 Cor. i. 2.

[c] See Clarke's Script. Doctr. ch. ii. sect. 4.

[d] Heb. i. 6. [e] Rev. v. 8.

[f] 2 Pet. iii. 18. Rev. v. 13. See also Rev. vii. 10.

[g] Προσκυνητὸς, Apol. i. p. 94. Apol. ii. 35. Ox. Dial. pag. 191, 209, 231, 365. Jebb.

[h] Ἐκεῖνόν τε, καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα——πνεῦμά τε τὸ προφητικὸν σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνοῦμεν. *Apol.* i. p. 11.

[i] See the passage above, p. 418.

[j] See above, p. 384.

[k] Θεὸν ἄγοντες τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγον, p. 122.

[l] Pag. 130.

and therefore of consequence must suppose worship due to him.

Tatian teaches that God only is to be worshipped; not [m] *man*, not the *elements*, not the *creatures*, δημιουργία. Very good: but the Son who [n] *created* matter, and is ἀγγέλων δημιουργὸς, might be worshipped notwithstanding.

Tertullian is so scrupulous, that he says, he will not so much as *call* any other, God, but the God whom he worshipped, and to whom alone he pronounces all worship due. But he must certainly include the *Son* in that only God; as every one knows who ever looked into his writings: and accordingly he [o] admits the worship of him.

Clement of Alexandria, as we have observed above, [p] protests against the worship of *creatures*; and allows no worship but to the Maker and Governor of all things. But then no man more [q] express than he, for the *worshipping* of God the Son. The reason is plain: the Son is [r] *Maker* and *Governor* of the world, and even παντοκράτωρ, according to this excellent writer.

Irenæus likewise, as above cited, gives his testimony for the worship of God only; and against the worship of any *creature*. But the same Irenæus as constantly supposes the Son to be truly God, and one God with the Father, and expressly [s] exempts him from the number of *creatures*; and therefore no wonder if he admits the Son to be [t] *invocated*, as well as the Father.

I shall observe the like of Origen, and then have done; referring the reader, for the rest, to the complete collection of testimonies lately made by the learned [u] Mr. Bingham, with very judicious reflections upon them.

Origen, as we have seen above, declares for the worship of the one God, in opposition to all *creatures*, δημιουργήματα, every thing *created*, γενητόν. But the good Father had his thoughts about him: he clearly distinguishes the Son from the δημιουργήματα, or *creatures*; and, besides, expressly makes him [x] ἀγένητος, *uncreated*, *immutable*, &c. According to Origen, the *Creator of the universe*, and he only, is to be worshipped [y], pag. 367. Very well; and look but back to page 308, and there the Son is

[m] Pag. 17, 18, 79.
[n] See above, p. 384.
[o] Apol. c. 21. Ad Uxor. l. ii. c. 6. Adv. Jud. c. 7.
[p] Pag. 419.
[q] Vid. p. 311, 851. ed. Ox.
[r] See above. p. 384, 314.
[s] Vid. p. 153, 243, ed. Bened.
[t] Pag. 166, 232.
[u] Orig. Eccl. B. xiii. c. 2.
[x] Contra Cels. p. 287, 169, 170.
[y] Τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργός.

[z] *Creator of the universe.* So, in [a]another place, he tells us, we are to worship him only *who made* (all) *these things;* and if we inquire further we shall find, in the same author, that God the Son [b]*made all things*, the very words. It is therefore a very clear case, that Origen thought the Son to have the fullest right and title to *religious* worship, the same that the Father himself had, as being eternal, immutable, Creator and Governor of all things. And therefore he speaks of his being [c]worshipped *as God*, by the Magi; and calls it *εὐσέβεια*, the very same word which he uses, [d]speaking of the worship due to the Father. In [e]another place, he speaks of the worshipping Father and Son jointly as *one God*, and [f]elsewhere mentions the worship of the Son, in his distinct *personal* capacity. The sum then of Origen's doctrine, as it lies in his book against Celsus, (the most valuable of all his works, and almost the only one to be entirely depended on, as giving the true sense of Origen, or of the Church in his time,) is contained in these particulars:

1. That God the Son, if a *creature*, or not *Creator*, or not truly *God*, should not be *worshipped* at all.

2. That being *truly God*, and *Creator*, &c., he may be worshipped; either *jointly* with the Father, as one τὸ Θεῖον, or *distinctly*, as *one Person* of the Godhead.

3. That though he be *God*, and *Creator*, yet the *Father* is so *primarily* and *eminently* as *Father*, and *first* Person; and therefore the distinct worship of the Son, considered as a Son, redounds to the Father, as the Head and Fountain of all. Hence it is, that, as the Father is *primarily* and *eminently* God, Creator, and object of worship; so also all worship is *primarily* and *eminently* the Father's: and thus it is that I understand Origen, in a [g]certain place which has been often misinterpreted.

[z] Δημιουργὸς τοῦδε τοῦ παντός.

[a] Σέβειν χρὴ μόνον τὸν ταῦτα πεποιηκότα, p. 158.

[b] Τὸν λόγον πεποιηκέναι πάντα, ὅσα ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ ἐνετείλατο, p. 63.

[c] Pag. 46.

[d] Τὴν εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸν εὐσέβειαν, p. 160.

[e] Ἕνα οὖν Θεὸν, ὡς ἀποδεδώκαμεν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν θεραπεύομεν, p. 386.

[f] Εὐχέσθω τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ, δυναμένῳ αὐτὸν ἰάσασθαι, p. 238. Τὸν διάκονον αὐτῶν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ προσκυνήσομεν, p. 239.

N. B. Here the translator (as it is usual with him to misrepresent such passages as relate to the *Son*) renders διάκονον αὐτῶν, *ejus ministrum*. The sense is, *dispenser* of them, i. e. *prophecies*, just before mentioned.

[g] Δεησόμεθα δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἐντευξόμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ εὐχαριστήσομεν, καὶ προσευξόμεθα δὲ ἐὰν δυνώμεθα κατακούειν τῆς περὶ προσευχῆς κυριολεξίας καὶ καταχρήσεως, p. 233.

Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 121. Bingham, Origin. Eccl. l. xiii. c. 2. p. 45, &c.

4. That the worship of the Son, considered as a Son, is not an *inferior* worship, nor any other than proper *divine* worship; being an acknowledgment of the same *divine* excellencies, and *essential* perfections communicated from Father to Son: and hence it is, that there is still but *one worship*, and *one object* of worship; as one *God*, one *Creator*, &c. by reason of the most intimate and ineffable union of the two Persons; which Origen himself [h] endeavours to express in the fullest and strongest words he could think on.

From what hath been said, we may know what judgment to make of the ancient *doxologies*. They ought certainly to be understood according to the prevailing doctrine of the primitive Church. They were different in form, but had all one meaning; the same which I have shewn you from the primitive writers. The Arians were the first who interpreted some of them to such a sense, as either favoured *creature-worship*, or excluded the Son and Holy Ghost from proper *divine* worship. It was low artifice to value one sort of *doxology* above another, only because more *equivocal*; and to contend for *ancient* words, in opposition to the *ancient* faith. The Catholics understood the subtilty of those men, and very easily defeated it: first, by asserting the only true and just sense of those *doxologies*, which the Arians had wrested to an heretical meaning; and next, by using, chiefly, *doxologies* of another form; which had been also of long standing in the Church; and which, being less *equivocal*, were less liable to be perverted. But the subject of *doxologies* being already in better hands, I shall here dismiss it, and proceed.

You observe, that "it was the constant practice of the "Apostles to pray and give thanks to God, through Jesus "Christ," (p. 91.) And so it is the constant practice of the Church at this day. What can you infer from thence? That the Father and Son are not equal, or are not to be equally honoured? Nothing less: but, as the Son stands to us under the particular character of *Mediator*, besides what he is in common with the Father, our prayers, [i] *generally*, are to be

[h] Ἀναβέβηκε δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεὸν, ὁ ἀσχίστως καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως, καὶ ἀμερίστως αὐτὸν σέβων διὰ τοῦ προσάγοντος ἐκείνῳ υἱοῦ, τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου καὶ σοφίας, &c. p. 382.

The same thought is thus expressed by Cyril.

Μήτε διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν τὸν πατέρα νομίζειν, ἕν τι τῶν δημιουργημάτων τὸν υἱὸν ὑποπτεύσωμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς πατὴρ δι' ἑνὸς υἱοῦ προσκυνείσθω, καὶ μὴ μεριζέσθω ἡ προσκύνησις. *Cyril. Catech.* xi. p. 143. Oxon.

[i] See Bull, D. F. p. 121. Fulgent. Fragm. p. 629, 633, 638, 642, &c.

offered rather *through* him than *to* him: yet not forgetting or omitting, for fear of misapprehension and gross mistakes, to offer prayers directly to him, and to join him with the Father, in *doxologies;* as the ancient Church did, and as our own, God be thanked, and other churches of Christendom still continue to do. You add, that "whatever honour is paid *to the Son*, is "commanded, on account of his ineffable relation to God, as "the only begotten Son," &c. But this *ineffable* relation is not that of a *creature* to his *Creator;* but of a *Son* to a *Father*, of the same nature with him. *This* may be styled *ineffable:* the other cannot, in any true or just sense. If the Son is to be *worshipped*, as you seem here to allow, it can be on no other account, but such as is consistent with the Scriptures; on the account of his being one with the Father, to whom worship belongs; and to whom it is appropriated in opposition to *creatures*, not in opposition to him who is of the same nature with, coessential to, and inseparable from him. The "worship," you say, "terminates not in the Son." How this is to be understood, and in what sense admitted, I have explained above. Strictly speaking, no honour is paid to either, but what redounds to the glory of both; because of their intimate union; and because both are but *one God*. "But," you say, "the Father "begat him:" very well; so long as he did not *create* him, all is safe: the *eternity*, the *perfections*, the *glory* of both are one. "And," you say, "gave him dominion over us." That is more than you can prove; unless you understand it of Christ, considered as *God-man*, or *Mediator*.

In some sense every thing must be referred to the Father, as the first Person, the Head and Fountain of all. But this does not make two worships, *supreme* and *inferior;* being all but one acknowledgment of one and the same essential excellency and perfection, considered *primarily* in the Father, and *derivatively* in the Son; who, though personally distinguished, are in substance undivided, and essentially one. All your arguments, on this head, amount only to a *petitio principii*, taking the main thing for granted; that a *distinction of persons* is the same with a *difference of nature;* and that a subordination of the Son, as a Son, to the Father, implies an essential disparity and inequality betwixt them; which you can never make out. Instead of proving the Son to be a *creature*, and that he is to be worshipped notwithstanding, (which are the points you undertake,)

all that you really prove is, that the *Son* is not the *Father*, or first Person, nor considered as the *first Person* in our worship of him; which is very true, but very wide of the purpose. What follows in your reply, (p. 91, 92, 93.) does not need any further answer; being either barely repetition, or comments on your own mistake of the meaning of the word *individual;* of which enough hath been said before. You are pleased (pag. 94.) to make a *wonder* of it, that I should quote Heb. i. 6. in favour of my *hypothesis*. But if you consider that the angels are there ordered to *worship* the Son; and that that text is a proof of the Son's being *Jehovah* (see Psalm xcvii.) and that worship is appropriated to God only, by many texts of Scripture, and the concurring sense of antiquity, as I have shewn above; there will be little further occasion for *wondering*, in so clear a case. In that very chapter (Heb. i.) it is sufficiently intimated what it was that made the *Son* capable of receiving worship and adoration. He is declared to have "made the worlds;" to be the "shining-forth of his Father's glory, and the express image of "his Person;" and to "uphold all things by the word of his "power," (ver. 2, 3.) Strong and lively expressions of his *divine, eternal, uncreated* nature; such as might give him the justest claim to the worship and adoration of men and angels. In the close, you have a remark about the error of Arius; which, you say, "did not consist in making the Son distinct from, and "really subordinate to the Father, (for that was always the "Christian doctrine.") Here you come upon us with *general* terms, and *equivocal* expressions; leaving the reader to apprehend that the Christian Church believed the Son to be a *distinct, separate, inferior* being; in short, a *creature*, as Arius plainly, and you *covertly* assert: whereas there is not an author of reputation, among all the ancients, before Arius, that taught or maintained any such thing. A *subordination*, in some sense, they held; and that is all; not in Arius's sense, not in yours. Well, but you proceed to tell us wherein his error consisted, viz. "in presuming to affirm, upon the principles of his own "uncertain philosophy, and without warrant from Scripture, "that the Son was ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, and that ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν." Arius had so much *philosophy*, or rather common sense, as to think, and so much frankness and ingenuity, as to confess, that there neither is nor can be any *medium* between *God* and *creature*. He was not so ridiculous as to imagine that God first made a

substance, and then out of that *preexisting created* substance made the Son; besides that, even this way, the Son had been, in the last result, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων: nor was he weak enough to believe that any thing, *ad extra*, had been *coeval* or *coeternal* with God himself. If he had, he need not have scrupled to have allowed the like privilege to the *Son;* the first and best of all Beings, except God himself, in his opinion.

But since you think your own *philosophy* so much better than Arius's, will you be so kind as to tell us plainly, whether the Son be of the *same divine substance* with the Father; or of some *extraneous* substance which *eternally preexisted;* or from *nothing?* The *first* you deny directly, as well as Arius; and the *second* also, by plain necessary consequence: and why then should you differ upon the *third,* which is the only one left, and must be true, if both the other be false? If Arius was rash in affirming this, he was equally rash in denying the Son's *coeternity* with the Father, and again in denying his *consubstantiality;* and so your censure of him recoils inevitably upon yourself. Then, for the other error of Arius, in asserting that the Son *once was not;* as having been produced, or *created,* by the Father; in your way, you correct it thus[k]: True, the Son was *produced, brought into existence*, had a *beginning*, and was not, metaphysically, *eternal;* but yet, for all that, it was an error, in *philosophy*, for Arius to say, that *he once was not.* Unhappy Arius! detested by his *adversaries*, and traduced by his own *friends*, from whom he might reasonably have expected kinder usage. Let me entreat you, hereafter, to be more consistent: either value and respect the man, as the great reviver and restorer of *primitive Christianity;* or renounce his principles, and declare him a *heretic*, as we do.

QUERY XVIII.

Whether worship and adoration, both from men and angels, was not due to him, long before the commencing of his mediatorial kingdom, *as he was their Creator and Preserver;* (see Col. i. 16, 17.) *and whether* that *be not the same title to adoration which God the Father hath, as Author and Governor of the universe, upon the Doctor's own principles?*

YOU answer, that "though the world was created by the Son,

[k] Pag. 51, 63.

"yet no adoration was due to him upon that account, either "from angels or from men; because it was no act of *dominion*, "and he did it *merely ministerially*, (p. 94.) just as no adoration "is now due from us to angels, for the benefits they convey to "us; because they do it merely *instrumentally*." This is plain dealing; and however I may dislike the thing, I commend the frankness of it. You are very right, upon these principles, in your parallel from angels: had the ancients thought the office of the Son *ministerial*, in your low sense, they would have paid him no more respect than they paid to *angels;* and would certainly never have *worshipped* him. But I pass on: "Creation," you say, "is no act of dominion;" and therefore is not a sufficient foundation for worship. The same reason will hold with respect to the Father also; for *creating* is one thing, and *ruling* another. Yet you will find that Scripture makes *creation* the ground and reason of worship, in so particular and distinguishing a manner, that no person whatever, that had not a hand in creating, has any right or title to worship, upon Scripture-principles; to which Catholic antiquity is entirely consonant, as we have observed above. I did not found his right of worship on *creation* only, but *preservation* too; referring to Coloss. i. 17. "By him "all things consist;" to which may be added, Heb. i. 3, "Up-"holding all things by the word of his power." The titles of *Creator*, *Preserver*, *Sustainer* of all things, sound very high; and express his supereminent greatness and majesty, as well as our dependence; and therefore may seem to give him a full right and title to religious worship; especially if it be considered, that they imply *dominion*, and cannot be understood without it. Besides that *Creator*, as hath been shewn, is the mark, or *characteristic* of the true God, to whom all honour and worship is due. Add to this, that by John i. 1. the Son was Θεὸς before the foundation of the world; which implies, at least, *dominion*, upon your own principles: and when he came into the world, "[a] He came unto his own," (John i. 11,) having been their

[a] Unus Deus Pater super omnes, et unum Verbum Dei quod per omnes, per quem omnia facta sunt, et quoniam hic mundus proprius ipsius, et per ipsum factus est voluntate Patris, &c. —Mundi enim factor vere Verbum Dei est. *Iren.* p. 315.

Verbum autem hoc illud est, quod in sua venit, et sui eum non receperunt. Mundus enim per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. *Novat.* c. xiii. p. 714.

Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo veniens in hunc mundum in sua venit, cum homo nullum fecerit mundum? *Novat.* p. 715. Vid. et Hippolyt. contr. Noët. c. xii. p. 14.

Creator, ver. 20. and, as is now explained, *Governor* from the first. Wherefore, certainly, he had a just claim and title to adoration and worship from the foundation of the world, even upon your own *hypothesis*. As to his creating *ministerially* only, I have said enough to that point, under the eleventh Query, whither I refer you.

From what hath been observed, it may appear sufficiently, that the divine Λόγος was our King and our God long before; that he had the same claim and title to religious worship that the Father himself had; only not so distinctly revealed; and that his enthronization, after his resurrection, was nothing more than declaring the dignity of his person more solemnly, and investing him as [b] *God-man*, in his whole person, with the same power and authority, which, as God, he always had; and now was to hold in a different capacity, and with the addition of a new and special title, that of *Redeemer*. [c] They therefore who endeavour to found the Son's title to worship, only upon the powers and authority of the *Mediator*, or *God-man*, after the resurrection, (alleging John v. 22. Phil. ii. 10. Heb. i. 6. and the like,) give us but a very lean and poor account of this matter; neither consistent with truth, nor indeed with their own *hypothesis*. You quote Phil. ii. 6. in favour of your notion; and say, that Christ "was from the beginning in the form of God; yet "he did not assume to himself to be honoured like unto God, "till after his humiliation." But this position can never be made out from that text. Allowing you your interpretation, about *assuming to be honoured*, yet this can mean only, that he did not assume *during his humiliation*, without any reference to what he had done before. It is very clear from John xvii. 5. that our blessed Saviour was to have no greater glory after his exaltation and ascension, than he had "before the world was. "Glorify me with thine own self, with the glory which I had "with thee, before the world was." His glory had, to appearance, been under an eclipse, during the state of his humiliation: but after that, he was to appear again in full lustre; in all the brightness and splendour of his divine majesty, as he had done ever before. You think, that "our worship of him, in his own

[b] Εἰ δὲ ὑψοῦσθαι λέγεται, καὶ ἐν τάξει χαρίσματος τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα δέχεσθαι, εἰς ἐκεῖνο δηλονότι μετὰ σαρκὸς ἐπανάγεται, εἰς ὅπερ ἦν καὶ δίχα σαρκός. *Cyril. Alex. Thes.* p. 130.

[c] Clarke's Script. Doct. prop. 48, 50, 51. Clarke's Reply, p. 239.

"distinct person and character, commenced after his resurrec-
"tion from the dead." I might allow this to be so in fact; and yet maintain, that he always had the same just right and title to *religious* worship; which must have had its effect, had it been clearly and distinctly revealed sooner. This is enough for my purpose; inasmuch as I contend only, that the worship due to him is not founded merely upon the power and authority supposed to have been given him after his resurrection; but upon his *personal* dignity and *essential* perfections. He might have had the very same right and claim all along, that ever he had after; only it could not take effect, and be acknowledged, till it came to be clearly revealed. Thus, God the Father had, undoubtedly, a full right and title to the worship and service of men, or of angels, from the first: but that right could not take place before he revealed and made himself known to them. This, I say, is sufficient to my purpose; and all that I insist upon. Yet, because I have a religious veneration for every thing which was universally taught and believed by the earliest Catholic writers, especially if it has some countenance likewise from Scripture; I incline to think that worship, distinct worship, was paid to the Son, long before his incarnation.

Irenæus is [d] express, that the Λόγος was worshipped of old, together with the Father. And this must have been the sense of all those Fathers, before the Council of Nice, who understood and believed that the person who appeared to the *patriarchs*, who presided over the Jewish Church, gave them the law, and all along headed and conducted that people, was the second Person of the ever blessed Trinity. Now, this was the general and unanimous opinion of the Ante-Nicene writers, as hath been shewn at large, under Query the second. And it is observable, that Eusebius and Athanasius, (two very considerable men, and thoroughly versed in the writings of the Christians before them,) though they were opposite as to party, and differed as to opinion, in some points; yet they [e] entirely agreed in this, that the Son was *worshipped* by Abraham, Moses, &c. and the Jewish Church. And herein, had we no other writings left, we might reasonably

[d] Qui igitur a prophetis adorabatur Deus vivus, hic est vivorum Deus et Verbum ejus——. L. iv. c. 5. p. 232. ed. Bened.

See also Novatian, c. 15. Deum et angelum invocatum.

[e] Euseb. E. H. l. i. c. 2. See also Comm. in Isa. p. 381, 386. Athanas. vol. i. p. 443, 445.

Vid. Fulgent. ad Monimum. l. ii. c. 3, 4. &c.

believe that they spake the sense of their predecessors, and of the whole Christian Church, as well before, as in their own times. You will say, perhaps, that the worship, supposed to have been then paid to the Son, was not *distinct* worship. But it is sufficient that it was (according to the sense of the Christian Church) paid to the *Person* appearing, the *Person* of the Son, and he did not refuse it; which is the very argument that [f]some of the Ante-Nicene writers use in proof of his divinity. The *Patriarchs* worshipped that Person, who appeared and communed with them; supposing him to be the God of the universe, to whom of right all worship belongs. Had he not been what they took him for, he should have rejected that worship, as the angel in the Revelations rejected the worship which St. John would have offered him. In a word, since the Son received that worship in his *own Person*, (according to the ancients,) it must be said, he was then *distinctly* worshipped, and in his own right, as being *truly* God. However that be, my argument is still good, that the Son (having been in "the form of God," and *God; Creator*, *Preserver*, and *Sustainer* of all things, from the beginning) had a right to worship, even upon *your* principles, (much more *mine*,) long before the commencing of his *mediatorial kingdom:* and therefore his right and title to worship was not *founded* upon the *powers* then supposed to have been given him: consequently, those texts which you refer to, for that purpose, are not pertinently alleged; nor are they of strength sufficient to bear all that stress which you lay upon them. This point being settled, I might allow you that, in some sense, *distinct* worship commenced with the *distinct* title of *Son*, or *Redeemer:* that is, our blessed Lord was then first *worshipped*, or *commanded* to be worshipped by us, under that distinct *title* or *character;* having before had no other *title* or *character* peculiar and *proper* to himself, but only what was [g]*common* to the Father and him too. Though Father, Son, and Holy

[f] Novatian may here speak the sense of all. On Gen. xxxi. he comments thus: Si angelus Dei loquitur hæc ad Jacob, atque ipse angelus infert, dicens: Ego sum Deus qui visus sum tibi in loco Dei: non tantummodo hunc angelum, sed et Deum positum, sine ulla hæsitatione conspicimus; quique *sibi* votum refert ab Jacob destinatum esse, &c.——Nullius alterius angeli potest hic accipi tanta auctoritas, ut Deum *se* esse fateatur, et votum *sibi* factum esse testetur, nisi tantummodo Christi——. C. 27.

[g] Sic Deus voluit novare sacramentum, ut *nove* unus crederetur per *Filium* et *Spiritum*, ut coram jam Deus in suis propriis *nominibus* et *personis* cognosceretur, qui et retro per *Filium* et *Spiritum* prædicatus non intelligebatur. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* c. 30.

Ghost are all jointly concerned in *creation*, *redemption*, and *sanctification*; yet it may seem good to Infinite Wisdom, for great ends and reasons, to attribute *each* respectively to one *Person* rather than another; so that the Father may be *emphatically Creator*, the Son *Redeemer*, the Holy Ghost *Sanctifier*: and upon the commencing of these titles respectively, the *distinct* worship of each (amongst men) might accordingly commence also. Excellent are the words of [h] Bishop Bull to this purpose; which I have thrown into the margin. I shall only add, that while you endeavour to found Christ's right and title to *worship* solely upon the powers supposed to be given him after his resurrection, you fall much below the generality of the ancient Arians, (whom yet you would be thought to exceed,) and are running into the Socinian scheme, not very consistently with your *own*. Thus you seem to be fluctuating and wavering between two, (at the same time *verbally* condemning both,) *certain* in nothing, but in opposing the Catholic doctrine; which when you have left, you scarce know where to fix, or how to make your principles hang together. To explain this a little further: I *found* the Son's title to worship upon the *dignity* of his *Person*; his *creative* powers declared in John i. and elsewhere; his being Θεὸς from the beginning; and his *preserving* and *upholding* all things (according to Coloss. i. 16, 17. and Heb. i.) antecedently to his *mediatorial* kingdom: you, on the other hand, *found* it entirely upon the powers given him after his humiliation, (alleging such [i] texts as these, Matt. xxviii. 18. John v. 22, 23. Phil. ii. 10, 11. Rev. i. 5, 6. v. 8, 9, 10.) as if he had no just claim or title to *worship* at all, before that time: for, though you put in the equivocal word *distinct*, (very ingeniously,) yet

[h] Profecto admiranda mihi videtur divinarum personarum in sacrosanctissima *Triade* οἰκονομία, qua unaquæque persona *distincto* quasi *titulo* humanum imprimis genus imperio suo divino obstrinxerit, *titulo* illi respondente etiam *distincta* uniuscujusque imperii *patefactione*. *Patrem* colimus sub *titulo Creatoris* hujus universi, qui et ab ipsa mundi *creatione* hominibus *innotuerit*; *Filium* adoramus sub *titulo Redemptoris* ac *Servatoris* nostri, cujus idcirco divina gloria atque imperium non nisi post peractum in terris humanæ *redemptionis* ac *salutis* negotium fuerit *patefactum*; *Spiritum* denique *Sanctum* veneramur sub *titulo Paracleti, Illuminatoris*, ac *Sanctificatoris* nostri, cujus adeo divina majestas demum post descensum ejus in Apostolos primosque Christianos donorum omne genus copiosissima largitione illustrissimum, *clarius emicuerit*. Nimirum tum demum Apostoli, idque ex Christi mandato, Gentes baptizabant in *plenam atque adunatam Trinitatem*, (ut cum Cypriano loquar) h. e. in nomine Patris, Filii, et Spiritus Sancti. *Bull. Prim. Trad.* p. 142.

[i] See Dr. Clarke's Reply, p. 239, 249.

your meaning really is, and the tendency of your argument requires it, that no worship, *distinct* or *otherwise*, was due to him, till he received those full powers. This pretence, I say, might come decently and properly from a Socinian or a Sabellian, who either makes creation *metaphorical*, or interprets such texts as John i. 1. Col. i. 16, 17. and the like, of the *reason* or *wisdom* of the Father; that is, the Father, *indwelling* in the man Christ Jesus. But in *you* it must appear very improper, and very inconsistent with your other principles: wherefore I must again desire you to be more consistent, and to keep to one constant scheme. Take either Arian, Sabellian, or Socinian, and abide by it; and then I may know what I have to do: but do not pretend to hold two schemes at a time, utterly repugnant to each other.

As to Scripture's seeming, in some places, to found Christ's title to worship, not so much upon what he *is in himself*, as upon what he has *done for us*; a very good reason may be given for it, if it be well considered by what springs and movements moral agents are actuated, and that we *love* even God himself, with reference to ourselves, [k] "because he first loved us." *Abstracted reasons* of esteem, honour, and regard, are unaffecting, without a mixture of something *relative* to us, which ourselves have a near concern in. The *essential* dignity of Christ's Person is really the ground and foundation of honour and esteem, (and consequently of *worship*, the highest expression of both,) which ought always to bear proportion to the intrinsic excellency of the object: but his offices *relative* to us, are the *moving* reasons which principally affect our wills; and without which we should want the strongest incitement to pay that honour and worship which the *essential* excellency of his Person demands. Scripture has sufficiently apprised us of both, discovering at once both his *absolute* and *relative* dignity; that so we being instructed as well concerning what he is in himself, as what he is in respect to us, might understand what honour justly belongs to him, and want no *motive* to pay it accordingly. Add to this, that Christ's office, *relative* to us, naturally leads us back to the *antecedent* excellency and perfection of that Person, who was able to do so great and so astonishing things for us: besides that it must appear in the highest degree probable, that no *creature* what-

[k] 1 John iv. 19.

ever (supposing him to have suitable abilities) could have been intrusted with so *great* and so *endearing* a charge; such as must inevitably draw after it a larger share of our love, respect, and esteem, than seems consistent with our duty to God, and the rules laid down in Scripture for our behaviour towards the *creatures*. But enough of this: I proceed.

QUERY XIX.

Whether the Doctor hath not given a very partial account of John v. 23. *founding the honour due to the Son on this only, that* the Father hath committed all judgment to the Son; *when the true reason assigned by our Saviour, and illustrated by several instances, is, that the Son doth the same things that the Father doth, hath the same power and authority of doing what he will; and therefore has a title to as great honour, reverence, and regard, as the Father himself hath? and it is no objection to this, that the Son is there said to do* nothing of himself, *or to have all given him by the Father; since it is owned that the Father is the fountain of all, from whom the Son derives, in an ineffable manner, his essence and powers, so as to be one with him.*

IN answer to this, you say, "The only honour due to our "Saviour is plainly supposed by St. John to be given him, "upon account of his being appointed by the Father Judge "of the world," p. 96. This is very strange indeed! What! was there no honour due to him on account of his having been Θεὸς from the beginning? None for his having *created* the world? None on account of his being the "only begotten Son," which St. John represents as a circumstance of exceeding great [1]glory? Surely these were things great enough to demand our tribute of honour and respect; and therefore St. John could never mean that he was to be honoured only upon that *single* account, as being constituted *Judge of all men*. This could never be the only reason why "all men should honour "the Son even as they honour the Father." What then did St. John mean? Or rather, what did our blessed Lord mean, whose words St. John recites? He meant what he has said, and what the words literally import; that the Father, (whose

[1] John i. 14.

honour had been sufficiently secured under the Jewish dispensation, and could not but be so under the Christian also,) being as much concerned for the *honour* of his *Son*, had been pleased to commit *all judgment* to him, for this very end and purpose, that men might thereby see and know that the Son, as well as the Father, was *Judge of all the earth*, and might from thence be convinced how reasonable it was, and how highly it concerned them, to pay all the same honour to the Son, which many had hitherto believed to belong to the Father only. And considering how apt mankind would be to lessen the dignity of the Son, (whether out of a vein of disputing, or because he had condescended to become man like themselves,) and considering also that the many notices of the *divinity* of his Person might not be sufficient, with some, to raise in them that esteem, reverence, and regard for him, which they ought to have; for the more effectually securing a point of this high concernment, it pleased the Father to leave the final judgment of the great day in the hands of his Son: men therefore might consider that this Person, whom they were too apt to disregard, was not only their *Creator*, and *Lord*, and *God*, but their Judge too, before whose awful tribunal they must one day appear: an awakening consideration, such as might not only convince them of his exceeding excellency and supereminent perfections, but might remind them also, how much it was their interest, as well as duty, to pay him all that honour, adoration, and service, which the dignity and majesty of his Person demands[m].

Let us but suppose the present Catholic doctrine of the coequality and coeternity of the three Persons to be true, what more proper method can we imagine, to secure to each Person the honour due unto him, than this; that every Person should be manifested to us under some peculiar title or character, and enforce his claim of homage by some remarkable dispensation, such as might be apt to raise in us a religious awe and veneration? This is the case in fact; and on this account, chiefly, it seems to be that the Son, rather than the Father, (whose personal dignity is less liable to be questioned,) is to be Judge of all men, that, "so all men may honour the Son," καθὼς τιμῶσι τὸν πατέρα. The learned Doctor [n]pleads that καθὼς often signifies a *general similitude* only, not an *exact equality*: which

[m] Vid. Jobium ap. Phot. Cod. ccxxii. p. 604. [n] Reply, p. 260.

is very true; and would be pertinent, if we built our argument on the critical meaning of the particle. But what we insist on, is, that our blessed Lord, in that chapter, draws a *parallel* between the *Father* and *himself*, between the *Father's* works and his *own*, founding thereupon his title to honour; which sufficiently intimates what καθὼς means; especially if it be considered that this was in answer to the charge of making himself [o] "equal "with God." This is what I intimated in the Query; upon the reading whereof, you are struck with "amazement at so "evident an instance, how prejudice blinds the minds," &c. But let me persuade you to forbear that way of talking, which (besides that it is taking for granted the main thing in question, presuming that all the prejudice lies on one side, and all the reason on the other) is really not very becoming in this case, considering how many wise, great, and good men, how many churches of the saints, through a long succession of ages, you must, at the same time, charge with *prejudice* and *blindness*; and that too after much canvassing and careful considering what objections could be made against them; to which you can add nothing new, nor so much as represent the old ones with greater force than they have been often before, 1300 years ago. It might here be sufficient, for you, modestly to offer your reasons; and, however convincing they may appear to you, (yet considering that to men of equal sense, learning, and integrity, they have appeared much otherwise,) to suspect your own judgment; or, at least, to believe that there may be reasons which you do not see, for the contrary opinion. Well, but after your so great assurance, let us hear what you have to say. "If our "Lord had purposely designed, in the most express and em-"phatical manner, to declare his real subordination and depend-"ence on the Father, he could not have done it more fully and "clearly than he hath in this whole chapter." Yes, sure he might: being charged with *blasphemy*, in making himself *equal* with God, he might have expressed his abhorrence of such a thought; and have told them that he pretended to be nothing more than a *creature* of God's, sent upon God's errand; and that it was not by his *own power* or *holiness*, that "he made the "lame man to walk," (see Acts iii. 12.) Such an apology as this would have effectually took off all further suspicion, and

[o] John v. 18.

might perhaps have well become a *creature*, when charged with *blasphemy*, who had a true respect for the honour of his *Creator*. But, instead of this, he goes on, a second time, to call himself "Son of God," v. 25, declaring further, that there was so perfect a union and intimacy between the Father and himself, that he was able to do any thing which the Father did; had not only the same right and authority to work on the *sabbath*, but the same power of giving life to whom he pleased, of raising the dead, and judging the world; and therefore the same right and title to the same honour and regard: and that the execution of those powers was lodged in his hands particularly, lest the world should not be sufficiently apprehensive of his high worth, eminency, and dignity; or should not "honour the Son even as they honour the Father."

This is the obvious natural construction of the whole passage: you have some pretences against it, which have been examined and confuted long ago by Hilary, Chrysostom, Cyril, Austin, and other venerable Fathers of the Christian Church; so that I have little more to do than to repeat the answers. *The Jews*, you say, *falsely* and *maliciously* charged him with making himself equal with God. So said the Arians: but what ground had either they or you for saying so? It does not appear that the Evangelist barely repeated what the Jews had said: but he gives the reasons why the Jews sought to kill him; namely, because he *had broke the sabbath*, and because he "made himself "equal with God." So thought [p]Hilary; and he is followed therein by others, whom you may find mentioned in [q]Petavius. And this [r]Socinus himself was so sensible of, that he could not but allow that the Apostle, as well as the Jews, understood that our blessed Lord had declared himself *equal* to God; only he is forced to explain away the *equality* to a sense foreign to the context.

But supposing that the Apostle only repeated what the Jews had charged him with; how does it appear that the charge was

[p] Non nunc, ut in cæteris solet, Judæorum sermo ab his dictus refertur. Expositio potius hæc Evangelistæ est, causam demonstrantis cur Dominum interficere vellent. *Hil. Trin.* l. vii. p. 935.

[q] De Trin. p. 152.

[r] Ex modo loquendi quo usus est Evangelista, sentiam eum omnino una cum Judæis censuisse Christum, verbis illis, se æqualem Deo fecisse ——necesse sit intelligere hoc ipsum *eum* quoque sensisse, non minus quam senserit Christum appellasse Deum *Patrem suum*, quod ab ipso, uno et eodem verborum contextu, proxime dictum fuerat. *Socin. Resp. ad Vujek.* p. 577.

false? It is not to be denied that he had *really* wrought on the sabbath, and had *really* called God *his Father*, and in a sense peculiar; and why should not the rest of the charge be as true as the other? The context and reason of the thing seem very much to favour it. His saying, "My Father worketh hitherto, "and I work," must imply, either that he had an equal right to do any thing his Father did; or, that he was so intimately united to him, that he could not but act in concert with him: which is further confirmed by what follows, v. 19. "What "things soever he doth, these also doth the Son likewise." Besides, that had this been only a malicious suggestion, a false charge of the Jews, the Evangelist, very probably, would have given intimation of it, as we find done in other cases of that nature, (John ii. 21. Matt. xvi. 12.) This is the substance of St. Chrysostom's reasoning, in answer to your first objection; and I am the more confirmed in its being true and right, by observing, as before said, that Socinus himself, a man so much prejudiced on the other side, could not help falling in with the same way of thinking, so far, as to believe that the Apostle and the Jews both agreed in the same thing, viz. that our Lord did, by what he had said, make himself *equal with God*, in some sense or other; such as the Jews thought to be *blasphemy*, and in consequence whereof, they would have *killed*, i. e. *stoned* him. Another exception you make from the words, "the Son can do "nothing of himself:" the obvious meaning of which is, that being so nearly and closely related to God, as a *Son* is to a *Father;* the Jews might depend upon it, that whatever he did, was both agreeable to and concerted with his Father; and ought to be received with the same reverence and regard, as if the Father himself had done it. He, as a *Son*, being perfectly one with his Father, could do nothing *ἐναντίον τῷ Πατρὶ*, *against his Father*, nothing *ἀλλότριον*, nothing *ξένον*, (as Chrysostom expresseth it,) both having the same nature; and harmoniously uniting always in *operation* and *energy*. Hence it was, that, if one *wrought*, the other must *work* too; if one did any thing, the other should do *likewise;* if one *quickened* whom he would, so should the other also; and if one had *life in himself*, (or the *power of raising* the *dead*,) so should the other have too: and if the Father was primarily *Judge of the world*, in right of his prerogative as *Father*, the Son should have it in the *exercise* and *execution*, to manifest the equality. Now, here is no straining

and forcing of texts, but the literal, obvious, natural interpretation. But the interpretation which you give is plainly forced, makes the context incoherent, and the whole passage inconsistent. For, be pleased to observe your sense of verse the 19th. The Son can do nothing but by *commission* from the Father: Why? then follows, "For what things soever he doth, these "also doth the Son likewise." Does it follow, because he "can "do nothing of himself," in your sense, that therefore he can do every thing which the Father does? Where is the sense, or connection? Is he here limiting and lessening his own powers, as, upon your principles, he should have done, in answer to the charge of blasphemy? No; but he extends them to the utmost; and, instead of retracting, goes on in the same strain, and says more than he had said before. To make good sense and coherence of the passage, upon your scheme, you must fill up the deficiency thus: The Son can do nothing but by commission; *and commission he has*, to do every thing that the Father doth: which, though it sounds harsh, and looks too familiar for a *creature* to pretend, yet might make the context coherent. However, since the interpretation I have before given is more natural and more obvious, argues no deficiency in the text, makes the whole coherent, and has nothing harsh or disagreeing in it, it ought to be preferred. For, after all, it must be thought very odd and strange for a *creature* to be *commissioned* or empowered to do *all things* that the *Creator* doth; and to do them ὁμοίως in the *same manner*, also I do not make any forced construction: for so the 20th verse, immediately following, interprets it; "For the Father loveth the Son, and sheweth him *all* "*things* that himself doth." You endeavour indeed to make some advantage of this very text; alleging that "this power "which the Son exercised, was given him, not by *necessity*, "(which is no gift,) but by *free love*." But why must *love* imply freedom? Doth not God *love* himself? And if the love of himself be no matter of choice, why must the love of his Son, his *other self*, be represented otherwise? You are forced to *add* to the text, to give some colour to your argument; and to call it *free* love, when the text says only, that the Father *loveth*.

Thus far I have endeavoured to clear up the sense of St. John; and to vindicate it from your exceptions: which are not of so great weight, that you need be *amazed* at any man's thinking slightly of them. Hilary well observes, that the drift and

design of our Saviour's words was to declare his *equality* of nature with the Father, and his *Sonship*, at the same time. [s]No *inferior* nature could be capable of *having all things;* nor could a *Son* have them but as *communicated.* So that, in the whole, it is directly opposite to such as either disown an *equality* of nature, or a *real* distinction; wherefore Hilary concludes triumphantly, both against Arians and Sabellians, in words very remarkable, which I shall throw into the [t]margin.

But you add, as a recapitulation of what you had said upon this article: "If therefore to be freely sent, and to act in the "name and by the authority of another, be, to assume an "equality of honour and regard with that other, by whom he "was sent; we must for ever despair to understand the meaning "of words, or to be able to distinguish between a delegated and "a supreme underived power," (p. 97.) To which I make answer: if declaring himself to be the *proper Son* of that other, which both the Jews and the Apostle understood to be the same with making himself *equal* with him: if his claiming to himself the same right, power, and authority which the other hath; and asserting that he is able to do whatever the other doth; and that the *exercise* of those powers is left to him, for this very end and purpose, that all men may honour the one even as they honour the other: if this be not assuming an equality of honour and regard with that other; we must for ever despair to understand the meaning of words, or to be able to distinguish between what is proper to a *creature*, and what to the *Creator only*.

As to what you hint concerning a *delegated* power, it is not to your purpose; unless you could prove that one person cannot be *delegated* to another, without being unequal, in *nature*, to him: which would prove that one man cannot be *delegate* to another man[u]; besides other absurdities. Acting by a *delegated* power does by no means infer any *inferiority* of *nature*, but rather the quite contrary; especially, if the charge be such, as no *inferior nature* could be able to sustain; or if the honour attending it,

[s] Omnia habere sola natura possit indifferens; neque nativitas aliquid habere possit, nisi datum sit, p. 928.

[t] Conclusa sunt omnia adversum hæretici furoris ingenia. *Filius* est, quia ab se nihil potest. *Deus* est, quia quæcunque Pater facit, et ipse eadem facit. Unum sunt, quia exæquatur in honore, eademque facit non alia. Non est Pater, quia missus est, p. 929.

He has more to the same purpose, p. 1015, 1251.

[u] See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 242 of this edition.

or consequent upon it, be too great for an *inferior nature* to receive; as the case is here. However, the divine administration, and wonderful *οἰκονομία* of the Three Persons, with their order of acting, is what we must not presume perfectly to understand; nor can any certain argument be drawn against the thing, from our imperfect and inadequate conceptions of it.

If it be objected, that there is a *supremacy* of *order* lodged in one more than in the other; let that be rightly understood, and I shall not gainsay it. The Father, as *Father*, is *supreme*; and the Son, as *Son*, *subordinate*. We pretend not to make the Son the *first*, but the *second* Person of the Godhead. Whatever inequality of honour such a *supremacy* of one, and *subordination* of the other necessarily imply, while the *nature* or *essence* is supposed *equal*, it may be admitted: but I am not apprised that they infer any; because, though there are two Persons, there is but one [x] *undivided* nature; which makes the case widely different from that of one man (a distinct and *separate* being) acting under another.

What follows, of your answer to the present Query, is only ringing changes upon the old objection, drawn from your imaginary sense of *individual substance*. And here you let your thoughts rove, and abound much in flight and fancy; conceiving of the *Trinity*, after the manner of bodies, and reasoning from corporeal and sensible images. A blind man would thus take his notion of colours, perhaps, from his *hearing* or *feeling*; and make many fanciful demonstrations against the *doctrine* of *vision*; which would all vanish, upon the opening of his eyes.

[x] Unius autem substantiæ, et unius status, et *unius potestatis*, quia unus Deus. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* c. 2. *Unius divinitatis* Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. *Id. de Pud.* c. 21.

Ἑνὶ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ υἱῷ, νοουμένῳ ἀμερίστῳ, πάντα ὑποτέτακται. *Athenag. Leg.* c. xv. p. 64.

Unam et eandem omnipotentiam Patris ac Filii esse cognoscas; sicut unus atque idem est cum Patre Deus et Dominus. *Orig.* περὶ Ἀρχ. l. i. c. 2.

Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλην δόξαν πατὴρ, καὶ ἄλλην υἱὸς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτήν. *Cyrill. Catech.* vi. p. 77. ed. Ox.

Ὁ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν πατέρα ἔχων, πᾶσαν περιέχει τὴν πατρικὴν ἐξουσίαν καὶ δύναμιν, ὁ δὲ ὅλον ἔχων (πατέρα) καὶ τὴν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοῦ πάντως ἔχει. *Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom.* l. i. p. 14.

Totum Pater, totum possidet Filius: unius est quod amborum est, quod unus possidet singulorum est; Domino ipso dicente; *Omnia quæcunque habet Pater, mea sunt;* quia Pater in Filio, et Filius manet in Patre. Cui, *affectu* non *conditione*, *charitate* non *necessitate*, decore subjicitur, per quem Pater semper honoratur. Denique inquit: *Ego et Pater unum sumus.* Unde non *diminutiva*, sed *religiosa*, ut dixi, subjectione est Filius Patri subjectus: cum originalis perpetuique regni una possessio, coæternitatis omnipotentiæque una substantia, una æqualitas, una virtus majestatis augustæ, unito in lumine una dignitas retinetur. *Zen. Veronens. cit. a Bull. D. F.* p. 266.

Were we as able to judge of what may, or may not be, in relation to the *modus* of the divine existence, as we are to judge of common matters, lying within the sphere of our capacity, there might then be some force in the objections made against the doctrine of the Trinity from natural reason: but since many things, especially those relating to the incomprehensible nature of God, may be true, though we cannot conceive how; and it may be only our ignorance, which occasions some appearing inconsistencies; we dare not reject a doctrine so well supported by Scripture and antiquity, upon so precarious a foundation as this; *that human understanding is the measure of all truth:* which is what all objections of that kind, at length, resolve into.

This being premised, let us next proceed to examine your pretences, that I may not seem to neglect any thing you have, that but looks like reasoning. The Query had intimated, that the Son *derives* his essence and power in a manner *ineffable.* Against which you object thus: "But is it not self-evident, "that, let the *manner* of the Son's generation or derivation be "ever so *ineffable*, if *any thing* was generated, or derived, it must "be a *distinct* individual substance?" No; but we think it sufficient to say, that it must be a distinct individual *Person.* All the difficulty here lies in fixing and determining the sense of the words *individual substance.* Would you but please to define the terms, we should soon see what we have to do. But you go on: "It could not be part of the Father's substance; that is absurd: "and to say, it was the whole, is so flagrant a contradiction, "that I question whether there can be a greater in the nature "and reason of things. Can the same *individual* substance be "*derived* and *underived?* Or, can there be a *communication,* "and *nothing communicated?* For, it is supposed, that the *whole* "essence, or *substance*, is *communicated* to the *Son,* and yet re-"mains *whole* and *uncommunicated,* in the *Father;* which is "evidently *to be*, and *not to be*, at the same time." This is your reasoning, founded only on your mistake and misapprehension: by *Father's substance,* as it seems, you understand the Father's *Hypostasis*, or *Person;* and are proving, very elaborately, that the Father never communicated his own *Hypostasis*, or *Person*, either *in whole* or *in part.* You should first have shewn us what body of men, or what [y] single man, ever taught that doctrine,

[y] As to your gird upon Tertullian, in your notes, I refer you to Bull, D.F. p. 95. for an answer.

which you take so much pains to confute. Let me now propose a difficulty, much of the same kind, and nearly in the same words, to you; only to convince you that objections of this nature are not peculiar to the doctrine of the Trinity, but affect other points likewise, whose truth or certainty you make no manner of doubt of. What I mean to instance in, is God's *omnipresence:* that God, the same *individual* God, is every where, you will readily allow; and also that the *substance* of God is God. Now, will you please to tell me, whether that *divine substance,* which fills heaven, be the same *individual* substance with that which filleth all things? If it be not the *same individual substance,* (as by your reasoning it cannot,) it remains only that it be *specifically* the same; and then the consequence is, that you make not one substance *in number,* but *many;* the very thing which you charge the doctrine of the Trinity with. But further, the *divine* substance is in heaven; that is without question: now, I ask, whether the *substance* which fills heaven, be *part* only of that substance, or the *whole?* If it be *part* only, then God is not in heaven, but a *part* of God only; and the attributes belonging to the whole substance cannot all be contracted into any one *part,* without defrauding the other *parts;* and therefore there can be only *part* of infinite power, *part* of infinite wisdom, *part* of infinite knowledge, and so for any other attribute. For if you say, that the *whole* infinite wisdom, power, &c. residing in the *whole,* is *common* to every part, "it is" (to use your own words) "so flagrant a contradiction, that I question whether "there can be a greater in the nature and reason of things." Can the same *individual* power, wisdom, &c. be communicated and not communicated? Or, *can there be a communication, and nothing communicated?* For it is supposed, that the whole *wisdom, power,* &c. is communicated to one particular part; and yet remains *whole* and uncommunicated in the other parts; "which "is evidently *to be,* and *not to be,* at the same time." If you tell me, that *part* and *whole* are not properly applied to *wisdom, power,* &c., I shall tell you again, that they are (for any thing you or I know) as *properly* applied to the *attributes* as they are to the *subject;* and belong to both, or neither. And since you are pleased to talk of *parts* and *whole* of God's substance, of which you know little, give me leave to talk in the same way, where I know as little. The learned Doctor represents it as

a great *solecism*, to speak of an [z]*ell*, or a *mile* of *consciousness*. He may be right in his observation: but the natural consequence deducible from it is, that *thought* is not compatible with an *extended* subject. For there is nothing more unintelligible, or, seemingly at least, more repugnant, than *unextended* attributes in a subject *extended:* and many may think that an *ell*, or a *mile* of God (which is the Doctor's notion) is as great a *solecism* as the other. Perhaps, after all, it would be best for both of us to be silent, where we have really nothing to say: but as you have begun, I must go on with the argument, about the *omnipresence*, a little further. Well, if it cannot be *part* only of the divine substance, which is in heaven, since *God* is there, and since all the perfections and attributes of the Deity have there their full exercise; let us say that the *whole* divine substance is there. But then how can he be omnipresent? Can the same *individual* substance be *confined* and *unconfined?* Or can there be a *diffusion* of it every where, and yet *nothing diffused?* For it is supposed that the whole essence or substance is diffused all over the universe, and yet remains whole and undiffused in heaven. Which, again, is "evidently *to be*, and *not to be*, at the same time."

I should hardly forgive myself, upon any other occasion, such trifling in serious things. If you take to this kind of *reasoning* (which is really not *reasoning*, but running riot with *fancy* and *imagination*) about matters infinitely surpassing human comprehension, you will make lamentable work of it. You may go on, till you reason, in a manner, God out of his attributes, and yourself out of your faith; and not know at last where to stop. For, indeed, all arguments, of this kind, are as strong for *atheism*, as they are against a *Trinity:* wherefore it concerns you seriously to reflect, what you are doing. This, and the like considerations, have made the wisest and coolest men very cautious how they listened to the rovings of wanton thought, in matters above human comprehension. The pretended contradictions, now revived by many, against the doctrine of the Trinity, are very old and trite. They were long ago objected to the Christians, by the heathen idolaters. They almost turned the heads of Praxeas, Noëtus, Sabellius, Manichæus, Paul of Samosata; not to mention Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches, and

[z] Clarke's Lett. p. 40.

other ancient heretics. The Catholics were sensible of them: but having well considered them, they found them of much too slight moment, to bear up against the united force of Scripture and tradition. The doctrine of the Trinity, with all its seeming contradictions, has stood the test, not only of what human wit could do, by way of dispute; but of all that rage and malice could contrive, through a persecution almost as bitter and virulent, as any that had ever been under heathen emperors. This is to me an additional confirmation, that the doctrine we profess is no such gross imposition upon the common sense and reason of mankind, as is pretended. It was neither force nor interest that brought it in; nor that hath since, so universally, upheld it: and men are not generally such idiots, as to love contradictions and repugnancies, only for humour or wantonness, when truth and consistency are much better, and may be had at as easy a rate. These reflections have carried me rather too far: but they may have their use among such readers as know little of the history of this controversy; or how long it had been buried; till it pleased some amongst us to call it up again, and to dress it out with much art and *finesse;* to take the populace, and to beguile the English reader. Many things have fallen under this Query, which properly belonged not to it. But it was necessary for me to pursue you, what way soever you should take. You was more at liberty: my method is determined by yours.

QUERY XX.

Whether the Doctor need have cited 300 *texts,* [a] *wide of the purpose, to prove what nobody denies, namely,* a subordination, *in some sense, of the* Son *to the* Father; *could he have found but one plain text against his* eternity *or* consubstantiality, *the points in question?*

YOUR answer to this is very short, not to say negligent. You say, "if the Doctor's 300 texts prove a real subordination, "and not in name only, the point is gained against the Querist's "notion of *individual consubstantiality;* unless the same indi-"vidual intelligent substance can be subordinate to itself, and "consubstantial with itself." Here you are again doubling

[a] Clarke's Reply, p. 7.

upon the word *individual*. The Querist never had such a notion as that of *personal consubstantiality*, which is ridiculous in the sound, and contradiction in sense; and yet you are constantly putting this upon the Querist, and honouring him with your own presumptions. Let me again shew you, how unfair and disingenuous this method is. Do not you say that the same *individual substance* is present in heaven, and, at the same time, filleth all things? That it *pervades* the sun, and, at the same time, *penetrates* the moon also? I might as reasonably argue that you, by such positions, make the *same individual substance* greater and less than *itself*, remote and distant from *itself*, higher and lower than *itself*, to the right and to the left of *itself*, containing and contained, bounded and unbounded, &c., as you can pretend to draw those odd surprising consequences upon the Querist. Would not you tell me, in answer, that I misinterpreted your sense of *individual*, and took advantage of an ambiguous expression? Let the same answer serve for us; and you may hereafter spare your readers the diversion of all that unmanly trifling with an *equivocal* word. But enough of this matter. I might have expected of you, in your reply to this Query, one text or two to disprove the Son's *eternity* and *consubstantiality*, and to supply the deficiency of the Doctor's treatise: but since you have not thought fit to favour me with any, I must still believe that the Doctor's 300 texts, though very wide of the purpose, are all we are to expect; being designed, instead of *real* proof, to carry some show and appearance of it, that they may seem to make up in number what they want in weight. All that the learned Doctor proves by his 300 texts, or more, is only that the Son is *subordinate* to the Father: whether as a *Son*, or as a *creature*, appears not. However, the *tacit* conclusion which the Doctor draws from it, and insinuates carefully to his reader, is, that the Son is not strictly and *essentially* God; but a *creature* only. This inference we deny utterly; alleging that a *subordination* may be, and may be understood, between two persons, without the supposition of any *inferiority* of *nature*; but all the answer we can get to this is, that [b] *nature* and *essence* are *obscure metaphysical* notions; (which is neither true, nor to the purpose, nor consistently pleaded by one who builds so much upon *self-existence*, a *metaphysical* term, the word *equivocal*, and

[b] Reply, p. 17, 19, 21.

the *notion* sufficiently *obscure*.) And thus, as soon as the learned Doctor comes up to the pinch of the question, not being willing to own the force of what is urged, he very wisely dissembles it, and goes off in a mist of words.

I cannot but take notice, upon this occasion, of your charging us frequently, in an invidious manner, with the use we make of *metaphysical* terms. I know no reason you have for it, except it be to anticipate the charge, as being conscious to yourselves how notoriously you offend in this kind. Any man, that is acquainted with the history of Arianism, knows that its main strength lay in *logical* and *metaphysical* subtilties. The faith of the Church was at first, and might be still, a plain, easy, simple thing; did not its adversaries endeavour to perplex and puzzle it with *philosophical* niceties, and *minute* inquiries into the *modus* of what they cannot comprehend. The first Christians easily believed that *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, in whose name they were *baptized*, and whom they *worshipped*, were equally *divine*; without troubling themselves about the manner of it, or the reconciling it with their belief in one *God*. As men generally believe that God *foreknows* every thing, and that man notwithstanding is a *free agent*, (scarce one perhaps in a thousand concerning himself how to reconcile these two positions, or being at all apprehensive of any difficulty in it;) so, probably, the plain honest Christians believed every Person to be God, and all but one God; and troubled not their heads with any nice speculations about the *modus* of it. This seems to have been the artless simplicity of the primitive Christians, till prying and pretending men came to start difficulties, and raise scruples, and make disturbance; and then it was necessary to guard the faith of the Church against such cavils and impertinencies as began to threaten it. *Philosophy* and *metaphysics* were called in to its assistance; but not till *heretics* had shewn the way, and made it in a manner necessary for the Catholics to encounter them with their own weapons. Some new terms and particular *explications* came in by this means; that such as had a mind to corrupt or destroy the faith, might be defeated in their purposes. It was needless to say that generation was *without division*, while nobody suspected or thought of any *division* in the case; but after *heretics* had invidiously represented the Catholics as asserting a *division*, it was high time for the Catholics to resent the injury, and to deny the charge. There was no occasion for the

mentioning of three *Hypostases*, till such as Praxeas, Noëtus, and Sabellius, had pretended to make *one Hypostasis* an article of faith; drawing many very *novel* and dangerous consequences from their prime position. The ὁμοούσιον itself might have been spared, at least out of the *creeds*, had not a fraudulent abuse of good words brought matters to that pass, that the Catholic faith was in danger of being lost, even under Catholic language. To return to our point: there would be no occasion now for distinguishing between *subordination* of *order* and of *nature*, were it not manifest how much the Catholic faith may be endangered by the endeavours of some, to slip one upon us for the other. Such as know any thing of *fair* controversy, may justly expect of you, that you support your cause, not by repeating and inculcating the word *subordinate*, (as if there was a charm in syllables, or men were to be led away by sounds,) but by proving, in a rational manner, that *all subordination* implies such an *inferiority* as you contend for. If this can be done, the Doctor's 300 texts (which are very good texts, and have undoubtedly an excellent meaning) may appear also to be pertinent to the cause in hand.

QUERY XXI.

Whether he be not forced to supply his want of Scripture-proof by very strained and remote inferences, and very uncertain reasonings from the nature of a thing confessedly obscure and above comprehension; and yet not more so than God's eternity, ubiquity, prescience, *or other attributes, which we are obliged to acknowledge for certain truths?*

TO the former part of the Query, you "answer directly in the "negative." To which I rejoin, that I still maintain the *affirmative*, and can readily make it good. The Doctor's insinuating from the 300 texts (which style the Father *God* absolutely, or the one God) that the Son is not strictly and *essentially* God, not one God with the Father, is a strained and remote inference of his *own;* not warranted by Scripture, nor countenanced by Catholic antiquity; but contradictory to both. Besides this, I must observe to you, that the main strength of the Doctor's cause lies, first, in his giving either a [c] *Sabellian* or *Tritheistic*

[c] See instances, Scripture Doctr. p. 99, 102, 293, 426, 465. first edition. Reply, p. 35, 38, 51, 53, 93, 121.

turn (admitting [d] no *medium*) to the Catholic doctrine; and then charging it with *confusion* of *Persons, polytheism, nonsense*, or *contradiction*. Take away that, to which his constant resort is, whenever he comes to the pinch of the question, and there will be little left considerable. He shews his reader *Tritheism*, and he shews him *Sabellianism*, (keeping the Catholic doctrine, which is neither, out of sight,) and then recommends *Arianism* (disguised) to him, as the best of the three. Now, since the Catholic doctrine has been generally thought different from any of the three, and more followed than all the rest put together, it ought to have been fairly presented, in company with the other; that so the reader, having all the *four* before him, might be the more able to pass a right judgment of them. You will frequently find the learned Doctor combating the *Catholic* faith under the disguise of *Sabellianism*, as if there was no difference between them; or if it be at all distinguished from *Sabellianism*, it immediately commences *Tritheism;* and a plurality of *coordinate* Persons is inevitable with the learned Doctor: this is the sum of his performance. Scripture, indeed, is brought in, and Fathers too, which is still more surprising: but the whole, in a manner, is this one *syllogism:*

If the Son be *consubstantial* with God the Father, he must be either *individually* or *specifically* so: but the former is *Sabellianism*, the latter *Tritheism*, both absurd: therefore, &c.——

The learned Doctor very well knows, how easy it would be to match this *syllogism*, or *sophism*, with others of the like kind, against *omnipresence, eternity, prescience*, and even *self-existence:* which, in reverence to the subject, and for prudential reasons, I forbear; sorry to find the cause put upon such a way of reasoning, as tends to undermine something more than the doctrine of the Trinity. But I proceed.

To give the better colour to his charge of *Tritheism*, the Doctor [e] every where takes it for granted (which was the only way, when it could not be proved) that God the Son cannot be *really* distinct, and strictly *divine* too, unless he be *coordinate*, in all respects, with the Father; which would be contrary to the supposition of his being a *Son*, and *second* Person. Two

[d] Script. Doctr. p. 86, 132, 415, 430, 435, 437, 441, 447, 455, 465. first edition.

[e] Script. Doctr. p. 86, 415, 430, 437, 441, 447, 455, 465, first edition.

coordinate Persons, it seems, they must be; or else one of them must inevitably be a *creature:* this is plainly his meaning, however studiously he avoids the word *creature;* choosing rather to insinuate covertly, what is too gross to appear in broad terms. The whole, you see, terminates in a *philosophical* question: And what occasion have we for Scripture or Fathers, (except it be to amuse our readers,) if *philosophy* can so easily end the dispute! For it is very certain that neither Scripture nor Fathers can add force to, if *concurring;* nor, if *reclaiming*, be able to stand against clear and evident demonstration. But *demonstration* is the thing wanting: as to *presumptions* and *conjectures*, we are in no pain about them. I shall have a further occasion to consider the charge of *Tritheism* hereafter; and therefore, dismissing it for the present, shall return to the business of the Query.

To the latter part of it you answer, that "God's attributes "are so far from being above comprehension, that they are all "strictly demonstrable by reason." You was sensible this was wide; and therefore very justly corrected it, in the words immediately following. "But I am willing to suppose" (how could you make any doubt of it?) "that the author meant, that the "MANNER of their existence in the divine nature is above com-"prehension; and so indeed it is." Very well: and yet you believe the *reality* of those *attributes*. Why then so *unequal* and *partial*, with respect to the Trinity, the case being exactly the same? why may not the thing be true, though the MANNER, or *modus* of it, be above comprehension? You add, "Though the "manner of the Son's derivation is above comprehension, yet "his real subordination is strictly demonstrable." p. 99.

Tantamne rem tam negligenter?

Here the argument was, in a manner, brought to a head; and the fate of the controversy depended on this article. Here you had a fair opportunity given you of laying on your charge of contradiction, if you had any you could depend on; and of clearing God's attributes (particularly the three mentioned) from being liable to the same or the like charge. But, instead of this, you walk calmly off with one sentence; in which, to be plain with you, it will be hard to find either weight or pertinency. If you mean, by *real subordination*, the subordination of a *creature* to God; or of one Person inferior in *nature* to another of a *higher, superior*, or *more perfect* nature; it is not

demonstrable from Scripture; nor can it any way be proved: if you mean any thing else, it is not pertinent.

You are so kind as to allow the *manner* of the Son's *derivation*, or generation, to be *above comprehension*. The Eunomians, your predecessors in this controversy, [f] thought (and they thought right) that, in order to support their cause, it would be necessary to affirm the nature of God to be *comprehensible*, or not above human comprehension; and therefore it is, that [g] Philostorgius censures Eusebius for closing in with the contrary opinion. You are more modest; they more consistent: for indeed this controversy, managed upon the foot of mere reason, terminates at length in that single question, *Whether the essence of God be above comprehension, or no.* The Catholics stood up for the *affirmative;* the wiser, but bolder, Arians maintained the *negative:* and this is what, if you understand your own principles, and will be at the pains to trace them to the last result, you will be obliged to take shelter in, or to give up your cause, so far as concerns all arguments drawn from the nature and reason of the thing. Some of our English Socinians have expressed themselves as roundly, upon this head, as any of the ancient Arians or Eunomians; declaring the divine nature to be no more *mysterious* than that of his creatures. Such assertions are shocking; but there is a necessity for them, if some men will be consistent, and ingenuous enough to speak out. They would not advance such bold paradoxes, if they were not forced to it.

Before I leave this Query, it will be proper to acquaint our readers what we mean by believing *mysteries*. For I find that this is a matter which is apt to give great offence, and to occasion many sad and tragical complaints. [h] Dr. Whitby is one of the most considerable men that I have observed giving into that popular way of reasoning, which had been formerly left (as it ought to be still) to writers of a lower class. He is very much disturbed that any thing should be proposed as an *article* of *faith*, which is not to be *understood:* and observes, that no man in his sober senses can give his assent to what he *understands* not; meaning understands *not at all.* He is

[f] Epiph. Hæres. lxxvi. p. 916. Socrat. E.H. l. iv. c. 7. p. 176. Theodoret. Hæret. Fab. l. iv. c. 3. Cyril. Alex. Thesaur. p. 260. ed. Paris. Chrysostom. Hom. xxvii. tom. i. p. 307.

[g] Philostorg. lib. i. p. 468. ed. Vales.

[h] Disquis. Modest. Præf. p. 19.

certainly very right, I do not say pertinent, in the remark: and I may venture to add, that no man, whether *sober* or otherwise, can do it. For, undoubtedly, where there is no *idea*, there can be no assent: because *assenting to nothing* is the very same with *not assenting*. Thus far we are perfectly agreed. But for the clearing up of this matter, I shall endeavour to reduce what relates to it, to the following particulars, as so many distinct cases.

1. Let the first case be, where the terms of a proposition, subject and predicate, (or either of them,) are not at all understood by the Person to whom it is given. For instance; the words, *Mene mene tekel upharsin*, carried no idea at all with them, till the Prophet had interpreted them; before which king Belshazzar could give no assent to them. The same is the case of any proposition given in an unknown language, or in such words, of a known language, as a person understands not. Only, I would have it observed, that, in such a case, a man neither admits nor rejects the *proposition;* because to him it is no *proposition*, but merely sounds or syllables.

2. A second case is, when the proposition is given in a language well understood, and in words which ordinarily convey *ideas* to the mind; but words so put together, in that instance, as to furnish us with no certain determinate meaning. A late anonymous writer has hit upon a very proper example of this very case. "A woman ought to have power on her head, be-"cause of the angels." The words, *woman*, *power*, *head*, *angels*, are all plain words, and carry with them obvious familiar *ideas*. And yet a man may have no *idea* of what is asserted in that proposition; and therefore can give no assent to it, more than this; that it is true in some sense or other, or that something should be believed, if he understood what: which is not assenting to that proposition, but to another; namely, that "whatever Scrip-"ture asserts, is true." The aforesaid author observes, very shrewdly, that having no certain *ideas* of the terms of the *proposition*, it is to him a *mystery*. I may add, that the *pertinency* of his observation is another such *mystery;* and the justice and equity of his drawing a parallel between this and the *mysteries* of *Christianity*, properly so called, must be a *mystery* to as many as cannot perceive either the *sense* or the *ingenuity* of doing it. But,

3. Another case may be, when the terms of a proposition are

understood, but are so connected or divided, as to make a proposition manifestly repugnant. *A triangle is a square, A globe is not round*, or the like. Such propositions we reject; not because we do not understand them, but because we do; and understand them to be false. Sometimes indeed a contradiction lies concealed under the words it is couched in, till it be resolved into plainer. For instance: this proposition, *The existence of a first cause is demonstrable, a priori:* as it lies under these terms, it seems reducible to case the second; as being sound without sense. But resolve it into this; *There is a cause prior to the first;* and then the [1] repugnancy appears. So again: *Necessity of existence is antecedently* (in *order of nature*) *the cause or ground of that existence.* These are only so many syllables. But put it thus: *A property is, in order of nature, antecedent to, and the ground and cause of the subject which supports it;* and the *contradiction* is manifest. Once more: *Necessity absolute and antecedent* (*in order of nature*) *to the existence of the first cause must operate every where alike.* This proposition seems to fall under case the second. But let it be resolved into plainer words; and then it will appear that this is the proper place for it.

4. A fourth case is, when the terms of the proposition carry *ideas* with them, *seemingly*, but not *plainly* repugnant. For example: *God* certainly *foreknows events depending on* uncertain *causes. The omnipresent substance is not extended.* Propositions of this kind may be, and are assented to; because there may be a greater appearance of repugnancy on the opposite side of the question; or, because there is not reason sufficient for suspending assent.

5. A fifth case is, when a proposition is formed in *general* terms, and reaches not to *minute* particulars. "The pure in "heart shall see God." The phrase of *seeing God* conveys some *idea*, but *general* only; not particular, precise, or determinate. "At God's right hand are pleasures for evermore." God's *right hand*, and *pleasures*, we have only *general* confuse *ideas* of: yet *ideas* we have; and we assent as far as our *ideas* reach. Having no more than a general confuse perception, our faith in such points can rise no higher, or reach no further; nor can more be expected of us.

[1] Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμῃ λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ. αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων, καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται, τοῦ δὲ ἀγενήτου οὐδὲν προϋπάρχει. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* p. 696.

6. A sixth case is, when the terms of a proposition convey *ideas*, but *ideas* of *pure intellect;* such as *imagination* can lay no hold of. Philosophers have illustrated this by the instance of a *chiliagon* and a *triangle*. We *understand* what is meant by a figure of a *thousand* sides, as clearly as we do what is meant by one of *three* only: but we *imagine* one more distinctly than the other. This instance belongs more properly to *distinct* and *confuse* imagination, than to the purpose it is brought for. *Ideas* of numbers, in the abstract, are properly *ideas* of *pure intellect:* and so are, or should be, our *ideas* of our own souls, of *angels*, of *God:* we may *understand* several things of them; but *imagination* has very little to do in such matters. However, our not being able to *imagine*, provided we do but *understand*, is no hinderance to our assent, in propositions of this kind.

7. The last and easiest case is, when the terms convey full and strong *ideas* to the *understanding* and *imagination* also. For instance: the man *Christ Jesus ate, drank, slept*, was *crucified, died*, and was *buried*, &c. Here, all is easy, clear, and plain, even to those who love not to think upon the stretch, or to be under any pain in assenting.

Now for the application of the foregoing particulars to the point in hand. Those articles of faith, which the Church has called *mysteries*, belong not to *case* the *first* or *second*, wherein no assent can be given: or if they do, they are no articles of faith, but so many sounds or syllables. It is to be hoped, they come not under *case* the *third:* for *plain* contradictions are certainly no *mysteries*, any more than *plain* truths; as is justly observed by the learned [k] Dr. Clarke. For the same reason, they fall not under *case* the *seventh*, where every thing is supposed distinct, clear, and particular as can be desired. Whatever is plainly reducible to any of the *four* cases now mentioned, is either no *matter of faith* at all, or no *mystery*. There remain *three* cases; where the *ideas* are either seemingly *repugnant*, or such as reach not to *particulars*, or such as *imagination* has no concern with. Assent may be given in all these cases, as hath been already observed; and so, possibly, here we may find *articles of faith:* and, if some gentlemen will give us leave, after we have thus explained what we mean by the *term*, we will call such articles *mysteries*. For example:

[k] Reply, p. 38.

The belief of *three Persons*, every one singly *God*, and all together *one God*, seems to fall under *case* the *fourth*: the *ideas* are *seemingly*, not *really*, repugnant. We know what we mean, in saying *every one*, as clearly as if we said *any one*, is *God*; a Person having such and such *essential* perfections. We see not perfectly how this is *reconciled* with the belief of *one God*, as we see not how *prescience* is reconciled with *future contingents*. Yet we believe both, not doubting but that there is a *connection* of the *ideas*, though our faculties reach not up to it.

Omnipresence, I think, is another *mystery*, and falls chiefly under case the *fifth*. We have a *general confuse idea* of it, and mean something by it. The *particular manner* how it is, we have no notion of; and therefore are not obliged to believe any particular *modus*. Fix upon this or that, there are *appearing* repugnancies and inconsistencies; and so far, this is reducible to *case* the *fourth*, as well as *fifth*.

The *incarnation* of the Son of God is another *mystery*, and comes under case the *fourth* and *fifth*. There are some *seeming*, not *real* repugnancies; and the *ideas* we have of it are *general* and *confuse*, not *particular* nor *special*. Such as our *ideas* are, such must our *faith* be; and we cannot *believe* further than we *conceive*, for *believing* is *conceiving*; *confusely*, if *ideas* are *confusely*; *generally*, if *general*; *distinctly* and *adequately*, if *distinct* and *adequate*.

The *generation* of the Son of God is another *mystery*. *Ideas* we have of it, and know what we mean by it. But being *spiritual*, *imagination* can lay no hold of them; being *general* and *confuse*, we cannot reach to *particulars*; and being *seemingly* repugnant, we cannot make out the entire connection. *Equality of nature* (which is part of the notion) is a *general* idea, and well understood; *reference to a head or fountain* is *general* too, but more *confuse*, and besides, *figurative*; *eternal* reference *very confuse*, as the *idea* of *eternity* necessarily must be; *inseparability* is general, obscure, negative; and we know but very imperfectly what the union of spiritual things means. Nevertheless we *understand* enough (though we can *imagine* little) to make it properly an article of belief; and no man can reasonably pretend to reject it, as having no meaning, or carrying no *idea* at all with it. We assent as far as our *ideas* reach, for we can do no more: we believe in *part*, what is revealed in *part*; our

faith keeping pace with our *ideas*, and ending where they end.

The *simplicity* of God is another *mystery*, of which we have some, but a very imperfect, general, and obscure *idea*. It may fall under *case* the *fifth* and *sixth*. *Scripture* says little of it: we have took it chiefly from *metaphysics*, which are short and defective. When we come to inquire, whether *all extension*, or *all plurality, diversity*, composition of *substance* and *accident*, and the like, be consistent with it, then it is that we discover how *confuse* and *inadequate* our *ideas* are. And hence it is, that while all parties admit the divine *simplicity*, in the general, yet when they come to be pressed with it in dispute, they often give different accounts of it; and easily so explain and state the notion, as to make it suit with their particular schemes. To this head belongs that perplexing question, (beset with difficulties on all sides,) whether the divine substance be *extended* or no. And if *extension* be admitted, ingenious thoughtful men will divide again, upon another question, whether *infinite* or no; some thinking it very absurd for any attribute of God not to be *infinite;* others thinking it no less absurd to admit any *infinite* extension, *number*, or the like, at all. They that suppose the divine substance *extended*, lest they should be obliged to conceive it as a *point* only; and lest they should admit that any thing can *act where it is not*, are, when pressed with difficulties about *aliquot parts*, forced to admit that any part of that substance, how great soever, or of whatever dimensions, must be conceived only as a *point*, in proportion to the *whole:* from whence it follows, that, unless the *world* be *infinite*, all that *acts* (of that infinite substance) in the *world*, is but a *point;* and so the whole *substance*, except that *point*, either acts not at all in the *world*, or acts *where it is not*. But to proceed.

Self-existence is another *mystery*, of which we know little: and the learned are hardly agreed whether it be a *negative* or *positive* idea. Yet every body believes it in the gross, *confusedly* and *undeterminately*. It is manifest, on one hand, that the *first cause* has no *cause;* neither itself, (much less any property of itself,) nor any thing else: and yet it may seem very wonderful how any thing should exist without a *reason a priori*; that is, without a *cause* for it[1].

[1] Οὐ γὰρ δέχεται λογισμὸς εἰδέναι πῶς οἷόν τε οὐσίαν εἶναι, μήτε παρ' ἑαυτῆς, μήτε παρ' ἑτέρου τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσαν. *Chrys. Hom.* xxv. tom. i. p. 298.

To name no more: *eternity* itself is the greatest *mystery* of all. An *eternity past*, is a thought which puzzles all our philosophy; and is too hard for the sharpest wits to reconcile. The *nunc stans* of the *schools* (though older than the *schools*) has been exploded; and yet *succession* carries with it insuperable difficulties. There is nothing peculiar to the doctrine of the Trinity, any thing near so perplexing as *eternity* is: and yet the gentlemen who are for discarding *mysteries* are forced to believe it. I know no remedy for these things but an humble mind; a just sense of our ignorance in many things, and of our imperfect knowledge in all. Now to return to the learned Dr. Whitby.

After a view of the premises, it might be proper to ask him, whether he dislikes the Catholic doctrine of the holy Trinity, as *perceiving contradictions* in it. If this be the case, however concerned I am for that doctrine, (believing it to be true,) I will venture to say, it would be an acceptable piece of service, if he could any way help others to *perceive* them too. Truth, *certain* truth, will be always welcome, in any cause, and from any hand, to all sober and considerate men. But if this should be done, he should not then complain that he *understands not* the doctrine, but that he *understands* (i. e. *distinctly* perceives) it to be *false*.

If he means that he has no *idea* at all of the *mystery*, not so much as a *general, confuse*, or *inadequate* apprehension of it; that must be a mistake; as may appear from what hath been before observed. Besides that having once, or oftener, wrote for it, (though he has since laboured very much to perplex, puzzle, and disparage it,) every candid man must believe that he understood in some measure, formerly, what he engaged in the proof of.

If the case be, that he does not throughly, fully, and adequately comprehend it, and therefore demurs to it; then it should be considered, that the result of all is this only, that he will not admit so far as he may understand, unless he may have the privilege to understand something more: which, whether it be not too familiar from a *creature* towards his *Creator*, and articling more strictly with Almighty God than becomes us, let any wise man judge.

If, lastly, it be pretended that it is a *human*, not a *divine* doctrine, which he is pleased to quarrel with; let him censure it as *human* and *unscriptural* only; and not as *unintelligible*, and *impossible* to be *assented* to: and then we may bring the cause to

a short issue, by inquiring whether the doctrine be *scriptural*, or no. Let things be called by their right names, and set in their true and proper light; that truth may not be smothered, nor any doctrine, (especially so ancient and so important a doctrine,) condemned, before we know why. So much we owe to the Church of Christ, which receives this faith; to the blessed saints and martyrs, many centuries upwards, who lived and died in it; to truth, to God, and to ourselves, as to see that it be fairly and impartially examined; that "proving all things," as we ought to do, in sincerity and singleness of heart, we may, at length, be both wise enough to know, and suitably disposed to "hold "fast that which is good."

It is excellently remarked by the ingenious Mr. Emlyn, in the Appendix to his [m] Narrative, "that the holy Scriptures require "no accurate, philosophical notions of God's *eternity*, *omnipresence*, "and *immensity*, &c. They are content to give us popular, easy "accounts of these matters—they trouble not men with the "niceties of *eternal successions*, or an eternal τὸ νῦν, without "*succession*; nor with *infinite spaces*, or of God's being present "in *part*, or in *whole*; and the like *metaphysical* difficulties.— "Our religion imposes no such difficulties on us, of believing "with the understanding what we cannot so much as *perceive* "by it; it only requires us to believe what it reveals to us, i. e. "to our *understanding* and *apprehension*."

All this is very rightly and judiciously observed. God's *eternity* and *omnipresence* we have only *general* and confuse *ideas* of; Scripture has not revealed to us the particular *modus*, or *minute* circumstances of either; and we are not obliged to *believe* any otherwise than as we *apprehend*, (i. e. confusely and inadequately;) nor indeed is it possible. The same is the case of three Persons, *every one truly God*, and all but *one God*; so far evident from Scripture, and *apprehended*, in the general, as fully and clearly (perhaps more so) as *eternity*, *omnipresence*, or the like. But the particular *modus*, how the *three* are *one*, and the *minute* circumstances of their *union* and *distinction*, are as much a secret to us, as how God foresees future contingents, or is present in all places at once. Many have been prying and inquisitive into this matter, hoping to know something more particularly of it, till they have come to doubt even of the thing itself, and so have

[m] Page 61.

fallen into *heresy:* and Catholics have sometimes exceeded in this way, endeavouring to *explain* beyond their *ideas;* which is really nothing else but multiplying words. The *notion* is soon stated, and lies in a little compass. All that words are good for, after, is only to fix and preserve that *notion*, which is not improvable (without a new revelation) by any new *idea;* but may be obscured and stifled in a multitude of words. The most useful words for fixing the notion of *distinction*, are *person*, *hypostasis*, *subsistence*, and the like: for the *divinity* of each Person, ὁμοούσιος ἀγένητος, *eternal*, *uncreated*, *immutable*, &c. For their *union*, περιχώρησις, *interior generation*, *procession*, or the like. The design of these terms is not to enlarge our views, or to add any thing to our stock of *ideas;* but to secure the plain fundamental truth, that *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost* are all strictly *divine* and *uncreated;* and yet are not *three Gods*, but *one God*. He that believes this simply, and in the general, as laid down in Scripture, believes enough; and need never trouble his head with nice questions, whether the union of three Persons should be called *individual* or *specific;* whether *Person* and *Being* are *reciprocal* terms, whether every person may be properly said to be *self-existent;* how three persons can be all in the *same place;* whether *all perfection* might not as well have been confined to *one Person* only; or whether one might not have been *as good as three*, and the like. These are *difficiles nugæ*, mostly *verbal*, or *vain* inquiries; and do not concern *common* Christians, any further than to be upon their guard, that they be not imposed on by these *subtilties*, invented to puzzle and perplex a plain *Scripture truth*, which is easily *perceived* and *understood* in the *general*, that is, as far as required to be *believed*. *Minute* particulars about the *modus*, may be left to "the disputers of this "world," as a trial of their good sense, their piety, modesty, and humility.

We do not take it well to be reproached, as running too far into *metaphysical* subtilties, by men whose peculiar talent it is, to play their *metaphysics* (that is, *their presumptions* about the nature of a thing whereof they know little) against Scripture and antiquity, the best guides in those searches. If the Catholics have sometimes gone further than was necessary, in particular explications, it should be remembered for whose sake they did it; and that it was chiefly with a view to satisfy such as would not be contented with the *general* truth laid down in Scripture.

I shall shew, by an instance or two, how that matter is. The περιχώρησις, and *interior generation*, are two *specialities* taught by the Catholics, and heavily complained of by your friend [n] Dr. Whitby, as *unscriptural* definitions. Now, these are but appendages to our prime (and, as we think, *scriptural*) positions, and we are no further concerned for them, than as they are conceived to hang upon the other; so that your quarrel with us for these, is really finding fault with our leading and *fundamental* doctrine of *one God in three Persons*. But to shew you how unequal you are in censuring us for *unscriptural* terms, observe the course and method of dispute which draws us first into them. You argue, suppose, that the Son cannot be *God*, in the strict sense, without making *two Gods:* we answer, that *Father* and *Son*, by a most intimate and ineffable union of *substance*, *will*, *power*, *presence*, *operation*, &c. (which we call περιχώρησις,) may be one God. You argue again, that if the *Son* be a *Son*, in our sense, there must be a *division* and *separate* existence: we say, No; alleging that he may be a *Son* in a *proper* sense, and in our sense, without *division*, and without a *separate* existence; and the name for this is *interior generation*. After we are come thus far, pursuing your wanderings into the *philosophy* of the thing; you step back again, and tell us, that Scripture says nothing of this περιχώρησις, or *interior* generation. Supposing (not granting) your pretence true; did you set out upon the foot of Scripture? Does Scripture any where tell you that two divine Persons cannot be one God? or that *Father* and *Son* must have a *separate existence?* You argue only from the nature and reason of the thing itself, of which you have no adequate *idea;* and we answer what is sufficient, and more than sufficient, to confute mere conjectures in matters above your reach. Lay you aside your *unscriptural* objections, and we shall have no occasion for *unscriptural* answers.

I shall just take notice of an artificial turn of Mr. Emlyn's, relating to this subject; and then put an end to this long, but, I hope, useful digression. His words are as follow: [o] "The "*pride of reason*, which hindered (*the Pagan philosophers*) from "believing in Christ, did not lie in refusing to submit their faith "to *mysterious* speculations, which puzzled their reason: but, "on the contrary, it lay in a proud affectation of swelling words

[n] Disq. Modest. Præf. p. 26.
[o] Exam. of Dr. Bennet, &c. p. 5. Introduct.

"and philosophic mysteries, and not humbling their under-
"standings to receive a plain Gospel, and familiar doctrine."

The thought is ingenious, and might pass well, if *history*, like *metaphysical arguments*, were to be made merely by strength of wit. He forgets that the *mystery* of the *resurrection* was one of those *plain familiar* things, which the *pride of their reason* refused to submit to. He considers not that the Jews, and the earliest *heretics*, (much of the same temper with the Pagan philosophers,) were offended at nothing more than at the *mystery* of *God incarnate;* which we learn fron Ignatius, Justin, [p] Irenæus, [q] Tertullian, and [r] other ancient writers; and he need but look into Justin, Tatian, and Origen, to find that the Pagans, in particular, were in the same sentiments, and joined in the same common charge against the Christian doctrine. Nay, it may further appear from other [s] evidences, that the very *mystery* of the *Trinity*, which is the "rock of offence" to some even at this time, gave very early offence to the Pagan wits; and was much disrelished by them: so averse were they to the receiving of *mysteries:* and the *pride* of *reason* wrought, at that time, much after the same manner as it does at this day; human nature being always the same. But it is now high time to proceed.

QUERY XXII.

Whether his (the Doctor's) *whole performance, whenever he differs from us, be any thing more than a repetition of this assertion, that* being *and* person *are the same, or that there is no* medium *between* Tritheism *and* Sabellianism? *Which is removing the cause from Scripture to natural reason, not very consistently with the title of his book.*

IT is of small importance to observe how the Doctor has proved such points, as he and we both agree in. He might have spared the unnecessary pains, and have took a shorter way with us, had his cause been such as could be served by close

[p] Secundum nullam sententiam hæreticorum Verbum Dei caro factum est. *Iren.* l. iii. c. 11. p. 189.

[q] Incredibile præsumpserant Deum carnem. *Tertull. contr. Marc.* i. iii. c. 8.

[r] Alii quoque hæretici usque adeo Christi manifestam amplexati sunt divinitatem, ut dixerint illum fuisse sine carne; et totum illi susceptum detraxerint hominem, ne decoquerint in illo divini nominis potestatem si humanam illi sociassent, ut arbitrabantur, nativitatem. *Novat.* c. 18.

[s] Lucian. Philopatr. Athan. Orat. p. 564.

argument. He need not have told us so often that the Father is *eminently* styled the one God, or that the Son is *subordinate*. We allow all that: the consequence which he draws from it, and covertly insinuates to his reader, is the thing we doubt of. This was the point which should have been laboured, for the conviction of wise and considering men. He has a deal to say in defence of what nobody opposes; and may there triumph securely without an adversary: but when he comes to the *point* of *difference*, the *pinch* of the *question*, there it is that he discovers his want of proof, and how little he has to depend on, besides that one *precarious* principle intimated in the Query; which indeed runs through his whole performance, and is often *supposed*, but never *proved*.

By this principle he [t]eludes the force of the first chapter of St. John's Gospel: and he refers to it again upon [u]Acts xx. 28. [x]1 Tim. iii. 16. John v. 18. By the same principle he evades the force of [y]John viii. 58. [z]xii. 41. [a]v. 23. And so he might have done with any number of texts, however full and express for the *received* dectrine: for, by the same [b]maxim, he draws over the Nicene Creed, and does not despair of bringing in the [c]Athanasian also. From hence it is visible, wherein the strength of his performance lies; and what it is that he chiefly trusts to. It is not *Scripture*, it is not *antiquity*, but a *philosophical* principle: to which Scripture, Fathers, Councils, Creeds, every thing, must yield. And indeed had it been a principle of *true* and *sound* philosophy, every reasonable man would be willing to pay the utmost deference to it: but it appears, at length, to be that kind of *vain philosophy*, which is often intruding where it has nothing to do. The subject is sublime, and above comprehension. We have no *intrinsic* evidence, no *ideas*, to build any thing *certainly* upon. *Extrinsic* evidence, *divine* revelation, is *here* all in all; and the only proper use of our rational faculties, is to inquire into the true and genuine sense of it. To *philosophize* here from the *nature* and *reason* of the thing itself, of which we know little, is choosing to be still in the dark, when we have light before us; and is not, properly, following our *reason*, but our *conceits*, *fancies*, and fond *conjectures*. You are pleased to say, in defence of the learned Doctor, that "if he

[t] Script. Doctr. p. 86. [u] Id. p. 87. [x] Id. p. 88, 97.
[y] Id. p. 99. [z] P. 102. [a] P. 132. [b] P. 465.
[c] P. 428, 430, 435, &c. first ed.

"had done no more than proved *intelligent being* and *person* to "be the same, it must for ever remain an unanswerable diffi-"culty," &c. Right, if he had *proved* what he has not, something might be said. I have [d] before observed to you, that the word *being* bears two senses; and that you yourselves will not call any thing a *being*, but a *separate* being. Excuse the Trinitarians for being reserved, after your example, in so tender a point; and for endeavouring to speak *properly*, as well as to think *justly*, in things pertaining unto God. All that the Doctor hath proved, or can prove, is only this; that *separate* persons are so many *intelligent beings;* which we readily admit: but *united* persons, or persons having *no separate existence*, may be *one Being, one Substance, one God*, notwithstanding. And that you may not think that I screen myself under *dark* words, or *obscure* distinctions, I will tell you frankly the meaning of what I have now said. It is little more than this, that persons so united as to make *one Being*, may be *one Being*. I suppose the *affirmative*, that they *may be so united;* having sufficient grounds for it in Scripture, and in Catholic antiquity. It lies upon you, in this case, to prove the *negative*, viz. that no union whatever can make two persons *one Being, one* τὸ Θεῖον, *one God:* you are to shew the supposition to be impossible, in the nature of the thing: that is, (as I humbly conceive,) you are to prove what you can know nothing of; and are to work up a demonstration without *ideas*. There the matter rests, and, I am persuaded, must rest, till you please to come out of *metaphysics;* and to put the cause upon the foot of *Scripture* and *antiquity*, the only lights in this matter. Strange that, at this time of day, any need to be told (what [e] *unbelievers* only doubted of formerly) that Scripture is our rule to go by, for forming our notions of God; and not the light of nature, which is darkness in comparison.

You are offended at the Querist for saying, that the Doctor admits no *medium* between *Tritheism* and *Sabellianism*. I should have said, it seems, *no medium* for his *adversaries;* and you

[d] Qu. ix. p. 371.

[e] Οὔτε γὰρ φύσει, οὔτε ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἐννοίᾳ, οὕτω μεγάλα καὶ θεῖα γινώσκειν ἀνθρώποις δυνατὸν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἄνωθεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἁγίους ἄνδρας τηνικαῦτα κατελθούσῃ δωρεᾷ *Just. Mart. Paræn.* p. 60.

Πανταχόθεν τοίνυν εἰδέναι προσήκει, ὅτι οὐδαμῶς ἑτέρως περὶ Θεοῦ ἢ τῆς ὀρθῆς θεοσεβείας μανθάνειν οἷόν τε, ἢ παρὰ τῶν προφητῶν μόνον, τῶν διὰ τῆς θείας ἐπιπνοίας διδασκόντων ὑμᾶς. *Ibid.* p. 129. ed. Ox. *Conf. Hippolyt. contr. Noët.* c. 9.

wonder at so *palpable* a *mistake*. Indeed the meaning of what I said was so *palpable*, that there was no occasion for *guard*, while I supposed myself writing to a man of sense. You have took it right so far: the Doctor allows us, his *adversaries*, no *medium*. But I had an eye to something more, viz. that he has, by the same principle, left no *medium* for himself; as I shall shew you in due time. I am only to observe now, that it is not from Scripture, or from Catholic antiquity, that the Doctor has learned this maxim, of *no medium* (for such as believe Christ to be *essentially* God) between *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*. This was what I complained of, his making a pompous appearance of Scripture and Fathers, when the whole is made to depend upon a mere *philosophical* question, which is to be the rule and measure to try Scripture and Fathers by. Let Scripture or Fathers appear ever so strong and clear for such a *medium*, they are condemned beforehand, either to speak another sense, or to be of no weight or authority. If this be the case, (as you seem to admit,) you ought to go upon very sure grounds. And yet the learned Doctor, instead of favouring us with any proof of his main position, which gives the law to the rest, has only often repeated it; which is no more than to say, there cannot be any *medium* in the case; no, there cannot. We do not pretend to be wise enough to know any thing, *a priori*, whether there *can* or there *cannot*; but, *a posteriori*, we may inquire after *fact*: and if we find by Scripture, rightly understood, that there really is such a *medium*; we shall not be concerned for any pretended strength of your *maxim* against it.

Our defence then against the charge of *Tritheism* will be as follows. By comparing Scripture with Scripture, we plainly find that the *divine* unity is not an unity of *Person*: we observe, that there are more Persons than one dignified with the same high titles of *Lord*, *God*, &c. invested with the same high powers, attributes, and perfections; and entitled to the same honour, worship, and adoration: and yet the Scripture never tells us of two *true Gods*; but constantly asserts that God is one. We take notice, that the Father is *Jehovah*, and Son is *Jehovah*, and yet the Lord *Jehovah* is one Lord; the Father *creates*, and the Son *creates*, and yet we have no warrant to say *two Creators*; the Father is *worshipped*, and the Son is *worshipped*, and yet we find no foundation for asserting *two objects* of *worship*, or *two worships*: in a word, the Father is *God*, and the Son is *God*, and yet we are

nowhere taught to call them *two Gods*. The obvious conclusion, from these premises, is, that they are both *one God*, (otherwise indeed *Ditheism* is unavoidable,) and thus the Scripture-notion of unity is of more Persons than one in the same Godhead. What confirms us in this reasoning, is, that our blessed Lord has told us, that he and the Father *are one*; that whosoever hath *seen* him hath *seen the Father*; that he is *in the Father*, and the Father *in him*; and very familiarly speaking of the Father and himself, he says, "we will come unto him," (that loveth Christ,) "and make our abode with him." St. Paul, in his Epistles, asks for the same *grace*, *mercy*, and *peace* from the Father and Son; and also prays that they may *direct* his *way*, 1 Thess. iii. 11. These things serve to illustrate and explain each other; and, all together, abundantly make good the position before laid down, that [f] Father and Son are *one God*. Accordingly the Prophet [g] Isaiah, as may be inferred from [h] St. John, makes them both to be one *holy, holy, Lord of hosts*, therein signifying both the distinction of Persons and unity of Godhead. These considerations (with many others too long to recite) convince us that there is a *medium* (saving the Son's *essential* divinity) between *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*. We assert not three absolute, original, coordinate divinities, like the Marcionites; we *separate* not the Persons from each other, with the Arians; we hold not a *specific* unity, (such as between two individuals of any species, two men, for instance.) If we did any of these, there might be some colour for the charge of *Tritheism*. But we acknowledge, with the Scriptures, one God the Father with his *coessential* and *coeternal* Son and Spirit; one head and fountain of all, the three divine Persons being one in nature, one in knowledge, in presence, in operation, and energy; never separate, never asunder; distinct without division, united without confusion. If this be *Tritheism*, it is what the Scripture has taught us, and what God, who best knows his own nature, hath recommended to us. But it is not *Tritheism*; it is the true and only *medium*, which may be found by looking in Scripture for it; and which you seem to have lost by following a false light, and wandering too far in fanciful speculations.

[f] I have hitherto waved the consideration of the Holy Ghost; for which reason also I pass it over here, confining myself chiefly to the point of the Son's divinity, which if sufficiently cleared, the other, I suppose, may be admitted without scruple.

[g] Isa. ch. 6. [h] John xii. 41.

Vid. Athanas. p. 108, 877, 889, ed. Bened. Basil. contr. Eunom. l. v. p.

To confirm us still more in this, we perceive, upon due inquiry, that those who lived nearest the apostolical age, and best knew the mind of the Scriptures, they also taught the same doctrine which we teach. There was some appearance of *Tritheism* in it then, as there is now; which is an argument to us, that it is still the same: but if any Christian seriously took upon him to charge the doctrine with *Tritheism*, and persisted in it, he was immediately rejected by the wiser and soberer Christians, as a *heretic*.

Praxeas, about the year 186, began openly to charge the Catholics with *Tritheism*. But his pretences were easily despised by the Church; and his arguments answered by Tertullian.

Not long after, Noëtus revived the charge, and his [i] plea was, that God is one, and that there could not be a *plurality* in the Godhead: but he went away with the character of a weak and rash man; and was condemned by the Christian Church. At the same time, the Noëtians had so high an opinion of the divinity of Christ, (Scripture and tradition running strong for it,) that [k] they had no way of solving the difficulty, but by making Father and Son *one Person*, and, in consequence, were Patripassians.

About the middle of the third *century* arose Sabellius. He pretended to be extremely zealous for the *unity*, and [l] charged the Catholics with asserting *three Gods*. He has been thought to have refined upon the Noëtian scheme, (if we may call it *refining*,) by denying a *God incarnate*, after the example of the earlier *heretics*; by which he avoided the error of the Patripassians. If so, he may be looked upon as holding nearly the same principles with the modern Socinians. This conjecture is grounded on a passage in [m] Epiphanius. But [n] St. Austin understood the matter otherwise, and the Sabellians have been generally reckoned with the Patripassians.

115. Hieron. in Isa. vi. et Epist. ad Damas. de eod. Epiph. Ancorat. p. 15, 31.

[i] Epiphan. Hær. lvii. pag. 480. Theod. Hæret. Fab. l. iii. c. 3. Hippol. contr. Noët. c. xi. p. 14.

[k] Ne videantur *duos Deos* dicere, neque rursus negare Salvatoris Divinitatem, unam eandemque substantiam Patris ac Filii asseverant: id est duo quidem nomina secundum diversitatem causarum recipientem, unam tamen Hypostasin subsistere, id est, unam Personam duobus nominibus subjacentem, qui Latine Patripassiani appellantur. *Orig. apud Pamph. Apol.* p. 226. ed Bened.

[l] Epiphan. Hæres. lxii. p. 514.

[m] Epiphan. Synops. tom. i. l. 2. p. 398. tom. ii. p. 146. ed. Petav.

[n] Aug. Hæres. 41.

Within a few years after Sabellius, Paul of Samosata carried on the same charge of [o] *Tritheism* (or rather *Ditheism*) against the Catholics; and was a warm, injudicious [p] asserter of the *unity*, confining it to the *Father* only, exclusive of the other Persons. But the Catholic bishops, as [q] Eusebius informs us, ran together against him, as against a wolf, that was endeavouring to destroy the flock of Christ.

About fifty years after him appeared Arius: who, to avoid [r] *Tritheism*, (as he thought,) and to preserve the unity of the Godhead, and that there might be *one* [s] *self-existent Being*, or *Person*, (the same pretexts, in the main, which had been handed down by some [t] before Praxeas, as well as by Praxeas himself, and Noëtus, Sabellius, and Paul of Samosata,) denied the *divinity* of the second Person, only allowing a *real* preexistence, and so making him more ancient than the others beforementioned did. Such were the men who formerly (joining therein with [u] Jews and Pagans) charged the Catholics with holding a *plurality* of Gods; while the Catholics notwithstanding retained the faith; despising the accusation, as weak, false, and groundless; and defending themselves upon such principles as have been before mentioned. None were ever condemned by the Church as *Tritheists*, but such as either denied the *unity* of *principium*, or made the *Hypostases* heterogeneous, separate, or *alien* from each other.

We have seen then that there is no just ground from *Scripture* or *antiquity* to charge our doctrine with *Tritheism*. If there be any pretence from the nature and reason of the thing itself, it is of very slight moment. The *divine nature* is best known from *Revelation*: it is from thence we discover that God is not μονοπρόσωπος, a single *Hypostasis*, but that the Father has his coessential and coeternal Son and Holy Spirit always in him and with him. We can have no other right conception of the *one God*, (to use the words of [x] Hippolytus,) but by believing in

[o] Epist. Synod. Antioch. Lab. tom. i. p. 845.

[p] Theodoret. Hæret. Fab. l. ii. c. 8. Athanas. vol. ii. p. 942.

[q] Euseb. Eccl. Hist. l. vii. c. 27.

[r] Ep. Alexand. apud Theod. E. H. l. i. c. 4. Ambr. de Fid. l. i. c. 1.

[s] Ἓν τὸ ἀγέννητον, εἷς ἀγέννητος.

[t] Vid. Novatian. c. 30.

[u] Athan. vol. i. p. 564. Lucian. Philopatr. p. 770, 774.

[x] Ἄλλως τε ἕνα Θεὸν νομίσαι μὴ δυνάμεθα, ἐὰν μὴ ὄντως Πατρὶ, καὶ υἱῷ, καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι πιστεύσωμεν. *Hippol. contr. Noët.* p. 16.

I shall add his *doxology*, because it has but lately appeared in the Greek, and so has been less took notice of:

Οὗτος ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος δι' ἡμᾶς γεγονὼς, ᾧ πάντα ὑπέταξεν Πατὴρ, αὐτῷ

a *real* Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. This is the faith of the ever blessed *Trinity;* which Scripture and Fathers hold forth to us; and which is too strongly supported, to be weakened by any wit or criticism. As to those who take *Trinity* and *Tritheism* for synonymous terms, they may go on to value themselves upon it. They have Jews, Pagans, and Heretics, fifteen hundred years backwards, to countenance them in it. It is sufficient to have shewn, that wiser and better men, the truly *primitive* and Catholic Church, never thought it *Tritheism;* but condemned those that thought so.

Having taken off the charge from our doctrine, I come, next, to fix it upon yours; where, I humbly conceive, it ought to lie. I do not pretend that you are *Tritheists*, in every sense; but in the same sense that the Pagans are called *Polytheists*, and in the Scripture-sense of the word *God*, as explained and contended for by yourselves. *One divine Person* is, with you, equivalent to *one God;* and two, to two Gods; and three, to three Gods: the case is plain; the consequence unavoidable. One *supreme* and two *inferior* Gods, is your avowed doctrine: and, certainly, the asserting three Gods (whether *coordinate* or otherwise) is *Tritheism;* against the *first commandment*, against the whole tenor of Scripture, and the principles of the primitive Church. It is, to me, an instance of the ill effects of *vain philosophy*, and shews how the "disputer of this world" may get the better of the Christian; when men appear so much afraid of an *imaginary* error in *metaphysics*, and, to avoid it, run into a *real* one, against Scripture and antiquity. You tell me, indeed, that if I am positive in this, you will bring both [y] Ante-

ἡ δόξα καὶ τὸ κράτος ἅμα Πατρὶ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι, ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ, καὶ νῦν, καὶ ἀεὶ, καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων, ἀμήν. P. 20. vol. 2. Fabric.

[y] The sense of Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, in relation to *Tritheism*, may be seen in the following passages:

Ἑξῆς δ' ἂν εἰκότως λέγοιμι καὶ πρὸς διαιροῦντας καὶ κατατέμνοντας καὶ ἀναιροῦντας τὸ σεμνότατον κήρυγμα τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὴν μοναρχίαν εἰς τρεῖς δυνάμεις τινὰς καὶ μεμερισμένας ὑποστάσεις, καὶ θεότητας τρεῖς——οἱ τρεῖς Θεοὺς τρόπον τινὰ κηρύττουσιν, εἰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ξένας ἀλλήλων παντάπασι κεχωρισμένας διαιροῦντας, τὴν ἁγίαν μονάδα. *Dionys. Roman. apud Athanas.* vol. i. p. 231.

Ὁ μὲν ἀρχὰς εἰσάγων δύο, δύο κηρύττει Θεούς· αὕτη Μαρκίωνος ἡ δυσσέβεια——πάλιν ὁ Θεὸν ἀγένητον εἶναι λέγων, ἄλλον δὲ Θεὸν γένητον, δύο καὶ αὐτὸς λέγει Θεοὺς, διὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας διαφορὰν, ἣν βλασφήμως εἰσάγει· ὅπου δὲ μία μὲν ἡ Ἀρχὴ, ἓν δὲ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς γέννημα——εἷς θεὸς, τελείας μὲν ἐν Πατρὶ τῆς θεότητος νοουμένης, τελείας δὲ καὶ ἐν υἱῷ τῆς πατρικῆς θεότητος ὑπαρχούσης. *Athan. contr. Sabell. Greg.* p. 42. Comp. Basil. Hom. 27. contr. Sabell. p. 604, 605.

Πῶς οὖν ἔσται μία θεότης, εἰ οὐκ ἔστι, καθ' ὑμᾶς Ὁμοουσίως τῷ Πατρὶ, εἰ γὰρ

Nicene and Nicene Fathers against me. But let me advise you to read them (a second time) over; and you will see no reason to be sanguine in this matter. The Doctor has cited some passages from them, and made them seemingly speak his sense; though, in the main doctrine, they are clearly against him, as I have observed [z] above. You appeal to these Fathers, as vouchers for you. But let us attend, however, to what you say.

"The ancient writers of the Church unanimously agree, that "nothing but an absolute equality and coordination in God the "Father and the Son can make them two Gods; and that the "real subordination of the Son to the Father preserves the "Church from *Polytheism*," (p. 100.) In the next page, you appeal to "Athanasius for the sense of the Nicene and Post-"Nicene Fathers," and to Hilary and Basil, in order to clear your doctrine from the charge of *Tritheism;* little imagining that these good and great men have [a] condemned your doctrine, as *Polytheism* and *Paganism*, over and over; as all know, that are any thing conversant in their works. Well: but what have they said to countenance your notion? This only; that *unity of principle* clears the *Church's* doctrine from the charge of *Tritheism*. Not *your* doctrine, not the Arian doctrine; but the Catholic doctrine. For since *equality* of *nature* and *unity* of *principle* too, are both requisite; the Catholics admitting the former (as their adversaries well knew) had nothing further needful to insist upon, in answer to the charge of *Tritheism*, but the latter. Unity of principle and sameness of nature together might make two Persons *one God*, (according to the unanimous opinion of the ancients,) but not either of them alone.

But now, in respect to the Arian (that is, your) doctrine, the pretence of unity of principle is perfectly absurd. The Son is supposed a *creature* of the *Father's:* if his being of, or from, the Father, in this sense, makes him *one God* with the Father, it will follow, that *angels*, or *men*, or even things inanimate, are one God with the Father also. Indeed, to do you justice, you do not so much as pretend, that *unity* of *principle*, or any thing

ἔχει τινὰ διάστασιν, ἤτοι διαφορὰν κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον, ἑτεροῖος μὲν ἂν εἴη Θεὸς ὁ υἱὸς, ἑτεροῖος δὲ ὁ πατὴρ, καὶ δύο κατὰ τοῦτο Θεοὺς ἀνάγκη λέγειν· ὅπερ ἐστιν ἀσεβὲς, καὶ οὐδὲ μέχρι μόνον ἀκοῆς παραδεκτόν. Ὁμοούσιος ἄρα τῷ Πατρὶ ὁ υἱός· οὕτω γὰρ τὸ ἓν θεότητι σωθήσεται. *Cyril. Alex. Thesaur.* p.78.

[z] Query 5.

[a] Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 565, 566. Hilar. p. 916. Basil. Ep. lxx. p. 863. Hom. xxvii. p. 601, &c.

else, can make him *one God* with the Father. Which is enough to shew, how very widely you differ from the *ancients*, in the main point of all. They thought it necessary to assert, that *Father* and *Son* were both *one God*. So Irenæus, Athenagoras, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Hippolytus, Lactantius, and even Eusebius himself, after some debates upon it: as may appear from the testimonies [b] before referred to: and of the Post-Nicene Catholic writers, in general, every body knows how they contended for it. They thought that the *divinity* of the Son could not be otherwise secured, and *Polytheism* at the same time avoided, than by asserting Father and Son to be *one God;* and they thought right. But what do you do? Or how can you contrive to clear your scheme? We ask if the Son be *God*, as well as the Father? You say, Yes: how then is there but *one God*? Your answer is, The Father is *supreme*, and therefore he, *singly*, is the *one God*. This is taking away what you gave us before, and retracting what you asserted of the *Son*. If *supremacy* only makes a Person *God*, the Son is no God, upon your principles: or, if he is *God* notwithstanding, then Father and Son are *two Gods*. Turn this over, as often as you please, you will find it impossible to extricate yourself from it. You can say only this: that you do not admit two *supreme* Gods. This is very true: no more did the Pagan Polytheists, nor the idolatrous Samaritans, nor others condemned in Scripture for *Polytheism*. You stand pretty fair upon the principles of *philosophy;* and are not guilty of any manifest error in *metaphysics*, upon this article. But you are such a *Tritheist*, as, upon Scripture-principles, and upon the principles of the Catholic Church, both [c] before and after the Nicene Council, must stand condemned. Your belief of the Fathers being for you, in this particular, is pure fancy and fiction; owing, I suppose, to your seeing only some pieces of them in Dr. Clarke. You can find but very little among the ancients, which either directly or indirectly favours your notion of a *supreme* and a *subordinate* God. They condemned it *implicitly*, in their disputes with the Pagans, all along, and no sooner was it started in the Church, but

[b] Qu. ii. p. 287. of this vol.

[c] N. B. I do not say that the Ante-Nicene writers would have called the Arian doctrine *Tritheism;* perhaps, *blasphemy* rather. But they would have charged it with *Paganism*, (see Tertullian above, p. 306.) which comes to the same with what the Post-Nicene said of it.

the Catholics were alarmed at it; and immediately condemned it as reviving of *creature-worship*, and restoring *Gentilism*, and Pagan *Polytheism*. Two Gods, a greater and a less, a supreme and an inferior, no Scripture, no sound reason, no good Catholic ever taught; no church would have endured. A *separate* God from the Supreme, an *inferior created* God, would not only have been looked upon as *Polytheism* and *contradiction*, considered in itself; but as *heresy* and *blasphemy*, if understood of God and Christ.

To conclude this head; if we understand the word *God* in the strict sense, it is ridiculous to charge the Arian scheme with *plurality* of Gods. But, if it be understood in the loose popular sense, or in your own sense of it, it is equally ridiculous to deny it. Mr. Nye, who, you know, has studied this controversy much and long, and is no friend either to the truly Catholic scheme or *yours*, condemning both as *Tritheism*, is pleased however so far to give the preference to the former, as to declare, that "the Arian heresy is only a more absurd and less defensible "*Tritheism*[d]." Of all the four schemes which have been followed, the Sabellian, Catholic, Arian, and Socinian; the Sabellian only, which entirely *ungods* the *Son*, (that is, by denying him any distinct *divine* personality, and admitting only a *human* personality, viz. of the man Christ,) and *annihilates* the *Holy Ghost*, stands perfectly clear of any appearance of *Polytheism*. The Catholic appears chargeable, but really is not so: the Arian and Socinian both appear so, and are so; wherefore a charge of *Tritheism* must come from them with a very ill grace. For, was the charge really just, and were we weak enough to assert three *coordinate* Gods; yet even that could not be more repugnant to the whole drift, scope, and tenor of the sacred writ, than the admitting a *plurality* of Gods, *great* and *little*, *sovereign* and *inferior*, *infinite* and *finite*, *uncreated* and *created*, to receive our addresses, and to be the objects of our love, faith, hope, confidence, and religious adoration.

[d] Explicat. of the Articles of Div. Unity, p. 91.

QUERY XXIII.

Whether the Doctor's notion of the Trinity be more clear and intelligible than the other?

The difficulty in the conception of the Trinity is, how three Persons can be one God.

Does the Doctor deny that every one of the Persons, singly, is God? No: Does he deny that God is one? No: How then are three one?

Does one and the same authority, exercised by all, make them one, numerically or individually one and the same God? That is hard to conceive how three distinct Beings, according to the Doctor's scheme, can be individually one God, that is, three Persons one Person.

If therefore one God necessarily signifies but one Person, the consequence is irresistible; either that the Father is that one Person, and none else, which is downright Sabellianism; *or that the three Persons are three Gods.*

Thus the Doctor's scheme is liable to the same difficulties with the other.

There is indeed one easy way of coming off, and that is, by saying that the Son and Holy Spirit are neither of them God, in the Scripture-sense of the word. But this is cutting the knot, instead of untying it; and is in effect to say, they are not set forth as divine Persons in Scripture.

Does the communication of divine powers and attributes from Father to Son and Holy Spirit make them one God, the divinity of the two latter being the Father's divinity? Yet the same difficulty recurs; for either the Son and Holy Ghost have distinct attributes, and a distinct divinity of their own, or they have not: if they have, they are (upon the Doctor's principle) distinct Gods from the Father, and as much as finite from infinite, creature from Creator; and then how are they one? If they have not, then, since they have no other divinity, but that individual divinity, and those attributes which are inseparable from the Father's essence, they can have no distinct essence from the Father's; and so (according to the Doctor) will be one and the same Person, that is, will be names only.

Q. Whether this be not as unintelligible as the orthodox notion of

the Trinity, and liable to the like difficulties: a communication of divine powers and attributes, without the substance, being as hard to conceive, nay, much harder, than a communication of both together?

YOU are pleased to say, that "had the author at all under-"stood Dr. Clarke's books, he would not have offered *these* "*considerations*, they are such gross mistakes," (p. 105.) It might be very pardonable to mistake the Doctor, who deals much in general and ambiguous terms; and I am the more excusable, as mistaking on the tender and candid side. I must own to you, I was not then aware, that the Doctor had denied *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be one God.* I did not apprehend, he would scruple to call them all together *one God;* because that would be manifestly excluding *Son* and *Holy Ghost* from the *one Godhead;* and then our dispute about his meaning would be perfectly at an end. I should have been very unwilling to make so home a charge as that upon him: but since you are a friend, and declare in public that this is his meaning, so it shall be hereafter. And now, I will not ask *how three Persons can be one God*, upon the Doctor's principles; but I will put the question thus: *How can it be true* (*upon the Doctor's principles*) *that every Person of the Trinity is God; and true likewise, that there is but one God?* The question or difficulty being thus fairly stated, I conceive that my reasoning against the other will, in the main, hold good against this too; only *mutatis mutandis.* Now then, clear me up this difficulty in the Doctor's scheme, and free it from *self-contradiction*, if you are able. I have been searching diligently several pages of your answer, to see if I might find any thing like a solution: but I perceive, at length, you was so wise as to drop it. You was to tell me how, notwithstanding that there are three *divine Persons*, (that is, *Gods*, according to you,) there is still but one God. But instead of this, you run wandering wide and far, to shew how three may be *one.* What? Three Gods one God? That was what I asked; the rest is not pertinent, but foreign to the point. Finding so little satisfaction from you, in a point so material, in the very pinch of the question between the Doctor and us, I thought proper to have recourse to the Doctor's books again; to see if any thing could be found there to our present purpose.

I perceived, that "[e]dominion and authority," according to him, "make God to be God." Upon this principle, he supposes the Son, "[f]by nature truly God, having true divine power and "dominion:" and he says, "[g]The word *God*, in Scripture, is "always a relative word of office, signifying personal dominion." The obvious conclusion, from these premises, is, that if *dominion* and *authority*, such as make any Person *truly God*, be lodged in three Persons; those three Persons, upon the Doctor's principles, must be *three Gods*. The Doctor being sensible of this difficulty in his scheme, and not being able to solve it, nor willing to profess *three Gods*, tries to disguise and elude it. He asks; "[h]Why must three divine Beings, of necessity, be conceived as "three Gods?" The answer is very easy: Because *three divine Beings*, or *Persons*, is exactly the same, in other words, with *three Gods*, upon his principles; and because every one of the three is supposed to have *personal dominion*, that very *dominion* which is sufficient to make a Person *truly God;* and such as *makes God to be God.* [i]He goes on to distinguish the three Persons by the names of *God*, *Lord*, and *Holy Spirit;* as if he had forgot, or had no mind to own, that either of the two last is *God*. He proceeds: "They can no more truly be said to be "three Gods, than each of them, singly, can be truly said to be "the God and Father of all, who is above all; which is the "Apostle's definition of the one supreme God." But this is not to the purpose; unless no one can be *God*, that is not the *supreme* God. If the Doctor says that, he contradicts himself strangely; having took a great deal of pains to shew that the *Son*, though not the *supreme* God, is yet *truly* God, *having true divine power and dominion.* If he thinks the Apostle's definition of *God* to be better than his own, why did he not stand to it? And then it would be seen plainly, that his meaning is, that no one can be *God* but the *Father;* which is making short work with the doctrine of the *divine* Trinity, and striking out *Son* and *Holy Ghost* at once. It is evident to a demonstration, that the three Persons are, upon the Doctor's *hypothesis*, as *really* and *truly* three Gods, as that every one, singly, is *God:* and therefore either let him say plainly, that there are three Gods; or that neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost is *God*. The difficulty

[e] Reply, p. 301. [f] Ib. p. 81. [g] Ib. p. 290. [h] Ib. p. 222. [i] Ib. p. 223.

then still remains unanswered; how (upon the Doctor's principles) three Persons can be every one, singly, *God;* and yet Scripture say true that there is but one *God.*

And now, I return to you again, whom I left instructing the reader, very particularly, how *three* may be *one;* viz. in *agreement* of mind, in their joint *care of the Church*, in *testimony*, &c. which might have been pertinent, had I been arguing from the text, "I and my Father are one;" or from 1 John v. 7. But your answering so copiously to what I did not ask, and slipping over the main difficulty, looks as if you were more concerned how to keep your reader from the sight of the question, than how to give him any reasonable satisfaction. The first pertinent thing I meet with from you is in page 108, where you charge me with a *manifest error*, for supposing it *Sabellianism* to make the *one God* but *one Person;* namely, the Person of the Father. What I assert is, that it is *Sabellianism* to say, that there is but one who is God, one *Person* only, instead of one *nature:* or to suppose the Godhead to be but one single *Hypostasis;* or μονοπρόσωπος, a Father without his substantial *Word* or *Spirit* eternally and essentially subsisting with him and from him. This is what I maintain, and what you will not be able to disprove. But let us see how you go about it. "One God," you say, "is one Person only; otherwise one Person could not "be one God." I answer, that no one Person is one God, *exclusively* of the other two Persons. You add, "if one God be "two Persons or more, it is impossible for one Person to be "God." When we say one Person is *God*, we mean that he is a *divine Hypostasis*, *Deitatem habens*, as the schools speak: but when we say God is three Persons, we understand it of the divine *essence*, or *substance:* so that the word *God* is sometimes taken *essentially* and sometimes *personally*, which makes the difference. You proceed: "The defenders of the scholastic "notion" (you mean the defenders of the Trinity in unity) "profess the Father alone, and distinct from the Son and Spirit, "is God, or the one God." Very true; in the *personal* sense before mentioned, *distinct* from, not *exclusive* of, the Son and Holy Spirit. In the same sense, either of the other Persons is God, and the one God. There is a further reason, why the Father is *peculiarly* and *eminently* styled the *one God:* not to exclude the other Persons; but to signify his *priority* of order, as Father, and as Fountain of all. Thus I have answered your

reasons, which you are pleased to call *demonstration;* though it is manifest that, all along in your reasoning, you take it for granted, that *God* is one Person only, and suppose the very thing in question. You next proceed to confute my assertion, that the making the one God but one Person is Sabellian. And you say thus: "If by one Person he means one intelligent "agent, he makes the Sabellians Catholics, and condemns his "own friends for *Tritheists.*" I certainly mean a *real* Person, an *Hypostasis,* no *mode, attribute,* or *property,* as you might easily have perceived. The charge of *Tritheism* I have sufficiently answered before, and returned it to its proper owners. I shall only add here, that each divine Person is an individual intelligent agent: but as subsisting in one undivided substance, they are all together, in that respect, but one undivided intelligent agent[k]; and thus my friends stand clear of *Tritheism.* You observe, that "Sabellius held one *Hypostasis,* or divine substance, "in opposition to the Church, who professed three *Hypostases.*" Why did you not add, or *three divine* substances, having rendered *hypostasis, divine substance,* just before? is not the reason of it visible? You would not say that the Sabellians held one *substance,* and the Church *three substances,* (though you say it in effect,) because the thing is notoriously false. But taking advantage of the ambiguity of the word *hypostasis,* sometimes used to signify *substance,* and sometimes *person,* you contrive a fallacy. The Church never professed three *Hypostases* in any other sense, but as they mean *three Persons;* nor would Sabellius have been censured for holding one *Hypostasis* only, had he meant *one substance.* If you have a mind to see clearly in what sense the Catholics professed either three *Hypostases,* or one only, you may please to consult [l]Athanasius and [m]Gregory Nazianzen, referred to in the margin.

The truth is, the Church always professed *one substance;* one eternal, immutable, uncreated *substance;* and this they understood by *God.* Notwithstanding, they believed the Son and Holy Spirit to be *substantially God.* Praxeas, Noëtus, Sabellius, and others, not conceiving how *one substance* could be more than *one Person,* [n]one *Hypostasis,* innovated upon the faith of the

[k] See Preface to my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 27 of this edition.

[l] Athanas. ad Antioch. p. 973.

[m] Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxii. p. 396. Orat. xxxii. p. 521.

[n] Origen expresses the Sabellian notion very distinctly in the following passage:

Μὴ διαφέρειν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλ' ἐν οὐ μόνον οὐσίᾳ,

Church, and made one single *Hypostasis* the *one God*, with three names. You tell us, with great assurance, that "this never was, "nor could be *Sabellianism*," (p. 109.) To which I shall only say; read, and you will find. You add further, that "the one "God is one Person only, and the Father that Person;" and that this is the "assertion of St. Paul." We will see to St. Paul presently; in the mean while, I again tell you, that this is the very essence of *Sabellianism*, and the doctrine of [o] Paul of Samosata, (as hath been observed to you above,) and for which he was condemned by the Church. Your pretence from the Apostle's words ("To us there is but one God, even the "Father") has been sufficiently answered under the former Queries. I shall only observe here, that the text mentioned is much stronger against the Doctor and yourself, than against us. For how can you, after so *plain* and *express* a text to the contrary, pretend that the *Son* also is *God to us*, really and truly God, and in the Scripture-sense of the word *God?* Whether, think you, do we, who make him *essentially* the *same God* with that one, and suppose but *one God* in all, more flatly contradict St. Paul; or you, who make *two Gods*, and in the same *relative* sense, in which St. Paul is supposed to use the word *God?* To take up your own words, upon this very occasion; you *will, I trust, be ashamed when you consider, that you plainly falsify St. Paul.* He says, there is *but one God*, even the *Father:* but you say, there are more Gods than one; and particularly, that the *Son* is *God* also, God *to us*. How come you off of this? by the help of a *distinction*, I suppose: and so can we; by a *distinction* much older, and much better warranted than yours; and therefore, be so kind as either to take some part of the *shame* with us, or else to acquit both. You proceed to acquaint us that the "Father is the only true God[p]." Very good: and do not the Doctor and you tell us, notwithstanding, that the Son is *true God*, having *true divine power* and *dominion?* If you can reconcile *two true Gods* with the doctrine of that text; sure, we need not despair, nor have any thing to fear from that text, who agree

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ, τυγχάνοντας ἀμφοτέρους κατά τινας ἐπινοίας, οὐ κατὰ ὑπόστασιν λέγεσθαι πατέρα καὶ υἱόν. *Orig. Com. in Joh.* p. 186. ed. Huet.

That is to say, The Sabellians did not only make Father and Son *one in essence*, (as the Church did also,) but they carried it so far as to make them one *subject, suppositum*, or *hypostasis*, having only *a nominal*, not a *real distinction*.

[o] Ἵνα εἷς εἴη, φησὶν, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντα Θεὸς ὁ πατήρ. *Athan. contr. Apollinar.* l. ii. p. 942.

[p] Page 110.

so far with it already, (more than you,) as to acknowledge but one God. We can give a reason why the Son was tacitly included, being so intimately united to the Father, as partaker of the same *divine* nature: but that any *creature* should not be excluded from being God, or that there should be two Gods, notwithstanding the text, must appear very strange. After this, you have two or three subtilties. The *Father*, you say, will be but a *third part*. You might, in this way, revive all the impertinencies of Aëtius, and throw them before English readers. I refer you to [q] St. Austin in the margin for an answer. Let me desire you not to give so great a loose to your fancy in divine things: you seem to consider every thing under the notion of extension, and sensible images. A reverential silence may well become us in so awful a subject, in which imagination has nothing to do, and of which our most refined and elevated thoughts are infinitely unworthy. But to proceed: you add, "If Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are the only true God, then "they are the Father." But if the *only true God* may be sometimes used in a *personal*, sometimes in an *essential* sense, there is no force in this reasoning. I might retort the argument upon you, who, in your way of conceiving God by extended parts, apply the phrase of *one God*, sometimes to one *part*, sometimes to another, and sometimes to the *whole*, almost in the [r] same manner, as we do to *one*, or to all the three *Persons*: but I am weary of trifling.

You ask me, "wherein the present scholastic notion disagrees "with the Sabellian?" I answer, in admitting three *real* subsisting persons. But since you are so often charging us with *Sabellianism*, it may be proper to observe here, how near akin the Sabellians and Arians are to each other; both, as it were, growing of the same stock.

[q] Putas Deum Patrem cum Filio et Spiritu Sancto unum Deum esse non posse: times enim ne Pater solus non sit unus Deus, sed *pars unius Dei* qui constat ex *tribus*: noli timere, nulla fit partium in Deitatis unitate divisio. In Trinitate—quæ Deus est, et Pater Deus est, et Filius Deus est, et Spiritus Sanctus Deus est, simul hi tres unus Deus: nec hujus Trinitatis *pars* est unus, nec major pars duo quam unus est ibi, nec majus aliquid sunt omnes quam singuli: quia *spiritualis* non *corporalis* est magnitudo. *Aug. contr. Maxim.* l. ii. c. 10. p. 697, 698.

Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et propter *individuam* Deitatem *unus* Deus est, propter uniuscujusque *proprietatem* tres *Personæ* sunt, et propter singulorum *perfectionem partes* unius Dei *non sunt*. *Id. ibid.* p. 699. Conf. August. de Trin. p. 849. Fulgent. Respons. contr. Arian. in fine.

[r] E. g. *God* exists, *God* is in heaven above, *God* is on earth below. The word *God* here (upon the Doctor's *hypothesis* of infinite extension) has three several *ideas* annexed to it.

1. In the first place, both seem to suppose, or take for granted, that if the *modus*, or *manner*, be unintelligible, the thing itself is incredible.

2. Both agree in the fundamental principle of *heresy*, that one substance, or being, can be only one *real* person, or *hypostasis*. As Nestorius and Eutyches, though taking different ways, yet proceeded upon the same bottom, that two *natures* could not make one *Person* in Christ: so Sabellius and Arius, before them, though differing in the last result, yet set out upon the same principle; that two *real* persons cannot be one *being* or *substance*.

3. In consequence of their prime position, both conspire to discard, in *reality*, the Son and the Holy Ghost from the *one true Godhead;* looking upon it as *Tritheism* to make the Persons *real* and *divine* too. One *Hypostasis* in the *Godhead* is all that either of them admits; both Judaizing, as [s] Gregory Nyssen justly observes, in that respect: and the Sabellian's Τριώνυμος (or God with three names) answers to the Arian's Ἀγέννητος, *self-existent*, or *unbegotten* God. Thus far they amicably agree: let us next observe where they differ.

Supposing them fixed and settled in the preliminary principle, it is manifest that the *Word* and *Spirit* must either be *names* only, or, if *real* distinct persons, *creatures*. The Sabellians were at liberty to choose this or that: but, finding Scripture run high, and tradition strong for the *divinity* of the *Word* and *Holy Spirit*, they made choice of the former; interpreting *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, as different names of one and the same *Hypostasis*, or *real* Person. By this, they effectually guarded against the supposed *Tritheism* of the Catholics, as well as against Pagan *Polytheism:* and, being wise men so far, secured the point which they aimed at. The Arians, who came after, (and who, as I before said, set out upon the same preliminary principles,) finding that the Sabellian *confusion* of Persons had been utterly routed, baffled, and exploded by all good Catholics, had really no option left, but either to make the Son and Holy Spirit *creatures*, or to give up their *preliminaries*. Accordingly, they took the way which the Sabellians had left them; and were very unhappy in this particular, that, endeavouring to avoid one kind of *Tritheism*, they fell into another.

[s] Ὃν γὰρ Σαβέλλιος λέγει Τριώνυμον, τοῦτον Εὐνόμιος ὀνομάζει Ἀγέννητον. *Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom.* p. 676.

The Arian scheme, besides its failing in its principal design of avoiding *Polytheism*, has many real and great difficulties; being as well too *high* for some texts, as too *low* for others: which the Catholics, or Sabellians can much better deal with. Hence, I suppose, it was, that the Unitarians, at the beginning of the Reformation, having modestly begun with [t] *Arianism*, for the most part, settled into *Socinianism*; which is near to *Sabellianism*: and our English Unitarians, who, for acuteness of wit, and subtilty of thought, have not been inferior to any of their brethren, have been still refining upon the Socinian scheme, (which had struck upon *Ditheism*, in like manner as the Arian had upon *Tritheism*,) and have brought it still nearer to *Sabellianism*. After all, when men have run their course from *orthodoxy* to *Arianism*, from *Arianism* to *Socinianism*, and from thence to *Sabellianism*; if they will but give themselves leave to reflect and look back, they may perhaps perceive, at length, that *Catholicism* is the only *Scriptural*, as well as the *ancient* scheme; liable to the fewest difficulties, and best guarded against objections. It is therefore no wonder that the bulk of Christians, learned and unlearned, have, for as many centuries upward as we have any clear records extant, espoused it. It is an easy matter for men of wit and fancy to find fault with any thing: but it requires thought and judgment to settle things upon their true bottom. Let those who are displeased with the *received* doctrine shew us a better; and make any other consistent scheme, (consistent with Scripture and with itself,) if they can. Wise and good men will be always willing to reform, if there be cause for it: but they will not be forward to pull down what appears to be founded on a rock, in order only to build upon the sand. It is some satisfaction to the Trinitarians to observe, how long some great wits have been new modelling Christianity; and have not yet been able to agree in any one certain scheme. The Arians fall upon the Sabellians, and the Sabellians again upon them: one defends the *personality*, and the other the *divinity* of the Λόγος, or *Word*, and cannot yet be brought to any agreement. [u] Betwixt them, the principles of the Catholic Church are supported, and they condemn each other, in the very things which

[t] Socin. contr. Erasm. Johan. p. 496.

[u] Uterque hostis Ecclesiæ res Ecclesiæ agit: dum Sabellius Deum ex natura in operibus prædicat: hi vero, ex sacramento fidei, Filium Dei confitentur. *Hil.* p. 919.

the Church condemns in both. If I may give a judgment of the two schemes, the Sabellian appears to be the neater of the two, and most consistent with itself: the Arian is more pious and modest, tender of degrading the Son of God too far. As men grow bolder and more learned in *heresy*, they will, very probably, be drawing nearer and nearer to the Sabellians. Two of the ablest and acutest men of the later Unitarians (one here, the other abroad) have preferred the Sabellian way: and as they have given proofs of their learning, so have they sufficiently shewn their *boldness* also, by treating so sublime and tremendous a subject in the way of scoff and ridicule. To return: you are pleased to say, that you "have answered for Dr. Clarke's notion "not being Sabellian, and have proved that it is not Trithe-"istic." But give me leave to say, that you are deceived in both: the ground is Sabellian, and the superstructure Tritheistic; and the whole contrived in such a way, as to hang loosely together.

It is obvious, at first sight, that the true Arian or Semi-Arian scheme (which you would be thought to come up to at least) can never tolerably support itself, without taking in the Catholic principle of a *human soul* to join with the *Word*. If you come thus far, it will then be easy to perceive that the Sabellian scheme is the simpler and plainer; besides that it better answers the *high* things spoken of the *Word;* in respect of which your scheme is as much too *low*, as before too *high*. But then again, the arguments for the distinct *personality* of the *Word* and Holy Spirit, bear so full and strong, that there will appear a necessity for taking in another Catholic principle; and that will completely answer all. And why then should not the Catholic doctrine (so apparently necessary to make Scripture consistent) be admitted? The case, in few words, appears to be only this. You cannot understand *how three* can be *one;* you see no reason, *a priori*, why, if the Son and Holy Spirit be *coeval* and *consubstantial*, they should not be *coordinate* too; you *know not* why the Father might not as well be said to be *begotten*, as to *beget;* to *be sent*, as to *send;* or the like. Very true: but you *may see* a reason, *a priori*, why creatures, of yesterday, may not be able to search the "deep things of God:" you *may know* how well it becomes them to submit their fancies, or presumptions, to divine revelation; content to "see *through* a glass darkly," till the time come to know God more perfectly, and to "see him as he

"is." This may be a sufficient answer to a pious and humble mind, in all cases of this nature; where the difficulty is owing only to our imperfect and inadequate conception of things.

I was obliged to pass over some remarks you had in your notes[x], for the sake of method: but it will not be too late to consider them here. I had made no use of John x. 30. ("I and "my Father are one,") but you had a mind to bring it in, to let us know how well you could answer it, from the *primitive writers*. I am always willing to defend those good men, and to rescue them out of the hands of those, who either knowingly or ignorantly abuse them. You begin thus, triumphantly: "The "defenders of the scholastic explication of the Trinity in unity, "though they pretend much that the most ancient writers of "the Church are on their side, yet, in expressing their notion "of the unity in the divine Persons, they do not only leave "Scripture and reason, but plainly run against the *whole stream* "*of antiquity* also. The text on which they so much rely (John x. "30.) is understood by Tertullian himself of the unity of love, "and consent, and power." You go on to cite Tertullian and others, from Dr. Clarke. But writers in a cause are very often known to represent things by halves. You shall see, presently, what little reason you have to talk of the "whole stream of "antiquity." The text, which you speak of, has all along been made use of by the Catholics, in two respects; first, in proof of our Lord's *real* divinity, against as many as denied it; and secondly, in proof of his *real* distinction from the Father, against the Noëtians or Sabellians. There was very little occasion to insist much upon *unity* of *substance*, with those who had carried *unity of substance* so high, as to make but one *Hypostasis*. It might be sufficient, in dispute with those men, to observe, that that text did by no means prove an *identity* of *person*, unless Paul and Apollos were one person, which is absurd. Whatever the text might otherwise prove, it certainly did not prove, what the Sabellians pretended, an *unity* of *person*. This the Post-Nicene Fathers frequently observe, against the Sabellians, (as the Ante-Nicene had done before;) though at the same time that text might be of good use against the Arians; as it had been all along against the *impugners* of Christ's *divinity*. For your clearer apprehension of this

[x] Page 106.

matter, I shall set down, [y] in two distinct columns, the sentiments of the primitive writers on this head; that you may

[y] Against impugners of Christ's divinity.

TERTULLIAN.

Nunquam separatus a Patre aut alius a Patre, quia *Ego et Pater unum sumus.* Adv. Prax. c. viii. Qui tres unum sunt, non unus, quomodo dictum est, *Ego et Pater unum sumus.* Ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem, *Adv. Prax.* c. 25.

NOVATIAN.

Quod si, cum nullius hominis hæc vox esse posset, *Ego et Pater unum sumus*, hanc vocem de conscientia *divinitatis* Christus solus edicit——merito Deus est Christus. C. 13.

Si homo tantummodo Christus, quid est quod dicit, *Ego et Pater unum sumus:* si non et Deus est, et Filius, qui idcirco unum potest dici, dum ex ipso est, et dum Filius ejus est, et dum ex ipso nascitur, et dum ex ipso processisse reperitur, per quod et *Deus* est. C. 23.

ORIGEN.

Λεκτέον δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο, ὅτι εἴπερ νενοήκει ὁ Κέλσος τὸ, Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν——οὐκ ἂν ᾤετο ἡμᾶς καὶ ἄλλον θεραπεύειν παρὰ τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεὸν,—ἕνα οὖν Θεὸν ὡς ἀποδεδώκαμεν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν θεραπεύομεν. *Contr. Cels.* l. viii. p. 386.

DIONYSIUS ROM.

Οὔτε (χρὴ) ποιήσει κωλύειν τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον μέγεθος τοῦ κυρίου ——ἡνῶσθαι δὲ τῷ Θεῷ τῶν ὅλων τὸν λόγον, ἐγὼ γάρ, φησι, καὶ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν. *Ap. Athan.* p. 232.

HIPPOLYTUS.

Οὐ δύο Θεοὺς λέγω, ἀλλ' ὡς φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς, ἢ ὡς ὕδωρ ἐκ πηγῆς, ἢ ὡς ἀκτῖνα ἀπὸ ἡλίου, δύναμις γὰρ μία ἡ ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς, τὸ δὲ πᾶν πατὴρ, ἐξ οὗ δύναμις λόγος. C. 11.

Against Sabellians.

TERTULLIAN.

Unum dicit neutrali verbo, quod non pertinet ad singularitatem sed ad *unitatem*, ad conjunctionem, ad dilectionem Patris, qui Filium diligit, et ad obsequium Filii, qui voluntati Patris obsequitur. *Unum sumus*, dicens, quos æquat et jungit. *Adv. Prax.* c. 22.

NOVATIAN.

Quia dixit *unum*, intelligant hæretici quia non dixerit *unus*. *Unum* enim neutraliter positum societatis concordiam, non unitatem Personæ sonat—merito unum sit Pater et Filius per concordiam, et per amorem, et per dilectionem—Novit hanc concordiæ unitatem et Apostolus Paulus cum Personarum distinctione—*Qui plantat et qui rigat unum sunt.* Quis autem non intelligat alterum esse Apollo, alterum Paulum, non eundem atque ipsum Apollo pariter et Paulum? C. 22.

ORIGEN.

Τὸν πατέρα, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὄντα δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πράγματα, ἓν δὲ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ, καὶ συμφωνίᾳ, καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τοῦ βουλήματος. ὡς τὸν ἑωρακότα τὸν υἱὸν (ὄντα ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, καὶ χαρακτῆρα τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ) ἑωρακέναι ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντι εἰκόνι τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸν Θεόν. *Contr. Cels.* l. viii. p. 386.

HIPPOLYTUS.

Οὐκ εἶπεν ὅτι ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν εἰμι, ἀλλ' ἕν ἐσμεν. τὸ γάρ ἐσμεν οὐκ ἐφ' ἑνὸς λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ δύο πρόσωπα ἔδειξεν, δύναμιν δὲ μίαν—τὴν δόξαν ἣν ἔδωκάς μοι,

perceive how they defended such an *unity* as we maintain, at the same time that they strenuously opposed the Sabellians. I shall make particular remarks upon the authors, singly, as I pass along; and afterwards throw in some general observations.

To begin with Tertullian: you will observe, that he interprets the text *expressly* of *unity* of *substance*, in one citation: and he is to be so understood in the other, had you but thought how to construe *unitatem*, as you should have done. I suppose, *unity* of *love*, *consent*, and *power*, may very well follow, after so good a foundation laid for it. Tertullian elsewhere [z] intimates the strict and inviolable harmony of the three Persons, resolving it into *unity* of *substance*.

Novatian is your next author: you may please to observe, how absurd he thinks it would have been for any mere man to

ALEXANDER ALEX.

Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν. ὅπερ φησὶν ὁ κύριος, οὐ πατέρα ἑαυτὸν ἀναγορεύων. οὐδὲ τὰς τῇ ὑποστάσει δύο φύσεις μίαν εἶναι σαφηνίζων. ἀλλ' ὅτι τὴν πατρικὴν ἐμφέρειαν ἀκριβῶς πέφυκε σώζειν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, τὴν κατὰ πάντα ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῦ ἐκ φύσεως ἀπομαξάμενος, καὶ ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν τοῦ πατρὸς τυγχάνων, καὶ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου ἔκτυπος χαρακτήρ. *Theod. E. H.* l. i. c. 4. p. 15.

EPIPHANIUS.

Καὶ πρὸς τούτους μὲν τοὺς νομίζοντας ἀλλότριον εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ πατρὸς—— λέγει, ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν—— διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἐν μιᾷ ἑνότητι θεότητος, καὶ ἐν μιᾷ γνώμῃ καὶ δυνάμει. P. 488. *Hær.* 57.

CYRIL. HIEROS.

Ἓν διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα ἀξίωμα ἐπειδὴ Θεὸς Θεὸν ἐγέννησεν. Ἓν διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν βασιλείαν—— ἓν διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν εἶναι διαφωνίαν ἢ διάστασιν.—— Ἓν διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλα Χριστοῦ δημιουργήματα καὶ ἄλλα πατρός· μία γὰρ ἡ πάντων δημιουργία. P. 142, 143. Ox. ed.

ἔδωκα αὐτοῖς ἵνα ὦσιν ἕν, καθὼς ἡμεῖς ἕν —τί πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχουσι λέγειν οἱ Νοητιανοί; μὴ πάντες ἓν σῶμά ἐστιν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἢ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ διαθέσει τῆς ὁμοφρονίας ἓν γινόμεθα; τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ὁ παῖς—ὡμολόγησεν εἶναι ἐν τῷ πατρὶ δυνάμει, διαθέσει; εἷς γὰρ νοῦς πατρὸς ὁ παῖς. *Contr. Novat.* c. vii. p. 11.

EPIPHANIUS.

Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς νομίζοντας αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι υἱὸν διὰ τὸ εἰρηκέναι, ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν, λέγει, ποίησον αὐτοὺς ἵνα ὦσιν ἓν καθὼς ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ ἕν ἐσμεν, ἵνα καταισχύνῃ Νοητὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ σχολὴν, παραγαγὼν εἰς τὸ μέσον τὴν τῶν μαθητῶν ἕνωσιν. Πῶς γὰρ ἠδύνατο Πέτρος καὶ Ἰωάννης, καὶ οἱ καθεξῆς εἶναι ἓν ὡς κατὰ συναλοιφήν; P. 488.

CYRIL. HIEROS.

Οὐκ εἶπε ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν εἰμι, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν, ἵνα μήτε ἀπαλλοτριώσωμεν, μήτε συναλοιφὴν υἱοπατορίας ἐργασώμεθα. P. 142.

[z] Tam consortibus substantiæ Patris. *Contr. Prax.* c. 3.

have said, "I and my Father *are one*." And why so? might not there be unity of *will, consent, authority*, between God and man? Undoubtedly there might. Well then; Novatian did conceive the text to speak of unity of *love*, &c. but *equality* of *nature presupposed:* for even Paul and Apollos were not of a *different* nature; one was as *truly man* as the other: and so, if Christ was *truly* God, as well as the Father, he might say, "I and my "Father are one." This is [a] plainly Novatian's sense, in the citations of the first column; and it is very consistent with the other, in the opposite column. All that unity of *consent, love*, &c. is founded upon, and resolves into *unity* of *substance* and *principle*, according to this writer.

Origen comes next. I have set against him a passage of Dionysius of Rome, who quotes the text in confirmation of what he had just before said, that we ought not by any means to undervalue the supereminent dignity of the Son, by supposing him a *creature*. As to Origen particularly, it is to be considered, that, if he had resolved the unity of Godhead, in that passage, into unity of *consent*, mentioning no other; yet no certain argument could be drawn from thence, that he held no other; any more than from the passages of Novatian and Tertullian before cited. Had they been left *single*, they had been liable to the same charge; and yet it seems merely accidental that they were not. Authors do not always speak their whole thoughts upon a particular occasion; but are content only to say as much as the occasion requires. Origen was guarding against the Sabellian abuse of the text, and his thoughts were turned to that chiefly. However, in that very place, he made so much use of the text, as from thence to infer, that Father and Son are *one God*, and *one object* of worship; which, to any one who is acquainted with Origen's principles in that book, must appear to denote the *divine* and *uncreated* nature of the Son; and consequently a *substantial* unity betwixt him and the Father: besides, that this is further intimated, in the passage cited, by the words, ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, and χαρακτῆρα τῆς ὑποστάσεως, which seem to have been added to qualify the former; and are hardly pertinent but on some such supposition. To confirm which, please to compare Origen with Alexander Bishop of Alexandria's comment on the same text, and you will find them very nearly the

[a] Compare a passage of Novatian, cited above, p. 295.

same; which is sufficient to acquit Origen of any suspicion of *Arianizing* in this point.

I come next to Hippolytus, who has but lately appeared, and whom neither the Doctor nor you have took notice of. He argues against the Sabellians, in the very same way with Tertullian, Novatian, and Origen: but then, in the other citation oppositely placed, he clearly resolves the unity of the Godhead into unity of *substance* and *principle*. But besides this, it deserves your special notice, that while he speaks of unity of *will* and *concord*, (admitting a kind of parallel between the union of Christians, and the union of God and Christ,) he clearly signifies how infinitely more perfect the latter is; resolving it into this, that the Son is the νοῦς πατρὸς, the living and substantial *mind*, or *thought*, of the Father. This then is the case: there is an unity [b] of concord, and harmonious love, founded upon unity of substance: and the words, "I and my Father are one," express both the unity itself, and the foundation of it. Paul and Apollos were one in heart and will, in such measure and degree as they were capable of: and so God and Christ are *one* likewise; but by an union infinitely more perfect, and upon an infinitely higher foundation. You need not be told, that καθὼς often signifies, not an *exact equality*, but a *general similitude* [c]: the remark is just; and, as it is at other times urged against us, so let me here claim the benefit of it.

I have added to the number two Post-Nicene writers, Epiphanius and the elder Cyril; which are enough to shew, that the same way of reasoning against the Sabellians (which prevailed before the Nicene Council) obtained likewise afterwards. Some are apt to triumph extremely, if they can but find any the least difference between the Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene writers. If there be but a text or two differently interpreted, a solemn remark is made upon it; and sometimes a trifling note of some obscure *scholiast*, or an *imaginary* difference, (having no foundation but the *writer's* ignorance, or negligence in comparing,) is improved into an argument of *change of doctrine*; and *Athanasianism* is made the name for what has been constantly held in

[b] Etiam nos quippe incomparabilem consensum voluntatis atque individuæ caritatis, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti confitemur, propter quod dicimus, Hæc Trinitas unus est Deus. *August. contr. Maxim.* l. ii. p. 720.

Vid. etiam Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. l. i. p. 389. Hilar. de Trin. p. 958.

[c] Vid. Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 572.

the Christian Church. If there be occasion to speak of the things seemingly derogatory to the honour of the Son, (his being *subordinate;* his referring all things to the Father, as *head, root, fountain, cause*; his executing the Father's will, and the like,) or of a real distinction between Father and Son, (as their being δύο ἀριθμῷ, *duæ res*, or one of them ἀριθμῷ ἕτερος, that is, *personally* distinct from the other,) then only Ante-Nicene Fathers are quoted; as if the Post-Nicene did not teach the very same doctrine: but if any thing, which seems to make more for the honour of the Son, be mentioned, (as his being *uncreated, eternal, one God* with the Father, *Creator* of all things, and the like,) this is to be represented as the doctrine of the Post-Nicene Fathers only; though nothing is more evident than that they varied not a tittle, in any material point of doctrine, from their predecessors; but only preserved, as became them, with an upright zeal, the true faith of Christ, "which was once delivered to the "saints."

To return. It is needless almost to take notice of other testimonies: those in the margin are sufficient to shew the true and constant sense of the Christian Church. The [d] Doctor quotes Basil and Chrysostom, as saying Father and Son were one, κατὰ δύναμιν: and, lest the reader should understand what those Fathers meant by κατὰ δύναμιν, he cuts Chrysostom short; whose words immediately following (εἰ δὲ ἡ δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ, εὔδηλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ οὐσία) shew that he meant by δύναμις, not the same *authority*, but the same inherent, essential, *omnipotent* power.

Athenagoras's δυνάμει may be rightly interpreted by Hippolytus before cited; or by Chrysostom; or by himself, in several places where he is clear for the *consubstantiality*. Justin Martyr's sentiments have been explained above; and the Council of Antioch's expression (τῇ συμφωνίᾳ) is vindicated by [e] Hilary; who himself may be readily understood by such as remember how the primitive Fathers held the Holy Ghost to be, as it were, *vinculum Trinitatis*, and sometimes *amor Patris et Filii;* as the Son himself is also styled *charitas ex charitate*, by [f] Origen. These things I can only hint to the intelligent reader, having already exceeded the bounds of a digression.

[d] Page 100. [e] Page 1170, 1171. [f] Pamph. Apol. p. 235. ed. Bened.

QUERY XXIV.

Whether Gal. iv. 8. *may not be enough to determine the d betwixt us; since it obliged the Doctor to confess, that (is* [g] by nature truly God, as truly as man is by nature man.

He equivocates, indeed, there, as usual. For, he will have signify that Christ is God by nature, only as having, by nature which he derives from the Father, true divine p and dominion: that is, he is truly God by nature, as hav nature distinct from, and inferior to God's, wanting [h] the essential character of God, *self-existence. What is thi trifling with words, and playing fast and loose?*

IN answer hereto, you begin: "Will the Querist insist "it, that the Son cannot be God by nature, unless he be "existent?" And you proceed: "I can assure him, the l "edest, even of his own friends, are ashamed of this: and "are few so hardy, as directly to affirm it." But have a patience, and I will endeavour to make you easy. Where your thoughts? Where were your eyes? Either I am stran mistaken, or the line, which offended you so grievously, *scored* underneath; and pag. 92. of the Doctor's Reply ferred to, as you find now: and my charging the Doctor *playing fast and loose*, immediately after, might have bee sufficient intimation of my meaning. Whether I think the *self-existent* or no, is not now the question. I took hold of Doctor's expression, charged him with *fast and loose*, that saying and unsaying, contradicting himself. If *self-existence* the *most essential character* of God, it seems to me to foll that the *Son*, who by the Doctor's confession wants that *chas ter*, cannot be *truly* and by *nature* God, any more than any th can be *truly* and by *nature* man, without the *essential chara* of man. As to my own part: I never pretended that *self istence* is an *essential* character of God: you might have c sidered that we deny it absolutely; we suppose it [i] *negative*

[g] Reply, p. 81. [h] Ibid. p. 92.

[i] Sicut——secundum *substantiam* aio, *homo* est, sic secundum *substantiam* nego, cum dico, *non-homo* est, &c. *Relative* autem negamus dicendo *non-filius:* relative igitur negamus dicendo *non-genitus. Ingenitus* po quid est nisi *non-genitus?*——q autem *relative* pronuntiatur, non i cat *substantiam. Aug. de Trin.* c. 6. Comp. Fulgent. contr. Ar p. 52. ed. Paris.

relative, and call it a *personal* character. *Necessary-existence* is an *essential* character, and belongs equally to *Father* and *Son:* if that be what you mean by *self-existence*, then that also belongs to both. Explain yourself, and deal not so much in *ambiguous* terms, which we have just reason to complain of. The Doctor knows how *self-existent*, by custom, sounds among common readers; and that denying the Son to be *self-existent* may be thought by many the same thing with denying him to be *God*. Had he pleased, in his translations of ἀγέννητος, and elsewhere, to say oftener *unbegotten* or *underived*, instead of *self-existent*, it would have been kind towards his readers, and perhaps as kind to himself: for it will be always thought as much beneath a *grave* writer to take the poor advantage of an *equivocal* word, as it is a disparagement to any cause to be served by it. But to proceed.

You wanted, it seems, to bring in a parcel of quotations, which you might as well have referred to only, where they [k] lie, and may be seen to greater advantage. Whatever they are, they contradict not me; nor are they at all pertinent to the business of the Query. My design was to shew, at once, the Doctor's inconsistency with Scripture and with himself: both which are intimated in the Query. It was your part to defend him as fairly as you could. The Doctor, I observed, was obliged from Gal. iv. 8. to confess that the Son is *by nature truly God*. From thence I infer, that his scheme cannot stand with that text; being an express contradiction to it. You insist upon it notwithstanding, that the Son may be *by nature truly God*, agreeable to the text, and consistent with the Doctor's principles. This then is the sole point between us, to be here discussed.

"You have," you say, "proved, that in Scripture there are "*different* and *subordinate* acceptations of the word *God*." True, you have proved that *men* have been called *Gods;* and *idol Gods;* the *devil* is also a God, (2 Cor. iv. 4.) and the *belly* a God. But, I think, St. Paul hath sufficiently intimated, (1 Cor. viii. 5, 6.) that the Son is not to be reckoned among the *nominal* Gods; besides that you yourselves confess it. If he be God at all, he is a *real* one: and now I want to see what Scripture warrants or permits us to profess two *real* and *true*

[k] Script. Doctr. p. 306, &c. alias 273, &c.

Gods. You say, the Son is God, *truly*, and *properly*, and by *nature*, in the *Scripture-sense* of the word *God*, (p. 110.) Then, say I, he must be the same with the one *supreme* God, because there is but *one*. If he is *truly* so, he is the same with the *only true God;* if *properly* so, his substance is *properly* divine; if *by nature* so, he has the same *nature* with the one God. Yet I very well know that you intend nothing like it: only, from the concurring language of Scripture and antiquity, you find it necessary to say as we say; and are afterwards to rack and strain invention, to find out some subtile and surprising meaning for it. What may we not do with any writings in the world at this rate, so long as words are capable of being pressed and tortured into diverse meanings? But let us go on, to see how you account for the Son's being God *by nature*. "If divine "power and dominion be derived and exercised partially, tem-"porarily," or in "certain emergencies only, it makes the "Persons to be, and to be styled Gods; not by nature, but by "grace." Your notion of *dominion* making *God* to be *God*, has been sufficiently exposed in the former parts. I need only ask here, what was God before the creatures were made? Or did he then commence *God, by nature*, when he created the universe, and began to have *dominion* over it? The Doctor appears to be in the utmost perplexity, how to account for the Son's being called God, John i. 1. He is forced to quit his notion of *dominion*[l]. Sometimes it is because he was in μορφῇ Θεοῦ *after* the creation: and [m]sometimes because he *was partaker* of *divine power and glory* (he knew not how to say *dominion*) *before* the creation: and sometimes [n]μετοχῇ τῆς αὐτοθέου θεότητος. So that now we have the Doctor's own authority for contradicting him, if he tells us again, that the word *God* is *always* a word of *office*. When he was considering the Son as *God* before the creation, he should have thought a little further, that the Father was then also *God*, and should have told us in what sense he was so. But to proceed: give me leave to observe here, that the Son is God, not *by nature*, but *by grace*, in consequence of your own principles. Being a *creature*, and *finite*, he can exercise the *divine* power and dominion no otherwise than *partially;* and since he did not exercise the divine power and dominion to the utmost, before his resurrection, he exercised

[l] Script. Doctr. p. 73. ed. 2. [m] Ibid. p. 240. ed. 2. [n] Ibid. p. 73.

it only in *certain emergencies;* and since the *exercise* began then, and is to end after the day of judgment, it is barely *temporary:* and so, by your own *characters*, you make him God, *by grace,* like *angels, magistrates,* and *prophets;* only his *dominion* is larger, and for a longer period of time: this is your God *by nature.* But you are very excusable for not doing what it is ridiculous, at first sight, even so much as to pretend to. For how should the *Son* be God *by nature,* upon your principles, when the *Father* himself, whatever his *metaphysical nature* may be, (which the [o]Doctor allows not to come into consideration,) is God by *office* only; might not have been *God* at all, if he had pleased to make no creatures; and may cease to be *God,* in the *Scripture-sense* of the word, whenever he will, by letting all things drop into their primitive nothing. Now unless *nature* and *office* signify the same, it is not easy to conceive, upon the Doctor's principles, how any Person can be *God, by nature,* at all. You say, "if the divine powers and dominion be derived "to, *and exercised by a* nature, person, or intelligent substance, "UNIVERSALLY," (which is impossible to suppose in a finite creature,) "PERMANENTLY," (which is contrary to your own supposition of a kingdom which is to have an end,) "UNALTERABLY," (though an *alteration* is presumed in respect of the Son, and might be supposed even in respect of the Father himself;) if these things be so; that is, if contradictions be true, what then? Then "such a Being, or Person, is God by nature," &c. And this you give us as "the true meaning of Gal. iv. 1." But, I hope, we shall have more respect for an inspired Apostle than to father any such meaning upon him. For the true sense and import of it, I refer you to the [p]learned gentleman, who has so well defended this text against Dr. Clarke. You add, "Had "not the Scriptures this sense of the word *God*, they could not "be intelligible or reconcilable," (p. 113.) But are you well assured that you understand whatever is intelligible or reconcilable? "The metaphysical definition," you say, "cannot be "the only Scripture-sense of the term *God.*" You allow then that it may be the *principal*, though not the *only* Scripture-sense: which I am glad to hear from you. The learned Doctor will not admit the *metaphysical* sense to be [q]*ever* the *Scripture-*

[o] Script. Doctr. p. 243, 296. alias 210, 263. Reply, p. 301.

[p] True Scripture Doctr. continued, p. 73, &c.

[q] Scripture Doctr. p. 296. Reply, p. 119, 290.

sense of the term *God*. *The metaphysical* sense, he expressly says, is "never intended;" but the "constant usage of Scripture" is different. "The word *God*, in Scripture, is ALWAYS a relative "word of office:" which though the Doctor has no proof of, nor ground for, nor is himself well satisfied in; yet he knew *why* he said it, having very good *prudential* reasons for it. For, if the *metaphysical* sense be ever intended, when the word *God* is spoken of the Father, no good reason can be assigned why it should not be so always, when spoken of the same Person: and if this be the current and most usual sense of the word *God*, in Scripture, we shall have a fair handle to prove that it was intended in the same sense, when spoken, in such and such circumstances, of the Son: or, at least, the Doctor will have little or no pretence left, upon his principles, for saying that the Son is *truly* and *properly* God. You observe, that the *metaphysical* definition of one *self-existent*, *underived*, *independent*, *supreme* Being, would *exclude* the Son, who is *derived*. This is the sum of your argument, and clearer than you have put it. But I must observe to you, that this *definition*, or something like it, hath long passed current with men who believed a *Trinity* of *divine Persons*, and were never apprehensive of any such consequence as you would draw from it. It is properly a definition of the τὸ Θεῖον, the divine nature, *abstracting* from the consideration of the *distinction* of Persons, which is the usual method that the Schoolmen and others have taken; and there the words *self-existent*, *underived*, *independent*, are not considered as *personal*, but *essential* characters. *Necessarily-existing*, *uncreated*, *immutable*, *all-sufficient*, are what they mean in that *definition*: otherwise it is a definition of the Person of the Father only, singly considered. But if, instead of *metaphysics*, (which must always be content to stand corrected by Gospel Revelation,) we choose to take our definition of God from Scripture, then that of [r] Melancthon, which I have put into the margin, will be more full and complete.

[r] Deus est essentia spiritualis, intelligens, verax, bona, pura, justa, misericors, liberrima, immensæ potentiæ, et sapientiæ, Pater æternus qui Filium imaginem suam ab æterno genuit, et Filius imago Patris coæterna, et Spiritus Sanctus procedens a Patre et Filio. *Melanct. Loc. Theolog. de Deo.*

QUERY XXV.

Whether it be not clear from all the genuine remains of antiquity, that the Catholic Church before the Council of Nice, and even from the beginning, did believe the eternity and consubstantiality of the Son; if either the oldest creeds, as interpreted by those that recite them; or the testimonies of the earliest writers, or the public censures passed upon heretics, or particular passages of the ancientest Fathers, can amount to a proof of a thing of this nature?

YOU tell me, in answer, that it is "not clear that the Ante-"Nicene Church professed the notion of INDIVIDUAL consubstan-"tiality:" that "the objector cannot produce one single passage "in all Catholic Ante-Nicene antiquity, which proves an INDI-"VIDUAL or NUMERICAL consubstantiality in the three divine "Persons." This answer is scarce becoming the gravity of a man, or the sincerity of a Christian, in so serious and weighty an argument. Did I speak of *individual* consubstantiality? or, if I had, could I mean it in your sense? I ask, whether the Fathers believed the three Persons to be *one substance;* and do affirm that they did, *universally.* You answer, that they did not assert the three Persons to be *one Person;* which is the constant sense you make of *individual.* And here you would make a show, as if the *objector* had been mistaken, and as if you contradicted him: when all resolves into a trifling equivocation, and you really contradict him not at all. That *present scholastic* notion, as you call it, of three Persons being one *Person, Hypostasis,* or *Suppositum,* is nowhere *present,* that I know of, amongst any that own a *Trinity:* neither is it the scholastic notion; as any man may see, that will but look into the Schoolmen, and read with any judgment. *Individual* has been generally owned, but not in your sense; and *numerical* too, but in a sense very different from what you pretend to oppose it in: and therefore, to be plain with you, this way of proceeding, in an important controversy, is neither *fair* towards your adversaries, nor *sincere* towards the readers; but, at best, is only solemn trifling. You know, or you know little in this controversy, that all the Fathers, almost to a man, either expressly or implicitly, asserted the *consubstantiality* of the Son with the Father. Call it *individual,*

or call it *specific;* that is not now the question. They mously maintained that the Son was not of any *created* or *n* substance, but strictly *divine;* and so closely and nearly to the Father's Person, (in a mysterious way above comp sion,) that the substance of the Son might be justly call *Father's* substance, both being one. And this is all tha any sober Catholic meant by *individual* or *numerical;* as often observed.

Is not this sufficient to urge against Dr. Clarke and yo make the Son of an *inferior* substance, differing entirely i from the Father's; in short, a *creature*, though you care speak it in broad terms? This is what you have not so m one Catholic Post-Nicene or Ante-Nicene writer to counte you plainly in. The main of your doctrine, the very wherein your scheme is contained, and on which it turn which distinguish you from the present orthodox, stand demned by all antiquity. Do you imagine all this is turned off, only by equivocating upon the word *numerical;* throwing out the term *scholastic*, to make weak persons b that we have borrowed our doctrine from the Schoolmen No: we know, and you may know, if you please to exa that, as to the main of our doctrine of the blessed Trini have the universal Church, as high as any records reach curring with us. To them we appeal, as well as to the Scrip that, together with Scripture, we may be the more secure we follow the true interpretation. I need not go on to that the primitive writers asserted the *consubstantiality*, be you have not denied it in the sense I intended; and i could not. Your slipping a word upon us, and sliding another point, may be taken for a confession and acknow ment, that the Query was just; and should have been ans in the *affirmative*, could your cause have subsisted, after so and frank a confession. "As to creeds," you say, "none o "three first centuries express the Querist's notion:" mea your own notion of *individual*, which is not the Quer What follows (p. 118.) is still pursuing the same mis Since you have told us, that there is no proof of *individual substantiality*, (that is, of *personal* identity, as you understan and in which sense nobody opposes you,) it would have fair and ingenuous to have owned that the Fathers did u mously hold a *consubstantiality*, in some sense or other. I

numerical, or *individual* in the strictest sense, was it, think you, *specific?* Yet, if so, it will follow that all the Fathers were directly opposite to the Doctor and you; and condemned your notion of the Son's being inferior in *kind, nature, substance*, &c. *Specific* unity implies *equality* of nature; as two men, specifically one with each other, are in *nature* equal; and so, any other two things of the same *sort* and *kind*. This notion, if it were what the Fathers held, you might charge with *Tritheism:* and, at the same time, you must give them all up, as no way favourable to your *hypothesis*. But the Fathers constantly took care to signify that they did not mean that the *Persons* were *specifically* one, like three human persons having a *separate* existence independent of each other: nor would they allow *three suns*, which would be *specifically* one, to be a proper or suitable illustration; but the rays of the same sun, the streams of the same fountain, and the like; all to intimate a much closer tie, a more *substantial* union, than *specific* amounts to. The *Persons*, the *Hypostases*, were three; and yet *una substantia*, as Tertullian expresses it, in all.

You would persuade us, (finding, I suppose, that either *specific* or *individual* consubstantiality would be equally against you,) I say, you would persuade us, that it was some *oratorical* and *figurative* consubstantiality which the Fathers meant. This I apprehend from what you drop in p. 121, where you expressly apply this new solution to the difficulty arising from Ὁμοούσιος in the Nicene Creed. I will not suffer the English reader to go away with this groundless notion, instead of a just answer. Such as know any thing of antiquity do not want to have such pretences confuted: such as do not, may please to take along with them these following considerations:

1. The doctrine of the *consubstantiality* appears to have been a constant settled thing; a sort of ruled case, running through all in general. Strange, that they should all *rhetoricate* in a matter of faith, of so great weight and importance; and that we should not meet with so much as one grave sober writer, to strip the matter of all flourish and varnish, and to tell us the naked truth.

2. It is to be observed, that the notion does not occur only in popular harangues, but in dry debates; chiefly in controversy with *heretics*, where it concerned the Catholics to speak accurately and properly, and to deliver their sentiments very distinctly.

3. This is further confirmed from the objections made by *heretics* to the Catholic doctrine. There were two standing objections made by *heretics* to the Catholic doctrine: one was, that it inferred a *division* of the Father's substance: the other, that it was *Tritheism*. We find footsteps of the former as early as [s]Justin Martyr. We meet with it in [t]Tertullian, as urged by Praxeas. [u]Tatian and [x]Theophilus both allude to it. [y]Sabellius was full of it; and it was afterwards one of the chiefest pretences of Arius; as may appear from his own Letters, besides many [z]other evidences. Now, what colour or pretence could there have been for the objection, had not the Catholics professed a proper communication of the same substance? Need we be told that angels and archangels, or any created beings, were derived from God without any *abscission* from, or *division* of, his *substance?* Or could it ever enter into any man's head to make so weak an objection to the Catholic doctrine, unless a *proper consubstantiality* had been taught by them? Yet this was the principal, the standing pretence for, and support of, heresy, for near two hundred years together.

The other was *Tritheism*; objected all along by the Sabellians, and afterwards (though more sparingly) by the Arians. What kind of *Tritheism* the Sabellians meant (*Tritheism* in the highest and strictest sense) appears, not only from the former objection about the *division* of the Father's substance, but also from the way they took to solve the difficulty; namely, by making Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, one and the same *Hypostasis*, as well as one *substance*; and their thinking it not beneath the Father himself to have submitted to *passion*. This makes it extremely probable that the Church, at that time, believed the three Persons to be *consubstantial* in a proper, not *figurative*, sense; in consequence whereof it was pretended that there would be three Gods; in like manner as three human persons, of the same *specific* nature, are three men.

4. What puts this further beyond all reasonable doubt, is the method which the catholics took to answer the two fore-mentioned objections. As to that about *division of substance*: they never tell the *heretics*, that there was no manner of ground or colour

[s] Dial. p. 183, 373. Jeb. See Bull. D. F. p. 66, 67, 33.
[t] Contr. Prax. c. 8.
[u] Tat. p. 21. ed. Worth.
[x] Theoph. l. ii. p. 129.
[y] Alexand. apud Theod. E. H. l. i. c. 4. p. 17. Athanas. p. 942.
[z] See Bull. D. F. N. p. 33.

for the objection: they never say, that the same difficulty would lie against God's creating angels, or archangels, or any other creature; as they might, and should have done, had they been of Dr. Clarke's principles, or of yours. No: [a] they only deny any *division* or *diminution* of the Father's substance, and illustrate, as well as they are able, so sublime a mystery, by one *light* kindled, as it were, from *another*; by the *sun* and its *rays*; by *fountain* and *streams*; *stock* and *branch*: all instances of the same *specific* nature, and [b] answering in some circumstances, though defective in others. One would not desire a fuller and clearer testimony, that those or the like *similitudes* were intended to signify the same with a proper *consubstantiality*, that we meet with in Dionysius of Alexandria [c].

Then, for their answers to the charge of *Tritheism*, as understood by the Sabellians, how easy it would have been for them to have told the objectors, that they did not take the word *God* in the strict sense; that Moses and other mortal men had been called *Gods*; that they believed the Son to be no more than a *creature*, though the most perfect of all creatures; and that the Sabellians did them a very great and manifest injury, to imagine otherwise of them. This would, this must have been their answer to the charge of *Tritheism*, as understood by the objectors, had they not otherwise "learned Christ." Instead of this, they appear to be very sensible of the just weight and importance of the objection. They must secure the *divinity* of the Son, and yet preserve the unity too. They have recourse to *unity* of *substance*, (even against those who made *one substance* to signify one *Hypostasis*,) as Tertullian frequently does, in his dispute with Praxeas: and notwithstanding that the Sabellians had, if I may so speak, carried the Son's *divinity* too high, insomuch as to make him the very same *Hypostasis* with the *Father*; yet the utmost that the Catholics could be brought to say, in *degradation* of him, was only this; that he was *subordinate* as a *Son*; equal in every respect, but as a *Son* can be equal to a *Father*; inferior, in point of *original*, (the Father being head and fountain of all,) but still of the same nature, power, substance, and perfections;

[a] Just. M. Dial. p. 183, 373. Tat. p. 21, 22. Athenag. p. 40, 96. Origen. Pamph. Apol. Tertull. Apol. c. 21. adv. Prax. c. 8. Theognost. apud Athanas. vol. i. p. 230. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. c. 11. p. 13. Dionys. Alexand. Resp. ad Quæst. 5. Conf. Prud. Apotheos. p. 172.

[b] See Bull. D. F. p. 120.

[c] Apud Athanas. de Sentent. Dionys. tom. i. p. 255, 256.

subsisting in and from the Father, inseparably and cons always and everywhere; and therefore *one God* with him. if any person, though in the warmth of dispute, did but l to drop any doubtful expressions, tending any way to les dignity of the Son, or was but suspected to do so; the was soon taken, and it awakened the jealousy of the Cat who could not bear any appearance of it. This was rema seen, in the famous case of Dionysius, bishop of Alex sixty years before the rise of Arius, and is recorded by A sius in his works.

5. To this we may add, that while the Sabellian contr was on foot, (which was at least a hundred years, and never have lasted so long, had the Catholics been of any principles than those which I here maintain,) I say, whi was on foot, how easy would it have been for the Ca to have pinched them close, and to have pressed then variety of arguments, more than they did, had they been c principles, or of Dr. Clarke's? The Father is *eternal*, but t not so; the Father is *omniscient*, but the Son *ignorant* of t of judgment; the Father is *omnipotent*, but the powers Son finite and limited; in a word, the Father is *Creato* the Son a *creature*; and therefore they cannot be one a same *Hypostasis*, or *Suppositum*. This argument had bee fragable, and could not have failed of being urged and p home, by men of such acute parts as Tertullian, Origen, I lytus, and others, had it been consistent with Catholic prin or had they not believed, that the Son was *consubstantial*, proper sense, enjoying all the *essential* perfections of the F in common with him.

6. It would be endless almost to proceed in this argu the rest I shall throw into a narrower compass, and give hints for your leisure thoughts to inquire into. The sense which the ancients had of the word *God*, as sign *substance*, and applying it to the Son, in the same sense; admitting but one substance to be strictly divine, and utter abhorrence of any inferior deities; their appropri worship to the one true God, and worshipping the Son not standing; their unanimous belief of the Son's being *et uncreated, omnipotent*, and of his being Creator, Preserve Sustainer of the universe: any one of these, singly al would be sufficient for the proof of a *proper consubstantiali*

asserted by the Ante-Nicene Catholic writers: but all together, and taken with the other particulars before mentioned, they make so full, so clear, so ample a demonstration of a matter of fact, that a man must be of a very peculiar constitution, who, after having well considered the evidences, can make the least doubt or scruple of it. And this I hope may be sufficient in answer to your pretence of an *oratorical* or *figurative* consubstantiality; a pretence, which you lay down with an unusual diffidence, and without so much as one reason, or authority, to support it.

It being evident, from what hath been said, that it was a *proper*, not *figurative*, consubstantiality, which the Ante-Nicene Fathers inviolably maintained; this is all I am concerned for. As to the question, whether it shall be called *specific* or *numerical*, I am in no pain about it. Neither of the names exactly suits it; nor perhaps any other we can think on. It is such a *consubstantiality* as preserves the *unity*, without destroying the *distinct personality*; such as neither Sabellians nor Arians would come into, but the Catholics maintained, with equal vigour, against both. It is a *medium*, to preserve the *priority* of the *Father*, and withal the *divinity*, the *essential* divinity, of *Son* and *Holy Ghost*: in a word; it is the sober, middle way, between the extravagancies of both extremes.

QUERY XXVI.

Whether the Doctor did not equivocate or prevaricate strangely, in saying, [d] *"The generality of writers before the Council of Nice were, in the whole, clearly on his side:" when it is manifest, they were, in the general, no further on his side, than the allowing a* subordination *amounts to; no further than our own Church is on his side, while in the main points of difference, the* ETERNITY and CONSUBSTANTIALITY, *they are clearly against him? that is, they were on his side, so far as we acknowledge him to be right, but no further.*

IN defence of the Doctor, you appeal to his very *numerous*, and, as you say, *plain* quotations from the ancient authors. And this, you promise beforehand, will be made further evident to all *learned* and *unprejudiced* persons, as soon as "Dr.

[d] Answer to Dr. Wells, p. 28.

"Whitby's Observations on Bishop Bull's Defens. Fid. Nic. "appear in the world." As to the Doctor's pretended *plain* quotations from the ancient authors, they have not *plainly*, nor at all determined against the *coeternity* and *consubstantiality* of the Son, the *points* in *question;* and therefore can do the Doctor no service: but, on the contrary, the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, have determined *plainly* against him, as to the main of his doctrine, wherein he differs from us. In asserting which, I say no more than the great Athanasius told the Arians long ago; and it is fact, that all the writers before them, of any repute or judgment, were directly against them. "[e] We give you demonstration," says he, "that our doctrine "has been handed down to us from fathers to fathers. But "you, ye revivers of *Judaism* and disciples of Caiphas, what "writers can you bring to father your tenets? Not a man can "you name, of any repute for sense or judgment. All to a man "are against you," &c. To the same purpose speaks St. Austin, in a studied discourse, which may be supposed to contain his coolest and most serious thoughts. "[f] All the Catholic "interpreters of the Old or New Testament, that I could read, "who have wrote before me on the Trinity, which is God, "intended to teach, conformable to Scripture, that Father, "Son, and Holy Ghost do, by the inseparable equality of one and "the same substance, make up the unity divine." Here you may observe the sum of the [g] Catholic doctrine. The same *homogeneous substance*, and *inseparability*. The first makes each Hypostasis, *res divina;* the last makes all to be *una substantia*, *una summa res*, one undivided, or *individual*, or *numerical* substance; one God. This is the ancient Catholic doctrine; and, I think, of the Schools too; though the Schoolmen have

[e] Athanas. de Decret. Syn. Nic. p. 233.

[f] Omnes, quos legere potui, qui ante me scripserunt de Trinitate, quæ est Deus, divinorum librorum veterum et novorum Catholici tractatores hoc intenderunt secundum Scripturas docere, quod Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, *unius ejusdemque substantiæ* inseparabili æqualitate divinam insinuent unitatem. *Aug. Trin.* l. i. c. 3. p. 753.

[g] I shall add another passage of St. Austin, to explain his sense more clearly: *Trinitas* propter *Trinitatem* Personarum, et unus Deus propter *inseparabilem* Divinitatem, sicut unus Omnipotens propter *inseparabilem* Omnipotentiam. Ita ut etiam cum de singulis quæritur, unusquisque eorum et Deus et Omnipotens esse respondeatur; cum vero de omnibus simul, non tres Dii, vel tres Omnipotentes, sed unus Deus Omnipotens: tanta inest in tribus inseparabilis unitas, quæ sic se voluit prædicari. *August. in Civit. Dei*, l. xi. c. 24.

perplexed it with innumerable subtilties. Hilary expresses it briefly thus: "Naturæ *indissimilis*, atque *inseparabilis* unitas." This, I say, is the doctrine; confute it, if you please, or if you can: in the meanwhile, however, let us honestly own the fact. But to proceed.

There were many writings extant in the times of Athanasius and Austin, which have not come down to us; and therefore *their* testimonies, in the case, are of the greater force. I might mention other Catholics, about that time, who appealed to antiquity, with all the assurance and freedom imaginable. But the most remarkable instance to our purpose is, that when in the time of Theodosius the Arians were pressed by the Catholics in dispute, and fairly challenged to refer the matter in controversy to the concurring judgment of the writers before them, and to put it upon that issue; the Arians declined it, and durst not abide the trial. See the story at large, in [h]Socrates and [i]Sozomen. So dull were the Catholics at that time, nay, so unthinking were the Arians too, that *they* could not perceive, what is now so *clear* to the Doctor, that the *generality of writers, before the Council of Nice*, were on the Arian side: but one party was confident, and the other suspected, at least, that the *contrary* was true.

But I need not take this indirect way of confuting the Doctor's assertion; though it affords us a very strong presumption, and is of much greater weight and authority than the single judgment of any of the moderns: many of the Ante-Nicene writings, by the good providence of God, are yet extant, and can speak for themselves; besides that the incomparable Bishop Bull has unanswerably defended them, and vindicated them from all such exceptions as appeared to have any shadow of truth or probability in them. To shew you how little reason the Doctor or yourself hath to boast of the Ante-Nicene writers as favourable to your cause, I shall here set down several positions, in which the Doctor and you run manifestly counter to the whole stream of antiquity.

1. *That the Son is not consubstantial with God the Father.* You are directly opposite to all antiquity in this your leading position, on which the rest hang, and on which the controversy turns. This is very clear from the testimonies collected by

[h] Lib. v. c. 10. [i] Lib. vii. c. 12.

Bishop Bull, and from what additional observations I have made under the last Query.

2. *That the Son is not coeternal with the Father.* Consubstantiality implies *coeternity*: besides that the aforementioned learned Prelate has given us numerous direct testimonies for it from the Ante-Nicene Fathers, above twenty of them; not one of any note plainly contradicting them. These two main points being determined against you, the rest are of less moment. Yet I cannot find that the *ancients* agreed with you in your other inferior positions, which you bring in as under-props to your scheme.

3. *That* God *is a relative word,* θεὸς *and* θεότης *signifying not substance, but dominion and authority.* This is directly [k] contrary to all Catholic antiquity, a very few instances excepted.

4. *That God the Father only was God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.* This position I have shewn to be contrary to the sentiments of the Ante-Nicene writers.

5. *That the titles of one, only, &c. are exclusive of the Son.* This also I have shewn, in these papers, to be directly contrary to the judgment of the ancients.

6. *That the Son had not distinct worship paid him till after his resurrection.* This, in the sense wherein you understand it, is not true; nor agreeable to the sentiments of the ancient Church.

7. *That Father and Son (or any two Persons) ought not to be called one God.* I have referred to the Ante-Nicene writers, who so called them, more than once. Some of the testimonies may be seen at large in Dr. Fiddes.

8. *That the title of* God, *in Scripture, in an absolute construction, always signifies the Father.* Directly contrary to the stream of antiquity; as may appear, besides other arguments, from their

[k] See Fiddes, vol. i. p. 375, &c. and what I have observed above, p. 323. Nothing more common than θεότης for *divine nature* (as ἀνθρωπότης also for the *human*) in ecclesiastical writers. I shall point to a few instances only out of many.

Melito apud Cav. Hist. Lit. vol. ii. p. 33. Grabe, Spicileg. vol. ii. p. 245. Hippolyt. vol. i. p. 226. vol. ii. p. 24. Orig. Contr. Cels. p. 342, 404. Cyril. Hierosol. Catech. xi. p. 142. Cyril. Alex. Thesaur. p. 232. Dial. i. de Trin. p. 405. Damasc. de Orth. Fid. l. iii. c. 11.

N. B. There is, in strictness, some difference between τὸ θεῖον and θεότης, (though the latter is often used for the former,) such nearly as between *concrete* and *abstract*; but still θεότης refers to *nature* and *substance*, (as Θεὸς also generally does,) not *dominion*. *Abstract* names of substances are not very common indeed. (See Locke, H. U. l. iii. c. 8.) but here there was a necessity for it.

application of Scripture texts, of the Old Testament, in which God is spoken of absolutely, to the Son.

9. *That an inferior God may be admitted besides the supreme, and worship paid to both.* Nothing can strike more at the very fundamentals of religion than this position, in the judgment of the ancients in general.

10. *That the Son is not* efficient *cause of the universe, and of all created beings.* This I take to be contrary to all the ancients. See the testimonies above[l].

11. *That the Son himself is* made, *or* created. This neither you nor the Doctor admit *in terms*; but in *reality*, and *in other words*, you both do; as hath been shewn. This position is flatly contrary to the doctrine of the ancients. The testimonies have been referred to above. There are other particulars, which I may at present forget, or which may less deserve notice. These are enough to shew that the Doctor's pretences to the Ante-Nicene Fathers are groundless.

What then has the Doctor to plead for himself, and for his so great assurance in this particular? First, that the Ante-Nicene (as did also the Post-Nicene) Fathers allowed a *subordination*; which is very true, but not at all pertinent; nor can any consequence be certainly drawn from it, in favour of the Doctor's *hypothesis*; which he himself seems to be aware of, as I have remarked above[m]. Another thing is, that the Ante-Nicene writers, some of them, spoke of a *temporal* generation by the *will* of the Father; which I have accounted for in my former pages. And a third thing is, that the generality of the *ancients*, when they speak of God absolutely, ordinarily mean the *Father*, and they distinguish his Person by some eminent titles and peculiar appellations; which may be easily accounted for.

Can these three considerations, or if there be more such, be ground sufficient for the Doctor to say, that the generality of the Ante-Nicene writers are *clearly* on his side, when they expressly contradict him in so many particulars as I have mentioned; several of them *essentials* of his *hypothesis*? The most that in truth can, or in justice ought to be said, is that, in some particulars, they *seem* to favour him; but could not *really* mean it, unless they notoriously contradicted themselves. The very utmost which the most sanguine man of your side should hope

[l] Query xi. [m] Page 448.

for, is, that the Fathers may be found contradictory to one another, or to themselves, in order to null their evidence. If they are consistent, they are ours certainly. And this difference there is plainly between us and you: that, as to your principles, the Fathers are express, clear, and full against them; no possibility of reconciling them together: as to ours, they are nowhere directly and expressly against us. If they are at all against us, it is only *indirectly*, and must be made out by *inference*, *deduction*, and *remote* consequences, neither *clear* nor *certain*. They may be reconciled to our *principles*, to *themselves*, and to *one another*: but as to any consistent agreement with yours, it is utterly impracticable.

Now supposing the Doctor ever so strongly to believe that the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, held principles which necessarily infer and imply his conclusion; yet we insist upon it, that they ought not to be judged of from any obscure disputable *consequences* which the Doctor draws for them, against what they drew for themselves. If we once take the liberty of denominating, sorting, or ranking of men with any side, not according to what themselves, perhaps rightly, professed, but according to what some *imagine*, in reason and good consequence, they ought to have professed, we may call *Protestants*, *Papists*; *Arminians*, *Calvinists*; *Orthodox*, *Heretics*; and what not. There are some common principles which all mankind agree in; and the several differences and distinctions amongst them arise only from their drawing consequences differently; and it is this that gives them their particular and special denomination. Now since it is evident and visible, as the light, that the Ante-Nicene writers did not own the *consequences* which the Doctor makes for them, but expressly and clearly rejected them; constantly affirming the *eternity* and *consubstantiality* of the Son, (the very points of difference between us and the Doctor,) it is plain and obvious to common sense, that the Doctor has no just claim or title to them, but that we have: they were, in the main points, *clearly* on our side, (consistent, or not consistent, is not now the question,) and as *clearly* against him. It is to no purpose to plead, in this case, that *premises* only are of any weight, and that *conclusions* always stand for nothing. This may be allowed in *argumentation*; but not in determining on what side any person, or any body of men were in this particular question; whether such *conclusions* follow from such *premises*. In this, the

Ante-Nicene writers were *directly* and *plainly* Anti-Arian; and therefore it is a great abuse of language, and as great an injury to them and to the truth, for the Doctor to say that they were "in the whole, clearly on his side."

But you had promised the world great matters from a book of Dr. Whitby's which has since seen the light; and I am therefore obliged to say something to it, though otherwise I should much rather wave it; because it is wrote only to *scholars*, with whom it can do no harm; and because, I believe, you are sensible, before this time, how uncautious a thing it is to promise in the dark; and to be sponsor for another's performance so long beforehand. Dr. Whitby is a person that has done good service to the Church, and to the learned world; and one would be willing to throw a veil over his late misconduct in this controversy, did not the imprudent triumphs of others oblige us to take some notice of it. But let us come to the point: I shall shew you, in some short strictures upon the performance, how little you are to hope for from it; and how far it comes short of expectation. I will divide what I have to say into two kinds of observations:

1. Upon general fallacies, running through the whole book.

2. Upon particular defects, misquotations, misconstructions, misrepresentations, &c.

His principal and most general fallacy, is his making *essence* and *person* to signify the same. One *individual* or *numerical* essence, he everywhere interprets to a Sabellian sense; understanding by it one *individual Hypostasis*, or *real Person*. And this ridiculous sense he fixes upon [n] all that now pass for *orthodox;* and, I think too, upon the generality of those who have been reputed Catholics down from the Council of Nice: for he [o] charges Athanasius himself with it; who has been generally looked upon as the standard of orthodoxy in this article. The charge is weak and groundless, and more especially in regard to Bishop Bull; who is [p] known to have declared himself against

[n] Præf. p. 32. [o] Ibid.

[p] I shall here only cite one passage of Bishop Bull, speaking of Sandius; whose steps Dr. Whitby has too closely followed.

Auctor ille, ubique in libro suo illud pro certo et rato habet Homoousianorum, quos vocat, et Sabellianorum de Filio Dei sententiam prorsus eandem esse. Quo nihil a vero remotius est; siquidem supra clare ostendimus, neminem Dei Filium Patri ὁμοούσιον posse dicere, nisi absurde admodum et improprie, qui cum Sabellio sentiat. *D. F. N.* p. 148.

See also D. F. p. 230. Animadv. in Gilb. Clerke, p. 1004.

it, as frequently, as strongly, and as fully, as it was possible for a man to do. The learned *Examiner*, though [q] he seems to have known this, is forced to [r] pretend ignorance, to give the better colour to what he was going about. For, otherwise, who would not, at first sight, observe the peculiar extravagancy of the undertaking, to confute Bishop Bull, only by shewing that the Bishop has *not* proved what he never intended to prove, nor so much as believed, but rejected as heartily as the learned *Examiner* himself can do. However, since this was, in a manner, necessary, that the learned *Examiner* might *appear* at least to have something to say, all due allowances are to be made for it. Let us now observe how, in the entrance, he is pleased to state the general question.

"[s] Whether *all* the Ante-Nicene Fathers professed the very "same doctrine which *we ascribe* to the Nicene Council; that "is, whether all acknowledged the same *numerical* essence of "the Father to have been *communicated* to the Son and Holy "Ghost, and that therefore both are one God in *number* with "the Father."

See how many *guards* he has put in; as it were conscious of what he had taken in hand, and fearing lest otherwise there should not be left him strength sufficient to secure a handsome retreat. He does not say, the *generality* of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, but *all*; so that if there happens to be but one exception, he may still be safe and secure. Next, he does not say the doctrine of the Nicene Council, but which *we ascribe* to that Council: now, who can tell what *we* he means? Perhaps himself and two or three more. Then again, *same essence* will not serve, but it must be the same *numerical* essence: and this he interprets, everywhere throughout his book, in a Sabellian sense. So here the *state* of the *question* is entirely changed: and unless the Bishop has proved (which God forbid) that all the Ante-Nicene Fathers were heretics and something worse, professing what themselves condemned as heresy, he has not, it seems, done enough to satisfy the learned *Examiner*. Not content with this,

[q] See Modest. Disquisit. p. 107. where he charges Bishop Bull with holding a *specific* unity; and Præf. p. 31.

[r] Præf. p. 31.

[s] Utrum Patres OMNES Ante-Nicæni eandem QUAM Concilio Nicæno TRIBUIMUS sententiam amplexi sunt: hoc est, utrum omnes EANDEM NUMERO Patris essentiam Filio et Spiritui Sancto fuisse COMMUNICATAM, eoque nomine utrumque cum Patre *unum numero Deum* esse agnoverunt? *Proœm.* p. 2.

he demands further to have it proved that this same *numerical* essence, that is, (according to him,) *Person*, was *communicated* to two other *Persons;* and he has some pretence for cavil at the word [t]*communicated*. Yet, as if all this were not sufficient, it must be also by *interior production;* as he observes a little after in page 2, and he has some turns of wit upon the word [u]*production*. Was this the way to answer such a writer as Bishop Bull; a wise, grave, learned, judicious author, and one that was above trifling?

In short, the plain question between Bishop Bull and the Arians is only this: Whether the Ante-Nicene Fathers, in general, believed the Son to be of an *eternal, uncreated, immutable,* and strictly *divine* substance, or no? Bishop Bull maintained the affirmative, and has unanswerably proved it, in the opinion of most men of true learning and judgment, whether here or abroad. This is what the learned *Examiner* should neither have concealed nor disguised; but have frankly and honestly confessed, as he did [x]formerly. If, notwithstanding, the learned Prelate has not proved that the Fathers held a *numerical* essence, in the *Examiner's* sense, (such as he thinks necessary to preserve the unity,) the Bishop should not be represented as failing in the proof of what he intended; but should be given up for a *Tritheist*, and the Catholic Church with him, whose advocate he is, and with whom he stands or falls. This would have been the fair and ingenuous way; unless the learned *Examiner* would have undertaken to prove that the Fathers before the Nicene Council were of Arian principles, which he durst not do. What does it signify to shew that they were not Sabellians? Did Bishop Bull, or does any man of sense, pretend they were?

You may judge of the performance, from his stating the question so strangely; and his setting out with such diffidence, as if he thought the cause desperate. When you come to the book itself, you will find two thirds of it, in effect, little more than retreating to the Sabellian sense of *numerical* and *individual*, which is only so much impertinence. This is the principal

[t] Præf. p. 21.

[u] Ibid. p. 23.

[x] Opus aggredior quod Bullus nostras, pietate summa et doctrina vir præditus, atque in antiquitatis totius scriptis versatissimus, *opere ære perenniori*, ad *doctorum* invidiam, et *novatorum cordolium*, summo judicio et industria peregit. *Whitby, Tractat. de vera Chris. Deit.* pag. 59.

and the most general fallacy which he trusts to; and is, in a manner, the turn of the whole book.

He has another *general fallacy*, which he serves himself of sometimes; and it is this:

When he finds some expressions run pretty high and strong for the divinity of Christ, [y] he says the Arians used the same or the like expressions. There is very little force or weight in the argument: for it amounts only to this. The [z] Arians, perfect masters of dissimulation, and notoriously accustomed to equivocating, used such or such expressions, meaning little by them; therefore the Ante-Nicene writers, men of a very different stamp and character, meant no more by those expressions. But, besides this, it is well known that the [a] Arians, at first, did not use those high expressions of the Son, but came into them by degrees, as they found their doctrine too shocking to be endured in broad terms; and as they perceived the necessity of using Catholic language. We can easily shew, how, and when, and why the Arians were obliged to speak higher than they thought. But it can never be shewn that the Ante-Nicene Fathers were under any such temptation; or that they affected to speak otherwise than they really meant, or than they would be generally understood. They were plain open men; unacquainted with those principles of latitude, and studied refinements, which came in afterwards. I may use almost a parallel instance from what has been lately seen among ourselves. From the year 1712, Arians have been taught to subscribe the Nicene and Athanasian creeds. But our good forefathers would have thought it horrid prevarication to do it; they were not so subtle and refined: and therefore, though *subscription* is now no certain argument of men's sentiments, it was formerly; when men were otherwise instructed, and loved Christian plainness

[y] Præf. p. 4, 29. Lib. p. 8, 9, 40, 90, 109, 153, 157. and elsewhere.

[z] Scilicet tenebriones isti parati erant quamlibet fidei confessionem suo suffragio comprobare, quæ modo vocem ὁμοουσίου non haberet: etiamsi quoque in ea ponerentur verba alia quæ apud sanos omnes idem prorsus significarent. *Bull. D. F.* p. 285.

[a] Arianos Jesum Christum *Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine, vitam ex vita, ante omnia sæcula ex Deo Patre genitum* dixisse, Eusebio adhuc in vivis agente, me legisse non memini: utcunque postea, ad declinandam invidiam in publicis formulis has voces fraudulenter usurparent, &c. *Cav. Epist. Apologet.* p. 65.

Qui artes Eusebii, reliquorumque Arianorum vocum ambiguitate perpetuo abutentium, non olfaciet hac in re; ei quid aliud optem non video, præter nasum. *Cler. Epist. Crit.* ii. p. 52.

and simplicity. This may serve for a brief *general* answer to the learned *Examiner's* second *general* fallacy.

There is a third *general salvo*, which occurs pretty often; that the Ante-Nicene writers distinguish God from Christ, (that is, the Father from the Son,) and call the Father *God* absolutely: now, since the Post-Nicene writers do so too, and since nobody scruples it, even at this day; I need not give myself the trouble of any more particular answer. Thus far for the general fallacies, running through his performance: after which, it may be needless to take notice of any *particular* mismanagement; but, for a specimen, you shall have a few instances of his misquotations, misconstructions, misrepresentations, reviving of old and trite objections, concealing the answers, and the like.

To begin with *misquotations:* page 22. he cites part of Polycarp's *doxology*, recorded in the Epistle of the Church of Smyrna. There he [b]leaves out the two most material words, (σὺν αὐτῷ) on which the argument chiefly depended, and then insults over the learned Prelate.

Page 62. citing a passage from [c]Athenagoras, he changes πρὸς αὐτοῦ into πρὸς αὐτὸν, without giving any notice of it or reason for it; only to make a weak insinuation against the *divinity* of God the Son.

Page 75, 76. he has a citation from Methodius, part of which you may see above, (p. 357.) the remainder I have here set down in the [d]margin. After giving a construction diametrically opposite to the intent and *letter* of the author, he breaks out into this expression: [e]"See how he (Methodius) manifestly "acknowledges the Son to have been made, and before begotten," (that is all the sense that I can make of what he says,) "in spite of the Bishop." He might have said, in spite of grammar and common sense: nothing can be clearer than that passage of Methodius for the eternal generation of the Son; which he does not only assert, but guards it against the objection from that text, ("This day have I begotten thee,")

[b] He reads it δι' οὗ σοι ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ δόξα, instead of δι' οὗ σοι σὺν αὐτῷ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ δόξα. *Vid. Euseb.* l. iv. c. 15.

[c] Πρὸς αὐτοῦ γὰρ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο. *Athenag. Leg.* p. 38. Ox. ed.

[d] Τὸ δὲ ἐγὼ σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε, ὅτι προόντα ἤδη πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων, λέγει, ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, ἐβουλήθην καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ γεννῆσαι, ὁ δή ἐστι πρόσθεν ἀγνοούμενον γνωρίσαι. *Ap. Phot.* p. 960.

[e] En quam clare agnoscit Filium γεγονέναι et προγεγονέναι, factum et prægenitum esse, frustra præsule renitente. *Modest. Disq.* p. 76.

explaining it, not of any *temporal* generation, (for he allows no such thing,) but of *a* temporal *manifestation*.

Page 97. you may see how he deals with a modern author, the learned Dr. Cave. He first applauds his great knowledge of ecclesiastical antiquity, (in which he is extremely right,) and then cites a passage from him, which, as represented, seems to say, that many of the earliest Fathers were against Christ's divinity. He had done this once before in his [f]Preface, so that one may see he is pleased with the discovery. I have given the passage at large in the [g]margin, including that part in hooks which our learned *Examiner* has left out. The whole turns upon this; whether Dr. Cave, by *in quibus*, intended the same as *in quibus singulis*, in *every one* of the foregoing particulars, or rather in *many, or most* of them. It is impossible to prove that he meant it strictly of *every* one; and therefore no certain argument can be drawn from this passage: but I will give you a reason or two, why I think Dr. Cave did not, or could not so mean it. You will observe, that *de divinitate* stands by itself, as a distinct article; and very probably is to be construed *of the Deity:* Lactantius is [h]known to have had very absurd notions of the *Deity*, supposing God to have had a *beginning*, and to have *made himself*. Dr. Cave could never mean that Lactantius had ὁμοψήφους *complures*, *many of his mind*, in this article: and therefore could not intend *in quibus*, strictly, of *every* particular, but of the whole, and in the general. Then, as to Dr. Cave's judgment of the sense of the Fathers, in respect to the divinity of the Son and his eternal existence, it is so [i]well known, and so often appears in his

[f] Præf. p. 28.

[g] Nævos, qui in scriptis ejus (Lactantii) notantur, *de divinitate*, de æterna Filii existentia [de animarum præexistentia et futuro post hanc vitam statu, de fine sæculi et mille annorum imperio, de adventu Eliæ multos ad Dei cultum conversuro] aliisque capitibus, de quibus obscure, incaute, quandoque etiam periculose locutus sit, excusabunt, apud candidos rerum æstimatores, sæculi quo vixit circa istas res imperitia, dogmata ipsa paulo abstractiora, nec dum a theologis dilucide explicata nec synodorum decretis definita, et *in quibus* ὁμοψήφους habuit complures præcedentium sæculorum Patres. *Cav. Hist. Liter.* vol. i. p. 112.

[h] Lactant. Institut. l. i. c. 7.

[i] Sancti Patres Catholicæ Fidei Nicænorumque dogmatum testes sunt inconcussi, vindices acerrimi; qui fidem ab Apostolis traditam, a *majoribus* acceptam, ad nos usque propagarunt, acceptam vita. Voce, etiam sanguine suo confirmarunt, invictisque argumentis contra omnia hæreticorum molimina sartam tectam conservarunt; quique nullis sophismatibus flecti queunt, ut in *Unitariorum* causam testimonium dicant. Hinc illæ lachrymæ, hæc fundi calamitas. Adeo ut de antiquitate ecclesiastica dici potest, quod

writings, that he should not be presumed to contradict his declared and repeated sentiments, without a manifest necessity. Wherefore Dr. Whitby does a great injury to the memory of that good man, by taking an advantage of an *ambiguous* expression. To proceed.

Page 60. he tells us, that the titles of *τοῦ παντὸς ποιητὴς*, and *τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς*, (that is, *Creator* and *Framer* of the universe,) were such as the writers of that age (the second century) always distinguished the Father from the Son by. If he means that the Son had not then those or the like titles given him, it is a notorious untruth, (as you may see by the quotations [k]above, from Irenæus and Clemens Alexandrinus;) if he means only, that those and the like titles were *eminently* and *emphatically* given to the Father, that indeed is very true of the *second* century; and as true of all the *centuries* following, down to this present, as appears by our creeds; which, I suppose, is no great discovery.

In his Preface, (p. 32.) he misrepresents Basil as declaring against unity of *essence*, where the good Father intended nothing but against unity of *Person*. In the same page, he brings in [l]Athanasius, and interprets what he said against the *ὁμοούσιον*, as if it had been meant of the *ὁμοιούσιον*, betwixt which, that accurate Father always carefully distinguished. A little lower, he represents Athanasius as maintaining *numerical* identity; which (in the sense of the learned *Examiner*) is making him a Sabellian. Thus, it seems, he is to confute Bishop Bull, only by puzzling and confounding such things as that incomparable Prelate had made plain and clear.

Page 9. he represents Barnabas's Epistle, *ἐν νόθοις*, which he interprets *spurious*, (page 19.) neglecting and concealing in what sense [m]Eusebius had reckoned it in *ἐν νόθοις*· and what had been said by very [n]learned men in defence of it.

de *ratione* alicubi habet Malmsburiensis philosophus; ubicunque *ratio* homini repugnat, hominem ipsi *rationi* repugnaturum. *Cav. Epist. Apologet.* p. 17.

[k] Qu. xi. p. 384.

[l] Vid. Athanas. tom. i. p. 767. compare tom. ii. p. 31.

Athanasius distinguished very particularly, more than Hilary and some other Fathers did, between the *ὁμοούσιον* and the *ὁμοιούσιον*. He thought that to say the Son was only *like* God, was as much as *denying* him to be *God*: as if we should say a thing is only *like* silver, therefore not *silver*; or only *like* gold, therefore not *gold*. This was his sense of the matter.

[m] See Cave, Histor. Literar. vol. i. p. 11.

[n] Pearson. Vindic. p. 276, 282. Bull. D. F. p. 15. Pr. Trad. p. 3.

Page 23. he gives a partial account of the ancient *doxologia*. No one that has seen St. Basil, the eighth book of the Clementine Constitutions, Polycarp's Doxology, and the Church of Smyrna's, besides Clement of Alexandria's, and Hippolytus's, can make any reasonable doubt, whether *to* or *with* were not applied in *doxologies* to the *Son* or *Holy Ghost*, as well as *by*, *through*, or in, by the earliest Ante-Nicene writers. To pretend Athanasian forgeries in answer to all, is only giving up the point, with the ridiculous circumstance of appearing to maintain it.

His account of Justin Martyr is one continued misrepresentation, as may appear in some measure by comparing it with what hath been observed in these papers[o].

Page 61. he takes occasion from the Latin version to misrepresent Athenagoras, and to insinuate that the Son is not *like* the Father. If the Greek words be rendered, as they signify, *infecti*, *et facti*, the equivocation upon *genitus*, and therewith the argument, is lost.

Page 62. he undertakes another passage in Athenagoras, a very famous one, and of singular use in this controversy; plainly shewing the true and genuine sense of such Fathers as spoke of a temporal generation, and being of equal force both against Sabellians and Arians, as the [p]learned Prelate has judiciously and admirably demonstrated against Petavius, Sandius, and others. Sandius, being sensible of its weight and force, thought it the wisest way to say, that the place was corrupt; and being a man of wit, he invented something of a colour for it. Gilbert Clerke, afterwards, thought of a more plausible solution of the difficulty: but the learned [q]Bishop had too much *acumen* to let it pass. Last of all comes Dr. Whitby with a new device, which, I suppose, is entirely his own. You see the passage in the [r]margin. The words *οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον*, he construes thus; "not as eternally generated;" as if he had read *γεννώμενον*, supplying *ἀϊδίως* by imagination. The sense and meaning of the word [s]*γενόμενον* signifying *made*, or *created*, is so fixed and certain in

[o] See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 235, &c. of this edition, where Justin Martyr is vindicated at large.

[p] Bull. Def. F. N. p. 204, 205.

[q] See Bull, Animadv. in Gilb. Cl. Op. Post. p. 1052, 1053.

[r] Πρῶτον γέννημα εἶναι τῷ πατρὶ, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον, ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς, νοῦς ἀΐδιος ὢν, εἶχεν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον ἀϊδίως λογικὸς ὤν. *Athan. Leg.* c. x. p. 38.

[s] Ἕνα Θεὸν ἄγει τὸν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ποιητὴν, αὐτὸν μὲν οὐ γενόμενον, ὅτι τὸ ὂν οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν—. P. 21. Τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ, γένεσίν τε οὐκ ἔχον· ἢ τὶ τὸ γενόμενον μὲν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε. P. 67. Οὐ φύσει ὄντων, ἀλλὰ γενομένων. P. 68.

this author, that no doubt or scruple can be reasonably made of it. And that he intended to signify the Son's *immutable, eternal, necessary* existence, in this passage, is so manifest, that a man must be of a peculiar complexion that can so much as question it; especially considering the other high things said of the Son, by this author, in other places; some of which have been above cited. I mention not how the learned *Examiner* endeavours to elude them; putting off one with a jest, (p. 60.) pretending an *interpolation* for another, (p. 61.) and, for fear all should not suffice, retreating at length to his quibble upon the word *numerical.*

Page 108. he makes a ridiculous representation of Tertullian, as if that writer believed two *angels* to be as much *one*, as God the Father and God the Son are. I shall only [t]transcribe the passage, and trust it with the intelligent reader.

Page 110, 113. you find him tampering with Irenæus; first, insinuating as if that excellent [u]writer had supposed the "Son "was our Lord and God, according to the good pleasure of the "invisible Father;" but admitting the more probable construction to be, that every *knee might bow*, according to the *good pleasure* of the invisible Father.

It is well known that Irenæus [x]allows no *creature*, nothing that had a beginning, to be justly called *God;* [y]looks upon the notion of an *inferior God* as a contradiction; does not [z]admit that any *creature* can *create:* and yet he makes the Son [a]truly God, [b]*coeternal and* [c]*consubstantial* (though he uses not the very word) with God the Father; Creator of men, of angels, of all things. Testimonies of the last particular are so many and so clear, (some of which have been cited above,) that I need not here refer to them. In contradiction to all this, Dr. Whitby would persuade us (from two or three passages which say no such thing) that Irenæus resolved all the dignity of the Son into

[t] Et nos etiam sermoni atque rationi, itemque virtuti, per quæ omnia molitum Deum edximus, propriam substantiam *Spiritum* inscribimus; cui et *sermo* insit prænuntianti, et *ratio* adsit disponenti, et *virtus* perficienti. Hunc ex Deo prolatum didicimus, et prolatione generatum, et idcirco Filium Dei et Deum dictum, ex *unitate substantia*. Nam et *Deus Spiritus*.—— Ita de *Spiritu Spiritus* et de Deo *Deus*, ut *lumen* de *lumine* accensum. *Tertull. Apol.* c. xxi. p. 202. ed. Havercamp. Lugd.

[u] Iren. lib. i. c. 10. p. 48. ed. Bened.

[x] Iren. lib. iii. c. 8. p. 183. ed. Bened.

[y] Lib. iv. c. 2. p. 229.

[z] Lib. iv. c. 41. p. 288.

[a] Lib. iii. c. 6. p. 180. lib. iv. c. 6. p. 235.

[b] Lib. ii. c. 13. p. 132. lib. ii. c. 25. p. 153.

[c] Lib. iii. c. 21. p. 217. lib. ii. c. 13. p. 132. lib. ii. c. 25. p. 153.

the powers given him after his resurrection[d]. I may, upon this occasion, take notice of another [e]writer, who has lately misrepresented Irenæus. He imagines that the good Father supposed the Λόγος, or Word, as such, *passible*. The passages, which he builds this fiction upon, you have in the [f]margin, according to the last edition. The most that you can espy in them is, that the Λόγος *suffered* in the flesh: one of the quotations does not *certainly* say so much, but might bear another construction. It might as reasonably be pretended that the Λόγος, as such, was *visible*, and *comprehensible*, and changed into a *frail man*, as that he was *passible*: see the margin. All that Irenæus intended to prove against the *heretics* was, that the Λόγος was constantly united to the man Christ Jesus, and did not desert the *human nature* in the *passion*, it being [g]necessary that the suffering Redeemer should be both God and man: this is all the case. But to proceed with the learned *Examiner*.

Page 147. he represents Tertullian as making the Son, in his highest capacity, "ignorant of the day of judgment." Let the reader see the [h]whole passage, and compare it with another, four chapters lower; and from thence judge of Tertullian's

[d] Irenæus's genuine principles may be seen in one short sentence. Pater ——verbum suum visibile effecit omni fieri carni, incarnatum et ipsum, ut in omnibus manifestus fieret rex eorum. Etenim ea quæ judicantur, oportebat videre judicem, et scire hunc a quo judicantur. *Iren.* l. iii. c. 9. p. 184.

[e] Emlyn, Exam. of Dr. Bennet, p. 18. first edit.

[f] Solus vere magister Dominus noster; et bonus vere Filius Dei, et patiens, verbum Dei Patris Filius hominis factus. *Iren.* l. iii. c. 18. p. 211.

Ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ σὰρξ ἐγένετο, καὶ ἔπαθεν. L. i. c. 10. p. 50.

Compare the following places:

Verbum, unigenitus qui semper humano generi adest, et consparsus suo plasmati, secundum placitum Patris et caro factus, ipse est Jesus Christus Dominus noster, qui passus est. P. 206.

Ὃς καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ σαρκὶ, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ἔπαθεν ἐλεύσεται. P. 207. Conf. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. c. 15.

Invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis, et impassibilis passibilis, et Verbum homo. P. 206.

[g] See Irenæus, l. iii. c. 18. p. 211. See also the famous passage about *quiescence*, p. 213. which plainly supposes all that was suffering and low to belong to the *man* only, all that was high and great to the Λόγος, or divine nature.

[h] *Ignorans et ipse diem et horam ultimam, soli Patri notam;* disponens regnum discipulis, quomodo et sibi dispositum dicit a Patre, habens potestatem legiones angelorum postulandi ad auxilium a Patre si vellet, *exclamans quod se Deus reliquisset*, in Patris manibus Spiritum ponens. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c, xxvi. p. 516.

Habes ipsum *exclamantem* in passione, *Deus meus, Deus meus*, ut quid me dereliquisti? —— Sed hæc vox carnis et animæ, id est, hominis, non *Sermonis*, nec *Spiritus*, id est, non *Dei*, propterea emissa est, ut impassibilem Deum ostenderet, qui sic Filium dereliquit, dum hominem ejus tradidit in mortem. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c. xxx. p. 518.

meaning. No reasonable doubt can be made, but that Tertullian understood the Son's being *ignorant*, &c. in respect only of his *humanity*, as well as he understood the other things, mentioned together with it in the same paragraph. Such as consider how highly Tertullian, elsewhere, speaks of the Son, as being of one *undivided* substance with the Father, can make no question of it.

Here it will be proper to obviate a difficulty which may naturally, upon the first thoughts, arise in one's mind. Why should the Catholics so often urge the texts relating to Christ's *human* nature only, against the Sabellians? For it may seem that, if they thereby proved two *Hypostases*, they proved only a *divine* and a *human Hypostasis*; and there might still be but one *Hypostasis* in the *Godhead*, as the Sabellians pretended. But it is to be considered, that both Catholics and Sabellians were agreed in one point, that God was incarnate, the *divine* nature personally united to the *man Christ Jesus:* and the main question between them was, whether the Father himself made one Person with Christ's human nature, or no. If the Catholics could prove the *negative*, (as they could easily do,) then the Sabellians must, of course, and upon their own principles, acknowledge another *divine Hypostasis*, besides the Father. The Catholics therefore urged all the texts, wherever Christ speaks of himself as a *distinct* Person from the Father; though many of these texts are meant of him in his *human* capacity only. Had our Saviour *Christ* spoke of the Λόγος, or *Word*, in the same manner as he does of the Father: had he prayed to the Λόγος, or *Word*, complained of being forsaken by him; or had he said, I know not the day of judgment, but he, the Λόγος, or *Word*, does; it could never have been presumed, that the *I* and He, the Λόγος and *Christ*, made one *Person*. It appearing therefore, from that manner of expression, that the *Father* was not *personally* united with the human nature of Christ; this was sufficient against the Sabellians, who allowed that the man Christ Jesus was personally united with *God:* and if it could not be with the *Father*, it must of consequence be with another *divine Hypostasis*, a *distinct* and *real* Son of the Father. Thus you see the force and significancy of those texts (and of all texts which intimated a plain *personal* distinction between the *Father* and *Christ*) against the Sabellians. They shewed that the Person speaking was not the *Father*. And yet the Person who spake,

having (as both sides allowed) a *divine* and *human* nature, might speak of himself in different respects; in this or in that capacity. Thus, in regard to the Son's *ignorance of the day of judgment*, it is manifest that the *Father* and *Son* are there spoken of, as of two Persons; and one as *knowing*, the other as *not knowing*, though only in a certain respect: one *ignorant* in such a capacity, the other not ignorant in any capacity at all, as having never taken *human nature*, and therewith *human ignorance*, into a *personal* union with himself. Thus far to clear this point, and to acquit myself of a [i] promise made you some time ago.

I shall proceed a little further in remarking on your friend's performance. It is frequent with him to bring up old objections, neglecting and concealing the Bishop's answers. I shall give a few instances only, that I may not be tedious.

Page 17. he pretends that the Bishop has not shewn, that the Fathers of the *second century* resolved the unity into the same principle with the Nicene Fathers. Yet the Bishop [k] has shewn it, and Dr. Whitby allows as much in the very next page; and has nothing to retreat to but the miserable evasion about *individual*.

Page 84. he refers to Basil as an evidence that Gregory Thaumaturgus believed the Son to be a *creature*. This he again repeats in the next page; and again in his Preface, p. 10. Yet the fact is evidently false; Basil himself a full witness on the contrary side; and this Bishop Bull had [l] given notice of, and made clear to a demonstration. When a writer strains so hard to put a *false* sense upon another, there is no uncharitableness in believing that he gives us at least his *own true* meaning.

Page 87. he revives an old objection, which the learned Prelate had ingenuously [m] set forth in its full force; and given it as full an answer. Your friend is here pleased to speak with great contempt of the Bishop's answer; for no other reason, that I can see, but because he was not able to confute it. Being however resolved to say something, he stoutly denies a plain matter of fact. Οἰκονομία, says he, is never used by the Fathers, in the Bishop's sense. Please to turn to the places noted in the [n] margin, and judge whether the Bishop or he be the more

[i] Qu. vii. p. 339, note [s]. See Athanasius further, upon the thing whereof I have been speaking, vol. i. p. 261.

[k] Bull. D. F. sect. iv. c. 4.

[l] Ibid. p. 155. 156, 157.

[m] Ibid. p. 267.

[n] Tertullian. adv. Prax. c. 2, 3. Clem. Alexandr. p. 831, 955. Tatian.

faithful and accurate in this matter. If any thing further be wanting in defence of Bishop Bull, in this article, let him speak for himself, in another [o] work, in answer to Gilbert Clerke; who, it seems, was much offended at the *οἰκονομία*, grieved, as he well might, to see his most pompous and plausible pretences entirely baffled by it. I should weary my reader, and myself too, if I went on remarking every place where old objections are brought up, and either none or very slight notice taken of the answers: if you have a mind to compare, you may note some pages referred to in [p] the margin. I shall proceed no further in this tedious and disagreeable employment; except it be to observe to you one peculiar piece of management, which I leave you to reflect on. The learned *Examiner* labours, for [q] two pages together, to shew that Clemens of Rome was far from speaking or thinking so highly of our blessed Lord, as St. Paul did. A little after, [r] he proposes Clemens to us as a very good interpreter of Scripture; and commends him highly, for laying Christianity before us in its naked simplicity. What can we think of this? The

c. 8. ed. Ox. Hippolytus contr. Noët. p. 12, 15.

Valesius had observed the thing long ago, and without any view to controversy.

Vetus omnis Christianorum theologia Deo quidem Patri monarchiam attribuit, Filio vero et Spiritu Sancto *οἰκονομίαν*, id est, administrationem et dispensationem. *Vales. Not. ad Euseb.* p. 5, 6. See also p. 90, 253.

[o] Bull's Posth. Works, p. 1045, 1046, 1047, &c.

[p] Modest. Disquisit.	Bull's Def. F.
Page 27.	Page 258, 120, 70.
29.	66.
30.	165.
40.	69. Judic.
50.	217.
62.	205.
69.	119.
74.	161, 162, 163.
77.	165—80, 111, 136.
82.	118.
95.	168, 202, 964.
96.	169.
107.	206.
109.	41.
120.	77.
122.	77, 78.
141.	261.
169.	293.

[q] Aliter plane D. Paulus loquitur: ——Argumento potius est Clementem de Christo aliter plane quam Paulum sensisse——magnam suspicionem injicit, eadem Clementem cum Paulo minime docuisse. *Whitb. Disq.* p. 14, 15.

[r] Solus Clemens Christianæ Fidei simplicitatem præ oculis lectoris ponit. *Whitb. Disq.* p. 19.

best construction I can make of it is, that he intended in p. 14, 15, not St. Paul himself, but St. Paul as now generally understood: and so he was to insinuate something, which was not fit to be expressed. But a man of art would have conducted better; would not have discovered himself so soon, but have trusted more to the sagacity of his reader. This manner of proceeding, in an important cause, is what I cannot account for. It seems to me, that if there be not reasons of conscience obliging a *good* man to speak out, there are always reasons of prudence which should make a *wise* man hold his tongue.

You may perceive, by this time, that Bishop Bull's book is like to stand, till something much more considerable appears against it. Several attempts of this kind have been made before; but to as little purpose: and if there be ever so many more, by ever so good hands, I will venture to say, they will succeed no better. The book will stand as long as clear sense, sound reasoning, and true learning have any friends left. The main substance of it is not to be confuted; any more than you can extinguish truth, or put out the light of the sun. The Fathers have been tried, and are found *faithful:* what they defended while living, the *divinity* of our blessed Lord, against the insults of Jews, Pagans, and Heretics, they still maintain in their works: and their works will be held in great esteem and veneration, while every weak attempt to blast their credit will meet with what it justly deserves——I was going to say what, but it may sound severe: I proceed to another Query.

QUERY XXVII.

Whether the learned Doctor may not reasonably be supposed to say, the Fathers are on his side, *with the same meaning and reserve as he pretends our* Church forms *to favour him; that is, provided he may interpret as he pleases, and make them speak his sense, however contradictory to their own: and whether the true reason, why he does not care to admit the testimonies of the Fathers as* proofs, *may not be, because* they are against him?

IN answer to this, you tell me, that it contains only an *invidious* suggestion, not any *argument.* The suggestion, I do assure you, is just, and *argumentative* too; and was *kindly* intended towards you; that you might not take things implicitly

and upon trust from others, but might examine them first yourself, and then pass a judgment of them. As to the *invidious* appearance of it; had I ever intended, or in the least thought of making the Queries public, you might, with a better grace, have told me of it. But as I had not the liberty of revising my papers, nor so much as any previous apprehension of your design, (presuming all along the very contrary, as I reasonably might,) these things considered, I hope the *invidious* part you will take to yourself; the *argument* (for an *argument* it is, in its kind) you may leave to me. It is of some moment to us, not only to have the primitive writers on our side, (as we plainly have,) but to have them *thought* so too. The learned Doctor has made some pretences that way; and they are of weight with such readers as are not duly apprehensive of the Doctor's uncommon manner of setting things off, with great advantage to his cause, and as great detriment to truth. Two reasons are intimated, in the Query, why his claim to *antiquity* ought to have the less force with considering men: first, because he lays claim to our Church's *forms;* which every common reader may see are directly against him; and secondly, because, notwithstanding his appeal to *antiquity*, he is wiser than to put the matter upon that issue. He endeavours to lessen the esteem of the ancients, all the while that he presumes they are on his side, (a sure mark that he suspects them,) and is securing a retreat when they fail him; as they certainly will, whenever strictly inquired into. I would leave it with any discerning man (who cannot examine further into the merits of the cause) to judge, whether it be at all likely, that those who speak always contemptibly of the ancients, and endeavour to the utmost to abuse and expose them, can reasonably be presumed to have a greater interest in them, than they who speak honourably and handsomely of them; who defend their character, and have, as it were, an affectionate tenderness and concern for them. Thus much for the second reason intimated in the Query. As to the first reason suggested, the import of it is this. If the learned Doctor can espy *Arianism* in our Liturgy or Articles, where it certainly is not; he may reasonably be supposed to mistake as much among the Fathers. He sees, in our Liturgy, the doctrine of one God the Father, *inclusive* of Son and Holy Ghost; but does not see one God *exclusive* of both; which is his doctrine. He finds a *subordination* of *order* taught in our public forms;

but does not find any subordination or inferiority of *nature;* which is his principle. And yet, upon these slight grounds, he scruples not to say, that the [s]*main branches* of his own doctrine are *expressly affirmed* in our Liturgy; meaning, by a tacit *consequence* of his own making. And since this *consequential*, that is, *imaginary*, countenance is all that he can claim from our Liturgy, and all that he really means, when he says the Church's forms are on his side; possibly he may mean no more, when he speaks of the Fathers. The generality of readers, it may be, understand him, as if he had intended to say, that the Ante-Nicene writers especially had declared against the *coeternity* and *consubstantiality* of the Son, the points in question: but I humbly conceive he intended no more than this; that the Ante-Nicene writers have declared something, which, he really believes, does by *consequence* destroy the *consubstantiality*, &c., though, at the same time, those writers admitted no such *consequence;* but *expressly* and *constantly* disowned it. This is all that he *can mean*, with respect to our Liturgy; and therefore, probably, all he *does mean*, in respect of the other; or however, certain I am, that it is all he *should mean*. Now you see the full of my argument. If it look *invidious*, I cannot help it; I am persuaded it is just; and I think it of as much importance to our readers to have the matter fairly stated, as it is that truth may not be smothered; nor any stress laid upon the Doctor's citations, beyond what they do really bear. The learned Doctor owns, as to Post-Nicene Fathers, that they are, in the whole, against him. And he should have owned as much of the generality, at least, of the Ante-Nicene Fathers too; and then he has no claim to any thing but *concessions;* of which he endeavours to make the utmost advantage *three* ways. First, by making more *concessions* than there really are: secondly, by representing those *concessions* in so promiscuous and confused a light, that a common reader cannot readily distinguish when or where the Doctor intended the full and entire meaning of an author, or a *concession* only: thirdly, by slipping his own conclusion upon those *concessions*, as if they were the same thing; though there really is no connection between them, no just consequence from one to the other. I would not be knowingly guilty of charging the Doctor falsely, in these or in any other particulars, for any con-

[s] Script. Doctr. p. 379. first ed.

sideration; and therefore it may be expected of me, that I explain myself more at large; which accordingly I shall do, in the order and method which I have already laid down.

I. The learned Doctor has taken several passages for *concessions*, which are really none: but only as he has given them such a particular air and aspect; either by *prefacing* them, and holding out a false light to the reader; or by *commenting* upon them; or by *ill translating* of them. I shall proceed to particulars; and you must not take it amiss, if we call upon you to return us back what you have unfairly wrested from us.

Scripture Doctrine, page 3. the Doctor produces a passage of Athanasius, part of which, so far as concerns us, you see in the [t]margin; with so much further as is necessary to clear the sense of the author. The Doctor's version runs thus: "For "he (*the Father*) is the one God, and the only one, and the "first. And yet *these things do not destroy the divinity of the* "*Son*." This rendering is flat and low; and neither answers the *intent* nor *letter* of the author. Οὐκ εἰς ἀναίρεσιν, literally, is, *not to exclude the Son:* plainly meaning not to exclude him from being the *one God*, and the *only one*, and the *first*, together with the Father. And so Athanasius interprets himself in the words immediately following: for he (*the Son*) also is πρῶτος, the *first*, the fulness of the Godhead of him who is the *first*, and *only* God. You will observe that the Doctor renders ἀπαύγασμα, as if it had been ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, *brightness of glory:* which is again concealing and stifling the sense of the author. Athanasius intended to signify the Son's *issuing* or *streaming* forth, as it were, from the Father's substance, as light from the sun; which meaning is lost and sunk in the Doctor's translation. You see then that this passage, when rightly understood, is entirely against the Doctor; and therefore ought not to be reckoned amongst *concessions*.

Let us go on to another, in the very same page, alias p. 4. (the passage you have in the [u]margin.) The Doctor renders it thus: "The true God, who is *most* strictly and absolutely such,

[t] Εἷς γὰρ Θεὸς καὶ μόνος καὶ πρῶτός ἐστιν· οὐκ εἰς ἀναίρεσιν δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ λέγεται· μὴ γένοιτο. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ, καὶ πρώτῳ, καὶ μόνῳ, ὡς τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ μόνου καὶ πρώτου καὶ μόνος λόγος, καὶ σοφία, καὶ ἀπαύγασμα ὤν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ πρῶτος καὶ αὐτὸς, πλήρωμα τῆς τοῦ πρώτου καὶ μόνου θεότητος ὅλος καὶ πλήρης ὢν Θεός. *Athanas.* 3. *Orat. contr. Arian.* p. 556. ed. Bened.

[u] Τὸν ἀληθινὸν καὶ ὄντως ὄντα Θεὸν, τὸν τοῦ Χριστοῦ πατέρα. *Athan. contr. Gent.* p. 9.

"even the Father of Christ." Here the English reader must needs think that, if the Father be *most* strictly, he is *more* strictly God than Christ is; especially when nothing appears in the passage to compare the Father with, but Christ. Under this view, indeed, the passage cited is a very great *concession*: but, in the Greek, there is no *concession* at all. The just and *literal* rendering of the passage is this: "The true God, who in reality "is such, namely, the Father of Christ." You must know, that Athanasius is here exhorting the Gentiles to turn from their dumb idols, to serve the living God. In opposition to what he calls [x] *οὐκ ὄντα*, *things* which have no *real* or but *precarious* existence, and [y] *οὐκ ὄντα τοιαῦτα*, *things* which were not *such as the heathens imagined*, i. e. not *divine*, he advises them to come over to the *Father of Christ*; whose property it is to exist in *reality*, and who is *truly* and *strictly* God. This is no more than Athanasius would have said of the Son; and [z] indeed has said, (in other words,) in that very treatise; and therefore you may please to strike this passage also out of the number of *concessions*.

The learned Doctor goes on in the same way (page 4.) and in another passage, instead of *far above all created being*, (which the Greek words signify, and which is the *certain* meaning of the author,) he chooses to say, "far above all derivative being;" insinuating to his reader as if the Son were to be included under *derivative being*; than which nothing can be further from the sense of the author in that very page; as I have observed [a] before, on another occasion. All the *concession* that is there, lies only in the Doctor's *translation*, and the turn he gives to it in the sequel: Athanasius himself has granted nothing that can do you any service; at least, not in that passage; and therefore let that also return to us again.

Page 89. (alias 79.) the Doctor cites a passage of Eusebius, which, he says, "expresses the unanimous sense of the Catholic "Church:" and it may be true, as it lies in Eusebius. But, as it is represented in the Doctor's translation, excluding the Son from any proper *efficiency* in the work of creation, it is diametri-

x Vid. Athanas. ibid. p. 7, 8.

y Ibid. p. 27.

z Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ὤν ἐστι, καὶ οὐ σύνθετος. διὸ καὶ ὁ τούτου λόγος ὤν ἐστι, καὶ οὐ σύνθετος, ἀλλ' εἷς καὶ μονογενὴς Θεὸς——ὡς ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ, καὶ αὐτῷ ὄντι Θεῷ, τὴν σύμπασαν διακυβερνᾶ καὶ καθίστησιν. *Athan. contr. Gent.* p. 40.

a Qu. xii. p. 391.

cally opposite to the *unanimous sense* of the ancients, and to Eusebius too; as hath been shewn above[b].

Page 100, 101. (alias 92.) the learned Doctor has two citations from Chrysostom and Basil; who interpret the texts, of *power*, as the Doctor also does of *power*. But if the Doctor means one thing by *power*, and they another, and the *ideas* be entirely different; their interpretation and his must be as different as the *ideas* are: and it is not fair to quote them as agreeing in the *thing*, when they agree only in the *name*. I have [c]before took notice how the Doctor dealt with Chrysostom, in order to conceal the good Father's true meaning. I shall here observe, how he perverts Basil's sense, by a small and seemingly slight turn in his translation. [d]Basil's words are *ἴσον καὶ ταυτοῦ κατὰ δύναμιν*; that is, *equal and the very same with respect of power*. The Doctor drops *equal*, which would have discovered Basil's meaning; and renders it, "one and the same in power." And thus Basil's words, which are utterly repugnant to the Doctor's *hypothesis*, are improved into a *concession* in favour of it.

Page 102. (alias 94.) he gives us a low and lame construction of a noble passage in [e]Irenæus. The words *κατὰ τὸ θεῖκὸν καὶ ἔνδοξον* he renders, "in a divine and glorious manner:" the true rendering is, *in his divine and glorious character:* namely, that which he had as God, and Son of God. Irenæus, in that chapter, is representing the Son as acting at different times in a different character or capacity. When he appeared to the Patriarchs, then he acted in his highest capacity, in his *divine* character. What that *character* is, [f]Irenæus explains, a little above in the same chapter: it is, as he is the *Word*, the *Framer* (or Maker) "of all things, who sitteth upon the cherubims, "and containeth all things," who is the Son of God, and God. This shews what is meant by the *τὸ θεῖκὸν καὶ ἔνδοξον*, and at the same time shews that, according to Irenæus, the *Λόγος*, who

[b] Qu. xi. p. 381.

[c] Qu. xxiii. p. 489.

[d] *Σαφῶς τὸ ἐν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ταυτοῦ κατὰ δύναμιν παραλαμβάνων. Basil. contr. Eun.* l. i. p. 35.

[e] *Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῖς μὲν πρὸ Μωυσέως πατριάρχαις, κατὰ τὸ θεῖκὸν καὶ ἔνδοξον ὡμίλει· τοῖς δὲ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ἱερατικὴν——τάξιν ἀπένεμεν· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος, &c. Iren.* l. iii. c. 11. p. 191.

[f] *Ὁ τῶν ἁπάντων τεχνίτης λόγος, ὁ καθήμενος ἐπὶ τῶν Χερουβὶμ, καὶ συνέχων τὰ πάντα. Iren.* p. 190.

Ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἡγεμονικὴν αὐτοῦ——καὶ ἔνδοξον γενεάν.

Illam quæ est a Patre, principalem, et efficabilem, et gloriosam generationem ejus enarrat, dicens sic, "In "principio erat Verbum, et Verbum "erat apud Deum, et Deus erat "Verbum," et "omnia per ipsum "facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est "nihil." *Ibid.* 191.

is God, then acted in his own proper character, and not
Person of the *Father* only, which the Doctor would infer
this passage. For it must be observed that the Son wa
(John i. 1.) before the time that he is supposed by the Doc
have acted ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, as God's *representative:* and it
that *antecedent* character Irenæus speaks; as is plain fro
referring to John i. 1.

Page 115. (alias 106.) he cites a place of Justin Martyr,
he renders the words which you see in the margin thus
" was not God the Creator of the universe, which then s
" Moses, that he was the God of Abraham, and the G
" Isaac, and the God of Jacob." An uncautious reader
imagine from this passage, put into this view, that the Son
God absolutely, nor *Creator* of the universe, according to J
But the meaning is, that that divine Person, who called *hi*
God, and was God, was not the Person of the *Father*, (
ordinary character is that of *Maker of all things,*) but an
divine Person, viz. God the Son. The unlearned reader sh
be told, that what is here said by Justin was in dispute
a Jew, who would not acknowledge more *divine* Persons
one. It was Justin's business to shew, that there was a *d*
Person, one who was God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,
was not the Father; and therefore there were two *d*
Persons. The learned Doctor, upon his principles, could
in that way, have confuted the Jew; so far as I apprehen
Justin's argument: for the Jew might reply, that it was
angel speaking *in the Person of God;* and that therefore
Father only was *God* notwithstanding. But Justin insists
it, that there was another Person, besides the Father, who
really " God of Abraham," &c. If this is to be taken for a
cession, it may be easily seen on what side it is.

Page 116. (alias 108.) the Doctor does not justice to Hil
Instead of *called* Lord and God, which is *diminutive,* it sh
have been, *delared to be* Lord and God: but this may ap
slight. Such another slight inaccuracy appears in his affec
to translate *God his Father,* instead of *God the Father,* (p.
179.) which however shews too much leaning to a cause;
helps to convey a false idea to the English readers.

Page 251. (alias 218.) he has a long citation from Novati

ε Οὐχ ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων ἔσται Θεὸν Ἀβραὰμ, καὶ Θεὸν Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Θεὸς ὁ τῷ Μωσεῖ εἰπὼν αὐτὸν εἶναι Ἰακώβ. *Justin. Mart. Dial.* 180. Je

in which all proceeds so fair and plausible, that a reader, already possessed with the Doctor's scheme, and carrying it in his head, may think that every thing falls in naturally with it. But, at length, the Doctor comes to [h] some cross words, and such as, if suffered to appear, would have made the reader construe all backwards, and have given quite another light to all that goes before or after. Here he stops short, breaks off in the middle of a sentence, passes over the offensive words, draws a line, skips to the next sentence, and goes gravely on to amuse his reader. A writer is not to be blamed, in some cases, for taking what is to his purpose, and omitting the rest: but, as the case is here, the best, and indeed only light, to direct the reader to the true meaning of what is cited, is left out. The word *divinity*, for instance, (which occurs twice in that passage,) an English reader will be apt to take in the Doctor's sense; and indeed can hardly do otherwise: but had the whole appeared, he could not but see how much the Doctor is mistaken. I must observe to you, that (p. 336, 337.) the Doctor deals with Novatian, and this very passage, almost in the same manner, again; excepting that, growing a little bolder, he takes more freedom in his translation. Mind the words (p. 337.) by the Son in [i] *acknowledgment* returned; and compare *per substantiæ communionem*, a little before. Novatian, in this place, had no thought of *acknowledgments*, nor any thing like it: but was intent upon quite another thing; explaining and illustrating, as well as he was able, the union and communion of *substance* in Father and Son; and shewing how all recurs to one head and fountain: on which account the Father might be reasonably styled the one God, inasmuch as the Son is so intimately one with him, as to be reckoned, in a manner, to him, and not another God from him. It is all but one *divinity*, or *divine substance*, of the Father in both.

Page 254. we may observe another turn by way of translation. The [k] Greek you may see in the margin, which the

[h] Unus Deus ostenditur verus et æternus Pater, a quo solo hæc vis divinitatis emissa, *etiam in Filium tradita et directa rursum per substantiæ communionem ad Patrem revolvitur*. Deus quidem ostenditur Filius cui divinitas tradita et porrecta conspicitur, et tamen nihilominus unus Deus Pater probatur. *Novat.* c. 31.

[i] The Latin is, *reciproco meatu* illa majestas atque divinitas ad Patrem qui dederat eam rursum ab illo ipso Filio missa revertitur et retorquetur. *Ibid.*

[k] Ὅτι δὲ ὁ σαρκωθεὶς Κύριος καὶ Θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ Πατὴρ οὐκ ἐστὶν, οὐδ', ὡς ἐκεῖνοι φαῖεν, ὁ μόνος Θεὸς, ἅπασαι μαρτυροῦσιν αἱ θεῖαι γραφαί. *Athan. contr. Sabell.* p. 47.

Doctor renders thus: "That Jesus Christ, our Lord and God "incarnate, is not the Father, nor, as the Sabellians would have "it, that same Person who is styled the only God; this the "Holy Scriptures everywhere testify." The literal and plain translation is thus: *That Jesus Christ, our Lord and God incarnate, is not the Father, nor (in the Sabellian sense) the only God, the Holy Scriptures everywhere testify.* This meaning, you see, is clear, plain, and easy, without the Doctor's embarrassments; and is undoubtedly the true sense of the author. But such a hint as this might have made an unlucky discovery to the reader; namely, that a man may believe the Son to be the *only God*, without being a Sabellian.

In the same page, the Doctor has another quotation from Athanasius, (if that treatise be his,) which, had he gone on but a few words further, would have appeared contradictory to the purpose for which it was brought. "[l]There is but one "God, because one Father; but the Son also is God, having "a sameness with the Father, as a Son; not that he is the "Father himself, but in nature united with the Father; two "indeed in number, but one entire essence." This is the whole sentence literally translated; and the sense of it is clear. The cutting it into halves, only to represent one part under another view, is not giving the sense of a writer, but *making* one for him.

Page 255. (alias 222.) the Doctor cites another passage from Athanasius; and, by the turn he gives it, stifles the true sense of the author: "[m]The Word has no other sort of divinity, but "that which he derives from the only God, as being begotten of "him."

The true construction is this:

"The Word has no other kind of divinity, but that of the only "God; because he is begotten of him." The plain meaning is, that the Godhead of Father and Son is all one: directly contrary to what the Doctor cites the passage for. After I had wrote this, I found that the Doctor himself (p. 317, alias 285.) had translated the sentence in the very same words that I have

[l] Εἷς Θεὸς, ὅτι καὶ πατὴρ εἷς· Θεὸς δὲ καὶ υἱὸς, ταυτότητα ἔχων, ὡς υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα· οὐκ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ πατὴρ, ἀλλ' ἡνωμένος πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τῇ φύσει· δύο μὲν ἀριθμῷ, μία δὲ οὖσα οὐσία τελεία. *Ibid.* p. 41.

[m] Μίαν ἀρχὴν οἴδαμεν, τόν τε δημιουργὸν λόγον φάσκομεν οὐχ ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον ἔχειν θεότητος, ἢ τὸν τοῦ μόνου Θεοῦ, διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πεφυκέναι. *Atham. contr. Arian. Orat.* iii. p. 564. ed. Bened.

done; excepting his putting *derived*, (instead of *begotten*,) which might convey a low idea to his reader. But, not content with that, for fear a sagacious reader should chance to discover the true sense of the author, he inserts a note upon *divinity*; interpreting it (*divine power*) in contradiction to the author's known ordinary sense of *θεότης*, as well as to the context.

P. 256. (alias 223.) he cites [n] Gregory Nazianzen, and translates him thus: "There is but one God; the Son and the Holy "Ghost being referred to the one cause." But then he adds a note, which confounds all: "namely," says he, "as being divine "Persons by whom the one God, or one cause and original of "all things, made and governs the world." Right; if we are to teach the Fathers how to speak: but what said Gregory Nazianzen? It is this: "We may, as I conceive, preserve (*the* "*doctrine of*) one God, by referring both the Son and Holy "Ghost to one cause without composition or confusion; and by "asserting (as I may say) one and the same movement and "will of the Godhead, together with the sameness of essence." Here is not a syllable about the one God's governing the world by his Son and his Spirit; which, though a true notion, is not sufficient to account for the *unity*; nor is it Gregory's account of it, as the reader must have imagined from the Doctor's comment.

Page 323. (alias 292.) the learned Doctor, by wrong pointing and mistranslating, perverts a passage of Justin Martyr. But I have explained and vindicated the true sense of it [o] elsewhere.

P. 325. (alias 293.) he produces an excellent passage of Irenæus, and translates it justly. But fearing it may be found too high, he subjoins a lessening note, to draw off the reader's thoughts. "This passage," says he, "is parallel to those "wherein he calls the Son and Spirit the hands of the Father; "namely, *executing his will as perfectly* as a man's own hands "perform the will of the man." But why may it not be rather *parallel* to those passages wherein the author says, the *Son* and *Holy Spirit* are (in a qualified sense) the very *self* of the Father!

[n] Τηροῖτο δ' ἄν, ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς Λόγος, εἷς μὲν Θεὸς, εἷς ἐν αἴτιον καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ πνεύματος ἀναφερομένων· οὐ συντιθεμένων, οὐδὲ συναλειφομένων· καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἓν καὶ ταυτὸ τῆς θεότητος, ἵνα οὕτως ὀνομάσω, κίνημά τε καὶ βούλημα. καὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ταυτότητα. *Greg. Naz. Orat.* xxix. p. 490. ed. Paris.

[o] Qu. viii. p. 350.

They are here called his *own offspring*, and *his own figure*; and *all the angels* are said to *serve and do obeisances* to them. Does not this sound something higher than *executing* the Father's *will*, however *perfectly*? Or, than the low *metaphor* about a *man* and his *hands*, as the Doctor represents it? True, Irenæus, and many other of the Fathers, used that expression, which they took from Scripture; but they understood a great deal more by it; the same as by [p]δύναμις, or *virtus*, the *mighty power* of God, and God himself.

In the same page he cites another excellent passage of [q]Irenæus; and I am glad to have this opportunity of setting before the reader, in its true light, so illustrious a testimony of a *coeternal* and *coessential* Trinity. The *literal* translation of the Greek may run thus; "Man being *created* and *fashioned*, "is *made* after the image and likeness of the *uncreated* God: "the Father *designing* and giving out orders; the Son executing "and creating; the Holy Ghost supplying nutriment and in-"crease." Here you will observe, that the joint operations of the three divine Persons, concurring in the creation of man, are set forth in such a manner, as to intimate both the distinct personality and unity of essence. That Irenæus supposed the three Persons to be the one ἀγέννητος Θεὸς, or *eternal God*, here spoken of, may appear; 1. From his introducing the three Persons immediately after, as explanatory of it[r]. 2. From [s]his understanding Gen. i. 26. of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, *Let* US *make*; and also, *after* OUR *image*; so that the image of any one is the image of all. 3. From Irenæus's other known principles; his asserting the Son to be *infectus*, or ἀγέννητος, (*uncreated*; and supposing the Son and Holy Ghost to be the [t]*self* of the Father; and speaking of Father and Son together, as *one* God. 4. From several hints in the same chapter, all confirming this sense. One character of the ἀγέννητος, there

p Vid. Tertull. contr. Hermog. c. 45. Euseb. in Psalm. p. 701, 722. Athanas. p. 214, 880. ed. Bened. Hieron. tom. iv. p. 49. ed. Bened. Basil. contr. Eunom. l. v. p. 111.

q Ὁ γεννητὸς καὶ πεπλασμένος ἄνθρωπος κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου γίνεται Θεοῦ· τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς εὐδοκοῦντος καὶ κελεύοντος, τοῦ δὲ υἱοῦ πράσσοντος καὶ δημιουργοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ πνεύματος τρέφοντος καὶ αὔξοντος. *Iren.* l. iv. c. 38. p. 285.

r Compare a passage of Hippolytus cited above, p. 287.

s Manus Dei ad quas Pater loquens, dicit, FACIAMUS *hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem* NOSTRAM. *Iren.* l. v. c. 1. p. 293.

Idem ipse qui initio plasmavit Adam, cum quo et loquebatur Pater: FACIAMUS *hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem* NOSTRAM, l. 5, c. 15. p. 312. Vid. et l. iv. c. 20. p. 253.

t Lib. ii. c. 30. p. 163.

given, is τέλειος: the same character is, in the same chapter, [u]applied to the Son, in the same sense. All things but the ἀγέννητος are said to be *in* [x]*subjection:* among which things Irenæus can never be supposed to include the Son and Holy Spirit. And further, every thing that is not ἀγέννητος, comes short of perfection, according to [y]Irenæus; who, at the same time, asserts the perfection of the Son, as before said. These things considered, the meaning of Irenæus, in this passage, appears to be, that the three divine Persons are one eternal, or *uncreated* God, as also one *Creator*. How then came the Doctor to cite such a passage, which threatens nothing but ruin and destruction to his principles? The case is this: the learned Doctor, by a strange oversight, read τοῦ μὲν Θεοῦ, instead of τοῦ μὲν Πατρὸς, though both the Greek and the old Latin agree in this last reading. This alteration, in the *text*, spoils all the elegance, and alters the whole turn of the sentence: besides this, the Doctor translates ἀγεννήτου, *unbegotten*, instead of *unmade;* not observing the *antithesis*, between γεννητὸς ἄνθρωπος, and ἀγεννήτου Θεοῦ, nor attending to *infecti Dei*, in the old translation; which might have set him right. Thus far I have gone on with some of the Doctor's quotations; but give me leave to step back for a few more, which I have overlooked.

Page 308. (alias 276.) the learned Doctor produces a passage of [z]Basil, which he renders thus, very surprisingly; "We af-"firm that, according to the natural order of *causes* and *effects*, "the Father must have the preeminence before the Son." Who ever heard before from any Catholic, that the Son was an *effect* of the Father? Could Basil say this? If the Doctor would but have suffered the very next immediate words, which make part of the sentence, to appear, they would have undeceived his reader. The literal construction of the whole sentence is this: "We do indeed allow that, in respect of the natural order of "(*emanative*) causes, and things issuing from them, the Father "is *prior* in *order* to the Son: but as to any difference in "*nature*, or *priority* of time, we allow no such thing." Basil had

[u] Υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ τέλειος ὤν. p. 284.

[x] Τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα ἐν ὑποταγῇ μένει τοῦ Θεοῦ. p. 285.

[y] Καθὸ δὲ μή ἐστιν ἀγέννητα, κατὰ ταῦτο δὲ ὑστεροῦνται τοῦ τελείου. p. 283.

[z] Ἡμεῖς δὲ, κατὰ μὲν τὴν τῶν αἰτίων πρὸς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν σχέσιν, προτετάχθαι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα φαμέν· κατὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς φύσεως διαφορὰν, οὐκέτι, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου ὑπεροχήν. *Basil. contr. Eun.* l. i. p. 31.

just before [a] explained what he meant by the Father's being *prior* in order of *causality*, by the instance of *fire*, and *light* streaming from it.

Page 317. (alias 285.) the Doctor has another citation from [b] Basil, which he renders thus: "Therefore our Lord saith, "*all mine are thine*, as referring to the Father, the original "cause of all things; and *thine are mine*, as signifying that "from the Father was derived to him the power of producing "things." The true rendering is thus, very near the *letter:* "Therefore our Lord saith, *all mine are thine*, inasmuch as the "original of the *creatures* is referred up to the Father; and "*thine are mine*, inasmuch as the power of *creating* descends "from him to the Son:" that is, with his *essence*, as Basil explains it a little after. The Doctor, I presume, did not care that his reader should know how clearly Basil distinguishes the Son from the (δημιουργήματα) *creatures;* and not only so, but supposes the *creatures* of the *Father* to be *creatures* of the *Son* likewise. The Doctor intended something by *all things*, in one place, and *things* only, in the other. But Basil is unconcerned in it.

I must just take notice, how particularly fond the learned Doctor is of the phrase, *was produced*, (see p. 275, 277, 281, 291.) which he uses frequently, without any warrant from the *authors* he translates; and for no other reason, that I can see, but because it is apt to convey a low idea (the *idea* of a *creature*, though the Doctor does not like the *name*) to the English reader.

I shall proceed no further in this article, having given instances enough to shew that some abatements and allowances should be made us, for such *concessions* as are really no concessions in the authors themselves. Upon the whole, one might really wonder that the learned Doctor, who had so wide a field of antiquity to range in, and was only to pick out such passages as, running in general terms, or taken separately, might be made to appear under such a view as he intended, should

[a] Ἔστι τι τάξεως εἶδος, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς παρ' ἡμῶν θέσεως συνιστάμενον, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθίᾳ συμβαῖνον, ὡς τῷ πυρὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ. *Basil. contr. Eun.* l. i. p. 30.

[b] Διὰ τοῦτό φησιν ὁ κύριος, τὰ ἐμὰ πάντα σά ἐστιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν δημιουργημάτων ἀναγομένης, καὶ τὰ σὰ ἐμά, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν αὐτοῦ τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ δημιουργεῖν καθηκούσης. *Basil. de Sp. Sanct.* c. viii. p. 161. It seems from what follows, that αὐτῷ, rather than αὐτοῦ, is the reading.

produce no more; but be forced even to wrest and torture several of those he had found, by prefacing, commenting, and translating, to accommodate them at length hardly, and after great reluctance, to his purpose. You will say, perhaps, that the Doctor sets light by the Fathers, and lays no stress upon them; I shall believe you, when he fairly gives them up. At present, it must be thought that they are esteemed of some moment, when a book is stuffed with quotations out of them, and so much pains taken to make them any way serviceable. One that sets so great a value upon the mere *appearance* and *shadow* of antiquity, can hardly be supposed to slight the thing itself: if the learned Doctor is so well contented with *concessions* only, snatched, in a manner, and extorted from the *ancients;* how would he have rejoiced to have found them come heartily, readily, and throughly into his scheme, as they do into ours!

II. But supposing all the Doctor's quotations from the Post-Nicene or Ante-Nicene writers had been at least real and full *concessions;* yet there is something so peculiar in this new way of quoting *concessions*, without taking notice of what should come in to explain or balance them, that we have reason to except against it, as not a fair way of dealing.

1. Because, though the learned Doctor does give notice in his Preface, that we are not to take the opinion of the authors, in the whole, from those quotations; yet many may happen to read the book without considering or remembering a short hint in the Preface; and so may lay a greater stress upon those authorities than the Doctor intended.

2. Because the Doctor nowhere (in Scripture Doctrine) gives any marks of distinction for an ordinary reader to understand, where he intended a *concession* only of an author, and where his entire opinion; where he agreed with the Doctor in *part* only, and where in the *whole*. Instead of this, he rarely lets his English reader see more of any passage, than may appear to comport with and favour his own *hypothesis;* either striking out what might have discovered it to be a *concession* in part, or disguising it in his translation, or explaining it away, by his prefacing it, or commenting upon it. Besides, since authors have very seldom, if ever, been cited in this manner (by men of character) in favour of such principles as they really disowned and rejected in the main; readers will be apt to carry that pre-

sumption and prejudice along with them; and a short adv
ment in the Preface will not be sufficient to prevent it.

3. Another reason against this method is, that it g
handle to many to boast of the numerous collecti
Dr. Clarke against the *received* doctrine. See (besides
" the Dissuasive from inquiring into the Doctrine of tl
" nity," (p 28.) where this very use is made of it. By this
truth is darkened, evidences perplexed, and the common
rather puzzled and confounded, than let into the true
the fact; so far as relates to the judgment of the *ancient*

4. It should be considered that the *moral* obliquity a
pitude of misquoting or misrepresenting authors consists i
that it is a means to deceive the simple, to surprise the
and unlearned, (who must or will receive things upon tr
is taking advantange of the blind side of human nature,
a snare for such readers, (perhaps ninety-nine in a hundr
read not with due care and thought. I do not see but th
method of the Doctor's (though he has endeavoured to
the scandal of it) is big with all this mischief. He has
given notice; and wise men and scholars would hav
secure enough *without* it: others will not be so *with* it
therefore he is still to take advantage of the ignorance
the partiality of another, the forgetfulness of a third, th
dulity, simplicity, haste, and inadvertency of as many as
unprepared and unfurnished to the reading his citations.
thing itself, you may perceive, is equally mischievous, ho
gilded over with specious pretences. And there is no m
it than this; *misrepresentation practised*, and, at the same
seemingly *defended*: and (though the learned Doctor do
perceive it) it is really nothing else but contriving a wa
to reconcile (if possible) a *good name* and an *ill thing* togetl

5. It might be of ill example, should this method of
authors (never before used by good and great men) grov
vogue. A Romanist, for instance, might, in this way, unde
to defend some of the Romish tenets. It would be easy fo
to make a numerous collection of testimonies from the Fat
and as much to the purpose as the Doctor's collection is.
inconveniences he might foresee; one to his own *character*,
discovery; the other to his *cause*, because his own cit
might be turned against him. To obviate the former, he

declare beforehand, that "he did not cite places out of these "authors so much to shew what was the opinion of the writers "themselves, as to shew how naturally truth sometimes prevails "by its own native clearness:" and to obviate the latter, he might say, he alleged the *testimonies*, not as *proofs*, but as *illustrations* only. Thus the writer might seem to come off pretty handsomely: but, in the meanwhile, the unlearned and unthinking might be led aside by the fair show of authorities; and all the remedy left for them is, *Si populus vult decipi, decipiatur*. These are my present sentiments of the nature and tendency of this new and extraordinary method of citing; which, however, I shall be very glad to alter, if I see any good reason for it. To me it seems that it ought never to be practised, though to serve the best cause in the world.

III. After all, I must observe to you, supposing the method to have been ever so fair, and the *concessions* both many and real, the Doctor has still failed in his main point, of making out the *importance* of those *concessions*, to the cause in hand. There the stress should have been laid: we did not want to know what *concessions* the Fathers, in general, had made; being ready at any time to make the same *concessions:* but shew us the *connection* between these *concessions* and the Doctor's *conclusion*. This is the point which should have been laboured; and which required all the learning and acuteness which the Doctor is master of. As thus: the Fathers asserted the *first Person* only to be *begotten*, or *unoriginate;* therefore they must of consequence make the Son no more than an *inferior God*, or no God. The Fathers supposed the Son *subordinate*, as a Son; therefore they must, by necessary consequence, deny his *consubstantiality* and *coeternity*. This was the *conclusion* which the Doctor was to draw out of those premises, and shew to be just and true. But, instead of this, he drops the principal thing; repeats indeed the *concessions*, such as they are, over and over; and by a multitude of words (not to shew any *certain connection*, but only a *verbal resemblance*) he at length slips his *conclusion* into their places. There is really nothing more, in this management, than interpreting *ill* what the good Fathers meant *well;* giving a *low* sense to words and phrases which they intended in a *high* one; and putting an Arian construction upon Catholic expressions. This is all that the learned Doctor hath really done by the help of those *concessions*. In the same way a man may quote all the *concessions*

of the *Fathers* about a *proper sacrifice*, in favour of the *sacrifice of the mass:* or their *concessions* about a *real presence*, in favour of a *substantial presence* of Christ's body and blood in the *Eucharist*. Only, if he would do it artfully and plausibly, he should take care to rest in *generals;* and supply what is further wanting by *intimations* and *innuendos*. This seems to have been the very method which the learned Doctor has taken to grace and set off many of his *propositions;* the 9, 11, 12, 17, 34, 35, 36, 39, 43, &c. The *concessions* there cited come not up to the points in dispute betwixt us, being mostly such *general* things as may be admitted on either side; and such as would not have been suspected to favour the Doctor's cause, in *opposition* to us, but by appearing in the Doctor's book. To make them suit the better, the Doctor has formed his *propositions*, for the most part, in *general*, or *ambiguous* terms; content to scatter intimations of his meaning here and there, as he saw proper; and to trust the rest to the sagacity, should I say, or weakness of his readers. And now, what is the result of the method of citing, or what does it really prove? I will tell you frankly and plainly. First, it proves that general expressions are capable of being put into different views, and may be made to look this way or that, (taken separately,) by men of wit. Secondly, it proves that when pertinent authorities cannot be had, writers in a cause will be content with any: this is all. Having seen what the learned Doctor's evidence from antiquity amounts to, I shall next attend to what you have to say in defence of him.

You persist in it, that "the Ante-Nicene Fathers and Coun-" cils——agree with the Doctor in every interpretation of Scrip-" ture, wherein he disagrees with the school-notions." By *school-notions* (a term of art) I am to understand the Catholic prevailing notions of the blessed Trinity. And will you pretend to say that the Ante-Nicene writers agree with the Doctor in every text? How strangely you deceive yourself! Do the Ante-Nicene writers interpret the first of St. John, so as to make the Father *one God supreme;* the Word *another God*, an inferior God besides him? This is the Doctor's real and intended interpretation of it; and yours too, however carefully you disguise it. Did the Ante-Nicene writers interpret the Doctor's 300 texts, or any one of them, so as to exclude the Son from being *one God* with the *Father?* No certainly: they declare the contrary, and proclaim Father and Son to be *one God*. Is it possible that the

Ante-Nicene writers (who understood all the texts to be consistent with the Son's *consubstantiality* and *coeternity*, which the Doctor cites in opposition to both) should interpret the texts as he does? It is too great an affront to common sense to pretend it. But the way is this; when the Doctor produces the texts, he expresses but part of his sentiments; and in such general words as Catholics and Arians may both agree in: and so far he and his authorities go on together. Afterwards he comes out of *generals*, bringing the words down to a particular reserved meaning, before concealed, (and which the *ancients* would have rejected with abhorrence,) and still he appeals to the *ancients*, as agreeing with him in his *interpretations*. Thus, for instance; in interpreting the texts which speak of the *Father* as the one God, he finds some of the ancients say, the Father is *αὐτόθεος*, the Son *second* only, or *subordinate*, God of God. Very well: so *says* the Doctor too: and now, who can make any doubt whether the ancients agreed with him in his interpretations? But observe the sequel: when the learned Doctor comes to explain his *ωον* meaning of *αὐτόθεος*, and *subordinate*, it appears, from many broad hints scattered here and there, to be this; that the Father only is *necessarily existing* and strictly *divine*; the Son another Being, inferior in kind, (or, what comes to the same, a *creature*,) directly contrary to all the ancients. Thus you see, while the Doctor keeps in generals, and speaks his mind but by halves, he and the ancients may agree together; as he and we also do: but as soon as ever he comes to particulars, and discovers his real and full sentiments, there the ancients desert him; as well as he us. But besides this general answer, give me leave to observe that, as to several particular texts, the Doctor has no reason to pretend that the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, were on his side. Rev. i. 8. is one of the Doctor's texts, which he interprets of the *Father*; and insists much upon it, that the ancients applied the title of *παντοκράτωρ*, the *Almighty*, to the Father only. And yet nothing more certain than that that very text was understood, by the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, of God the Son: Catholics and Heretics both agreed in it. The text was urged against the Catholics, in the Sabellian controversy; and was as plausible a text as any in the New Testament, on the Sabellian side: yet the Catholics admitted that it was to be understood of God the Son; and readily allowed, in consequence of that text, that the Son was *ὁ παντοκράτωρ*, the

Almighty, as well as the Father. See [c] Tertullian, Hippolytus, and, probably, Origen, agreeing in this: the Doctor has not pretended to cite any Ante-Nicene, or any ancient writer, who understood the text otherwise; though he makes a show of having the *ancients* in general on his side, in this very particular, (Script. Doctr. p. 63,) without proving any thing more than that the *Father* was *ordinarily* or *emphatically* styled ὁ παντοκράτωρ, which is true, but not pertinent; nor is it giving us the sentiments of the *ancients*, with regard to this text; but his *own*, John xii. 41. is another noted text, which the Doctor endeavours (Script. Doctr. p. 102.) to interpret in favour of his own *hypothesis;* and makes a show of authorities as countenancing him in it. But none of his authorities come up to this point: so far from it, that they are all against him; as I have sufficiently proved under Query the second, and elsewhere. The like may be observed of the *authorities* which he produces (p. 114, 115.) to confirm his interpretation of Acts vii. 30, 31, 32. And I have, above, shewn you as much of John x. 30. and other the like texts; where you pretend to have some countenance from the ancients, for your interpretation. In short, there is not a text which the Doctor can pretend to urge in favour of his *main* doctrine, and against ours; and at the same time shew that the ancients agree with him. As soon as ever you interpret any text directly against the divinity of Christ, as understood by us in the strict sense, you go off entirely from the *ancients*, and go on by yourselves. But enough of this.

In answer to the latter part of the Query, you observe, that the reason why the Doctor doth not admit the testimonies of the Fathers as *proofs*, "is not because they are against him; "but because, though they are clearly for him, yet, in matters of "faith, he allows of no other proof than the infallible testimony "of the Word of God."

One might be willing to believe this to have been the reason, why he *would not* admit them as *proofs*, if there were not another very plain one, why he *could not;* could not, without

[c] Tert. cont. Prax. c. 17. Hippol. contr. Noët. c. vi. p. 10. Orig. Ἀρχ. l. i. c. 2. Vid. et Athan. p. 554, 684, 762. ed. Bened. Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxv. p. 573. Andreas Cæsar. in loc. Hieron. in Zech. c. ii. p. 1718. Epiph. vol. i. p. 488. That the Son is παντοκράτωρ might be shewn from other texts. Ps. xxiv. 10. Is. vi. 5. Zech. ii. 8. See Euseb. Dem. Ev. l. vi. c. 16. Just. Mart. Dial. p. 107. Jeb. Hieron. vol. iii. p. 519, 1718. ed. Bened. See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 141, &c. of this edition.

inevitable ruin and destruction to his whole *hypothesis*. An adversary need not desire any fairer advantage of the learned Doctor, than to have the issue of the cause put upon the Doctor's citations; taking in no more than is absolutely necessary to clear the sense of the authors in those very passages. But waving this, let me ask you further, why the testimonies of Fathers may not be admitted as *proofs*, inferior or collateral proofs? If I can know from *Church-writers*, and from *Scripture* too, what was believed by the Church (in sundry articles) from the beginning; I have then two proofs of the same thing, though not both equally strong, or equally authentic. The proof from *Church-writers* is an additional, inferior proof; but still a *proof* it is, probable at least, of something, as to *fact*; and not barely an *illustration* of a *dogma*, or doctrine. Are we able to *prove* what were the opinions of several sects of *philosophers* from the books which are extant; and may we not also prove what was the faith of Christians, in the same way, from the books which they have left us? You add, "The authority of the Fathers, "could it be proved to be unanimous against Dr. Clarke, ought "not to determine any article of faith." No; but it is a strong presumptive proof, that his *interpretation* of *Scripture* is not the true one: a proof so considerable, that I know not whether any thing less than clear and evident demonstration ought to overrule it. For you must remember, that Dr. Clarke, or any *moderns*, as well as the *ancients*, are *fallible* men; and have only the same *human reason* to work with, which others had sixteen hundred years ago, in an age of miracles, and near to the days of inspiration. *Moderns*, at so great a distance off, may, at least, as easily mistake, in interpreting Scripture, as you suppose the ancient and universal Church to have done, in a momentous article of faith. Well then; supposing that we had been for some time debating this very point of the blessed Trinity, on the foot of Scripture; men's wits are so various, that several interpretations may be invented of the same texts; and perhaps none of them so manifestly absurd, but that they possibly may be true; nor so manifestly right, but that they possibly may be wrong. What can we do better, in such a case, than to appeal to those who lived nearest the times of the inspired writers? Their judgment, their decisions, and consequent practice, are at length the safest rule to go by; at least till you can shew us a better. *Scripture*, you will say,

is the *rule;* and so say I. You bring your Scripture proofs; and I produce mine. You have your solutions of such difficulties as I press you with; I have solutions too, and such as I think sounder, better, and juster than yours: you think the very contrary. Thus far, it is combating text with text, criticism with criticism, reason with reason; and each side will think his own superior. Now, suppose I can further produce a cloud of witnesses, a numerous company of primitive saints and martyrs, confirming my interpretation, concurring in my sentiments, and corroborating my reasons; and suppose I find also that those who took your side of the question were condemned by the generality as *heretics*, and *corrupters* of the faith of Christ; this will add such weight, strength, and force to my pretensions, that impartial men will soon perceive which is the most probable, which the safer side, and which it behoves them to cleave to. This is so agreeable to the common sense and reason of mankind; and the advantage of having *antiquity* of one's side is so apparent, that I will venture to say, none ever talked against it, who did not suspect, at least, that *antiquity* was against them: and this I take to be one of your greatest misfortunes in this controversy; that you are sensible how much it would weaken your cause to give up the Fathers; and yet, you are certain, in the result, to weaken it as much, by pretending to keep them.

QUERY XXVIII.

Whether it be at all probable, that the primitive Church should mistake in so material a point as this is; or that the whole stream of Christian writers should mistake in telling us what the sense of the Church was; and whether such a cloud of witnesses can be set aside without weakening the only proof we have of the canon of Scripture, *and the integrity of the sacred text?*

IN answer hereto, you admit that "the testimony of the "whole stream of antiquity is sufficient to determine, in fact, "what faith the Church hath always professed and declared in "her public forms." I am content to put the matter upon this issue; and let the point be decided from their professions in baptism, creeds, doxologies, hymns, which were public forms; and from public censures passed upon *heretics*, which are as

clear evidence as the other of the Church's faith at that time. Only I would not exclude collateral proofs; such as the declared sentiments of eminent Church-writers, the interpretations of creeds, left us by those that recite them, (such as those of Irenæus, Tertullian, and others;) and ecclesiastical history, telling us what the tradition of the Church was, down to such a time. From these put together, we have very clear and full proof that the Catholic Church did all along profess a Trinity of *consubstantial, coeternal* Persons, in unity of nature, substance, and Godhead. This, the incomparable Bishop Bull has sufficiently shewn in his *Defensio Fidei Nicenæ*, *Judicium Ecclesiæ*, and *Primitiva Traditio*. Bishop Stillingfleet pursued the same argument, with variety of learning, in his Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, chapter the 9th, which he concludes in these words: "Taking the sense of those articles, as the "Christian Church understood them from the Apostles' times, "then we have as full and clear evidence of this doctrine, as we "have *that we received the Scriptures from them.*" Dr. Clarke's and Dr. Whitby's pretences to the contrary have been sufficiently answered; partly by the learned gentleman who wrote the True Scripture Doctrine continued, and partly by these sheets. You have little to object, but that the Fathers did not assert an *individual consubstantiality*, in your sense; which is true; and is no more than telling me, that they were not mad, when I contend that they were sober.

But you add; the question is, whether, supposing the Fathers had unanimously declared for our notion, "whether (in a "question not of fact, like that concerning the canon of "Scripture, but of judgment and reasoning) such a testimony "would prove that those Scriptures reveal it; or whether such "an interpretation of Scripture——would be as infallible as "Scripture itself." But this is no question at all between us. What we pretend is, that we have as good proof of *the doctrine of the Church*, as of the *canon of Scripture*. Whether the Church, after the Apostles, was as infallible as the Apostles themselves, is quite another question. We think it very unlikely that the apostolic churches should not know the mind of the Apostles; or should suddenly vary from it, in any matter of moment. We look upon it as highly improbable that the faith of those churches should so soon run counter to any thing in Scripture; since they had the best opportunities of knowing

what Scripture meant; were made up of wise and good men, men who would sooner die than commit any error in that kind wilfully. Upon this, we believe the concurring judgment of antiquity to be, though not *infallible*, yet the *safest* comment upon Scripture; and to have much more weight in it, than there generally is in wit and criticism; and therefore not to be rejected, where the words of Scripture will, with any propriety, bear that interpretation. This is sufficient for us to say or pretend. We have as plausible arguments, to speak modestly, from Scripture, as you can pretend to have: nay, we think your notions utterly irreconcilable with Scripture, according to the natural, obvious, grammatical construction of words. And besides all this, we have, what you want, the concurring sense of the *ancients* plainly for us. The question then is not, whether Scripture and Fathers be equally infallible: all the Fathers together are not so valuable, or so credible, as any one inspired writer. But it is plainly this: whether the ancient *Heretics* or *Catholics*, as they have been distinguished, have been the best interpreters of disputed texts; and whether we are now to close in with the former or the latter. You would insinuate that you have *Scripture*, and we *Fathers* only: but we insist upon it, that we have *both*; as for many other reasons, so also for this, because *both*, very probably, went together: and as you certainly want one, so it is extremely probable that you have *neither*; for this very reason, among many others, because you have not *both*. This argument is of force and weight; and will hardly yield to any thing short of *demonstration*; much less will it yield to such sort of reasonings as you are obliged to make use of, wanting better, to support your *novel* opinions.

The sum of the whole matter is this. The unanimous sense of the ancients, upon any controversial point, is of great moment and importance towards fixing the sense of Scripture, and preventing its being ill used by desultorious wits, who love to wander out of the common way; and can never want some colour for any opinion almost whatever. We do not appeal to the *ancients*, as if we could not maintain our ground, from *Scripture* and *reason*, against all opposers: this has been done over and over. Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, the two Gregories, Chrysostom, Austin, Cyril, and others, undertook the cause on the foot of Scripture, and were easily superior to all the

Arians. But since we have an advantage, over and above Scripture evidence, from the concurring sentiments of antiquity, we think it very proper to take that in also; and we shall not easily suffer it to be wrested from us.

QUERY XXIX.

Whether private reasoning, in a matter above our comprehension, be a safer rule to go by, than the general sense and judgment of the primitive Church, in the first 300 *years; or, supposing it doubtful what the sense of the Church was within that time, whether what was determined by a council of* 300 *bishops soon after, with the greatest care and deliberation, and has satisfied men of the greatest sense, piety, and learning, all over the Christian world, for* 1400 *years since, may not satisfy wise and good men now?*

HERE you tell me, as usual, when you have little else to say, that the Council of Nice knew nothing of *individual* consubstantiality: and then you add, pleasantly, that you "turn the "Query against the Querist: and lay claim to the Nicene "Confession." What! lay claim to a *confession* made in direct opposition to the men of your principles? You say, if any consubstantiality is to be found in that Creed, it is the *specific*, not *individual*. And what if it were? Would that give you any claim to the Nicene Confession? Are God and his creatures *consubstantial*, of the same rank, sort, kind, or species? You are forced to have recourse to a *figurative* sense, which pretence I have obviated above. You are so kind to the Querist, as to be "willing to suppose and believe," that he "is not ignorant of "the true and only sense of the word ὁμοούσιος;" meaning thereby the *specific* sense. In return, I will be so just to you, as to say, that you understand the word very right: and yet the Nicene Fathers did not teach a *merely* specific *consubstantiality*. The word ὁμοούσιος expresses their sense; but not their *whole* sense, in that article. It expresses an *equality* of nature, and signifies that the Son is as truly *equal* in nature to the Father, as one man is *equal* to another, or any individual equal to another individual of the same sort or *species*. And this was chiefly to be insisted on against the Arians, who denied such *equality*, making the *Son* a *creature*. Wherefore the true reason, to use Dr. Cudworth's words, only *mutatis mutandis*, why the Nicene

Fathers laid so great a stress upon the ὁμοούσιον, was not because this *alone* was sufficient to make Father and Son *one God*; but because they *could not be so without it.* [d] Ὁμοούσιος the Son must be, or he could not be God at all, in the strict sense; and yet if he was barely ὁμοούσιος, like as one human person is to another, the *two* would be *two Gods.* And therefore the Nicene Fathers, not content to say only that the Son is ὁμοούσιος, insert likewise, "God of God, Light of "Light, begotten," &c. and, "of the substance of the Father;" and this they are known to have declared over and over, to be "without any division:" all which taken together expresses a great deal more than ὁμοούσιος would do alone; and are, as it were, so many qualifying clauses, on purpose to prevent any such misconstruction and misapprehension, as the word might otherwise be liable to. The good Fathers, like wise men, at once maintained the *equality of nature*, which ὁμοούσιος expresses, and the *unity* of the Godhead too. Guarding equally against *Arianism* and *Tritheism*, they took all prudent care to preserve the *coequality* of the two *Persons*, without *dividing* the *substance*, which was what they intended. The learned Doctor [e] represents this matter somewhat crudely. He observes upon the word in the Nicene Creed, (γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς,) that the Son was not himself that *individual substance*, from which he was begotten. This he has so worded, that *individual substance*, with him, can only signify *individual Hypostasis*, or *Person*: and it is very true, that the Son is not *that Person*, from whom, or of whom, he proceeded: but the *substance* might be *undivided* notwithstanding; which is all that any Catholic means by *individual substance.* "But their meaning," he says, "was; he was

[d] Hi tres, quia *unius substantiæ* sunt, *unum* sunt; et *summe* unum sunt, ubi nulla naturarum, nulla est diversitas voluntatum. Si autem *natura unum* essent, et consensione non essent, non *summe* unum essent: si vero *natura dispares* essent, unum non essent. Hi ergo tres, qui unum sunt propter ineffabilem conjunctionem Deitatis, qua ineffabiliter copulantur, *unus Deus* est. *Aug. contr. Maxim.* l. ii. p. 698.

This is very full to our purpose; and, by the way, may shew how far St. Austin was from *Sabellianism*; which some have weakly pretended to charge him with. But there are many passages in this piece against Maximin, one of his very latest pieces, full against *Sabellianism*, as well as against *Arianism*. I may just remark, that there is a deal of difference between *unius substantiæ*, and *una substantia*. Two men are *unius ejusdemque substantiæ*, not *una substantia*. But the three Persons are not only *unius substantiæ*, but *una substantia*. The *modern* sense of *consubstantial* takes in both.

[e] Reply, p. 35.

"produced, not from any other substance, (as man was formed "from the dust of the earth,) but after an ineffable manner, "from the substance of the Father only." Here he leaves out the principal thing, which the Arians asserted, and which the Catholics guarded against, viz. *not from nothing*, not ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων. If therefore the Son, according to the Nicene Fathers, was not from any other substance besides the *Father's*, nor from nothing; it is very plain that (unless they supposed a *division* of substance, which they absolutely reject) they supposed the Son to be of the same *undivided*, or *individual* substance with the Father. As to the supposition of his being produced from any other substance, (as Adam was formed from the dust of the earth,) there was very little occasion to guard against it: the notion is, in itself, too silly for any man to own. The Arians themselves (against whom the creed was contrived) never pretended it, but [f] expressly disowned it: their noted tenet was, that the Son was the *first* thing made. The Nicene Fathers designed, chiefly, to guard against the supposition of the Son's being *from nothing*, which was what the Arians insisted upon; they and the Catholics equally believing it ridiculous to imagine any *substance* to have been first made, and then the Son to have been made out of it. Wherefore I humbly conceive, the true reasons why the Nicene Fathers were so very particular in the words, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς, were, [g] first, to signify that they understood *generation* in a *proper*, and not *figurative* sense, as the Arians did; and, secondly, withal to [h] secure the *divine unity*. For, if the Son were *ab extra*, and *independent of the Father*; the *alliance*, the *relation*, the *unity* of the Persons, in the same Godhead, had (upon their principles) been lost, and *Ditheism* unavoidable.

This may be enough to satisfy you, that whatever the word ὁμοούσιος may commonly signify, yet the Nicene Fathers meant a great deal more than a *specific* unity; if not by that word,

[f] Memorant Filium Dei neque ex aliqua subjacente materia genitum esse, quia per eum creata omnia sint. *Hilar.* p. 832.

[g] Vid. Bull. Def. F. N. p. 114, 115. Εἰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστι μόνος, ὡς υἱὸς γνήσιος—λεχθείη ἂν εἰκότως καὶ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός. *Ath.* p. 228.

[h] Ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀληθῶς γεγέννηται Θεὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ, Θεὸς ἀληθινὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ; οὐκ ἔξωθεν ὤν, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ οὐσίας. *Epiphan.* p. 610.

Οὐχ ὡς ἀρχὴ ἑτέρα καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑφεστὼς, οὐδ' ἔξωθεν ταύτης γεγονὼς, ἵνα μὴ τῇ ἑτερότητι, δυαρχία γένηται. *Athanas. Orat.* iv. p. 617.

Οὐδὲ ἄλλος Θεὸς ὁ υἱὸς, οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν ἐπενοήθη. *Orat.* iii. p. 553.

singly considered, yet by that taken together with the rest, which were put in to explain it. The word may indifferently serve to express an *equality* of nature, whether the *Hypostases* be *undivided*, or whether they have a *separate existence*. It was therefore properly enough applied in the Creed: and care was taken that both *generation* and *consubstantiality* should be understood in a sense suitable to things *divine*; that is, taking from the *idea* all that is low, mean, and imperfect; and applying only so much as might comport with the majesty, dignity, and perfections of the adorable and incomprehensible Trinity.

You seem to be apprehensive, that you must, at length, be obliged to give up the Nicene Creed, as utterly inconsistent with your principles; as indeed it is. And therefore, in the next place, you endeavour to lessen the credit of it; alleging that "the Council of Antioch before, and the Council of Arimi-"num, and other councils, after, (some of them with a greater "number of bishops than met at Nice,) determined against the "ὁμοούσιος." The objection drawn from the determination of the Council of Antioch, about sixty years before the Council of Nice, you find largely answered by [i] Bishop Bull. They condemned the word, as it had been misunderstood and misapplied by Paul of Samosata; but established the very same doctrine with the Nicene Fathers. I may answer you briefly, upon your own principles. You say, Paul of Samosata was condemned for holding ὁμοούσιος in the sense of *individual* consubstantiality, (p. 118.) which, if it be true, was reason good enough for condemning him; as you understand *individual*, that is, in a Sabellian sense. The remark of Hilary, who goes upon the same supposition which you do, may here be pertinently [k] cited; and may serve as a sufficient answer. It is observable that Hilary makes the number of bishops in the Antiochian Council no more than eighty; Athanasius, but seventy; Eusebius, an indefinite number; very many. It does not appear that they were near so considerable as the famous Council of Nice of three hundred and eighteen bishops.

[i] Def. F. N. p. 29, &c. See also Mr. Thirlby, Answer to Whiston, p. 103. Defence, p. 96.

[k] Male intelligitur Homousion: quid ad me bene intelligentem? Male Homousion Samosatenus confessus est: sed nunquid melius Arii negaverunt? Octoginta episcopi olim respuerunt; sed trecenti et decem octo nuper receperunt. *Hilar. de Synod.* p. 1200.

You next mention the Council of Ariminum, and give a hint of *other councils.* It would have been but fair to have told us what *other councils* you meant, which had, as you say, a *greater number* of bishops than met at Nice. You know, I presume, or at least might know, that you cannot name one, besides the Council of Ariminum; which I shall speak to presently.

In your Appendix (p. 154.) you say the determination of the Council of Nice, for the ὁμοούσιος, was rejected by a *greater council* than that of Nice, met at Jerusalem. But in these few words you have two mistakes; or, at least, you have said what you cannot prove. [l]Eusebius's words, which you refer to, may mean no more than this, that the Council of Jerusalem was the greatest he had known, since the famous one of Nice. Your other mistake is, that "they rejected the determination of the Council "of Nice," &c. How doth this appear? did they say a word against it? Or did they make any declaration against either the Council of Nice or the ὁμοούσιον? Not a syllable. But [m] they received Arius to communion, partly upon the good Emperor's recommendation, who believed him to have recanted, and to have come in to the [n] true Catholic faith, as established at the Council of Nice; and partly upon Arius's [o] own *confession of faith,* which was so plausibly worded, that it might easily pass for *orthodox,* though it wanted the word ὁμοούσιος. Now, is it not very unaccountable in you to call this rejecting the determination for the ὁμοούσιον, when it was only receiving a man, supposed by the Emperor, and perhaps by many of the Council, to have repented of his *heresy,* and to have embraced every thing that the Nicene Council had determined; the very sense and meaning of ὁμοούσιος itself, though not the word.

Pass we on now to the Council of Ariminum, in the year 359, when the Arians had the *secular* power on their side, and made use of it with all imaginable severity. The whole number of

[l] De Vita Constant. l. iv. c. 47. p. 454. See Valesius's Notes.

[m] See the history in Socrat. l. i. c. 33. Sozom. l. ii. c. 27. Athanas. p. 734.

[n] Arius swore to the Emperor, calling God to witness, that he believed in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as the *whole* Catholic Church taught, which the Emperor could take in no other sense, but as it had been lately determined by the Catholic Nicene Fathers. See Sozom. l. ii. c. 27.

And this may further appear by the Emperor's putting Arius to the test afterwards, to see whether he really acknowledged the Nicene faith or no. See Socrat. l. i. c. 38. Comp. Phot. Cod. 256. p. 1413.

[o] Extat in Sozom. l. ii. c. 27.

bishops in council are computed at about [p]400, and [q]not above eighty of them Arians. [r]All the Catholics, at first, declared their unanimous adherence to the Nicene Creed; and protested against any new form of faith. All manner of artifices, frauds, and menaces were contrived to bring them and the Arians to something like an agreement. Yet the utmost they could do, was only to bring the Catholics to subscribe a [s]*confession* artfully worded in general terms. And no sooner did the Catholic Fathers, after their return home, perceive how they had been imposed upon by ambiguous terms, and overreached by craft and subtilty; but they [t]confessed their error, and repented of it with tears. The history of the Council at large is too tedious for me to recite here: it may be seen either in the original authors, Athanasius, Sulpicius Severus, Hilary, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Jerome; or with less trouble, and in less compass, in Cave's Life of Athanasius, or lastly in Montfaucon's. When you have well considered the arts and practices of the Arians, much the smaller number, in that Council, you may perhaps see reason to be ashamed of having mentioned it, but no reason for opposing it to the celebrated Nicene Council. While the Council of Ariminum was free, and left to give their real opinions; the Arians were condemned by a great majority, and their *principals deposed*. Even, at last, you have no reason to boast of their unanimous agreement to a new faith. It was a *verbal* agreement only to expressions seemingly Catholic: and probably the *majority* [u]departed with the same high value and opinion of the Nicene faith, which they brought with them. Four years after the Synod of Ariminum, [x]Athanasius reckons up particularly the churches which still

[p] Sulpic. Sev. p. 267. Athanas. p. 720, 749. Maximin the Arian makes the whole number 330. *August. Collat.* tom. viii. p. 650.

[q] Sulpic. Sever. p. 269.

[r] Hilar. Fragm. p. 1341.

[s] Quæ Catholicam disciplinam, perfidia latente, loqueretur. *Sulpic.* p. 273. Sonabant verba pietatem, et inter tanta mella præconii, nemo venenum insertum putabat. *Hieron. contr. Lucifer.*

[t] Vid. Ep. Liber. apud Socr. l. iv. p. 183. Hieron. contr. Lucif. Dial. Sulpic. Sever.

[u] Vid. Ambros. Ep. cap. i. p. 862.

[x] Athanas. Ep. ad Jovian. pag. 781. Theod. E. H. l. iv. c. 3. See Liberius's Letters an. 366. apud Socrat. l. iv. c. 12. Damasus's Lett. Sozom. l. vi. c. 23.

Hoc est illud *Homousion*, quod in Concilio Nicæno adversus hæreticos Arianos, a Catholicis patribus, veritatis auctoritate, et auctoritatis veritate firmatum est: quod postea in Concilio Ariminensi (propter novitatem verbi, minus quam potuit intellectam, quod tamen fides antiqua repererat) *multis paucorum fraude* deceptis, hæretica impietas sub hæretico imperatore labefactare tentavit. Sed post non longum

embraced the Nicene faith. Those of Spain, Britain, Gaul, all Italy, Dalmatia, Dacia, Mysia, Macedonia, Greece, Africa, Sardinia, Cyprus, Crete, Pamphylia, Lycia, Isauria, Egypt, Libya, Pontus, Cappadocia, and the churches of the East; excepting a few that followed Arius. He calls them the *whole world*, and *all* the churches throughout the world. He declares that he *knows* it, and has their *letters* by him to prove it. And it is worth reciting what account the bishops of Egypt and Libya, and among them Athanasius, give of the extent of the Nicene faith, about ten years after the time that you pretend there was a *general council* against it. Writing to the bishops in Africa, they begin thus: "[y] It is the greatest satisfaction to us to have "seen what Damasus, our fellow-minister, and Bishop of the "great city of Rome, and such a number of bishops in council "with him, besides other synods in Gaul and Italy, have wrote "in defence of the true orthodox faith: that faith which Christ "delivered, and the Apostles taught, and our Fathers assembled "at Nice, from out of the whole Christian world, handed down "to us. So intense was their zeal at that time, in regard to "the Arian heresy; that they who had fallen into it, might be "reclaimed; and that the heads or authors of it might have a "mark set upon them. To this determination (*of the Nicene "Fathers*) formerly the [z] whole Christian world consented: and "at this very time, many councils have confirmed and published "the same: by means of which all they of Dalmatia, Dardania, "Macedonia, Epirus, Greece, Crete, and the other islands, Sicily, "Cyprus, and Pamphylia, Lycia, Isauria, all Egypt, the two "Libyas, and the most of Arabia, have acknowledged it." They go on to set forth the great respect and veneration due to the decisions of the Nicene Council; and shew how far it was preferable, in every respect, to all the Arian synods: and particularly to the pretended General Council of Ariminum, which some presumed, at that time of day, to set against it. The whole would be well worth the reader's perusal; and thither I refer you for a more particular answer; that you may learn

tempus, libertate fidei Catholicæ prævalente,—Homousion Catholicæ fidei sanitate *longe lateque* defensum est. *August.* tom. viii. p. 704.

[y] Apud Athanas. p. 891.

[z] To the same purpose says Marius Victorinus, speaking of the ὁμοούσιον.

Conditum juxta veterum fidem (nam et ante tractatum) et multi orbis episcopi, trecenti quindecim in civitate Nicæa, quam per totum orbem decretam fidem mittentes, episcoporum millia in eadem habuerunt, vel illius temporis, vel sequentium annorum. l. 3. *contr. Arian.*

hereafter not to call every thing *hugely romantic*, which may have happened to escape your notice or observation. I must take leave to tell you, there never was a synod on your side, so free, so large, so, in every respect, unexceptionable, as the Council of Nice was. Nay further; that whatever opposition was made to it, was carried on with such wiles, crafts, subtilties, and refined artifices, as every honest man would be ashamed of: and further; that, notwithstanding all they could do, the Arians were not able long to maintain their ground; but the men who sustained the shock, and kept up the credit of the Nicene Creed, were not only the most numerous, but appear to have been as wise, as judicious, and as pious men, as ever the Church was adorned with, since the times of the Apostles.

I do not pretend that there is demonstration in this kind of reasoning, in favour of any cause. But it will have its weight with cool and considering men: who, reflecting that religion is not a thing to be coined and recoined every month; that it has been thought on so long and well, and by persons blessed with as good a share of understanding, and as great sincerity, as any are, or have been; and that the generality of the wisest and most excellent men have hitherto gone on in such a way, and that too after a strict and severe examination, being well apprised of the objections made against it; I say, who, reflecting thus, will be very cautious of contradicting what seems to have been so well and so deliberately settled; and will be rather willing to suspect their own judgment, and modestly decline what looks like leaning too much to their own understandings. However, such considerations may be of use to those who, not having leisure, inclination, or patience to examine throughly into this controversy, (as perhaps few have,) must be content to judge as they can: and since they find the same Scriptures so very differently interpreted by the contending parties, till they can themselves enter into the very heart of the controversy, how can they do better than close in with those who have been in possession of this faith for so many centuries, and have had, in a manner, in every age, for at least fourteen hundred years, I will venture to say sixteen, the most eminent lights and ornaments of the Christian Church to support and defend it? This I mention as the safest way; and such as will be taken by modest, humble, and discreet men; being what they can best answer to God and their own consciences, even though, at

length, it should prove erroneous; which yet has not hitherto, nor ever will be, I am persuaded, made appear. As for those who choose to go out of the common road, and to run counter to all that has hitherto been called and reputed *Catholic*, or *orthodox;* let them look to it, and be it at their own peril. They must believe that the ancient *heretics* were the soundest Christians; that the first general council which met from all parts of Christendom, and having no bias, so far as appears, to determine them this way or that, either did not know what was the faith of their respective churches, and what had been handed down to them by their predecessors, or else wilfully and unanimously agreed to corrupt it; and that too in a very material article, in which the sum of the Christian religion is contained; and in which the nature and object of our worship is very nearly concerned. They must believe further that the churches, in general, throughout the Christian world, through every age, (and even since the Reformation, upon which matters were strictly looked into and carefully reexamined,) have fallen into the same error; and so continue, even to this day; some few private men only, here and there, shewing their dislike of it. Now, they who pretend this, must bring some very strong proofs to make good their pretences. If they have not something very weighty and momentous to urge; something that carries the force and evidence of *demonstration* with it, they are first very unreasonable in calling us to attend to what so little deserves it; and next very inexcusable in their attempts to draw others into their *precarious* sentiments, and to raise doubts and perplexities in the minds of simple well meaning men. But I pass on to

QUERY XXX.

Whether, supposing the case doubtful, it be not a wise man's part to take the safer side; rather to think too highly, than too meanly of our blessed Saviour; rather to pay a modest deference to the judgment of the ancient and modern Church, than to lean to one's own understanding?

UPON the question, whether it be not safer and better (supposing the case doubtful) to think too highly, rather than too meanly of our blessed Saviour; you answer, "Questionless it is;" which one might think a very fair and ingenuous confession,

and you need not have added a word more. You go on to say, that this is our "most plausible pretence;" in which, I think, you do it a deal too much honour. I did but just hint it; and lest it should not be of force sufficient, immediately strengthened it with another consideration, which I am persuaded will bear, if this should not; and the rather, because you have not thought fit so much as to take notice of it. I must however follow you, upon the former point, that *plausible* plea, and which is so just, that you seem yourself to give in to it. Yet, I know not how, by some peculiar turn of thought, you at length come to say, that it "proves as weak and false as any other they ever allege." If it prove no *weaker*, I shall be satisfied. Let us hear what you have to say. Your argument is this: "Since Revelation "is the only rule in the case, if we go beyond, or if we fall "short, are we not equally culpable?" I am very glad to hear from you, that *Revelation* is the *only* rule in the case: abide by that, and matters may easily be adjusted. To the argument I answer; that you *equivocate* in the word *equally*, and make a *sophistical* syllogism with four terms. *Equally* culpable, signifies, either that one is culpable *as well* as the other, or that one is culpable *as much* as the other; *equally* a fault, or an *equal* fault. Our dispute is about the *latter*, and yet all that you really prove is only the *former*. *Revelation* undoubtedly is the rule; and to go beyond it is certainly culpable, as well as it is to fall short of it; and yet not *culpable* (at least not in this instance) in the same degree. Is there no such thing as an error on the right hand, (as we say,) or a fault on the right side? Of two extremes, may it not often happen, that one is more dangerous than the other? This I assert to be the case here: and I will give you my reasons for it. Our blessed Lord hath done great and wonderful things for us. If our respect, duty, and gratitude happen, through our ignorance and excessive zeal, to rise too high; this is the overflowing of our good-natured qualities, and may seem a pitiable failing. But, on the other hand, if we happen to fall short in our regards, there is not only ingratitude, but *blasphemy* in it. It is degrading and dethroning our Maker, Preserver, King, and Judge; and bringing him down to a level with his creatures.

Besides; we have many express cautions given us in Scripture, not to be wanting in our respects and services towards God the Son; but have no particular cautions against honouring him

too much. We know that we ought to "honour him, even as "we honour the Father;" which, if it be an ambiguous expression, we are very excusable in taking it in the best sense, and interpreting on the side of the precept. We know that by dishonouring the Son, we do, at the same time, dishonour the Father: but we are nowhere told, that the Father will resent it as a dishonour done to himself, if we should chance, out of our scrupulous regards to the Father and Son both, to pay the Son more honour than strictly belongs to him. On these and the like considerations, (especially when we have so many and so great appearances of truth, and such a cloud of authorities to countenance us in it,) the error, if it be one, seems to be an error on the right hand. Now you shall be heard again: "Can "any man think to please the Son of God, by giving that to "him which he never claimed or could claim?" Positive enough. But will you please to remember that the Query *supposes the case doubtful*, (which was abundantly civil to you,) *doubtful* whether the Son of God has *claimed it*, or no; and the whole argument runs upon that supposition. This therefore discovers either some want of acumen, or great marks of haste. You add; "It "can be no detraction from the dignity of any Person (how great "soever that dignity be) to forbear professing him to be that "which he really is not." I perceive your thoughts are still absent; and you do not reflect, that you are begging the question, instead of answering to the point in hand. You are to *suppose* it, if you please, *doubtful*, who or what the Person is. In such a case, it may be better to give him what he does not require, than to defraud him of what he does: it is safer and more prudent to run the risk of one, than of the other. You go on; "It may well become serious and sincere Christians to consider, "whether it is not possible, that while, adventuring to be wise "beyond what is written, they vainly think to advance the "honour of the Son of God, above what he has given them "ground for in the Revelation, they may dishonour the Father "that sent him," &c. I am weary of transcribing. Consider, on the other hand, whether it be not more than *possible*, that, while others *adventuring to be wise beyond what is written*, (teaching us to profess *three Gods*, making the *Creator* of the world a *creature*, inventing new *unscriptural* distinctions of a *supreme* and a *subordinate* worship, with many other things equally *un-*

scriptural and unwarrantable,) they *vainly* think to bring down *mysteries* to the level of their low understandings, and to search the "deep things of God;" they may not dishonour both Father and Son, and run into heresy, blasphemy, and what not; and sap the very foundations of the Christian religion. You proceed; "It may become them to consider what they will answer at the "*great day*, should God charge them with not observing that "declaration of his, *I will not give my glory to another*." They may humbly make answer, that they understood that *his glory* was not to be given to *creatures;* and therefore they had given it to none but his own Son, and his Holy Spirit, whom they believed not to be *creatures*, nor other Gods; and whom himself had given his glory to, by commanding all men to be *baptized* in their names, equally with his own; and ordering particularly, that "all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the "Father." If they happened to carry their respect too high, yet it was towards those only whom the Father principally delighteth to honour; and towards whom an ingenuous, grateful, and well-disposed mind can hardly ever think he can pay too much. Upon these and the like considerations they may humbly hope for pity and pardon for a mistake; such an one as the humblest, most devote, and most conscientious men might be the aptest to fall into.

But what must an Arian have to say, at that *great day*, if it appears that he has been uttering *blasphemies* against the Son of God, and reviling his Redeemer, (the generality of sober Christians looking on, all the while, with horror; shocked at the impiety; and openly declaring and protesting against it,) and for no other reasons, in the last result, but because he thought *generation* implied *division*, and *necessary* generation implied outward *coaction;* and he could not understand whether the unity should be called *specific* or *individual*, nor *how* there came to be three Persons; nor *why* one might not have been as good as three; nor *why* the Father should be said to beget the Son, rather than *vice versa;* and the like? Is this kind of reasoning suitable to, or becoming Christians, who have their Bible to look into; which alone can give any satisfaction in these matters? To go upon our own fancies and conjectures, in a thing of this kind, is only betraying too little reverence for the tremendous and unsearchable nature of God, and too high an

opinion of our own selves. You have a further pretence, built upon your mistaken notion of *individual*, which I need not take notice of; having already almost surfeited the reader with it.

QUERY XXXI.

Whether any thing less than clear and evident demonstration, *on the side of Arianism, ought to move a wise and good man, against so great appearances of truth on the side of* orthodoxy, *from* Scripture, reason, *and* antiquity; *and whether we may not wait long before we find such* demonstration?

IN your answer to this, I am rebuked, first, for giving the name of *orthodoxy* to a *scholastic* notion; and, secondly, for calling your doctrine *Arianism*. As to the first, I stand so far corrected, as to beg the privilege of using the word *orthodoxy* for the *received doctrine*. You are pleased to call it a *scholastic* notion. How far it is *scholastic*, I do not certainly know; but sure I am that it is primitive and Catholic; and I do not know that the *Schoolmen* were *heretics* in this article. If they were; so far, you may depend upon it, our notion is not *scholastic*. As to your doctrine being justly called *Arianism*, I hope, without offence, I may say, I have made it plain to a demonstration, (excepting only that, in some particulars, you fall below *Arianism*,) and I should advise you hereafter, for your own sake, to dispute so clear a point no further. But let us go on. You add: "If it be impossible, by the rule of Scripture and "reason, and the sense of the most ancient writers and councils "of the Church, that the *scholastic* notion should be true; and "if there be no *medium* betwixt (the *scholastic notion*) and the "notion of Dr. Clarke, (that is, *Arianism*,) then it will be de-"monstrated that (*Arianism*) is the true doctrine of Jesus "Christ and his Apostles, as revealed in Scripture, and the "true sense of Scripture interpreted by right reason, and as "understood by the best and most ancient Christian writers." This is your *demonstration*; only I have thrown in a word or two, by way of parenthesis, to make it the clearer to the reader. The sum of it is this; if the *scholastic* notion (by which you mean *Sabellianism*) be not true; and if there be no *medium* between *Sabellianism* and *Arianism*; then *Arianism* is the true doctrine, &c. That is, if *supposing* be *proving*, and if *begging the question* be the same thing with *determining* it; then something

will be *demonstrated* which is not *demonstrated*. You do well to refer us to your *Appendix* for proof, and to shift it off as far as possible. *Demonstrations* are good things, but sometimes very hard to come at; as you will find in the present instance. You may take as much time longer, as you think proper, to consider of it. Give me a *demonstration*, justly so called; a chain of clear reasoning, beginning from some plain and undoubted axiom, and regularly descending by necessary deductions, or close connection of *ideas*, till you come at your *conclusion*. Till you can do this, it will be but labour lost, to endeavour to shake the *received doctrine* of the ever blessed *Trinity*. For, unless you can give us something really solid and substantial, in an article of so great importance, the reasons which we have, on our side of the question, are so many, so plain, and so forcible, that they must, and will, and ought to sway the minds of modest, reasonable, and conscientious men, while the Church stands, or the world lasts. Any man that duly considers what we have to plead from holy Scripture, and what from the concurring judgment and practice of the primitive and Catholic Church; and reflects further upon the natural tenderness which every pious and grateful mind must have for the honour of his blessed Lord and Saviour, the dread and horror of blasphemy, and how shocking a thing it must appear to begin now to abridge him of that respect, service, and supreme adoration, which has been so long and so universally paid him, and by the blessed saints and martyrs now crowned in heaven; I say, any man that duly considers this, will easily perceive how impossible it is for *Arianism* ever to prevail generally, except it be upon one or other of these suppositions: either that the age becomes so very *ignorant* or *corrupt*, that they know not, or care not, what they do; or that some new light spring up, on the side of *Arianism*, some hidden reserve of extraordinary evidences, such as, in 1400 years' time, the wit of man has not been able to discover. As to the latter, neither yourself nor yet the learned Doctor has been pleased to favour us with any such discovery: as to the former, I have too good an opinion of you to suspect that you can either hope or wish for it. You will have a mind to try what you can do; and so give me leave to represent to you a short summary of what we are to expect of you.

1. You are to prove, either that the Son is *not Creator*; or that there are *two Creators*, and one of them a *creature*.

2. You are to shew, either that the Son is not to be *worshipped* at all; or that there are *two objects* of *worship*, and one of them a *creature*.

3. You are to prove, either that the Son is not *God*; or that there are *two Gods*, and one of them a *creature*.

4. You are to shew, that your *hypothesis* is high enough to take in all the high titles and attributes ascribed to the Son in holy Scripture; and, at the same time, low enough to account for his "increasing in wisdom, not knowing the day of judg-"ment," his being "exceeding sorrowful, troubled, crying out "in his agonies," and the like. You are to make all to meet in the one Λόγος, or *Word*; or else to mend your scheme by borrowing from ours.

5. I must add, that, whatever you undertake, you are either to prove it with such strength, force, and evidence, as may be sufficient to bear up against the stream of antiquity, full and strong against you; or else to shew that antiquity has been much misunderstood, and is *not* full and strong against you.

Now you see what you have to do; and our readers, perhaps, may understand what we are talking about, the dust being, I hope, in some measure thrown off, and the cause opened. Now proceed as you think proper: only dispute fair; drop ambiguous terms, or define them; put not gross things upon us; contemn every thing but truth in the search after truth; and keep close to the question: and then it will soon be seen, whether *Arianism* or *Catholicism* is the *Scripture doctrine of the Trinity*.

There remain only two Queries, which I have any concern in; and I hardly think it needful to take further notice of them, the substance of them being contained in the former: besides that this defence being drawn out into a length beyond what I expected, I am willing to come to a conclusion. You will excuse me for not returning a particular answer to *your* Queries, having obviated all that is of weight in them, in this Defence of my own. Besides, you have now had some years to consider this subject, and may probably see reason to alter some things; to contract your Queries into a shorter compass, and to put them closer and stronger; though that part, I think, should come, after you have made a *defence* of your own principles: otherwise, you know, it is nothing but finding faults, without proposing any way to mend them; which is only a work of fancy, and is both fruitless and endless. My design chiefly was to be upon the

offensive: the *defensive* part, on our side, has been handled over and over, in books well known, and easy to be had. What was most wanting was, to point out the particular defects of Dr. Clarke's scheme, which was thought to contain something *new;* and was certainly set forth in a very *new* method.

In conclusion, give me leave to tell you, that I have entered into this cause (after a competent weighing what I could meet with, on either side) under a full conviction both of the truth and importance of it; and with a resolution (by God's assistance) to maintain it; till I see reason (which I despair of) to alter my judgment of it. Make you the best you can of your side of the question, in a *rational* and *fair* manner. Truth is what I sincerely aim at, whether it be on your side or on mine. But I may be allowed to speak with the greater confidence in this cause, since the controversy is not *new*, but has been exhausted long ago; and all had been done on your side, that the wit of man could do, long before either you or Dr. Clarke appeared in it. You may, if you please, traverse over again *Scripture, antiquity*, and *reason*. As to the first; all the texts you can pretend to bring against us have been weighed and considered; and we have solutions ready for them; while you are yet to seek how to give a tolerable account of several texts; those, especially, which declare the *unity* of God, and proclaim the Son to be *God, Creator*, and *object* of *worship* and *adoration*. If you proceed to Fathers, they stand pointed against you; and you are certain to expose your cause, as often as you hope for any relief or succour from them. If, lastly, (which you think your strongest hold,) you retire to *philosophy* and *metaphysics*, I humbly conceive, you will still be able to do nothing. It will be only falling to *conjecture*, after you fail of *proof;* and giving the world your *wishes*, when they looked for *demonstrations*. I do not expect you should believe one word of what I have now said; neither say I it to discourage any *rational* inquiries; let truth have its utmost trial, that it may afterwards shine out with greater lustre: only let not your *zeal* outrun your *proofs*. If your arguments have weight sufficient to carry the point with men of sense, let us have them in their full strength; all reasonable men will thank you for them. But if, failing in *proof*, you should condescend (which yet I am persuaded you will not) to wile and stratagem, to colours and disguises, to misrepresentation and sophistry, in hopes to work your way through the unlearned and

unthinking part of the world; then let me assure you beforehand, that that method will not do. Every man, that has a spark of generous fire left, will rise up against such practices; and be filled with disdain to see parts and learning so prostituted, and readers so used.

I am, Sir,

Your Friend and Servant.

POSTSCRIPT

TO

THE FIRST EDITION.

I HAVE just run over the second edition of Dr. Clarke's Scripture Doctrine; where I observe, that most of the passages, which I have animadverted upon, stand as they did, without any correction or amendment. Where the Doctor has attempted any thing, which may seem to weaken the force of what I have offered above, I shall here take notice of it. I had noted (as the learned Mr. Welchman had done before me) the Doctor's unfair manner of suppressing some words of Chrysostom, which were necessary to let the reader into the author's true meaning. The Doctor here endeavours [a] to bring himself off, by saying, that the words left out are Chrysostom's "own in-"ference, and not the explication of the words of the text." But the truth is, Chrysostom's inference shews plainly what his *explication* of the text was; which *explication* represented separately without that *inference*, by the help of the Doctor prefacing it, was made to appear in another light, and to speak another sense than what the author intended. *One in power* (*κατὰ δύναμιν*) is the same, with Chrysostom, as *equal* in power or ability, and *essentially* so. He could never have imagined, that *one in power* should signify no more than the Doctor pretends. One having *infinite* and the other only *finite* power, could not, according to Chrysostom, be properly said to be one, *κατὰ δύναμιν, in power*. His interpretation then, being not only different but contrary to the Doctor's, should not have been represented in such a manner (by suppressing a part of it) as to be made to appear to countenance a notion which it clearly contradicts.

[a] Page 92.

The learned Doctor [b] has put in an explanatory *parenthesis* to his translation of a passage of Irenæus. I have took notice [c] above, that he had not done justice to Irenæus in that passage: and I am glad to find that the Doctor himself is now sensible of it. He has not yet come up to the full sense of the author; as you may perceive, by comparing what he hath said with what I have remarked above. But he has said as much as could be expected of him: the wiser way would have been, to have struck the quotation out of his book.

Page 248. the learned Doctor criticises a passage of St. Austin; which I am obliged to take notice of, having made use of that passage in these sheets [d]: I will give you the Doctor's own words, that you may be the better able to judge of the matter. After he had cited several passages out of Justin Martyr, where, probably, Justin was speaking of the temporary *προέλευσις*, or *manifestation*, or *generation* of God the Son, he proceeds thus: "Note: in all these passages, the words "*κατὰ βουλὴν*, and *βουλῇ*, and *θελήσει*, and *δυνάμει*, signify "evidently, not *volente*, but *voluntate*; not the mere *approbation*, "but the *act* of the *will*. And therefore St. Austin is very "*unfair* when he *confounds* these *two* things, and asks (*utrum* "*Pater sit Deus, volens* an *nolens*) whether *the Father himself* "*be God, with or without his own will?* The answer is clear: he "is God (*volens*) *with* the approbation of his will; but not "*voluntate*, not *κατὰ βουλὴν*, not *βουλῇ*, *θελήσει*, and *δυνάμει*, "not by an *act* of his will, but by *necessity of nature*." Thus far the learned Doctor. This is strange misrepresentation. I pass by his misconstruction of Justin Martyr, and his insinuation (grounded upon it) that the Son became *God* by an *act* of the *Father's will*. Admitting it were so; how is St. Austin concerned in this matter, and how comes in the Doctor's *therefore*, where there is no manner of connection? Was St. Austin commenting upon Justin Martyr? The Doctor's thought seems to have been this: that St. Austin, having admitted that the Son was *God* by an *act* of the Father's *will*, and being pressed with the difficulty arising from that supposition, had no way of coming off, but by asking, whether the Father *himself* was not *God* by his own *will*. If this was not the Doctor's thought, it is at least what his readers, very probably,

[b] Page 94. [c] Page 305. [d] Page 89.

will have, upon the reading the Doctor's note. But to clear up this matter, I will tell you the whole case. The Arians, formerly, as well as now, being very desirous to make a *creature* of God the Son, set their wits to work to find arguments for it. They had a great mind to bring the Catholics to admit that the Son was first produced or generated by an *act* of the Father's *will*, (in the sense of *free choice*,) and the consequence they intended from it was, that the Son was *a creature*. The Catholics would not admit their *postulatum* without proof; and so the Arians attempted to prove it thus, by a *dilemma*. The Father begat his Son, either *nolens* or *volens*; *against* his will or *with* his will: it could not be *against* his will, that is absurd; therefore it must be with his *will*; therefore that *act* of the will was precedent to the Son's existence, and the Father *prior* to the Son. Here the Doctor may see who the men were that first *confounded* two distinct things, *mere approbation*, and an *act* of the *will*: not the acute St. Austin, not the Catholics; but the Arians. To proceed: the [e] Catholics, particularly Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril of Alexandria, and St. Austin, (men of excellent sense, and who knew how to talk pertinently,) easily contrived to baffle their adversaries with their own weapons. Tell us, say they to the Arians, whether the *Father* be *God*, *nolens* or *volens*; *against his will*, or *with his will*. This quite confounded the men, and their *dilemma*; and they had not a word to say more. For if they had said *nolens, against his will*; that was manifestly absurd: if they had said *volens, with his will*; then, by their own argument, they made the Father *prior* to himself. The Doctor perhaps might have helped them out. Let us see then: "The answer," he says, "is clear." But what is *clear*? Does he imagine there was any difficulty in answering St. Austin's question, taken by itself? This required no Œdipus; any man might readily answer it: but the difficulty was for an Arian to make an answer which should not recoil upon himself. Let us take the Doctor's answer, and observe whether it could be of use. "The Father," says he, "is God with the approbation of his will, (*volens*,) not by an act "of his will." But if an Arian formerly had thus answered St. Austin, it would have made the good Father smile. For he

[e] Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 610, 611. Gregory Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 565, 566. Cyril. Alexandr. Thesaur. p. 50, 52. August. tom. viii. p. 626, 994. ed. Bened.

would immediately have replied: Well then; so the Father had his Son (*volens*) *with the approbation of his will*, and not by an *act* of his *will*: and now what becomes of your *dilemma*, and your *nolens volens?* What could the Arian have pretended further, except it were to persist in it, that the Son was *God* by an *act* of the *will?* To which it would be readily answered, that this was begging the question: and so the whole must have ended. Judge you now, whether the Doctor or St. Austin had the greater *acumen* in this matter; and which of them is most apt to be *very unfair*, and to *confound* distinct things.

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3 2044 052 776 440

DUE OCT 21 1925

MAY 8 '57